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Reconstructing Berlin’s ruined contours after 1990 was one of the most important ways 
that reunified Germany made a public display of its relationship to the violence wrought by both 
the Nazis and East Germany during the twentieth century. By integrating historical forms into 
new buildings in the city’s commercial center, Berlin’s urban planners hoped to show the world 
that the nation had transcended totalitarianism and was worthy of a prominent place in the new 
global order. In order to achieve this vision, they adopted an approach called “Critical 
Reconstruction,” which required architects to follow rigid design standards based on traditional 
building typologies. In doing so, they also sought to rein in a flood of eager international 
investors who threatened to turn central Berlin into a landscape of flashy, corporate experiments. 
However, because of its strict insistence on historical styles, its ambivalence towards – if 
not affinity for – Nazi architecture, as well as its rejection of contemporary movements such as 
Deconstructivism, Critical Reconstruction was interpreted by many observers as reactionary and 
dangerously conservative. Historians and social scientists commonly refer to it as a controversial, 
backward-looking representation of German national identity. In this dissertation, I 
fundamentally reassess the discourse of Critical Reconstruction and argue that this so-called 
“conservative” turn in Berlin city planning practice was in actuality driven by socially 
v 
progressive planners making a failed attempt to shape a new democratic society through the 
regulation of built form. My research thus casts doubt on one of the most central post-
Enlightenment claims about architecture: that its aesthetic qualities can both directly represent 
and influence people and politics. 
Critical Reconstruction is mentioned often in recent histories of Berlin, and a handful of 
architectural historians have also examined isolated aspects of its deployment in terms of its 
relationship to trends in architecture and urban planning. However, without considering how it 
functioned discursively on multiple levels and in diverse arenas (professional, economic, and 
political), scholarly portrayals of Critical Reconstruction are reductive at best; at worst, these 
accounts risk reinscribing the same rigid and simplistic view of Berlin’s planning culture that 
they seek to critique. My project offers the first detailed examination of Critical Reconstruction 
as both a public discourse and a planning methodology, showing how planners’ endeavors to 
revive Berlin’s landscape in a socially responsible way ultimately gave rise to the opposite: a 
landscape of homogenous commercial buildings whose construction mainly served corporate 
interests, while simultaneously bolstering Berlin’s connections with the worst facets of its own 
history. Additionally, as discussions in the national media revealed Critical Reconstruction’s 
formal affinities with fascist architecture, suspicions grew amongst the general public that both 
this theory’s aesthetics and its authors also harbored authoritarian tendencies. The city that 
resulted from Critical Reconstruction’s intervention was thus, ultimately, a hyper-capitalist 
landscape that harkened back stylistically to the very moment in its violent history that Berlin 
desperately wanted to symbolically supersede. 
This research goes beyond one-dimensional depictions of Critical Reconstruction as a 
unilateral statement about German identity, revealing its status as a set of planning tactics 
vi 
situated within a network of conflicting institutional and political formations. As such, it also 
addresses two fundamental problems faced by architects and planners in the global age: how to 
productively contend with the forces of capital while advocating for sustainable local growth, 
and how to make buildings into legible signifiers of politically acceptable narratives about a 
nation’s history and identity without risking public and professional misinterpretation. The case 
of Critical Reconstruction, I demonstrate, illustrates just how difficult such a contradictory set of 
tasks can be; indeed, the means of architecture and urban planning may be wholly inadequate for 
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Critical Reconstruction: A Progressive Theory Turned Conservative 
 
It is rare to find a text on Berlin’s post-Wall reconstruction that does not reference the 
famous statement by the early Modernist art historian Karl Scheffler: “Berlin is doomed always 
to become, and never actually to be.” It is a line from his book Berlin: Ein Stadtschicksal 
(Berlin: The Fate of a City), published in 1910, wherein Scheffler portrayed Germany’s capital 
city as a fundamentally unique and modern space, as opposed to other, older European capitals, 
which were more “harmoniously developed organisms of history.” Berlin, he wrote, arose 
“artificially, under all kinds of difficulties, and had to adapt to unfavorable circumstances.”1 To 
be sure, Berlin’s urban history in the nineteenth century was a story of tumultuous growth and 
difficult adjustment, but Scheffler’s statement is infinitely more fitting for the century that 
followed. He could not have known, in 1910, how prescient his words would be: multiple waves 
of social, political, and physical destruction characterized Berlin as a space of both utopian 
possibility and tragic failure from World War I until the fall of the Wall in 1989. The dramatic 
end of the Cold War, and with it, forty years of division for the city and the nation, presented yet 
another opportunity for Berlin to “become” something, and the stakes of this transformation were 
high. Not only did the city desperately need to recraft its image in order to attract global 
businesses and residents who could shore up its weak economy, but, as the nation’s new capital, 
its reconstruction was also one of the most important ways that reunified Germany made a public 
display of its relationship to its violent past. 
                                                
1  Karl Scheffler, Berlin, ein Stadtschicksal (E. Reiss, 1910), 267. 
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The urban planning philosophy of Critical Reconstruction was one of the most visible 
forces at work in Berlin’s new landscape following the country’s reunification in 1990. 
Developed by the architect Josef Paul Kleihues beginning in the 1970s and deployed in the post-
Wall era by one of Berlin’s most powerful city planners, Hans Stimmann, Critical 
Reconstruction encouraged a return to “traditional” architectural styles and typologies, and 
sought to recreate the pedestrian-centered urban street life of the early twentieth-century 
European metropolis through the restoration of the inner city’s original baroque-era street plan. 
By integrating historical forms into the city’s refashioned commercial center, Stimmann and 
other planners in Berlin hoped to show the world that the nation – in spite of, or perhaps even 
because of, its particular history – had a unique character and was worthy of its own prominent 
place in the new global order. However, because of Critical Reconstruction’s strict insistence on 
historical styles, as well as the often ill-considered statements of its proponents, it was seen by 
many observers as a reactionary attempt to whitewash Berlin’s traumatic history by rehabilitating 
Nazi aesthetics and by selectively excluding important contemporary architectural movements 
such as Deconstructivism. Furthermore, planners’ attempts to “remedy” mid-century planning 
meant that many East German buildings in the city center, constructed in the 1960s and 1970s, 
became the targets of demolition, making it look as if the Critical Reconstructionists were also 
purposely erasing significant touchstones for the “collective urban memory” of East Berlin 
residents. By analyzing the discourse of Critical Reconstruction from its roots in the 1970s to its 
final form in Berlin’s Planwerk Innenstadt (“Inner City Plan”) of 1999, this study demonstrates 
that this “conservative” turn in Berlin city planning practice was in actuality driven by socially 
progressive planners who hoped to shape a new, more unified democratic society in the formerly 
divided city, using the regulation of built form as their tool. Their ultimate failure to achieve 
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these ends casts doubt on one of the most central post-Enlightenment claims about architecture: 
that buildings and other urban configurations can send clear messages that will directly influence 
people and politics for the better. 
 
Literature Review 
A number of studies have alluded to the signifying practices at work in the architecture of 
the new Berlin, but they have refrained from tackling the thorny question of adequately defining 
Critical Reconstruction’s role in the city’s rebuilding. Historian Brian Ladd’s Ghosts of Berlin: 
Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape (1997) and journalist Michael Z. Wise’s 
Capital Dilemma: Germany’s Search for a New Architecture of Democracy (1998), both written 
with popular audiences in mind, were some of the first to introduce the topic to a general 
English-speaking audience, and Ladd’s book in particular has become a classic.2 Both examine 
the extent to which the scars of history are still visible in Berlin’s urban landscape and look at 
how Germany’s identity as a democratic nation was expressed in new buildings and memorials 
after 1990.3 Written for a popular audience, however, both works are somewhat general in their 
treatment of the city’s recent history, of which Critical Reconstruction is only one facet. Thus 
Ladd and Wise do not even satisfactorily define Critical Reconstruction as a theory, much less 
                                                
2 Brian Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape (Chicago, Ill.: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998); Michael Z Wise, Capital Dilemma: Germany’s Search for a New Architecture of Democracy (New York: 
Princeton Architectural Press, 1998). 
3 There is quite a substantial body of literature on the general urban, political, and social development of Berlin. 
Alexandra Richie’s Faust’s Metropolis is rightfully a classic (Alexandra Richie, Faust’s Metropolis: A History of Berlin (New 
York: Carroll & Graf, 1998).). Other histories include: Hermann G. Pundt, Schinkel’s Berlin; a Study in Environmental Planning 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972); T. H. Elkins, Berlin  : The Spatial Structure of a Divided City (London  ; New York: 
Methuen, 1988); Alan Balfour, Berlin: The Politics of Order, 1737-1989 (New York: Rizzoli, 1990); Charles Werner Haxthausen 
and Heidrun Suhr, Berlin: Culture and Metropolis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990); Ronald Taylor, Berlin 
and Its Culture: A Historical Portrait (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Giles MacDonogh, Berlin (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998); David Clay Large, Berlin (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Brian Ladd, The Companion Guide to Berlin 
(Woodbridge; Rochester, NY: Companion Guides, 2004). Several journalists have also offered accounts of Berlin’s 
reconstruction, including Eva Schweitzer, Grossbaustelle Berlin: wie die Hauptstadt verplant wird (Berlin: Nicolai, 1996); and 
Uwe Rada, Hauptstadt der Verdrängung: Berliner Zukunft zwischen Kiez und Metropole (Berlin: Schwarze Risse, 1997). 
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unpack the problematic ways in which it was applied to the built environment; rather, they 
provide a point of departure for the research questions that I confront in this dissertation. 
My analysis of Critical Reconstruction builds on the groundbreaking work of a handful of 
scholars across various disciplines. Political scientist Elizabeth Strom’s Building the New Berlin: 
The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City (2001) is an invaluable resource 
for understanding the city’s complex political and administrative structures – and the challenges 
their leaders faced – in the immediate post-Wall era.4 Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in 
London und Berlin (2005) by architectural historians Harald Bodenschatz and Uwe Altrock is an 
encyclopedic account of new construction in Berlin since the fall of the Wall, which provided a 
foundation for many of the case studies that I discuss.5 Architectural historian Florian 
Hertweck’s Der Berliner Architekturstreit: Architektur, Stadtbau, Geschichte und Identität in der 
Berliner Republik 1989-1999 (2010) supplies a thoughtful set of close textual readings of the so-
called “Berlin Architecture Debates,” a series of critical exchanges which were very influential 
on Critical Reconstruction’s reception in the mid-1990s.6 Berlin Alexanderplatz: Transforming 
Place in a Unified Germany (2010), by anthropologist Gisa Weszkalnys, allows a first-hand 
view of the ways in which everyday residents were marginalized in the planning process at that 
particular site, and urban historian Stefanie Hennecke’s Die Kritische Rekonstruktion als 
                                                
4 Elizabeth A Strom, Building the New Berlin: The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City 
(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001). 
5 Harald Bodenschatz and Uwe Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in London und Berlin (Berlin: 
Verlagshaus Braun, 2005). 
6 Florian Hertweck, Der Berliner Architekturstreit: Architektur, Stadtbau, Geschichte und Identität in der Berliner 
Republik 1989-1999 (Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 2010). 
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Leitbild: Stadtentwicklungspolitik in Berlin zwischen 1991 und 1999 (2010) offers a thorough 
documentation of the creation and approval of the Planwerk Innenstadt.7  
Two other architectural history studies parallel mine most closely: Karin Lenhart’s 
Berliner Metropoly: Stadtentwicklungspolitik Im Berliner Bezirk Mitte Nach Der Wende (2001) 
investigates post-Wall city planning in central Berlin in general, and Christina Brichetti’s Die 
Paradoxie des postmodernen Historismus: Stadtumbau und städtebauliche Denkmalpflege vom 
19. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert am Beispiel von Berlin und Beirut (2009) contextualizes Berlin’s 
reconstruction within larger, international discussions and debates about post-modern 
historicism.8 Post-Wall Berlin: Borders, Space and Identity (2011) by historian Janet Ward, is a 
wider-ranging and more sociological take on post-Wall Berlin and has influenced my thinking 
about the city’s global status, as well as its relationship to ideas in the fields of sociology and 
geography.9 Despite this relatively large body of literature on Berlin’s reconstruction, however, 
none of these authors has looked at Critical Reconstruction’s full historical arc, charting its many 
changes and its deployment over time, nor do they successfully relate it to the larger questions of 
                                                
7 Gisa Weszkalnys, Berlin, Alexanderplatz  : Transforming Place in a Unified Germany (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2010); Stefanie Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild: Stadtentwicklungspolitik in Berlin zwischen 1991 und 1999 
(Hamburg: Kovač, 2010). 
8 Karin Lenhart, Berliner Metropoly: Stadtentwicklungspolitik Im Berliner Bezirk Mitte Nach Der Wende (Opladen: 
Leske + Budrich, 2001); Katharina Brichetti, Die Paradoxie des postmodernen Historismus: Stadtumbau und städtebauliche 
Denkmalpflege vom 19. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert am Beispiel von Berlin und Beirut (Berlin: Schiler, 2009). 
9 Janet Ward, Post-Wall Berlin  : Borders, Space and Identity (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). There is also a substantial body of literature on the city-marketing techniques used in Berlin in the 
1990s, including Karen E Till, The New Berlin: Memory, Politics, Place (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005); and 
Claire Colomb, Staging the New Berlin: Place Marketing and the Politics of Urban Reinvention Post-1989 (Hoboken: Routledge, 
2011). Many authors have also looked at Berlin as a capital city and as a site of key national memorials, including Julia Walker, 
“Capital Building: Anxiety and Memory in Berlin’s Government District” 2009; Jennifer A Jordan, Structures of Memory: 
Understanding Urban Change in Berlin and beyond (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006); as well as numerous 
works by James E. Young, most notably James Edward Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); and James Edward Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in 
Contemporary Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). There are also several edited collections on 
Berlin’s reconstruction, including William J. V Neill and Hanns-Uve Schwedler, Urban Planning and Cultural Inclusion: 
Lessons from Belfast and Berlin (Houndmills [England]; New York: Palgrave, 2001); and Andreas W Daum and Christof Mauch, 
Berlin, Washington, 1800-2000: Capital Cities, Cultural Representation, and National Identities (Cambridge, UK; New York, 
N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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German history and identity. My dissertation thus remedies a key missing link among the various 
existing works on Berlin’s post-1990 rebuilding. 
 
Research Questions and Methodology 
This work offers an account of Critical Reconstruction’s development amidst the shifting 
social and political landscape of reunified Berlin and Germany.10 Beginning with an 
investigation of Critical Reconstruction’s creation by Josef Paul Kleihues in the 1970s, I track its 
transformations under the city planner Hans Stimmann in the early 1990s, as well as the various 
public discussions and debates that figured in its reception, and I conclude by exploring its final 
flowering in Stimmann’s comprehensive Planwerk Innenstadt (“Inner City Plan”) of 1999. My 
study pairs a discourse analysis of primary texts of Critical Reconstruction and its reception, 
gathered from architecture journals, government publications, newspapers, and collections of 
essays by architects, planners, and critics, with stylistic and formal explications of the key 
architectural sites, competitions, plans, images, and construction projects to which this approach 
was applied. Images and buildings offer both illustrations of and, at times, telling counterpoints 
to, the statements of Critical Reconstruction’s proponents.11  
Critical Reconstruction’s preservation and rehabilitation of Nazi buildings, the demolition 
of mid-century East German structures, and its use of “traditional” aesthetics to construct high-
end commercial and residential infrastructure explicitly for bourgeois users, appeared to many as 
                                                
10 There is a huge literature on German identity and its relationship to history. One of the best-known works in English 
is Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1988). Other useful accounts are offered in the following works: Stuart Taberner and Frank Finlay, Recasting 
German Identity: Culture, Politics, and Literature in the Berlin Republic (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2002); Mary 
Fulbrook, German National Identity after the Holocaust (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press  ; Malden, MA, 2002); and Norbert Frei, 
1945 und wir: das Dritte Reich im Bewusstsein der Deutschen (München: C.H. Beck, 2005). 
11 It should be noted that many state archival documents from this period are still under a thirty-year embargo and will 
not be accessible until after 2020. 
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a reactionary take on this new national identity. However, Critical Reconstruction itself was not 
an essentially conservative theory. Both Kleihues and Stimmann inhabited positions on the 
political and intellectual Left. More specifically, then, my research presents a detailed 
explanation of how Critical Reconstruction came to be read as a definitively conservative 
approach, despite these progressive origins. 
Defining “Identity” 
 The term “identity” appears throughout this dissertation, and thus it is important to define 
my use of the term at the outset. During the late 1980s and 1990s, academic discourse blossomed 
in multiple ways around the notion of “identity.” This growth included important conversations 
about aspects of personal identity such as gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, and their 
relationship to larger societal norms and issues; it also encompassed questions of nationalism and 
cultural hegemony. Sociologist Anthony Smith and political historian Benedict Anderson, to 
name two of the most notable scholars, contributed specific theorizations of how people come to 
identify with the construct of a “nation.”12 Alongside these conversations, work was also being 
done by philosophers and literary and cultural scholars, many from France, on the ways that 
signs and symbols relate to our lived social realities (including our relationship to nations or 
nationalities): thinkers like Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard, Fredric 
Jameson, and Jacques Derrida.13 At this time there was also a growing interest in the relationship 
between what was termed “collective memory” and national or community identities, spurred 
partly by the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the “commemorative fever” that 
                                                
12 See Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991); Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991). 
13 The work of such thinkers is often summarized under the term “post-structuralist,” though individually they often 
resisted this categorization. 
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surrounded it.14 Many looked back to the work of Maurice Halbwachs, whose seminal Le 
mémoire collective (1950) had introduced the term into academic discourse; in the realm of 
architecture studies, Pierre Nora’s Les lieux de mémoire (1984) also became an important 
touchstone for thinking about how space and place related to memory and national identity.15 
 In reunited Germany after 1989, these many facets of “identity” intersected in a highly 
public set of conversations and debates – appearing everywhere from the federal parliament floor 
to tabloid newspapers – over questions of what the country’s official history and dominant 
cultural outlook should entail. How should the Nazi and East German pasts be remembered, 
memorialized, talked about, and theorized? How did this issue relate to Germany’s future as part 
of the larger EU and the global West? How should “Germanness” be defined – was it ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, cultural, legal, or a combination of some or all of these? These tricky issues 
resurface continually throughout the dissertation. Thus, when I invoke the term “identity,” I am 
referring to public perceptions about what it meant to be German and to official accounts or 
attempts to mold that perception. This perceived identity was often simultaneously cultural, 
social, and political, including morals and values, tastes, party affiliations, ethnicity, religion, and 
economic class.16  
Other Theoretical Frameworks 
Critical Reconstruction’s trajectory, as a theory and as a set of built results, must be 
understood in the larger context of other discursive realms: the above-mentioned discussions 
                                                
14 Barbara A. Misztal, Theories Of Social Remembering, Theorizing Society (Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education, 
2003), 2. Misztal’s book is a wonderful overview of the various theories of and approaches to collective memory. 
15 Maurice Halbwachs, La mémoire collective, 2001; Pierre Nora, Les Lieux de mémoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). 
16 The often unspoken side to this identity is that it is still largely presumed to be ethnic and religious in its basis; this is 
still being hotly negotiated today. Critical Reconstruction’s conservatism does in some ways echo the ethnocentric (even 
sometimes racist) viewpoints of many Germans, who nevertheless often see themselves as progressive because of their 
admonition of guilt with regard to the Holocaust. This strange and troubling dialectic deserves further attention, but is outside the 
scope of my study here. 
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about German history and identity; marketing efforts to shore up Berlin’s status as a global 
metropolis; debates over the relationship of architectural aesthetics to particular political 
regimes; and the global theorization of post-modern architecture as an answer to Modernism’s 
failed projects. I address these various issues throughout, arguing that, for the most part, Critical 
Reconstruction’s proponents failed to successfully negotiate questions of how Berlin’s past 
should relate to its present and future. In addition, my analysis of Critical Reconstruction’s 
various texts, images, and themes is underpinned at key moments by concepts drawn from 
cultural studies and geography. I rely particularly on the work of the geographer David Harvey, 
who offers a theorization of public-private partnership in late-twentieth-century city-building, as 
well as his work on mapping as a tool of colonialism. These and other ideas from the 
transdisciplinary field of post-colonial studies, especially those of Edward Said, also help to 
explain how the application of Critical Reconstruction to East Berlin can be read as a colonial 
move on the part of Stimmann and others. In tandem with this analysis, I refer to work on the 
concept and mechanisms of gentrification by Neil Smith and Sharon Zukin. But while these 
theoretical ideas are illuminating, my dissertation is definitively not a reading of Critical 
Reconstruction through the lens of Critical Theory, urban theory, or post-colonial studies. 
Rather, these concepts are deployed as theoretical models that help to explain my findings, which 
are based directly on a close analysis of the discourse and built results of Critical Reconstruction 
itself. In other words, the examples of architecture and urban planning that I discuss are not 
selected on the basis of their ability to illustrate or conform to a particular critical framework; on 
the contrary, Harvey and others provide a useful set of terms and concepts for discussing and 
analyzing what actually took place in Berlin under Critical Reconstruction. 
 10 
Outline of the Dissertation 
Chapter 1, “Josef Paul Kleihues and the Genesis of the Theory of Critical 
Reconstruction,” elucidates the fundamentally progressive roots of this method, which was 
created and applied by Kleihues during the state-sponsored International Building Exhibition in 
West Berlin between 1978 and 1987. Kleihues’s work was responding to the post-modern turn in 
professional trans-Atlantic architectural discourse, especially the work of architects such as Aldo 
Rossi, who encouraged a return to the dense urban forms of the pre-modern European cityscape, 
but in a highly personal and formally reductive manner. Kleihues was also attempting to remedy 
the lack of an existing architectural “school” in Germany in the post-war era. His ambitious aim 
was to create a strand of post-modernist architectural style and theory that would be appropriate 
to the socio-political climate of West Germany, where architects and other intellectuals were 
wary of both North American populism and European neo-historicism. As part of the so-called 
“skeptical generation” of West Germans who came of age during the 1950s, Kleihues was highly 
suspicious of direct statements or overt ideologies.  
The specifics of Kleihues’s aesthetics drew heavily on Germany’s classical tradition – 
specifically, the work of Karl Friedrich Schinkel and the early Modernists – as well as traditional 
nineteenth-century Berlin forms such as the six-story apartment block with an inner courtyard. 
However, this return to “traditional” forms in Kleihues’s work risked problematic associations 
with Nazi architecture. In order to sidestep this affiliation, he incorporated two other key factors 
into his design theory: the use of new materials and technologies that had been eschewed by the 
Nazi regime; and the highly personal “poetry” of the individual architect, which injected a strand 
of the irrational or romantic into his work and unseated any suspicions that he was resorting to 
dogma.  
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In contrast to Stimmann’s application of the theory in the post-Wall period, during the 
International Building Exhibition, in particular, this early version of Critical Reconstruction 
promoted dialogue, disagreement, and diversity amongst architects. By attracting international 
designers and allowing them to publicly debate urban issues, Kleihues aimed to reestablish a 
welcoming and open architectural culture for West Germany that displayed its firm emplacement 
within the larger, democratic West. Though it was not regarded as the most experimental of 
architectural styles, both the West German and the larger Western architectural community 
lauded Critical Reconstruction in the 1980s as a forward-thinking way to restore a traditional 
European city. 
Chapter 2, “International Investment and Berlin Planning in the Immediate Post-Wende 
Era,” looks at the failures of two of Berlin’s first big post-Wall projects, which provided the 
impetus for the adoption of Critical Reconstruction as a city planning method: the retail and 
entertainment center at Potsdamer Platz, and the Friedrichstadt Passagen shopping mall. I situate 
these examples within a discussion of the fraught conditions of post-1989 planning in Berlin, 
where intense pressure from investors – combined with bureaucratic incompetence, archaic and 
divided institutions, and a dizzying array of conflicting property claims – created an 
overwhelming situation for city planners. The first projects undertaken with investors in this new 
climate resulted in both professional rifts and sadly mediocre designs. Though Potsdamer Platz 
and the Friedrichstadt Passagen garnered worldwide attention and are still tourist attractions 
today, these projects were seen by planners and architects in Berlin as distinct failures because of 
their showy aesthetics and overt links to corporations. This difficult political and administrative 
situation led Hans Stimmann, who took office as the city’s Senate Construction Director in April 
of 1991 (well after the deals on Potsdamer Platz and the Friedrichstadt Passagen had been made), 
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to adopt Critical Reconstruction as his guiding method for planning, despite the fact that he had 
formerly been a vehement critic of Kleihues. 
Chapter 3, “Critical Reconstruction’s Transformation under Hans Stimmann,” examines 
this theory’s discursive transformation and deployment by Hans Stimmann, as head city planner, 
between 1991 and 1995. A left-leaning social democrat, Stimmann was dedicated to the idea that 
city planning could promote the resurgence of small-scale, middle-class property ownership and 
thus give rise to a community of engaged citizens. Though he had previously criticized what he 
called Kleihues’s “aesthetic” approach to city planning, Stimmann nevertheless adopted Critical 
Reconstruction’s guidelines. Doing so allowed him to regulate buildings’ formal attributes, like 
heights, massing, façades, and materials, providing at least a superficial mechanism of control 
over eager multinational investors who seemed to want to turn Berlin into the next Las Vegas. 
The result was a restrictive and rigid version of Critical Reconstruction that allowed for little of 
the open dialogue or stylistic diversity that had occurred under Kleihues in the 1980s. 
Unfortunately, because of the limits of his own political and administrative power, Stimmann 
was not able to curb large-scale investment, and corporations, rather than middle-class 
individuals, quickly became the main property owners in central Berlin. This phenomenon is 
exemplified by three large-scale developments in the city center: the Hofgarten am 
Gendarmenmarkt and the Kontorhaus Mitte, both overseen by Kleihues, and the Quartier 
Schützenstrasse, designed by Aldo Rossi. These designs demonstrate why Critical 
Reconstruction quickly garnered a reputation as a tool of capitalist development that was 
dangerously reductive in its aesthetics and looked to shut out more experimental approaches to 
architecture, especially Deconstructivism. 
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Chapter 4, “Critical Reconstruction and the Berlin Architecture Debates,” examines how 
the growing negative public perception of Stimmann’s method was also strongly influenced by 
discussions in the press. Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, then director of the German 
Architecture Museum in Frankfurt, began the so-called “Architecture Debates” by publishing an 
architectural manifesto in the popular national magazine Der Spiegel.17 He called for a “New 
Simplicity” (Neue Einfachheit) in architectural design that would reference German history and 
even allow Nazi buildings to be appreciated for their calm, rational forms. Though it did not 
mention Critical Reconstruction directly, Lampugnani’s declaration was nevertheless interpreted 
by many as a direct statement of Stimmann’s goals, and figures such as the Deconstructivist 
architect Daniel Libeskind responded with outspoken criticisms of both the New Simplicity and 
Berlin’s city planning politics in general. Lampagnuni’s statements were defended by, among 
others, the prominent Berlin architect Hans Kollhoff, who was at the time in the midst of two 
construction projects that underscored critics’ reading of Critical Reconstruction as highly 
conservative: the master plan for Alexanderplatz, for which Kollhoff had just recently beat out 
Libeskind in a competition, and the renovation of the Nazi Reichsbank building as the new home 
of the German Foreign Ministry. Despite their attempts to justify their return to “traditional” 
aesthetics by referencing early Modernist architecture, none of the New Simplicity’s or Critical 
Reconstruction’s supporters were able to successfully rebuff the accusation that they looked to 
“normalize” or even revive fascist aesthetics, rather than contextualizing or problematizing them.  
Yet another dissenting voice in the Architecture Debates was supplied by the critic and 
urban theorist Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, one of Stimmann’s main collaborators and the 
originator of the idea that Critical Reconstruction could enable a return to small-scale property 
                                                
17 Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, “Die Provokation Des Alltäglichen,” Der Spiegel, December 30, 1993. 
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ownership. He vehemently opposed Lampugnani and Kollhoff, accusing them of plagiarizing his 
own ideas, and, despite the fact that he regularly worked for Stimmann as a contractor, he also 
charged Stimmann and Kleihues with leading and architectural “cartel” that was single-handedly 
reshaping the city. Thus, this chapter demonstrates not only how critical and theoretical positions 
can be subject to misrepresentation and misinterpretation; it also shows how an exchange 
between professionals, when undertaken on such a public stage, as the Architecture Debates 
were, could fuel the larger negative perception of something like Stimmann’s Critical 
Reconstruction. In the public’s eye, Critical Reconstruction came across in these exchanges as 
aesthetically conservative, backward-looking, authoritarian, and pro-big business, despite the 
fact that is was deployed by a politician who had long been part of the political left and a vocal 
critic of capitalist development.  
Chapter 5, “Gentrifying the GDR,” looks at the relationship of Critical Reconstruction to 
greater East Berlin, which became Stimmann’s focus after 1996. Although it looked very similar 
to parts of West Berlin, Stimmann and others routinely relied on a rhetoric of “emptiness” to 
describe the landscape of the former East. In this chapter I argue that by proposing infill and 
small-scale land ownership as remedies for what were portrayed as spatial, political, and social 
“voids,” Stimmann’s plans became tantamount to a colonial move that purported to “educate” 
the supposedly helpless residents of the former East about democratic self-governance. In this 
context, I examine Kleihues’s renovation of the famous Centrum department store on 
Alexanderplatz, which entailed the removal of its memorable aluminum honeycomb façade, as 
well as various demolitions of GDR buildings undertaken in tandem with Stimmann’s Planwerk 
Innenstadt, or “Inner City Plan,” adopted into law in 1999. This chapter concludes by 
demonstrating that, as in his earlier projects in the city center, Stimmann’s policies were unable 
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to achieve the small-scale investment that he wanted, and instead resulted in the corporate-driven 
displacement of grassroots communities and businesses. Critical Reconstruction failed to achieve 
its aims of supporting small democratic communities in greater East Berlin, and it also erased 
important touchstones of East Berliners’ “collective urban memory” and marginalized residents’ 
voices in the process. Given Stimmann’s earlier commitment to participatory planning methods 
in the 1970s and 1980s, it is apparent that, over the course of his work as Critical 
Reconstruction’s main proponent, he became more and more attached to the idea that only an 
elite group could or should be responsible for such decisions. In essence, he became a 
conservative in practice, even if his larger aims seemed, to him, to remain progressive. Critical 




In his 1997 essay “The Voids of Berlin,” first published in the journal Critical Inquiry, 
cultural critic Andreas Huyssen observed that 
once all this construction is completed, the hope is that Berlin will take its rightful 
place as a European capital next to its more glamorous competitors. But will it? 
… The fact that the city is caught between the pressures of this new urban image-
politics and the more general crisis of architectural developments in these last 
years of our century makes any such hope appear simply misplaced, if not 
deluded. Indeed, Berlin may be the place to study how this new emphasis on the 
city as cultural sign, combined with its role as capital and the pressures of large-
scale developments, prevents creative alternatives and thus represents a false start 
into the twenty-first century. Berlin may be well on the way to squandering a 
unique chance.18 
 
                                                
18 Andreas Huyssen, “The Voids of Berlin,” Critical Inquiry 24, no. 1 (Autumn 1997): 59, emphasis mine. 
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Indeed, rather than a global exemplar for the future of architecture, Critical Reconstruction in 
Berlin became, I argue, a lesson in how to alienate both local constituents and professional 
colleagues while favoring and benefitting only two groups: global real estate interests and a 
limited cadre of architects. As such, it reflected poorly not only on the development of German 
identity vis-à-vis the nation’s troubled history, but also on the status of the profession as a whole. 
Critical Reconstruction’s historical trajectory, I demonstrate, reveals a city grappling with 
architecture’s power, promises, and limits in the post-modern age. Since the Enlightenment, 
Western architects and theorists have sought various ways of influencing social and political 
realities through urban design. This effort reached a climax during the Modernist era after World 
War II, which saw the rise of pre-fabricated, car-friendly communities on a massive scale. 
Although the “post-modern turn” in the architecture of the 1970s meant a return to traditional 
urban aesthetics – a preference for pedestrian-friendly, mixed-use communities and historical 
styles – these aesthetic shifts masked a continued insistence on architecture’s ability to directly 
influence human relationships. Critical Reconstruction is one example of this tendency in post-
modernist design, and its story demonstrates many of the problems with overarching 
architectural theories that champion the power of built forms to shape society.  
Viewed in this context, the case of Critical Reconstruction also points to two larger conclusions 
about this kind of “building in public”: first, that certain strands of post-modern architecture 
theory still, in many ways, embodied the Modernist project in terms of its hopes to represent and 
construct a new and better world; and, second, like Modernism itself, they ultimately failed at 
this project. Instead of promoting productive dialogue that acknowledged Berlin’s central role in 
the symbolization of German national identity, or creating an urban landscape that adequately 
answered the needs existing residents while attracting new ones, this approach became a tool of a 
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small, paternalistic elite who ultimately caved to corporate interests, while still believing that 
they were doing the opposite. By offering a foundational investigation of Critical 
Reconstruction’s complex history as both a theoretical approach and as a collection of built 
results, my research looks past blanket accusations that would paint this method simply as a 
dictatorial and conservative attempt to wield power over city planning politics or to favor 
capitalist interests. Rather, I argue, it must be seen as the outcome of a network of interactions 
between city planning policies, development pressures, and professional architectural discourse 
that affect not just Berlin, but also countless other cities in the global age. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Josef Paul Kleihues and the Genesis of the Theory of Critical Reconstruction 
 
 Critical Reconstruction was adopted by city officials as the guiding concept for the 
rebuilding of Berlin in 1991. However, its application to reunified Berlin differed significantly 
from its original formulation, in the work and writings of the West Berlin architect Josef Paul 
Kleihues in the sixties, seventies, and eighties. This chapter discusses the genesis of the idea of 
Critical Reconstruction in Kleihues’s work during the Cold War period, examining how he 
authored it as a response to both disciplinary and larger socio-political questions. His own 
designs and writings, as well as the exhibitions and conferences that he organized in the 1970s, 
culminating in West Berlin’s ambitious International Building Exhibition (1978-1987), all 
addressed issues central to the practice of architecture in West Germany at the time: namely, how 
to deal with the legacies of both Modernist planning and the nineteenth-century urban fabric, and 
how this engagement with the past related to the emerging post-war identity of the nation. If 
historical forms were to be preserved and revived, then which ones were worthy of such 
treatment? Were there buildings or styles that were still too tainted by the legacy of Nazism, and 
if so, how should they be handled? 
Kleihues’s ideas sat firmly within the landscape of Western European thought on 
urbanism and architecture from the 1960s on, constituting what might be called a German neo-
rationalism that sought to differentiate itself from both the populist and historicist strains of 
trans-Atlantic post-modern architecture. Architectural references to the pre-Modernist past were 
considered taboo in West Germany during the fifties and sixties, when historicism tended to be 
equated with fascism; by the early 1970s, historicism was also seen as symbolic of a dangerous 
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and intellectually heedless decadence that was all too easily coopted by capitalism. On the other 
hand, the vehement critique of International Style Modernism within the architectural 
community required that young architects take a stand with regards to it as well. Kleihues 
attempted to cut a path between these various stylistic approaches. At first, on the level of 
individual buildings, he attempted to reconcile historicism and Modernism with an approach that 
he called Poetic Rationalism, which combined a highly structured aesthetic and industrial 
materials with traditional urban typologies and an openness to what he called “poetry” – an 
acknowledgement of the inherent and necessary subjectivity of the architect. Later, as head of the 
International Building Exhibition, Kleihues further developed these precepts into the urban 
theory of Critical Reconstruction, which rested on the idea that the “historical” (i.e. nineteenth-
century) ground plan of the city should be adopted as the basic framework for a complementary 
and contrasting set of architectural designs that, in a manner similar to Poetic Rationalism, took 
tradition and context into account, but utilized contemporary materials and methods in 
sometimes playful or experimental ways. 
Kleihues’s approach was perfectly suited to this mid-twentieth-century moment in his 
professional, political, and social context in West Germany. He managed to create an 
architectural theory that was historically oriented, but remained comfortably distanced from 
direct statements about German history, which would have been too controversial and explosive 
at the time. Furthermore, rather than propounding his theories as the only possible solution, 
Kleihues promoted dialogue within the architectural community about the relationship between 
design and history, and he supported a diversity of approaches to architecture that often diverged 
from his own. Because he believed that architects should be sensitive to historical and 
geographical context, rigorous and purposeful in their response to the requirements for a design, 
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and yet add something formally “poetic” to it as well, Kleiheus managed to offer solutions that 
could be simultaneously read as regionalist and global, personal and general, exacting and 
accepting, potentially value-laden and yet, when needed, comfortably apolitical. Most 
importantly for this study, he saw himself as reestablishing an architectural tradition within West 
Germany that drew on the best moments of its history: the Enlightenment and the Weimar years 
(1919-1933) – times, in other words, before the violence and destruction wrought by the Nazis. 
 
A Brief History of Berlin City Planning and Architectural Traditions 
 As political scientist Elizabeth Strom notes, there is no true “zero hour” in Berlin 
planning history.1 Since its earliest beginnings, the city’s landscape has been in continual flux. 
The original kernel of the city comprised two medieval fishing villages, Cölln and Alt-Berlin. It 
became the capital of the surrounding territory of Brandenburg when the Hohenzollern family 
was appointed to rule by the Holy Roman Emperor in the fifteenth century, and it grew into a 
garrison town in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as successive rulers conquered and 
acquired more lands, notably the kingdom of Prussia, which stretched into present-day Poland.2 
In Prussia’s capital city of Berlin, successive city walls were built and then exceeded, often 
before they were completed, and a massive Baroque palace was constructed at the eastern end of 
what became the city’s via triumphalis, the avenue of Unter den Linden.3 Especially important 
                                                
1 Elizabeth A Strom, Building the New Berlin: The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City 
(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001), 39. 
2 Brandenburg is now its own state, or Bundesland; Berlin itself is also a city-state, so the two are actually separate 
political entities today, though their politics often intertwine. Brandenburg’s capital is the former Prussian royal seat of Potsdam, 
which lies just outside of Berlin to the southwest. 
3 For more on this early history of Berlin, see Brian Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the 
Urban Landscape (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Alan Balfour, Berlin: The Politics of Order, 1737-1989 
(New York: Rizzoli, 1990); Hermann G. Pundt, Schinkel’s Berlin: A Study in Environmental Planning (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1972); Alexandra Richie, Faust’s Metropolis: A History of Berlin (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1998); Ronald 
Taylor, Berlin and Its Culture: A Historical Portrait (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). 
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for Critical Reconstruction was the gridded street layout introduced in the city center in the late 
seventeenth century as part of a plan to house Prussia’s rapidly growing army. This new method 
of urban organization presented an ordered contrast to the winding streets and jagged walls of the 
medieval town (fig. 1.1), and this “original” traffic plan is often referred to by Kleihues and other 
twentieth-century city planners as the “baroque street plan” of the central inner city.4 
Enlightenment and Industrial Berlin 
Following the occupation of the city by Napoleon’s army in the early nineteenth century, 
the Hohenzollern ruler Friedrich Wilhelm III commissioned the architect Karl Friedrich Schinkel 
with a number of projects that effectively reimagined the central area surrounding Berlin’s royal 
palace as an urban expression of particular political and philosophical ideals. Though the ruler 
himself was somewhat conservative, even repressive, Schinkel’s public architecture emphasized 
the liberal, reformist ideals of figures like his contemporary Wilhelm von Humboldt, who 
believed in a society of free, educated individuals. Most famously, Schinkel created a royal art 
museum (now called the Altes [“Old”] Museum because several more such structures have 
subsequently been added to the area) that was open to the public: a true innovation and a radical 
statement concerning the role of public aesthetic education at the time. With its impressively 
long, horizontal façade of fluted columns and its seemingly endless iconographic allusions to 
various classical figures and narratives in the decoration, Schinkel’s museum constituted a 
radical reinvention of the language of classicism, drawing on influences from French 
Enlightenment architects and putting these in conversation with the most current philosophical 
and aesthetic movements in Prussia (fig. 1.2).5 The museum was part of a larger urban ensemble 
                                                
4 See Hermann G. Pundt, Schinkel’s Berlin: A Study in Environmental Planning, 12. 
5 For a detailed account of how Schinkel’s architecture developed in tandem with contemporary academic thought, see 
John Toews, Becoming Historical: Cultural Reformation and Public Memory in Early Nineteenth-Century Berlin (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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around the palace’s pleasure garden (the Lustgarten) that included a new cathedral (demolished 
and replaced in the late nineteenth century), a guardhouse, a church, a theater, and the famous 
Bauakademie (fig. 1.3). Together, these structures symbolized the importance of the education 
and involvement of the individual in the making of society, and they are still often invoked today 
as a touchstone – if not a blueprint – for the planning of the city center. 
However, Schinkel’s sleepy, low-rise Berlin was very soon subsumed by a burgeoning 
industrial metropolis. With a population of 150,000 in 1800, the city’s growing railroad and 
manufacturing businesses soon drew factory workers from the neighboring countryside, and by 
the 1870s, when it became the capital of Bismarck’s German Empire, it had grown to house over 
a million people, with many surrounding suburbs. Thus the original royal capital found itself at 
the booming center, or Mitte (the name given this district in 1920), of a gigantic urban 
agglomeration.6 Unlike those in other cities, such as Paris, where such growth was aesthetically – 
and often ruthlessly – controlled, officials in Berlin never sufficiently wielded their power over 
the nineteenth-century city.7 Minimal zoning in the form of Fluchtlinien (building alignments, 
including height limits) allowed property owners to build almost anything they wished, with 
limited safety restrictions, and as a result, high-density buildings quickly arose as close to one 
another as possible, with up to 90% site coverage.8 To appeal to residents and maximize rent, 
developers tended to adopt the popular Parisian building type that arose from Baron von 
Haussmann’s replanning measures, with commercial space on the ground floor and elaborate 
stucco decoration. Typically the best, most spacious and expensive apartments were located in 
                                                
6 Brian Ladd, The Companion Guide to Berlin (Woodbridge; Rochester, NY: Companion Guides, 2004), 5. 
7 James Hobrecht and his “Hobrecht-Plan” is often cited as the one attempt to guide this development, but it is also 
faulted for containing too few restrictions and for its classist approach of encouraging builders to locate the nicer apartments in 
the front of the building, where they would have more access to light and air (crucial for health concerns in a city where coal was 
the main source of heat). In any case, Hobrecht’s plan was only ever partially put through. See Klaus Strohmeyer, James 
Hobrecht (1825-1902) und die Modernisierung der Stadt (Potsdam: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2000). 
8 Strom, Building the New Berlin, 40. 
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the front, and behind these were successive “Hinterhöfe” (“back courtyards”), populated by the 
working class (figs. 1.4-1.5) The use of coal stoves for cooking and heating meant that the 
interiors of these courtyards quickly turned black with soot, and the stifling, overcrowded rear 
apartments received little light or ventilation. These spaces soon became associated with a 
declining birth rate, repugnant social mores, and epidemics like tuberculosis. They were so 
notorious for their bad conditions that they earned the name “Mietskaserne” (“rental barracks”) – 
a name still used for them today, though they are now considered Berlin’s most desirable 
dwellings.9 
Berlin and Weimar Modernism 
The city’s population continued to grow through World War I and the following era of 
the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), reaching a high point of four million after the annexation of 
the city’s surrounding suburban districts in 1920.10 At the same time, Germany saw the birth of a 
range of new approaches to architecture and planning.11 One of the most influential of these 
movements was Neue Sachlichkeit (“New Objectivity”), expressed specifically in the profession 
of architecture by the term “Neues Bauen” or “New Building.” “New” with a capital “N” 
signified the jettisoning of all the trappings of the decorative, aesthetically decadent nineteenth 
century: a new focus on simplicity, practicality, usefulness, and efficiency. The members of 
Germany’s preeminent Modernist design school, the Bauhaus, are undoubtedly the best-known 
proponents of the Neues Bauen. Though it began in 1919 as a handicraft-oriented school, by 
1925, its leader, Walter Gropius, had turned the school from a medieval guild model toward a 
                                                
9 Werner Hegemann’s 1930 treatise Das Steinerne Berlin is still commonly cited as the most scathing critique of the 
Mietskaserne. Werner Hegemann, Das Steinerne Berlin  : Geschichte Der Grössten Mietskasernenstadt Der Welt (Berlin: 
Kiepenheuer, 1930). 
10 T. H. Elkins, Berlin  : The Spatial Structure of a Divided City (London  ; New York: Methuen, 1988), 24. 
11 This period of innovation included many different movements, from the Expressionist work of Bruno Taut and others 
to the neo-historicism of the Stuttgart School under Karl Bonatz, as well as the gradual turn towards Neue Sachlichkeit in the 
work of the Bauhaus under Walter Gropius. 
 24 
model of cooperation with industry and the use of modern, mass-produced, industrial materials. 
These design tactics were seen not just as a means to improve the life of modern human beings, 
but also – at least in part – to educate and mold them into modern subjects, good citizens, and 
efficient workers.  
In already densely-built Berlin, these Modernist precepts were expressed mainly through 
slum-clearance measures, especially in the old medieval city surrounding the royal palace (figs. 
1.6-1.7), rather than extensive new construction. However, the Weimar government’s 
expropriation of lands formerly held by nobility did allow for the construction of a handful of 
notable Modernist housing projects on the edges of the city.12 These included the iconic 
Grosssiedlung Britz (1925-1933), also known as the Hufeisensiedlung because of its horseshoe 
(“Hufeisen”) shape. Designed by Bruno Taut, it combined the modern approach of Neues Bauen 
with “traditional” elements, including serious consideration of the existing features of the 
landscape such as ponds and streams, the inclusion of private garden space for each dwelling, 
and brightly-colored façades. In 1929, the Siemens corporation also began construction on a 
housing project called Siemensstadt in northwestern Berlin, involving, among several other 
designers, Gropius himself. Some of Berlin’s 1920s commercial architecture also reflected the 
Modernist turn, notably in Erich Mendelssohn’s glass and steel Columbushaus on Potsdamer 
Platz (fig. 1.8, later destroyed by a fire), and the stone-clad Modernist buildings of Max Taut 
(figs. 1.9-1.10). As will become clear in Chapter 4, these Modernist precedents supplied the 
fodder for various arguments made by both Critical Reconstruction’s proponents and its critics in 
the debates over Berlin’s post-Wall reconstruction. However, in the early 1930s, these 
                                                
12 The new laws allowed for government appropriation of lands formerly under the ownership of the nobility, which the 
state could then lease at low rates, and offer subsidies to developers who were willing to use them to build low-density housing. 
Ronald V. Wiedenhoeft, Berlin’s Housing Revolution: German Reform in the 1920s (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1985), 11. 
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developments were overshadowed as the Nazi party took power, followed by wartime 
destruction and the country’s division. 
 
Architecture Theory and the Post-Modern Turn in Europe and West Germany 
Post-war Global High Modernism and West Germany 
As Hitler and Albert Speer began their massively overscaled, neo-classical project of 
remaking Berlin into “Germania,” the capital they envisioned for Nazi Germany, architects such 
as Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius (both German émigrés to the United States), and 
the Swiss-French Le Corbusier were leading what would become a global movement under the 
general heading of “Modernist” architecture. Although their individual approaches differed 
considerably, their common traits were codified as the “International Style,” a concept 
popularized through a 1932 exhibition and catalog of the same name at the Museum of Modern 
Art in New York, authored by Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson. This term came to 
denote buildings with simple rectangular volumes, flat roofs, planar surfaces with a lack of any 
ornament or decoration, and industrial materials like aluminum for finishes. Equally influential 
was the idea, put forward most forcefully by Le Corbusier in his book Towards a New 
Architecture (Vers une Architecture, 1923) but echoed by Hitchcock and Johnson, that such an 
aesthetic had affinities with the functional aspects of the architecture, and was thus – to some 
extent – scientifically and technically justified, as well as universally applicable around the 
globe.13 Architectural historian Sigfried Giedion took these ideas one step further and attempted 
                                                
13 Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, trans. Frederick Etchells (New York: Payson & Clarke, 1927); Henry-
Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson, The International Style (New York: Norton, 1932). As Rosemarie Haag Bletter has 
shown, functionalism was by no means a clearly defined term within Modernist discourse (even Le Corbusier advocated going 
beyond the utilitarian to include the abstract and creative), and Hitchcock and Johnson were also ambivalent about pure 
functionalist approaches to design. See Rosemarie Haag Bletter, “Introduction,” in The Modern Functional Building, by Adolf 
Behne (Santa Monica, CA: Getty Research Institute for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1996). 
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to prove that this new architecture expressed not simply a new style, but a fundamentally new 
relationship between humans and their world: one based on totally new conceptions of space and 
time, fueled by the availability of advanced technologies and theories such as Einstein’s 
relativity.14   
These ideas were promoted and disseminated through the international organization 
known as CIAM (Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne), which, under the leadership 
of Le Corbusier and Giedion, brought together a diverse group of prominent architects, critics, 
and historians from around the world in regular meetings between 1928 and 1959. One of the 
most important outcomes of the meetings was a document known as “The Athens Charter,” 
formulated at their 1933 session. Based heavily on the ideas of Le Corbusier, the charter 
expressed many of the precepts that would come to constitute Modernist city planning practice, 
such as the separation of urban functions, the building of residential tower blocks within park-
like green spaces, and the addition of large thoroughfares for traffic. All of this, of course, meant 
the implied demolition of historical (mostly nineteenth-century) city centers with their densely 
packed buildings and mixed zoning. The Athens Charter was presented as an antidote to these 
supposedly unhygienic urban environments, which, in the authors’ view, constituted “the very 
image of chaos: they do not at all fulfill their purpose, which is to satisfy the primordial 
biological and psychological needs of their populations.”15 If buildings were of historical 
importance, they might be protected from demolition, but only 
if they are the expression of a former culture and if they respond to a universal 
interest … and if their preservation does not entail the sacrifice of keeping people 
in unhealthy conditions … and if it is possible to remedy their detrimental 
                                                
14 See Sigfried Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1941). 
15 Le Corbusier and International Congress for Modern Architecture, eds., The Athens Charter (New York: Grossman 
Publishers, 1973), point 71.  
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presence by means of radical measures, such as detouring vital elements of the 
traffic system or even displacing centers hitherto regarded as immutable.16 
 
Modernist architectural and city planning discourse thus essentially saw the existing historical 
fabric of cities as obsolete, and promoted an approach to design that relied solely on so-called 
“functional” logic, new industrial materials, and abstract geometry. 
As will be discussed further in Chapter 4, the Nazi regime never officially settled on a set 
of state-sanctioned tenets for design, but it did, for the most part, reject Modernist aesthetics. In 
the post-war era, the architecture mostly closely associated with the regime was considered that 
of the “Führerbauten” – buildings in Munich and Berlin commissioned by Hitler himself. The 
Chancellery, the Haus der Deutschen Kunst, the Air Force Ministry, and the Reichsbank 
exemplified a form of stiff classicism that related most closely to the Nordic or Romantic 
Classicism of architects like Gunnar Asplund.17 The end of World War II saw the rise of the 
United States as the world’s political and economic superpower, and therefore also the new 
epicenter of International Style Modernism. As a supposedly universal style without strong 
regional connotations, Modernism now became the accepted language of global democracy. 
Though Germany had lost almost all of its pre-war Modernist architects to the United States 
during the war, in West Germany, the formal language of International Style Modernism was 
embraced wholeheartedly in the late 1940s and early fifties as the antidote to Nazi classicism. 
High-profile projects like the 1958 German pavilion at the Brussels World’s Fair and Sep Ruf’s 
Chancellor’s Bungalow in Bonn helped shore up West Germany’s image as committed to the 
                                                
16 Ibid. This was not necessarily just lip service on the part of CIAM’s authors; Le Corbusier’s Plan Voisin actually did 
incorporate the preservation of the important monuments on the Right Bank. See Kevin D. Murphy, “The Paradox of Urban 
Conservation in France, 1830-1930,” Change Over Time 4, no. 1 (April 1, 2014): 53. 
17 For a detailed explanation of the Nazi regime’s politics and aesthetics in architecture, see Barbara Miller Lane, 
Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918-1945 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985) especially pages 190-191. 
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project of democracy and integration with the West.18 Berlin was no exception. As architectural 
historian Michael Hesse contends, continuing to “destroy” the former Nazi capital after the war 
through Modernist planning measures “was also a kind of symbolic denazification,” since the 
International Style stood for “freedom, democracy and the Western way of life.”19 This style had 
the added benefit of being easy to differentiate from the Eastern Bloc socialist realism of the 
1950s, although, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, by the 1960s “Eastern” and “Western” 
Modernism became effectively indistinguishable.  
As Hesse notes, post-war building in West Berlin was largely opposed to earlier 
traditions, going “against the remains of the baroque grid plans and the nineteenth century 
geometrical urban ground plans, against symmetry, axiality and hierarchic order, against clearly 
defined urban spaces with street- and square-forming walls, against block development and 
traditional building typology.”20 In fact, many planners began to suggest that the only way to 
return to Berlin’s true essence was to remove the vestiges of the late-nineteenth-century city, 
leaving Schinkel’s Berlin intact but removing the ubiquitous Mietskaserne.21 The “crusade 
against the nineteenth-century tenement city” even extended to “purifying” the facades of these 
buildings by hacking off their ornamentation. (fig. 1.11) The 1957 Interbau (short for 
Internationale Bauausstellung, or International Building Exhibition) (figs. 1.12-1.13), wherein a 
section of the bombed-out and formerly dense city center was completely rebuilt, also 
exemplified the tenets of Modernist architecture and planning with its large tower blocks 
                                                
18 Andreas Schätzke, “A Matter for the Polis: Cities, Architecture and the Public in Germany,” in Josef Paul Kleihues: 
The Art of Urban Architecture, ed. Paul Kahlfeldt, Andres Lepik, and Andreas Schätzke, trans. Michael Robinson (Berlin: 
Nicolai, 2003), 56. 
19 Michael Hesse, “Identity through Critical Reconstruction,” in Josef Paul Kleihues: Themes and Projects, ed. Andrea 
Mesecke and Thorsten Scheer, trans. Michael Robinson (Basel: Birkhäuser, 1996), 30. 
20 Ibid., 29–30. 
21 Eric Mumford, “CIAM Berlin and the New Monumentality” (Lecture, Achtung: Berlin Symposium, Yale University, 
February 15, 2013). 
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sprinkled throughout a park-like, auto-friendly landscape. This style of construction became the 
model for mass housing construction in West Germany: until the 1970s, the state sponsored the 
construction of over 500,000 dwellings per year nationwide.22  
Given the precepts of the International Style, which offered a convenient prescription for 
new construction, there was little impetus to promote a unique, local West German architectural 
culture in the immediate post-war era. As architectural theorist Ullrich Schwarz notes, the 
increase in globalization and the advanced technical knowledge of architects elsewhere coupled 
with a “certain sense of inferiority” that affected West German clients and politicians, leading to 
the professional and discursive marginalization of German architects in general.23 It would fall to 
the next generation – that of Josef Paul Kleihues – to reinvent the language of West German 
architecture in a way that could appropriately and definitively represent their young nation. 
The Post-Modern Turn in Europe and Its Influences on Critical Reconstruction 
While the International Style was undoubtedly the language of global democracy in the 
1950s and 1960s, it was quickly becoming the cipher of global corporate capitalism as well, with 
glass-and-steel skyscrapers popping up everywhere from Asia to Latin America. By the late 
fifties, a significant generational shift was also occurring: young architects, especially in Europe, 
were becoming highly critical of the promises made by Modernist design and theory – not so 
much because they disagreed with its basic aims, but because, in their eyes, Modernism had 
failed to meet its stated objectives. The most visible examples of this critique were the vehement 
clashes at the final two CIAM conferences in Dubrovnik (1956) and Otterlo (1959), between the 
                                                
22Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani notes that, in most cases, the emphasis was on efficiency and affordability rather than 
“committed ideological analysis,” i.e. the quality of such construction was often questionable. Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, 
“From Large Housing Estates on the Outskirts to Rebuilding the Inner City: Urban Development Debates in Germany 1960-
1980,” in Josef Paul Kleihues: The Art of Urban Architecture, ed. Paul Kahlfeldt, Andres Lepik, and Andreas Schätzke, trans. 
Michael Robinson (Berlin: Nicolai, 2003), 67.  
23 Wolfgang Pehnt, “German Architecture from 1945 to 1990,” in New German Architecture: A Reflexive Modernism, 
ed. Ullrich Schwarz (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002), 284. 
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older generation of architects, including Le Corbusier and Gropius, and a group of young 
architects who called themselves “Team 10.” This group critiqued the Athens Charter as brittle, 
technocratic, and insensitive to the actual social needs of users, and their protests ultimately led 
to the disbanding of the organization.24 In their manifesto, Team 10 demanded that urban 
solutions be based on local context, emphasizing “place and occasion” rather than Giedion’s 
universal “space and time.”25 These conflicts, and others, led to the sea change that has been 
characterized as the “post-modern turn,” though the term would not become part of common 
parlance until the late 1970s.26 As architectural historian Jorge Otero-Pailos observes, 
To accomplish this change of direction, they had to replace the piloting concepts 
of Modernism, from the abstract ideas of space and form, toward new notions of 
history and theory. Out went the conviction that technology drove history, and in 
came the sense that architectural history was driven by the search for authentic, 
original human experiences. … They conceived contemporary experience in 
terms of historical continuity rather than rupture.27 
 
The term “post-modernism,”28 despite its ubiquity, is notoriously hard to define. It is 
alternately used to denote an era, a style, a movement, and a “condition” across many disciplines, 
including literature, the visual arts, and philosophy, as well as architecture and city planning.29 
Even within the discipline of architecture itself, there are many different definitions of the term. 
                                                
24 Team 10 posited a sensitive and context-driven approach to design, which nevertheless preserved many of the 
aesthetic tenets of Modernist functionalism and technology. It is worth noting that they vehemently opposed the more historicist 
designs coming out of Italy at the time, even though both groups were critical of High Modernism. 
25 There has been much recent work on the Smithsons and Team 10. See, for instance, Max Risselada and Dirk van den 
Heuvel, eds., Team 10: 1953-81, in Search of a Utopia of the Present (Rotterdam: NAi, 2005); Mark Crinson and Claire 
Zimmerman, eds., Neo-Avant-Garde and Postmodern: Postwar Architecture in Britain and Beyond (New Haven, CT: Yale 
Center for British Art, 2010); and Noah Chasin, “Ethics and Aesthetics: New Brutalism, Team 10, and Architectural Change in 
the 1950s” (CUNY Graduate Center, 2002). 
26 See Rosemarie Haag Bletter, “Modernism in Crisis? Architectural Theory of the Last Three Decades,” in US Design 
1975-2000, ed. R. Craig Miller (Munich: Prestel, 2001), 37–69. 
27 Jorge Otero-Pailos, Architecture’s Historical Turn: Phenomenology and the Rise of the Postmodern (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xi. 
28 Following the most common usage, while architectural Modernism will be capitalized in this study to differentiate it 
from other types of modernisms, I have chosen to leave post-modernism in lower case. 
29 See Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoffrey Bennington 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
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Charles Jencks, who claims to have been the first to utilize the term to denote a style, defines it 
as the use of “multiple or oppositional codes”; Umberto Eco, who was influential on Jencks, 
defines it as the “ironic play of real and fake”; others, such as Robert Venturi and Jean-François 
Lyotard, describe it as embracing a “plurality of truths.”30 A useful definition for this study is 
offered by architectural historian Mary McLeod, who asserts that the unifying characteristic of 
post-modernism is its “search for meaning.” “For most,” she states, “this has meant an attempt to 
acknowledge architecture’s own history, including the Modern movement, through 
transformation and selective quotation of earlier designs in their own work.”31 This 
preoccupation with meaning has meant a greater emphasis on context, as well as on the symbolic 
qualities of architecture. Urban historian Nan Ellin also writes,  
Against the universalism of the Modern movement, these [post-modern] reactions 
featured a renewed interest in the specificity of regional and historical styles along 
with a respect for the diversity of urban subcultures. … These reactions have also 
tended to presuppose many meanings (multivalency) or many “readings,” rather 
than only one “truth,” and have sought to express this through the symbolic 
dimension of built form.32 
 
As Ellin explains, the European expression of these sentiments differed from the American one, 
which tended to focus on individual buildings and vernacular landscapes such as the suburbs. 
Instead, “the European critique proceeded directly to formulate another urban vision,” a tendency 
which Ellin attributes to “the deeply engrained historical and cultural attachment to cities among 
Europeans along with the continued desirability of an investment in central cities, as well as 
political economies which – in contrast to the American one – subsidize large-scale plans.”33 
                                                
30 Charles Jencks, The Story of Post-Modernism: Five Decades of the Ironic, Iconic and Critical in Architecture 
(Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley, 2011), 79. 
31 Mary McLeod, “Architecture,” in The Postmodern Moment: A Handbook of Contemporary Innovation in the Arts, 
ed. Stanley Trachtenberg (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), 24. 
32 Nan Ellin, Postmodern Urbanism (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996), 9. 
33 Ibid., 10. 
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Thus, “European urban designers began turning to the pre-industrial past for inspiration and 
legitimation. The closed book on ancient, medieval, renaissance, baroque, and vernacular 
townscapes was reopened and closely studied.”34  
The search for “meaning” in a general sense, and a return to the historical European 
urban landscape in particular, were major driving forces behind Kleihues’s theoretical 
formulations.35 His work also has significant affinities with several other, closely interrelated 
threads within post-modern architectural thought and design. The first of these is commonly 
termed “Critical Modernism” or “Critical Regionalism,” a viewpoint supported by Jencks, 
Kenneth Frampton, Alexander Tzonis, Liane Lefaivre, and others who discuss the architecture of 
the post-modern movement as constituting a critique or revision, rather than a complete erasure 
or rejection, of Modernism, as well as an emphasis on regional styles and contexts.36 This 
tendency was already visible in Team 10’s work in the late 1950s: while they remained highly 
critical of the failures of the Modern movement to solve society’s ills, they retained much of its 
embrace of technology. Similarly, the circle of Italian architects around Ernesto Nathan Rogers 
and the journal Casabella-Continuità in post-war Italy were also opposed to strict, CIAM-based 
Modernism.37 They promoted an even more formally varied approach to building than Team 10, 
one that more explicitly incorporated local forms, materials, and histories, an approach 
exemplified in BBPR’s Velasca Tower in Milan (1956-8). (fig. 1.14) This Italian group saw the 
                                                
34 Ibid. 
35 Although Kleihues himself saw Critical Reconstruction as being opposed to post-modernism (which he defined 
narrowly as a style), his approach is nevertheless often included in discussions of post-modern architecture. For the purposes of 
this study, I will do the same, considering post-modernism broadly, as a loosely connected set of responses to Modernism that 
began with the breakup of CIAM in the late 1950s, reached fruition in the 1970s and 1980s, and has continued to have significant 
influence and reverberations through the turn of the twenty-first century. 
36 See Jencks, The Story of Post-Modernism; Kenneth Frampton, “Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture 
of Resistance,” in The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (Port Townsend, Wash.: Bay Press, 1983); 
Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre, Architecture in Europe since 1968: Memory and Invention (New York: Rizzoli, 1992). 
37 Jencks, The Story of Post-Modernism, 62. 
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need, in the words of the Italian architect Giancarlo De Carlo, for “pliant and adjustable plans 
which must proceed, not from abstract ideological rules, but from a detailed knowledge of 
historic realities which vary from country to country,” i.e. they identified the need for a 
regionalist approach to design.38  
Along with an attention to local historical styles and typologies came an interest in the 
phenomenological aspects of architecture. Rogers, especially, emphasized the “experiential” 
qualities of the urban environment as being of prime importance. As Otero-Pailos explains, 
Rogers understood the city as representing an accumulation of “historical presents”:  
the physical environment produced by a culture’s activity over time … contained 
all of that culture’s experiences and therefore all of its history. … To be a socially 
responsible architect meant creating new forms out of existing traditions, to add 
new experiences harmonious with existing ones. … Rogers argued that the only 
socially ethical way forward for Modernism was to refound itself in tradition, to 
return to its historical roots, as a way to participate in the general advancement of 
culture.39 
 
The notion of historical contextualism gained further and more pointed expression in the 
so-called “neo-historicism” of, among others, the Luxemburger brothers Rob and Léon Krier. 
Unlike Team 10 or the Italian Critical Modernists of the immediate post-war period, the Kriers 
attempted to more directly and literally revive the architectural forms of the industrial nineteenth 
century and earlier, as well as – problematically – the architecture of the Nazi period.40 Although 
their approach was much more ideologically conservative than Kleihues’s, they contributed 
significantly to the idea of Critical Reconstruction in the 1970s by promoting the revival of the 
urban form of the European perimeter block (fig. 1.15).41  
                                                
38 Mary McLeod, “Architecture,” 24.  
39 Otero-Pailos, Architecture’s Historical Turn, xxiii–xxiv. 
40 Léon Krier has most recently garnered criticism for his work on Nazi architect Albert Speer. Léon Krier, Albert 
Speer: Architecture 1932-1942 (New York: Monacelli Press, 2013). 
41 Jencks, The Story of Post-Modernism, 67. 
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Finally, a slightly different, but related, strain of Italian design and theory provides the 
most visible parallel to, and influence on, Critical Reconstruction: the neo-rationalism of a group 
of architects, hailing mainly from Italy, who made their entrée onto the global architectural scene 
in 1973 at the Milan Triennale.42 Though sometimes classified as a separate movement from 
post-modernism,43 neo-rationalism emerged during the 1960s as an approach that attempted to 
identify the roots of architecture in a set of prototypical forms or “typologies” within the 
historical urban landscape.44 Aldo Rossi’s monumentally influential Architecture of the City 
(1966) is a prime example of these sentiments.45  
In this four-chapter treatise, Rossi presented a “theory of urban artifacts” that defines 
architecture both synchronically (as “the visible image of the city and the sum of its different 
architectures”) and diachronically (“the construction of the city over time”).46 This view allows 
him to propose two important theses. First, because a given building’s use will change over time, 
it will accrue various meanings that may or may not directly be expressed through its form. 
Therefore, he argues, architecture cannot be understood as being simply functional, but must be 
seen as serving aesthetic, semiotic, or symbolic purposes as well. Rossi calls this “the critique of 
                                                
42 This movement was christened “La Tendenza” by designer Massimo Scolari in his essay for the catalog to the 1973 
Milan Trienalle. See Mallgrave and Goodman, An Introduction to Architectural Theory, 29. It is also called simply “rationalism,” 
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qualities,” it is sometimes seen as not belonging to the post-modern style aesthetically. See McLeod, “Architecture,” 30. 
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45 Colin Rowe was likely yet another strong influence on Kleihues. See Sebastian Schmaling, “Masked Nostalgia, Chic 
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naïve functionalism.”47 Second, the purposes and significations of structures may indeed 
transform with time, but because they exist in a specific place, they have the potential to embody 
the traces of this history, or, in Rossi’s sociologically-based terminology, “collective memory”: 
In an urban artifact, certain original values and functions remain, others are totally 
altered … We contemplate the values that remain – I am also referring to spiritual 
values – and try to ascertain whether they have some connection with the 
building’s materiality. … At this point, we might discuss what our idea of the 
building is, our most general memory of it as a product of the collective, and what 
relationship it affords us with this collective. … There are people who do not like 
a place because it is associated with some ominous moment in their lives; others 
attribute an auspicious character to a place. All these experiences, their sum, 
constitute the city.48 
 
The city, for Rossi, is thus “a great, comprehensive representation of the human condition.”49 
Based on his understanding of architecture as arising from both functional needs and aesthetic or 
symbolic ones, Rossi then develops a theory of the “type,” referring to the work of Quatremère 
de Quincy and relying on the logic of structuralist thinkers such as Claude Lévi-Strauss. The 
“type,” for Rossi, consists of those elements that cannot be further reduced – structures that 
underlie, but do not necessarily dictate the precise physical forms of, architecture.50 Thus, unlike 
the CIAM Modernists, Rossi’s solution to the problem of urban design is based in architects’ and 
users’ subjective experience rather than in a set of universal rules. As architectural historian 
Helmut Geisert observes, a typology in Rossi’s terms should not be understood as something to 
be imitated, but as a model: an “imaginative process in which the hidden idea has first to be 
decoded so that it can be transformed aesthetically, making it a construction rather than a 
                                                
47 Ibid., 46. It should be noted that, although his writing has been interpreted otherwise, Rossi here is in conversation 
with urban thinkers and historians such as Malinowski and Chabot, rather than Le Corbusier and CIAM. Certainly, as discussed 
above, the High Modernists were not committed simply to functionalism per se, but embraced a range of aesthetic approaches 
that attempted to reconcile the use of new materials and techniques with new ways of life brought about by industrialism. Much 
of this nuance has been lost in later, post-modern critiques of Modernism, which tend to portray it as a rigidly functionalist 
approach. 
48 Ibid., 29. 
49 Ibid., 34. 
50 Ibid., 39–41. One of his case studies for typology was, in fact, Berlin housing. 
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reconstruction, and definitely not a copy.”51 Like the critique of functionalism, typology, too, 
allows for an understanding of built form as separate from – though possibly linked to – its 
practical function. Rossi’s theory therefore allowed for a thoughtful historical rehabilitation of 
the city, without precisely dictating its outward appearance.  
By incorporating the idea of collective memory into their work, the neo-rationalists 
demonstrated an attention to the everyday users of their structures. In trying to speak beyond the 
insular avant-garde, however, they also risked cooptation by political or economic systems. This 
generation of architects therefore tended to shy away from directly tackling larger social and 
political problems, as their predecessors in the Modern movement had done.52 Furthermore, in 
Europe, both historicism (especially neo-classicism) and Modernism were seen as tainted styles: 
historicism because of its association with fascism, and Modernism because it represented both a 
failed set of architectural theories and the rise of global capitalism. Architects in Europe needed 
to differentiate themselves clearly from these two stances without running afoul of new 
ideologies, especially the rising Marxist sentiments of the student movement in the late 1960s. 
Suspicion vis-à-vis the potential assimilation by the market or by political systems was shored up 
by the important influence during this period of the critical theorist Theodor Adorno, who had 
emigrated to the United States during the war but returned to West Germany in 1949 and later 
headed the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. His theories of the avant-garde gelled 
perfectly with the anti-capitalist sentiments of many young Continentals: he emphasized the 
importance of art’s (and architecture’s) aesthetic and conceptual autonomy, while simultaneously 
recognizing the practical impossibility of such a thing. The result was that architects like Rossi 
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52 Ellin, Postmodern Urbanism, 158. 
 37 
adopted an attitude towards both historicism and Modernism that pulled freely from both without 
relinquishing a critical stance toward either. The justification for such aesthetic and functional 
decisions was a highly personal – even at times mystical – attitude toward the ways in which 
architecture was allowed to signify. As McLeod noted, “meaning” in the most general sense 
became one of the major goals of post-modern architecture, but the specificity of that meaning 
was left consciously in question.53 However, the unwillingness of the neo-rationalists, as well as 
Kleihues, to put a finger directly on the nature of that meaning meant that their architecture was 
easily coopted by the very political and corporate interests that they abhorred.54 
Post-Modernism in West German Architecture and Urbanism 
A turning point for West Germany’s post-war architectural culture was the summer 
institute at the Technical University of Berlin, headed by the German neo-rationalist Oswald 
Matthias Ungers between 1963 and 1968. Ungers’s work in Berlin, as well as his time as head of 
the architecture school at Cornell University in the 1970s, promoted a discussion of 
contextualism, traditional urbanism, and historicism on both sides of the Atlantic.55 In the words 
of architectural historian Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, this marked the discovery of “tradition” 
as having “progressive potential.”56 The founding of the journal Arch+ in 1968 also opened up 
the German-language conversation amongst architects about these ideas. Most importantly, 
Ungers’s seminar took Rossi’s The Architecture of the City as one of its primary topics and 
                                                
53 See Mary McLeod, “Architecture,” 42, for a discussion of the loss of literacy (following Frampton) of publics vis-à-
vis architecture as sign; this focus on meaning, then, she argues became problematic because people had no reference points for 
signification in architecture, because Modernism had erased them. 
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helped introduce its ideas into the German-speaking community (the book was not translated into 
German until 1973).57 
 Several other popular books also increased public awareness of the destruction of the 
historical city fabric by both the bombs of World War II and Modernist planning. Kevin Lynch’s 
The Image of the City (1960), Jane Jacobs’s The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961), 
and Robert Venturi’s Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture (1966) were all widely read 
by architects in Germany.58 In the German-speaking milieu, these sentiments were echoed by 
Wolf Jobst Siedler and Elisabeth Niggemeyer’s The Murdered City (Die Gemordete Stadt, 
1964). This book dialectically paired images of pre-Modern city fragments with ones of 
Modernist urban landscapes, as well as essays on the destruction of the historical city. 
Psychologist Alexander Mitscherlich’s The Inhospitability of our Cities (Die Unwirtlichkeit 
unserer Städte: Anstiftung zum Unfrieden, 1965) added to this conversation, followed by Ulrich 
Conrads’s Architecture – Space for Life (Architektur – Spielraum für Leben, 1972), which 
directly pleaded for a renewal of the historical city “from within” and suggested a strategy of 
“critical re-production” of urban quality.59 Importantly, Conrads encouraged a return to thinking 
about the various constituent elements of the “traditional” urban landscape, such as squares, 
streets, trees, courtyards, passages, and blocks.60 In 1975, the International Design Center 
(Internationales Design Zentrum) in West Berlin staged an exhibition on “Designing the Historic 
Street,” along with a conference and design competition that took a street in central Berlin as its 
object. Invited architects included such international figures as Vittorio Gregotti, Alison 
                                                
57 Ungers’s neo-rationalism and urbanism, it should be noted, differs significantly from Rossi’s. See Jasper Cepl, 
Oswald Mathias Ungers: Eine Intellektuelle Biographie, Kunstwissenschaftliche Bibliothek, Bd. 33 (Köln: König, 2007). 
58 See also Christopher Klemek, The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal: Postwar Urbanism from New York to 
Berlin (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
59 Schätzke, “A Matter for the Polis,” 62. 
60 Ibid. 
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Smithson, and Charles Moore, as well as Ungers and Hardt-Waltherr Hämer, who would later 
head the 1987 International Building Exhibition with Kleihues.61 
 The growing student movement in the late 1960s gave new impetus to the renewal of 
historic city centers as well. In West Berlin, students at the Technical University organized an 
exhibition, accompanied by a manifesto, titled “Diagnosis of Building in West Berlin” 
(“Diagnose zum Bauen in West Berlin”) in 1968, as a reaction to the more official “Berlin 
Building Weeks” (“Berliner Bauwochen”), an exhibition meant to show off new city-sponsored 
infrastructure projects.62 Staged in the shell of a building designed by Scharoun, the “Diagnosis” 
exhibition constituted an anti-capitalist critique of the city’s Modernist development policies, and 
the manifesto was signed not only by students but by many practicing architects, including 
Kleihues.63 Outside of the discipline of architecture, the occupation of tenements by squatters 
was becoming another important way that young people showed a renewed interest in the 
historic city fabric, and along with existing citizens’ groups, these residents began to restore 
nineteenth-century buildings.64 These activities paralleled and intersected with the growing 
preservationist movement, which was also taking hold on both sides of the Atlantic.65 Such 
                                                
61 Ibid., 63. 
62 See Thorsten Scheer, ed., Josef Paul Kleihues: Works 1966-1980, trans. Geoffrey Steinherz, vol. 1 (Ostfildern: Hatje 
Cantz, 2008), 84. The group also called this “Aktion 507” after the seminar room at the Technical University of Berlin. See also 
Gruppe Aktion 507, “Manifest Der Aktion 507,” 1968, http://issuu.com/textraum/docs/aktion_507-
manifest?e=7005999/2871121. 
63 Schätzke, “A Matter for the Polis,” 57. 
64 Hard-Waltherr and Marie-Brigitte Hämer were involved in an exemplary one: Block 118 in Charlottenburg, where 
residents were involved in the process and rents were kept stable. 1975-80. See Lampugnani, “From Large Housing Estates ... ,” 
73. See also Regine Dölling, The Conservation of Historical Monuments in the Federal Republic of Germany: History, 
Organisation, Tasks, Case-Histories. A Contribution to European Architectural Heritage Year 1975 (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Inter 
Nationes, 1974). 
65 In the United States, for instance, the demolition of Penn Station in the early 1960s led to the establishment of an 
official landmarks preservation act, while in Paris the destruction of Les Halles spurred a similar conversation. In Western 
Europe, the Council of Europe officially adopted a charter in October 1975 regarding the preservation of important architectural 
monuments and staged a touring exhibition in support of the initiative titled A Future for Our Past. See “European Charter of the 
Architectural Heritage - 1975,” ICOMOS: International Council on Monuments and Sites, n.d., 
http://www.icomos.org/en/support-us/179-articles-en-francais/ressources/charters-and-standards/170-european-charter-of-the-
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projects contrasted sharply with the Modernist mega-housing projects of the Gropiusstadt 
(completed in 1960) and the Märkisches Viertel (completed in 1974) in West Berlin, both of 
which became notorious for their low standards of living.66 The press also participated in the 
growing public critique: in 1974, the Tagesspiegel, West Berlin’s centrist newspaper, ran a 
seven-part series by Günther Kühne titled “Is Berlin losing its face?” (“Verliert Berlin sein 
Gesicht?”), aimed at raising awareness of how Modernist development was making incursions 
on the historical city fabric.  
 Thus, by the end of the 1970s, the time was ripe for the large-scale renewal of West 
Berlin’s historical inner city (which, because of the Berlin Wall, now lay along its eastern 
border) (fig. 1.16). Though urban renewal programs took place at this time across West 
Germany, Berlin was an especially appropriate place for large-scale, politically-charged 
experiments. On the one hand, it was not officially part of West Germany: legally, it remained an 
exceptional zone. It was also not a capital city for the West and therefore did not carry with it the 
pressure of officially representing the nation.67 On the other hand, as the site of the Berlin Wall 
and a tiny island of democracy in the midst of a Communist state, it was also a highly visible 
space in which to wage the cultural Cold War by demonstrating democratic-capitalist superiority. 
West Berlin could function, therefore, historian Janet Ward contends, as a “threshold site,” or, in 
the words of architectural historian Matthias Schirren, as a “nexus point for reimagining lines of 
                                                                                                                                                       
architectural-heritage; Eine Zukunft für unsere Vergangenheit: das europäische Denkmalschutzjahr des Europarates. (Bonn: 
Europa Union, 1975). 
66 See Wolfgang Pehnt, “German Architecture from 1945 to 1990,” in New German Architecture: A Reflexive 
Modernism, ed. Ullrich Schwarz (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002), 290; see also Florian Urban, Tower and Slab: Histories of 
Global Mass Housing (Abingdon, Oxon [England]; New York: Routledge, 2012). The Märkisches Viertel was the setting for the 
notorious Christiane F. book and movie. Christiane F., Kai Hermann, and Horst Rieck, Wir Kinder vom Bahnhof Zoo (Hamburg: 
Stern Buch, 1979); Christiane F. – Wir Kinder Vom Bahnhof Zoo, dir. Uli Edel (Neue Constantin Film, 1981). 
67 This was not the case for East Germany – Berlin remained its capital city throughout the Cold War. 
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cultural force.”68 Kleihues’s theory of Critical Reconstruction became one very important way in 
which these lines were drawn in the 1980s. 
 
Kleihues’s Early Years in West Berlin and His Theory of Poetic Rationalism 
West German Identity and the Holocaust: Jürgen Habermas and the Historians’ Quarrel 
Born in 1933, Kleihues was part of what has been called the “skeptical generation.”69 
Having grown up under the Nazis, this generation had experienced a total collapse of its world-
view at the end of World War II. In West Germany, their resulting disillusionment translated, 
argues historian Frank Brunssen, into a “deeply skeptical and anti-ideological outlook.”70 For 
them, the aporia of the Nazi period, including the crimes of the Holocaust, formed the basis of a 
“negative form of identification” with being German. As the writer Christa Wolf famously put it, 
she wished fervently “not to have to be German” (“keine Deutsche sein zu müssen”).71 Any 
direct, public discussion of a positive West German national identity was out of the question; 
instead, the focus was on integration with the larger Western international community, and on 
the post-war re-founding of the nation based on a democratic constitution. 
                                                
68 Janet Ward, Post-Wall Berlin: Borders, Space and Identity (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 36; Matthias Schirren, “Exempla Trahunt Vel in Aliam - Hans Scharoun’s Theory,” in Josef Paul 
Kleihues: The Art of Urban Architecture, ed. Paul Kahlfeldt, Andres Lepik, and Andreas Schätzke, trans. Michael Robinson 
(Berlin: Nicolai, 2003), 25. For more on political status of West Berlin, see Strom, Building the New Berlin, 22. 
69 See Norbert Frei, 1945 und wir: das Dritte Reich im Bewusstsein der Deutschen (München: C.H. Beck, 2005). 
70 Frank Brunnsen, “The New Self-Understanding of the Berlin Republic: Readings of Contemporary German History,” 
in Recasting German Identity: Culture, Politics, and Literature in the Berlin Republic, ed. Stuart Taberner and Frank Finlay 
(Rochester: Camden House, 2002), 20. In East Germany, national identity took a very different path. Under this regime, the 
population was encouraged to see themselves as victims of the Nazi period, rather than as perpetrators. The lack of collective 
guilt with regards to the Holocaust in East Germany is part of the reason that the former Eastern states saw a resurgence of right-
wing political groups after 1990. 
71 Quoted in ibid., 21. It should be noted that Wolf was actually an East German, but the sentiment applies equally well 
to East and West in this case. 
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The public attitude of the majority of West Germans toward their history was expressed 
succinctly by president Richard von Weiszäcker in his speech to parliament on the fortieth 
anniversary of the Allied victory, in 198572: 
All of us, whether guilty or not, whether old or young, must accept the past. We 
are all affected by its consequences and liable for it. The young and old 
generations must and can help each other to understand why it is vital to keep 
alive the memories. It is not a case of coming to terms with the past 
(Vergangenheitsbewältigung). That is not possible. It cannot be subsequently 
modified or made not to have happened. However, anyone who closes his eyes to 
the past is blind to the present. Whoever refuses to remember the inhumanity is 
prone to new risks of infection.73 
 
Weiszäcker’s choice of words here is telling: the collective guilt shouldered by West Germans 
with regards to Nazi crimes was seen as a necessary prophylactic against future “infections” by 
such destructive ideologies. In speaking against the idea of “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” (often 
translated as “coming to terms with the past” but also connoting a “completion” or “mastering” 
of the past, i.e. its closure and comprehensibility) Weiszäcker was also countering the notion that 
the history of the Holocaust could be “normalized,” i.e. narrativized and therefore understood as 
a historical fact, or that a “closing line” (“Schlusstrich”) could be drawn under it. Instead, the 
incomprehensibility of the Holocaust, Weiszäcker argued, echoing the sentiments of the so-
                                                
72 Despite this outwardly-expressed attitude, the personal opinions and deeds of individuals often remained 
problematically sympathetic to or ambivalent towards the Nazi legacy, as dramatized in films like Das Schreckliche Mädchen 
(The Nasty Girl). See Das Schreckliche Mädchen, dir. Michael Verhoeven, (HBO Video, 1992). 
73 “Wir alle, ob schuldig oder nicht, ob alt oder jung, müssen die Vergangenheit annehmen. Wir alle sind von ihren 
Folgen betroffen und für sie in Haftung genommen. Jüngere und Ältere müssen und können sich gegenseitig helfen zu verstehen, 
warum es lebenswichtig ist, die Erinnerung wachzuhalten. Es geht nicht darum, Vergangenheit zu bewältigen. Das kann man gar 
nicht. Sie läßt sich ja nicht nachträglich ändern oder ungeschehen machen. Wer aber vor der Vergangenheit die Augen 
verschließt, wird blind für die Gegenwart. Wer sich der Unmenschlichkeit nicht erinnern will, der wird wieder anfällig für neue 
Ansteckungsgefahren.” Quoted in Claus Leggewie, “Ein Ort, an Den Man Gerne Geht”: Das Holocaust-Mahnmal Und Die 
Deutsche Geschichtspolitik Nach 1989 (München: Hanser, 2005), 32. For the full text of the speech, see Office of the 
Bundespräsident, “Gedenkveranstaltung Im Plenarsaal Des Deutschen Bundestages Zum 40. Jahrestag Des Endes Des Zweiten 
Weltkrieges in Europa,” n.d., http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Richard-von-
Weizsaecker/Reden/1985/05/19850508_Rede.html. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. 
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called “skeptical generation,” should be constitutive of the German nation: a “negative founding 
moment” on which the idea of their collective identity and purpose as a nation was based.74  
However, there was a move in the 1980s by some public intellectuals and politicians, 
including Chancellor Helmut Kohl (in office from 1982 to 1998), to create a new national 
identity for West Germans as both victors (through post-war rebuilding and integration with the 
West) and victims of the violence and destruction of the Second World War.75 Writing in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in 1986, historian Ernst Nolte spurred a vitriolic public debate 
known as the “Historians’ Quarrel” (“Historikerstreit”), by suggesting that the Holocaust could 
be relativized as a reaction to the Stalinist gulags, and that Nazism had simply been a natural 
response to the rise of Bolshevism in the Soviet Union.76 The philosopher Jürgen Habermas, a 
student of Adorno and his successor at the Frankfurt Institute, became Nolte’s immediate and 
aggressive opponent. In a rebuttal in the national newspaper Die Zeit, Habermas voiced the 
concern that this kind of logic would lead to a problematic “cancelling out of damages” that 
would absolve Germans of their status as perpetrators under the Nazis and result in the very kind 
of conception of national identity that would sever their hard-won ties with the West.77  
Habermas was an extremely important public figure for West Germans of Kleihues’s 
generation. In his first major work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), 
he argued that the Enlightenment had constituted an era of rational and critical discussion of 
public affairs, and that this sense of civic participation had been gradually undermined in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the rise of industrial capitalism and the growth of the 
                                                
74 Leggewie, Ein Ort, an Den Man Gerne Geht, 33. 
75 The memorial at Schinkel’s Neue Wache is a perfect expression of these sentiments. For a discussion, see Ladd, The 
Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape. 
76 Ernst Nolte, “Vergangenheit, Die Nicht Vergehen Will,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 6, 1986. 
77 Jürgen Habermas, “Eine Art Schadenabwicklung: Die Apologetischen Tendenzen in Der Deutschen 
Zeitgeschichtsschreibung,” Die Zeit, July 18, 1986. 
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welfare state. To combat this tendency, Habermas advocated for a restructuring of the public 
sphere based on a democratic model where important matters are discussed and debated publicly 
by engaged citizens.78 Sometimes called “communicative rationality,” because he located the 
concept of rationality not in abstract or ideal structures, but in the linguistic communication of 
human beings, Habermas’s philosophy clearly provided a model for Kleihues to approach the 
questions of molding a new German architecture through discussion and dialogue during the 
IBA. 
Kleihues’s Early Projects 
Kleihues began his training at the Technical University of Stuttgart in 1955, where the 
faculty was dominated by pre-World War II proponents of German Modernism.79 Before he 
could fully assimilate their teachings, however, Kleihues was recruited by the Berlin architect 
Hans Scharoun, and he transferred to the Technical University of Berlin in order to study with 
the Expressionist-Modernist master.80 During the late fifties, in addition to completing his 
dissertation on Scharoun’s work, Kleihues interned in the office of Peter Poelzig, then professor 
of hospital-building (Krankenhausbau) at the Technical University.81 As opposed to the more 
strictly Modernist legacy of the faculty in Stuttgart, Scharoun and Poelzig both exhibited more 
willingness to experiment – Scharoun with a biologically inspired Expressionism, and Poelzig 
with traditional regional forms. These two diversions from the hard line of functionalist 
                                                
78 See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989); and Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1984). 
79 Thorsten Scheer, “The Necessary Diversity,” in Josef Paul Kleihues: Works 1966-1980, ed. Thorsten Scheer, trans. 
Geoffrey Steinherz, vol. 1 (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2008), 8. 
80 Kleihues worked on Scharoun’s Stuttgart “Romeo and Juliet” drafting floorplans. Following his move to Berlin, he 
worked as a guide at the Interbau exhibition, spent time at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris, and married his wife at Le 
Corbusier’s church at Ronchamp in 1961. See ibid., 9. 
81 See the “Peter Poelzig Collection,” Architekturmuseum, Universitätsbibliothek at the Technische Universität Berlin, 
accessed March 21, 2014, http://architekturmuseum.ub.tu-berlin.de/; and “Poelzig, Peter,” NRW Architekturdatenbank, accessed 
March 21, 2014, http://www.nrw-architekturdatenbank.tu-dortmund.de/ for examples of his work. 
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Modernism had a profound effect on the budding Kleihues, who graduated in 1959 and 
established his own West Berlin firm in 1962 with Hans Heinrich Moldenschardt. Although 
Berlin in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as discussed above, was hardly a hotbed of architectural 
experimentation, it was, by the same token, a space of possibility where Kleihues had the 
freedom to try out new formal approaches and novel ways of relating to the city’s architectural 
legacies.82 
It was undoubtedly Scharoun, who, having acted as head city planner for Berlin 
immediately following the war, encouraged Kleihues’s interest in urbanism. Early on, he entered 
competitions for neighborhood renewal projects, where his penchant for historical forms often 
shone through. His 1967 design for the neighborhood of Ruhwald in West Berlin incorporated 
rowhouses, which had, since the end of the war, been rejected as too conservative (fig. 1.17).83 
Similarly, his 1969 design for a building straddling Lewishamstrasse in Charlottenburg, also in 
West Berlin, demonstrates an attention to the historic shape of the city block.84 Kleihues was no 
neo-traditionalist, however. His 1969 competition entry for rebuilding the neighborhood of 
Perlach in Munich (fig. 1.18) is staunchly Modernist, with separation of functions and linear 
rows of buildings. One of his first large commissions was for the main workshop of the Berlin 
Department of Sanitation (1969) (fig. 1.19). This clearly Miesian design demonstrates Kleihues’s 
early strategy of synthesizing traditional and Modernist forms.85 His design for Neukölln 
Hospital (1973) (fig. 1.20) also illustrates a focus on seriality and geometrical abstraction as 
                                                
82 See Geisert, “Eupalinos - Berlin,” 9. 
83 Scheer, “The Necessary Diversity,” 9. 
84 This design seems to have been done in conjunction with Kleihues’s commission to do the Berlin-Atlas study (begun 
officially in 1971). He also collaborated on the design with Leon Krier, who was working in his office at the time. Scheer, Josef 
Paul Kleihues: Works 1966-1980, 1:60; Lampugnani, “From Large Housing Estates ...,” 75. 
85 This approach also connects to his theory of “sequencing” (Reihung), explored later in the Dortmund Architecture 
Conferences. Scheer, Josef Paul Kleihues: Works 1966-1980, 1:68–69. 
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means of aesthetic expression, as well as an early interest in the playful, even decorative nature 
of functional materials that would later become hallmarks of the global High Tech style.  
The First Manifesto and Kleihues’s Theory of Poetic Rationalism 
These early projects demonstrate some of the key facets of Kleihues’s emerging personal 
theory of architecture, which he called “Poetic Rationalism,” laid down formally for the first 
time in his “First Manifesto” of May 1976. The text, fittingly, takes the form of a poem86: 
Unwittingly, 
For the most part humorlessly, 
Sometimes even angrily, 
Architecture is discussed to death and nothingness, 
With mediocre consensus the case is made against architecture. 
Architecture is seldom: 
Architecture as exhortation 
Against an increasingly violent world in which builder and architect relieve themselves of 
responsibility and engagement. 
Architecture as protest 
Against apolitical technism and instrumental thinking that pervert the act of building into 
routine. 
Architecture as example 
Against superficial faith in research and function and a utilitarian rationalism which 
negates all poetry. 
Architecture as poetry 
Against the blind order of functional-rational arrogance. 
Architecture looking back 
Timid and ardent. 
Architecture as learning 
From classical landscapes, from villages in Nepal and from Las Vegas. 
Architecture as renewal 
In dialogue with Alberti, Palladio, Schinkel, and all that we hold sacred. 
Architecture as a possible category of the new 
Acknowledging the eternally constant, under ever-new cladding. 
Architecture in search of broader autonomy 
                                                
86 Given the Adornian tendencies in Kleihues’s thought, it is ironic that he should choose poetry as the antidote to 
rationality, although, as Nicolaas Barr Clingan writes, Adorno did not mean to condemn the poet himself who would “write 
poetry after Auschwitz,” but the system in which all cultural products and processes are coopted and become exchangeable, to 
the point of devaluing human life. Nicolaas P. Barr Clingan, “Adorno, Celan, and the Dictum against Poetry after Auschwitz,” 
CCAR Journal: The Reform Jewish Quarterly 62, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 8–22. Also note that there is a “Second Manifesto,” 
written in 1984 and titled “The Seven Pillars of Architecture” (“Die Sieben Säulen der Architektur”), which reworks many of the 
same themes through a seven-part poem that follows the archetypal character of Archaeus through the discovering of geometry, 
classical architecture, the crisis of rational thought, and, ultimately, the discovery of “poetry.” See Josef Paul Kleihues, “Die 
Sieben Säulen Der Architektur,” in Das Abenteuer Der Ideen: Architektur Und Philosophie Seit Der Industriellen Revolution, ed. 
Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, Claus Baldus, and Josef Paul Kleihues (Berlin: Frölich & Kaufmann, 1984), 11–16. 
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Lovingly singing out of tune, collecting characteristics 
Breaking away from the moral terror of pure reason and empirical realities, 
Eluding the market and wastefulness. 
Architecture as desire 
Boundless.  
Architecture 
For pleasure on the part of the viewer as well, 
Offering tendencies and possibilities up for discussion.87 
 
As the first lines of the poem suggest, Kleihues’s Poetic Rationalism confronts the 
problems articulated by post-war critiques of Modernist architecture. Modernism’s critics, 
however, in Kleihues’s view, have not simply argued against a single approach to building, but 
have denounced and undermined architecture’s entire political, social, and aesthetic value, 
leading to an unhealthy, nihilistic complacency. This was a natural sentiment for a young 
architect in West Germany at the time, where most building done quickly and cheaply in the 
mode of the globalized International Style, without any philosophical or societal aspirations. As 
Ungers later observed, the goal of Kleihues’s generation of West German architects thus became 
to revive – and to carefully situate themselves within – the Western humanist tradition, defined 
by “reason, openness, variety and freedom,” as well as a reliance on dialectical thinking, 
whereby their techniques and strategies could continually evolve.88 In basing his architecture on 
the notion of the “rational,” Kleihues inserts himself into a long line of Enlightenment thinkers 
                                                
87 “Nichtsahnend, / Zumeist humorlos, / Zuweilen wohl auch böse, / Wird Architektur in Nichtigkeit zerredet, / Wird 
mediokrem Konsens das Wort geredet gegen Architektur. / Architektur ist selten:/ Architektur als Ermunterung / Gegen eine 
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Architektur als möglichen Kategorie des Neuen / In Erkenntnis des immer gleichen, unter stets neuer Hülle. / Architektur auf der 
Suche nach erweiterte Autonomie / Liebevoll distonieren, Attribute sammeln, / Gegen den moralischen Terror reiner Vernunft 
und empirischer Realitäten absetzen, / Dem Markt und Verschleiss sich entziehen. / Architektur als Sehnsucht / Grenzenlos. / 
Architektur / Auch zum Vergnügen auf der Seite des Betrachters, / Tendenzen und Chancen stehen zur Diskussion.“ In Josef Paul 
Kleihues, “Erstes Manifest,” in Dortmunder Architekturausstellung, 1976 (Dortmund: Abteilung Bauwesen der Universität 
Dortmund, 1976), 3. 
88 Oswald Mathias Ungers, “The Question of European Architecture and Its Crisis,” in Josef Paul Kleihues: The Art of 
Urban Architecture, ed. Paul Kahlfeldt, Andres Lepik, and Andreas Schätzke, trans. Michael Robinson (Berlin: Nicolai, 2003), 
148. 
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and architects, beginning with the French theorists of the late eighteenth century (Laugier, 
Soufflot, and others, especially Durand), as well as the German tradition following Kant. The 
lineage, Kleihues writes elsewhere, then moves to Gilly and Schinkel, Semper, and finally the 
early rationalism of Behrens, Taut, Mies van der Rohe, and Hilbersheimer.89 Reviving the 
humanist tradition implied not only an Enlightenment worldview based in reason, but also meant 
shouldering, as these earlier architects did, some kind of obligation toward society at large. 
However, in order to propose an architecture of political and intellectual engagement, Kleihues 
had to be careful, for, as Adorno and other thinkers had clearly demonstrated, cultural products 
and processes are all too easily coopted by economic and political systems, and used to facilitate 
the exploitation – or, in the case of Germany under the Nazis, the extermination – of human 
beings.  
Kleihues thus proposes, in the next few lines of the manifesto, an architecture of social 
and political “responsibility” and “protest.” But, the manifesto argues, this cannot be done with 
“superficial faith” in the capabilities of rational thought to solve human problems; rationalism 
must be qualified. This demand means rejecting the ideas of pure functionalism and economic 
determinism that underlay much of the Modernist thinking of the 1920s. Instead, for Kleihues, 
rational principles are to be applied to the creative process itself as a way to remain self-
reflexive.90 Though he still dedicates himself to function, construction, and economy, Kleihues 
does this, as he states elsewhere, “in freer ways” (“auf freiere Weise”): 
We must attempt to expand rationalism, to interpret it anew … I wanted to make 
clear with this concept that I am concerning myself with a contradictory 
expansion of classical rationalism: with a conception that allows me to involve 
                                                
89 Thorsten Scheer, “Poetic Rationalism,” in Josef Paul Kleihues: Themes and Projects, ed. Andrea Mesecke and 
Thorsten Scheer, trans. Michael Robinson (Basel: Birkhäuser, 1996), 15. See also Josef Paul Kleihues, “Kritische 
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experimentation more heavily and to mobilize not only the mind, but also the 
emotions as a part of the design process.91 
 
The way to achieve this expansion, Kleihues argues, is through the characteristic of the poetic.92 
When put in conversation with rationalism, as Kleihues’s biographer Thorsten Scheer explains, 
both elements become “equally justified components of a tension field they produce, which 
always includes the possibility of mutual criticism.”93 Kleihues himself calls this the principle of 
“coincidentia oppositorum” – the coincidence of opposites.94  
 The fact that Poetic Rationalism incorporates emotions, but does so within the framework 
of a rational geometry, in turn guarantees architecture’s autonomy. As Kleihues suggests in the 
manifesto, his architecture thus resists the “moral terror” of both “empirical realities” and the 
market economy. It cannot be coopted by either politics or capitalism, because it resists any kind 
of overt symbolism. According to Scheer, 
Kleihues’s notion was based on a logic of geometry and dimension…which if it 
does not prevent, makes a rhetorical and narrative interpretation more difficult, a 
result that is characterized by restraint and which refrains from obvious 
assignment of meaning. In this respect Kleihues understood his concept as a 
guarantee of aesthetic ambiguity instead of the dogmatic limitation of a geometric 
formula masquerading as a panacea.95 
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Lampugnani, and Anna Meseure, eds., “Josef Paul Kleihues im Gespräch mit Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani,” in Baumeister im 
Profil: Architektur-Forum Dresden (Stuttgart: G. Hatje, 1991), 70. Kleihues stated this during his interview with Lampugnani in 
1991. 
92 This appears to have been adopted from Heidegger. See his talk on Poetic Rationalism where he takes Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein and does a structuralist reading (langue/parole) of their use of the term “language” with regards to architectural 
expression. 
93 Scheer, “Poetic Rationalism,” 24. 
94 Kirchbaum, Lampugnani, and Meseure, “Joseph Paul Kleihues im Gespräch,” 71.This was also a concept used by 
Ungers. See Jencks, The Story of Post-Modernism, 67. Kleihues’s theories also link back to nineteenth-century discussions of 
Kunstform and Werkform. See Geisert, “Eupalinos - Berlin,” 13. 
95 Scheer, “The Necessary Diversity,” 12, 13. 
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In other words, as architecture historian Fritz Neumeyer writes, “Modernism’s fascination with 
seriality is definitely shared, but certainly not as a result of convictions about social and moral 
superiority of the mechanical over the beautiful, but as a result of architectural insight into the 
essential necessities and natural laws of architecture as a discipline.”96 The result is a “pragmatic 
openness” that relies on an emphasis on geometry to achieve a highly abstract appearance, the 
renunciation of narrative connections and personal expressions,97 and, yet, a strong orientation 
towards philosophy and history.98 This outlook, Kleihues hopes, allows him to avoid both 
“fashionable experiments” and rigid functionalism.99 
Poetic Rationalism as Valuing History and Context 
Kleihues’s position differs from that of Greenbergian High Modernism, which claimed 
autonomy for art based on faithfulness to the medium itself, in that Kleihues’s architecture is not 
just about architectural form. Such strict formalism would make his work just as susceptible to 
political or market cooption as an architecture that overtly sells itself to the masses. Kleihues 
balances his rational, poetic geometry with two other ideas: history and context. In this respect, 
Kleihues was clearly influenced by Rossi, as well as Christopher Alexander and Robert Venturi, 
both of whom Kleihues indirectly references in his poem (“Architecture as learning / … from 
villages in Nepal and from Las Vegas”).100 Kleihues’s designs cannot just be plopped down on 
any site; they reference their environment, take its memory and history into account, and create 
                                                
96 Fritz Neumeyer, “Poetry and Reason,” in Josef Paul Kleihues: The Art of Urban Architecture, ed. Paul Kahlfeldt, 
Andres Lepik, and Andreas Schätzke, trans. Michael Robinson (Berlin: Nicolai, 2003), 39. 
97 Kirchbaum, Lampugnani, and Meseure, “Joseph Paul Kleihues im Gespräch,” 14–15. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Scheer, “The Necessary Diversity,” 15. 
100 Especially palpable in Berlin in the 1970s were ties to Cornell, as Oswald Matthias Ungers and Rem Koolhaas both 
led summer institutes at the Deutsche Architektur Zentrum. (Kleihues was close with Ungers, and later sponsored the latter’s 
return to Germany – see Cepl, Oswald Mathias Ungers, 342.) Internal differences in the work of these various figures later led to 
sharp splits between them (the “urban archipelago” vs. the “European City”). Kleihues often also mentions Kevin Lynch as 
influential on his thinking. 
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the possibility for new histories to be written within them. Architecture must, he argues in the 
manifesto, be willing to learn from the past: not by simply copying the great architecture of 
preceding eras, but, in a dialogical manner, presenting “the eternally constant, under ever-new 
cladding.”101 Rather than revivalism, an attention to history or memory can offer architects a way 
to critique and improve upon past experiments. As Scheer writes, “Kleihues’s call for memory 
should be defended against the reproach that he is concerned about assuring his aesthetic position 
by tradition, and thus a return to the principles of tradition. The concept of ‘memory’ should 
rather be seen as a critical category applied to contemporary architectural practice directed 
merely at fulfilling function.”102 
 Architecture as poetic geometry arising from an analysis of the site and a confrontation 
with memory and history, for Kleihues, means that built form should be intimately bound up 
with the idea of the “genius loci” – the “spirit of the place”:103  
I believe that every place, in addition to its specific reality, also possesses a 
unique atmosphere, which can be very different. Paris is not London, New York is 
not Berlin, Dresden is not Vienna. The atmospheric character of a city opens itself 
to us only through the agile correspondence of intellect and feeling. Atmosphere 
itself is a mixture of spirituality … and the utterly concrete rhythm of life.104 
 
Clearly Rossi, who also wrote about the genius loci, is a major influence on his thinking about 
these matters, but Kleihues is careful to distinguish his own approach from the one presented in 
The Architecture of the City. While Kleihues admits that Rossi ushered in a new era of 
                                                
101 Kleihues, “Erstes Manifest.” 
102 Scheer, “Poetic Rationalism,” 19. 
103 This is an important concept in Rossi’s Architecture of the City, and is also taken up by Martin Heidegger and 
Christian Norberg-Schulz in their work on the phenomenology of space. Martin Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” in 
Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper Colophon, 1971); Christian Norberg-Schulz, “The Phenomenon of Place,” in The 
Urban Design Reader, ed. Michael Larice and Elizabeth Macdonald (London: Routledge, 2007). 
104 “Ich glaube, dass jeder Ort neben seiner spezifischen Realität auch eine jeweils eigene Atmosphäre besitzt, die sehr 
unterschiedlich sein kann. Paris ist nicht London, New York ist nicht Berlin, und Dresden ist nicht Wien. Das Atmosphärische 
einer Stadt erschliesst sich uns nur in der agilen Korrespondenz von Verstand und Gefühl. Atmosphäre selbst ist eine Mischung 
aus Spiritualität … und ganz konkreten Lebenshrythmus.” Kirchbaum, Lampugnani, and Meseure, “Joseph Paul Kleihues im 
Gespräch,” 70. 
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architectural thought that allowed for a new way of thinking about the relationships between 
politics, economics, history, and aesthetics, he feels that Rossi’s approach is too formally limited. 
“The idea of the critical reconstruction of the city, in contrast to the reductive, the traditionally 
oriented, theory of Rossi, is more open and ready to experiment. In the sense, not of an obviously 
harmonious, but rather of a diverse totality, we want to and must accept the contradictory and 
antithetical as goal and method.”105 
 An attention to the genius loci surfaced most visibly in Kleihues’s project for the 
restoration of Vinetaplatz in the neighborhood of Wedding, begun in 1971 and completed in 
1977.106 Here, Kleihues revived the form of the nineteenth-century perimeter block – the first in 
Berlin since 1945 – leaving the center of the building open as a residential courtyard (figs. 1.21-
1.23).107 The beveled corners of the building, as well as its tripartite façade, also reference the 
surrounding nineteenth-century buildings. The use of a perimeter block design that alluded to the 
historical city was a bold move: up until this time, any discussion of so-called “traditional” (i.e. 
nineteenth-century or neoclassical) forms in West Germany had been viewed with utmost 
skepticism.108 Nevertheless, though in plan the building looks traditional, its reductive geometry, 
abstract seriality, and attention to such functional issues as sunlight (the balconies all face south 
so that residents can have maximum access to light) also refer directly to the Modernist tradition. 
In addition, Kleihues openly referenced German Modernists such as Walter Gropius and 
                                                
105 “Die Idee einer kritischen Rekonstruktion der Stadt … ist im Gegensatz zu der reduktiven, den Traditionsbezug 
betonenden Theorie Rossis offener und experimentierfreudiger. Im Sinne einer nicht vordergründig harmonischen, sondern 
vielfältigen Ganzheit wollten und mussten wir Gegensätzliches und Widersprüchliches als Ziel und Methode akzeptieren.” Josef 
Paul Kleihues, “Städtebau ist Erinnerung,” in Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin 1984/87: die Neubaugebiete - Dokumente, 
Projekte, ed. Josef Paul Kleihues (Stuttgart: Gerd Hatje, 1993), 15. It is possible that Kleihues is borrowing from Venturi in his 
use of the concept of “contradiction” here, though in general he sought to clearly differentiate his method from that of the 
American post-modernists. 
106 For a discussion of dates, see Scheer, Josef Paul Kleihues: Works 1966-1980, 1:115–118; Lampugnani, “From 
Large Housing Estates ...,” 74. The project is commonly referenced with the date 1973.  
107 Hesse, “Identity through Critical Reconstruction,” 31. 
108 Scheer, “The Necessary Diversity,” 12. 
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Scharoun in his writings about Vinetaplatz, focusing on their responses to local conditions in 
various small-scale projects. Thus, with his Vinetaplatz design, Kleihues reintroduces the notion 
of the traditional to the West Berlin and West German architecture scene, while also reviving a 
strand of German Modernism that avoided the problematic legacy of International Style 
megaprojects. 
 Another design from around the same time demonstrates that Kleihues was dedicated not 
only to reviving traditional forms, but also to reimagining how West Berlin was planned on a 
larger scale. His competition entry for an urban design for Wittenbergplatz-Tauentzienstrasse-
Breitscheidplatz (in the historic shopping district near Zoostation in West Berlin – the new 
“heart” of the West) (1975-1977) further illustrates Kleihues’s commitment to both tradition and 
Modernism. In this six-block “city within a city,”109 the massing of the buildings and the use of a 
pedestrian-friendly boulevard with lavish plantings to tie them together, Kleihues revives the 
nineteenth-century ground plan of the area. However, this plan is then overlaid with structures 
that, though they reference nineteenth-century massing110 and utilize contemporary materials and 
abstract, repetitive geometries. Kleihues thus avoids the reactionary neo-historicism of revivalist 
architects such as the Kriers or Quinlan Terry; his reference to tradition looks at the deeper 
structures of the city and overlays these with modern forms and materials, utilizing rational 
geometries accented with personal touches.111 
Further impetus and visibility for the renewal of historical city forms was provided by the 
designation of 1975 as “European Architectural Heritage Year” by the Council of Europe.112 In 
                                                
109 Lampugnani, “From Large Housing Estates ...,” 75. 
110 According to Lampugnani, their tunnel roofs reference Godin’s Familistère in Guise. See ibid. 
111 See Hesse, “Identity through Critical Reconstruction,” 39. 
112 In Germany there was a touring exhibition titled Eine Zukunft für unsere Vergangenheit as well. This became a 
ratified convention between several member states in 1985. See “Treaties of the Council of Europe,” Council of Euope: Treaty 
Office, accessed March 21, 2014, http://conventions.coe.int; Schätzke, “A Matter for the Polis,” 60. 
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West Berlin, Kleihues became involved in related architectural renewal and preservation projects 
through the “Berlin-Atlas” project commissioned by the city senate (Berlin-Atlas für Stadtbild 
und Stadtraum, 1973). This work compiled not only zoning and property data on the West Berlin 
neighborhoods of Charlottenburg and Kreuzberg, but information about the states of structures 
and facades on each block.113 As did many of the theoretical texts of the 1970s, the Berlin-Atlas 
drew on the cartographic conventions of the “Nolli Plan,” a baroque map of Rome that became 
popular amongst post-modernists as a way to demonstrate “figural voids” in the urban landscape 
in stark black and white (fig. 1.24).114 The Berlin-Atlas became the first of many Berlin maps to 
rely on this visual rhetoric to argue for the renewal of the historic cityscape, and to argue against 
Modernist planning that proposed to do away with the original street plan.115  
Thus, with Poetic Rationalism, illustrated through his projects of the 1960s and 70s, 
Kleihues developed a theory that attempted to reclaim an architectural legacy for Berlin and for 
West Germany that would avoid the pitfalls of Modernism (with its “naïve functionalism”) and 
historicism (with its ties to Nazism), while also remaining regionalist – i.e., being German. 
Poetic Rationalism allowed him to knit these needs together under the rubric of intellectualized 
emotion rather than pure personal expression, with an eye towards distanced social engagement 
that refused, at the same time, to become overtly politicized or subject to pure economic needs. 
Unfortunately, the ambitious nature of such a project, and the theoretical gymnastics that such a 
position necessitated, made it, as will be demonstrated below, very difficult to successfully 
translate into a set of clear tenets for building. 
                                                
113 See Hesse, “Identity through Critical Reconstruction,” 35. 
114 Jencks, The Story of Post-Modernism, 62. 
115 Hans Stimmann, “Town Planning - Urban Development - Architecture: The Way Back to the Architecture of 
Metropolis Berlin,” in Josef Paul Kleihues: The Art of Urban Architecture, ed. Paul Kahlfeldt, Andres Lepik, and Andreas 
Schätzke, trans. Michael Robinson (Berlin: Nicolai, 2003), 96. 
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The Formalization of the Theory of Critical Reconstruction in the IBA 
The Formation of the IBA and the “Kleihues Plan” 
Kleihues wrote and talked about the idea of Poetic Rationalism throughout the late 1970s. 
However, as should be clear from his early work, his ambitions, and his ideas, were larger than 
individual buildings: he was interested in thinking about the city as a whole, and in influencing 
the disciplinary conversation about urban issues in a significant way. Beginning in 1973, through 
his position as head of the newly established architecture faculty at the University of Dortmund, 
Kleihues directed the organization of a years-long series of symposia, exhibitions, and 
publications that invited architects from around the globe to contribute to a discussion about the 
future of architecture. Inclusive in their stylistic scope (the first show, for instance, allowed 
architects who were otherwise at odds, such as Rossi, Venturi, Moore, and Ungers, to live side 
by side in the same exhibition), these events allowed for a conversation to begin about how to 
knit together elements of the traditional with the critique of the Modern, without resorting to 
dogma.116 Symposium themes included “The Principle of Sequencing in Architecture” (“Das 
Prinzip Reihung in der Architektur,” 1975), “Grid and Module in Architecture and City 
Construction”117 (“Raster und Modul in Architektur und Städtebau,” 1976), and “Axis and 
Symmetry in Architecture and City Construction” (“Achse und Symmetrie in Architektur und 
Städtebau,” 1977). This last conference coincided with another, Kleihues-led show titled Five 
Classical Architects in Germany (“Fünf Architekten des Klassizismus in Deutschland,” 1977), 
                                                
116 Neumeyer, “Poetry and Reason,” 34. 
117 The German word Städtebau, literally “city-building,” is commonly used to refer to both city planning and the 
architecture therein. It is indicative of the German city planning culture that planning and construction are not seen as separate 
endeavors. 
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featuring the work of Friedrich Weinbrenner, Leo von Klenze, Georg Ludwig Friedrich Laves, 
Friedrich Gilly, and Karl Friedrich Schinkel.118 
Even at this time, such topics were considered controversial, especially in West 
Germany. In the same year, the jury decision to accept James Stirling’s design for the Neue 
Staatsgalerie in Stuttgart, a playful post-modern take on a number of neo-classical motifs, was 
met with public furor; some even called it “fascist.”119 As Siedler wrote in the West German 
periodical Die Zeit,  
[Kleihues] took the risk of giving talks and arguing about the still slightly 
disreputable subject of “symmetry and axis in architecture and town planning”: on 
the one hand, this courts the danger of coming into disrepute for propagating a 
fascist system of rule, but it does take the opportunity of at last helping to liberate 
a terribly neglected and yet natural principle for constructing and ordering from 
ideological persecution.120 
 
Siedler soon became Kleihues’s ally in the reintroduction of the idea of the historical city to the 
wider German public. Together, in 1977, they launched what became known as the “Morgenpost 
campaign” (Morgenpostaktion). This endeavor consisted of an extended series of articles titled 
Models for a City (Modelle für eine Stadt), published in the Berliner Morgenpost newspaper by 
Siedler and Kleihues. Other contributors included a wide-ranging group of international 
architects, planners, and critics (including Charles Moore, James Stirling, and Heinrich Klotz, 
who founded the national German Architecture Museum in 1979). Taking two specific areas in 
West Berlin as examples, the articles demonstrated and debated how these could be restored in a 
                                                
118 Kleihues, “Städtebau ist Erinnerung,” 60–61. Later, in 1984, he helped organize an exhibition on Friedrich Gilly, 
Schinkel’s mentor and one of Kleihues’s influences. See Neumeyer, “Poetry and Reason,” 31. In 1987 he organized the 
exhibition 750 Years of Architecture and City Planning in Berlin. See Valentin Wehefritz, ed., “Prof. Dipl.-Ing. Josef Paul 
Kleihues, Architekt,” (Universitätsbibliothek der Technischen Universität Dortmund, 2011), 
https://eldorado.tudortmund.de/bitstream/2003/29149/1/Kleihues_fertig.pdf. 
119 Gavriel D Rosenfeld, “The Architects’ Debate: Architectural Discourse and the Memory of Nazism in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 1977-1997,” History and Memory 9, no. 1/2 (1997): 190. See also Chapter 3 of O. K. Werckmeister, 
Citadel Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
120 Quoted in Schätzke, “A Matter for the Polis,” 60–61. 
 57 
way that did justice to both the historical identity of Berlin and to the contemporary state of the 
architectural discipline.121 Siedler and Kleihues’s ultimate aim was to gather public support for 
another large-scale building exhibition, along the lines of the 1957 Interbau.  
They succeeded. Approved by the Berlin Senate in 1978, the International Building 
Exhibition (Internationale Bauaustellung, commonly referred to as “the IBA”122) consisted not 
only of building competitions, but countless informational sessions, guided tours, exhibitions, 
and publications. Originally planned to open in 1984, it was delayed for political reasons and 
was finally officially completed in 1987.123 The exhibition had two main components: a set of 
urban restoration projects (“Stadterneuerung”), led by Hardt-Waltherr Hämer; and a massive 
number of new building projects (“Neubau”), headed by Kleihues. (Already geographically 
separated from one another, the two halves ended up becoming quite isolated in their approaches 
and rhetoric, due to disagreements amongst the leading figures of the IBA.124) For the new 
building portion of the exhibition, the senate approved six aims, utilizing clearly Kleihuesian 
rhetoric: 1) to create an urban center for West Berlin; 2) to develop various neighborhoods and 
their character as “cities within a city”; 3) to take the historic structure of the city as its basis; 4) 
to redefine “the relationship between social norms and freedom for the individual” (i.e. “the city 
as a constant, the building as a variable”); 5) to thematize the inner city as a place to live; and 6) 
to do all this by creating a “productive state of tension” between social needs and individual 
artistic responsibility – that is, with public discussion, involvement of local business and 
                                                
121 See ibid., 60–65. 
122 The use of a definite article with the English acronym of “IBA” could be debated; it appears both with and without a 
“the” in different sources. I have chosen to include the definite article here. 
123 Werner Oechslin, “Phoenix from the Ashes: The Internationale Bauaustellung Berlin - Idea, Process, Result,” in 
Josef Paul Kleihues: The Art of Urban Architecture, ed. Paul Kahlfeldt, Andres Lepik, and Andreas Schätzke, trans. Michael 
Robinson (Berlin: Nicolai, 2003), 85. 
124 See Hans Stimmann, “Zwischen Stadtplanung, Politik Und Architekturmoden. Die IBA,” in Von Der Sozialutopie 
Zum Städtischen Haus, by Hans Stimmann, ed. Jörn Düwel and Michael Mönninger (Berlin: DOM, 2011), 79–90. 
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residents, but also following the “individual intuition” of architects and planners.125 The senate 
bill also set out the goal of creating 9,000 dwellings within the 250-hectare exhibition space in 
West Berlin.126  
 One of the most lasting images to come out of the IBA was a map, known as the 
“Kleihues Plan,” which hung in the stairwell of the Martin-Gropius-Bau in 1984 during an IBA-
sponsored exhibition titled Idea, Process, Result (Idee, Prozess, Ergebnis) (fig. 1.25). Drawn in 
india ink in Kleihues’s studio, this five-by-six-meter plan shows the designated development 
areas for the IBA in brilliant color, emphasizing both the “historical” (i.e. nineteenth-century) 
street grid with planned buildings (in red), emphasizing its proposed (re-)completion through the 
efforts of the exhibition. Surrounding these color sections are black-and-white renderings of the 
existing ground plan and buildings in the rest of West Berlin, stressing their incompleteness; East 
Berlin on Kleihues’s map, though showing the street grid, remains almost ghostly – 
conspicuously devoid of any buildings at all.127 Thus, as the map suggests with its emphasis on 
the dense, historical inner city, the IBA became yet another platform for Kleihues to promote 
discussion within the architectural community about the shift towards historically-oriented urban 
planning and construction. It also gave him a chance to further develop his thinking on 
architecture and urban design, resulting in the theory he called “Critical Reconstruction.”128  
                                                
125 Lampugnani, “From Large Housing Estates ...,” 76. 
126 See ibid. for details on funding, history, and exact locations of the demonstration areas. 
127 Stimmann, “Town Planning - Urban Development - Architecture,” 96. Michael Hesse asserts that “Kleihues was in 
favor of not projecting the division forward. On the contrary, traditional urban structures should be kept valid and developed 
logically with a view to future unification.” See Hesse, “Identity through Critical Reconstruction,” 49. 
 
128 Kleihues was not the only one to use this term. Many other similar terms exist, and “critical reconstruction” is 
sometimes used to describe projects that were not under his direction or even in Germany at all – for instance, Eastern Europe. 
See Michele Caja, “Critical Reconstruction as Urban Principle,” Arc 2 Città, February 21, 2013, 
http://www.arcduecitta.it/world/2013/02/critical-reconstruction-as-urban-principle-michele-caja/. 
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Projects in the Southern Friedrichstadt as Examples of Critical Reconstruction  
The Friedrichstadt,129 one of the IBA demonstration areas, became the ideal place to 
experiment with this approach. Originally planned as part of an expansion of the garrison town 
of Berlin in the eighteenth century and built up into a banking, newspaper, and entertainment 
district in the nineteenth,130 then slightly reshaped as part of Hitler’s plans for Germania, it was 
heavily bombed during World War II and was now split along its East-West axis by the Wall, 
becoming home to the notorious Checkpoint Charlie (fig. 1.26). The approach of Critical 
Reconstruction meant returning the southern (i.e. West Berlin) section of this neighborhood to its 
pre-Nazi and pre-Modernist ground plan, retaining and integrating old building stock, promoting 
a mix of urban functions, and dividing large blocks into smaller units that supported the 
expression of diverse styles while adhering to a relatively uniform typology.131 Kleihues did not 
have any interest in enforcing harmony in the sense of a historical stage-set:132  
The city as a living system should be conceptualized as a kind of menotactic133 
whole, which under normal circumstances carries with it the guarantee of 
necessary changes in order to enrich and carry forward its identity. The concept of 
                                                
129 As illustrated in Kleihues’s map, the IBA involved several demonstration sites within the western part of central 
Berlin, flanking the Berlin Wall: in addition to the Southern Friedrichstadt, there was the Southern Tiergarten, which contained 
freestanding apartment buildings grouped along the edge of Berlin’s large central park; Tegel, a rural “getaway” on the edge of 
the city, included living, leisure, and cultural functions; and Prager Platz, an urban square that was to be rehabilitated as a 
combined traffic and pedestrian landscape. Josef Paul Kleihues, ed., “Die Neubaugebiete” (Gerd Hatje, 1993), 275. Kleihues had 
wanted to refashion Mehringplatz (also known as Hallesches Tor) in the Southern Friedrichstadt: this area had been rebuilt in 
1962 according to plans by Duttmann and Scharoun. Currently it is a pedestrian-only zone; Kleihues would have restored it with 
the integration of traffic. Hesse, “Identity through Critical Reconstruction,” 44. 
130 See Tilmann Buddensieg, Berliner Labyrinth, neu besichtigt: von Schinkels Unter den Linden bis Fosters 
Reichstagskuppel (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1999); Eva Schweitzer, Grossbaustelle Berlin: wie die Hauptstadt verplant wird (Berlin: 
Nicolai, 1996). 
131 Hesse, “Identity through Critical Reconstruction,” 43. 
132 By contrast, the Nikolaiviertel just across the Wall was a veritable Disneyland of historicism. Kleihues also felt that 
Rob Krier’s master plan for the Southern Friedrichstadt was too historicist. See Kleihues, “Kritische Rekonstruktion,” 2004, 55. 
133 Kleihues explicates this term elsewhere: “This is a kind of urban-construction menotaxi (Gr. ménon = lasting and 
taxis = order), thus a constant ordering of the city …” (“Dies ist eine Art städtebaulicher menotaxi (gr. ménon = bleibend und 
taxis = Ordnung), also einer konstanten Ordnung von Stadt …”). Josef Paul Kleihues, “Kritische Rekonstruktion: Auf Dem 
Wege Zur Metropole Berlin,” Deutsche Bauzeitung 127, no. 5 (May 1993): 78.  
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a backward-looking, historicizing reconstruction is not only inappropriate, but 
suggests a totally different goal from that set by the IBA.134 
 
Rather than dictating exactly how everything should look, attention to the idea of the genius loci 
would allow for various forms of new architecture to arise out of the existing layers of history at 
the site. Kleihues focused on the street plan as the basic city structure, on which all other 
elements should be based:135 
The ground plan in particular bears witness to the spiritual and cultural idea of the 
founding of a city. The ground plan of the city predetermines the relationship 
between the requirements of economy, trade, and traffic and defines the 
“foundational” (grundlegende) character of the place for many years. Finally, it is 
the fundamental elements of the city that, even after their deterioration, still give 
clues to their previous development in the form of hidden traces.136 
 
Working from the ground plan, a Critical Reconstruction-based approach would, according to 
Kleihues, create “possibilities for unfolding” (Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten) for the urban 
environment through “renewal, enrichment, cultivation,” and also by allowing architects to add 
“something individual.”137 Attention to history also meant seeing it through fresh eyes and 
making any modifications necessary in order to suit the needs of the contemporary city. So, for 
                                                
134 “Stadt als lebendiges System sollte aber al seine Art menotaktisches Ganzes begriffen werden, welches unter 
normalen Bedingungen die Gewähr dafür bietet, daß notwendige Veränderungen seine Identität fortzuschreiben und zu 
bereichern vermögen. Der Begriff einer rückwärtsgewandten, historisierenden Rekonstruktion wird dem nicht nur nicht gerecht, 
sondern suggeriert ein ganz anderes Ziel, als die Internationale Bauaustellung es sich gesetzt hat.” Josef Paul Kleihues, 
“Poetischer Rationalismus,” in Ausgewählte Texte, ed. Gerwin Zohlen (Berlin: Internationale Bauakademie, 2004), 58. 
135 “Die historische Grundstruktur der Stadt muß als Konstante zur Grundlage der Stadtentwicklung werden.” (“The 
historical ground-plan of the city must become the constant foundation for city planning.”) Kleihues, “Kritische Rekonstruktion,” 
2004, 51. 
136 “Speziell der Grundriss gibt Zeugnis von der geistigen und kulturellen Idee einer Stadtgründung. Der Grundriss der 
Stadt präjudiziert das Verhältnis der Bedingungen von Wirtschaft, Austausch und Verkehr und definiert den ‘grundlegenden’ 
Charakter des Ortes für viele Jahre. Schließlich sind es die Fundamente der Stadt, welche auch nach deren Verfall noch als 
verbürgte Spuren auf ihre einstmalige Entwicklungen hindeuten.” Kleihues, “Städtebau ist Erinnerung,” 18. 
137 “Es ging mir auch dabei um einen Weg … die Gewährung einer möglichst freien (in gewisser Weise autonomen) 
Entfaltungsmöglichkeit der einzelnen Elemente der Stadt und zugliech um deren Einbindung in erkennbare, im Hinblick auf den 
‘Genius loci’ des Ortes wiedererkennbare Ordnung…. Daneben gibt es den legitimen Anspruch … nicht nur der Rekonstruktion 
oder einer vorsichtigen Interpretation, sondern auch der Erneuerung, Bereicherung und Kultivierung das Wort zu redeen. Die 
kulturellen Werte und Erkenntnisse sollen respektiert werden, aber man ist als moderner Architekt herausgefordert, etwas 
Eigenständiges hinzuzufügen.” Kirchbaum, Lampugnani, and Meseure, “Joseph Paul Kleihues im Gespräch,” 74. 
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example, the renewal of the Southern Friedrichstadt entailed the creation of streets that were not 
exactly the same as the pre-war plan, but respected its “spirit.”138  
From this ground plan, the “stereometry,” or construction of buildings, and the 
“physiognomy,” or design of the facades, which Kleihues referred to as “the image of the city,” 
would arise.139 However, architects were not to have too free a hand. Stereometry and 
physiognomy should be based on the same principles of careful contradiction (“coincidentia 
oppositorum”) that underlay Poetic Rationalism. With this insistence, Kleihues clearly 
distinguished himself from the idea of a superficial (American) post-modernism, with its free, 
often cheeky play of forms and – most importantly – its acceptance, or at times even its 
wholehearted embrace, of consumerism. In contrast, Kleihues associated his approach with the 
more sober idea of the “European city,” a catchphrase that had been in use since at least the early 
1970s, which, for him, meant an urban environment that was highly planned and ordered – not 
an “anything goes” approach, in which architects or developers had free rein.140 Kleihues 
promoted a thoughtful and careful synthesis of historicism and Modernism, not a bombastic 
display of either one. The idea of the Critical Reconstruction “seeks a path of dialogue between 
tradition and Modernism, seeks the contradiction of the Modern not in the sense of a break, but 
visible development throughout moments of time and place.”141 The two sides must be put in 
conversation and allowed to critique one another without resorting to bold, overly personal or 
subjective statements. 
                                                
138 Ibid. 
139 Kleihues, “Städtebau ist Erinnerung,” 18. 
140 See Hartmut Häussermann and Walter Siebel, Die europäische Stadt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004). 
141 “[Die kritische Rekonstruktion] sucht einen Weg des Dialogs zwischen Tradition und Moderne, sucht die 
Kontradiktion der Moderne nicht im Sinn eines Bruchs, sondern der sichtbar bleibenden Entwicklung über die Stationen der Ort 
und Zeit.” Kleihues, “Kritische Rekonstruktion,” 2004, 58.  
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The “critical” element in Critical Reconstruction was meant to extend past the level of 
styles. It was a way for architecture to acknowledge and respond to the larger societal problems 
that arose in modernity. Kleihues wanted the contemporary city to be approached as 
“immanently dialectical,” not in the sense of Hegel’s dialectics, with its implied faith in 
teleological progress, but in the Adornian sense of moving forward with the awareness that no 
one solution will ever solve society’s ills.142 This awareness meant recognizing the “moments of 
crisis” to which the Modern tried to respond, as well as those to which it ultimately led: 
Modernity is the living consciousness of crisis. In no way should the expiration of 
the classical belief in a universal regulative be interpreted as a temporary political 
symptom. The Modern has lived out and thought out crisis. We cannot unbind 
ourselves from the responsibility to interrupt its work and its sorrow. The step that 
we can attempt to make is conceivably small – and I mean “conceivably” in this 
case in the literal sense: that the step can even be conceived of. Critical 
Reconstruction is only trying, not to resignedly flee back towards an ideal world 
out of the consciousness of crisis, but rather to strengthen, in opposition to the 
classical Great Unity, the virulent uniqueness of each single part as part of a 
living whole.143 
 
So, while remaining aware of the pitfalls of both classical and Modernist forms, as well as their 
status as signifiers and carriers of the history of various crises, Kleihues sought a dialectical 
relation between the two that would generate a “contradictory and complex grammar.”144 In this 
way, architects would be encouraged to retain a critical distance toward these strategies, while 
utilizing the best of both: 
This cannot be about a fight wherein one or the other side – tradition or 
Modernism – is put down – and is put down possibly only as a kind of Phyrric 
                                                
142 Ibid., 53.  
143 “Modernität ist das gelebte Bewusstsein der Krise. Keinesfalls lässt sich der Verfall des klassischen Glaubens an ein 
universales Regulativ als vorübergehendes politisches Symptom deuten. Die Moderne hat die Krise gelebt und gedacht. Von der 
Verpflichtung, uns ihrer Arbeit und ihrer Trauer auszusetzen, können wir uns nicht entbinden. Der Schritt, den wir versuchen 
können, ist denkbar klein – ‘denkbar’ sage ich an dieser Stelle in wörtlicher Bedeutung: dass der Schritt eben gedacht werden 
kann. Die kritische Rekonstruktion versucht nämlich lediglich, aus dem Bewusstsein der Krise nicht resignativ in heile Welt 
zurückzuflüchten, sondern in konstruktiver Opposition zur klassischen Einheit im Grossen die virulente Einzigartigkeit der Teile 
als Teile eines lebendigen Ganzen zu stärken.” Kleihues, “Städtebau ist Erinnerung,” 17. 
144 Kleihues, “Poetischer Rationalismus,” 36. 
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victory – but rather, to reveal the possibilities that the reductionism of the 
previous epoch of the Modern had kept hidden, to open to the Modern an 
additional decisiveness (Entschlossenheit). To freely adapt the last paragraph of 
Adorno’s Negative Dialectics: our attempt is in solidarity with the Modern, even 
in the moment of its downfall.145 
 
 These ideas are borne out in various ways in the competition winners for the Southern 
Friedrichstadt. One of the most lauded designs was, in fact, one by Aldo Rossi: a residential and 
office building built along both side of the corner of Wilhelmstrasse and Kochstrasse (figs. 1.27-
1.28). It references the history of the neighborhood in two ways. First, in its response to the 
historical ground plan: flush with the street on two sides, it also integrates a semi-public 
courtyard on the interior of the block – hallmarks of the “block-edge development” 
(Blockrandbebauung) typical of nineteenth-century Berlin. Second, it also refers to nineteenth-
century Berlin typologies in its massing and decoration. Matching, for the most part, the height 
of the surrounding buildings, Rossi’s design belies its massive character by breaking up the 
façade into bays of varied heights and materials, a reference to the small individual parcels that 
formerly existed in the area. However, the building’s forms and materials are clearly modern. 
Glass curtain walls alternate with soaring, abstracted gables, and a distinctive, overscaled column 
at the corner references the typical Berlin “corner-house” (Eckhaus) in a playful and 
contemporary manner.146 Rossi thus fuses nineteenth-century city forms with strikingly up-to-
                                                
145“Es kann nicht um einen Kampf gehen, bei dem die eine oder die andere Seite, die der Tradition oder die der 
Moderne, schließlich unterliegt – und möglicherweise nur im Sinn eines Pyrrhussiegs unterliegt - , sondern darum, die 
Möglichkeiten, die sich im Reduktionismus der zurückliegenden Epoche der Moderne verdreckt gehalten haben, freizugeben, um 
der Moderne ein Stück zusätzlicher Entschlossenheit zu eröffnen. In freier Verwendung des Schlußsatzes aus Adornos Negativer 
Dialektik,: Unser Versuch ist solidarisch mit der Moderne noch im Augenblick ihres Sturzes.” Ibid. Note that in the original text 
by Adorno, he is referring is not to the Modern, but to metaphysics. See Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics (Routledge, 2003), 
408. 
146 Dietmar Grötzebach, Günter Plessow, and Reinhold Ehlers, “Wohn- und Geschäftshäuser, Wilhelmstrasse 36-
38/Kochstrasse 1-4,” in Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin 1984/87: die Neubaugebiete  : Dokumente, Projekte, ed. Josef Paul 
Kleihues (Stuttgart: Gerd Hatje, 1993), 84. 
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date ones, and uses this tension to produce a welcoming space for both the tenants and 
passersby.147 
 A design by Rem Koolhaas and OMA for the “Haus am Checkpoint Charlie” (fig. 1.29) 
confronts history in a totally different way: as a story still in the making. While the building does 
conform to the typical height of the surrounding nineteenth-century structures, and Koolhaas 
references the fin-de-siècle paintings of Ludwig Kirchner in his description, its materials and 
details are distinctly Modernist, with rows of ribbon windows topped by a gridded glass curtain 
wall and a flat, geometric roof cantilevered over the top. For Koolhaas, the most pressing aspects 
of the genius loci are in its status as a Cold War border. Thus, he integrates “temporary” (in the 
sense that he hopes the Wall will someday be removed) structures and services for border 
personnel, and sees the building as a potential future memorial to the division of the Cold War:  
From Friedrichstrasse, the semi-permanent pavilion on the ground floor signifies 
the border-character of the building. One day, when the pavilion is no more and 
the ground floor is turned into a supermarket, the projecting roof over 
Friedrichstrasse will remain as a remembrance of the Wall. At present, however, 
it corresponds with the physical reality of this dividing line between East and 
West.148 
 
Critical Reconstruction, in this example, allows Koolhaas to confront contemporary politics in a 
practical way, by simply providing spaces for history to unfold. 
A design by Zaha Hadid on Stresemannstrasse (figs. 1.30-1.31) demonstrates yet another 
way of understanding Critical Reconstruction as embracing “possibilities for unfolding.” In plan, 
                                                
147 One big problem with the design is the large column, which attracts graffiti and is now used for garish advertising 
(see fig. 1.27). 
148 “Von der Friedrichstrasse aus deuten die semi-permanenten Pavillons im Erdgeschoss den Grenzcharakter des 
Hauses an. Eines Tages, wenn es die Pavillons nicht mehr geben wird und das Erdgeschoss in einen Supermarkt umgewandelt ist, 
wird das auskragende Dach über der Friedrichstrasse als Erinnerung an die Mauer bleiben. Im Augenblick jedoch korrespondiert 
es noch mit der physischen Realität dieser Trennungslinie zwischen Ost und West.” Rem Koolhaas, Elia Zenghelis, and Matthias 
Sauerbruch, “Appartementhaus am Checkpoint Charlie, Friedrichstrasse 207-208,” in Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin 
1984/87: die Neubaugebiete: Dokumente, Projekte, ed. Josef Paul Kleihues, trans. A. Bleininger (Stuttgart: Gerd Hatje, 1993), 
74. The bottom floor of the building now serves as a museum about Checkpoint Charlie – it has not yet become something as 
mundane as a grocery store. 
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the building completes a triangular block by filling in one edge, and it responds to traditional 
Berlin architecture in its height and in the gridded distribution of the windows. Its massing and 
materials, however, are hardly traditional: it includes a highly expressive corner element and the 
whole façade is sheathed in brilliant, anodized sheet metal.149 Rather than referencing history, 
Hadid sees her design as responding to the needs of current and future residents: 
[My designs] actually react to the new life and work requirements of our time. 
Behind the flowing and exploding spaces stands the conviction that our 
environment, our work- and life-forms, are changing ever faster and will continue 
to do so. All things have a certain dynamic and change their quality with use.… In 
this way architectural spaces can arise that no one has seen before; in these new 
spaces, people will move in totally new ways…and the perception of the city will 
be totally different. This newly achieved freedom can also be seen in a greater 
context: as spiritual freedom.150 
 
As illustrations of the theory of Critical Reconstruction, these three examples 
demonstrate the flexibility inherent in Kleihues’s thinking.151 Though he had a role in shaping 
competition briefs, building guidelines, and jury decisions, Kleihues did not use his position in 
the IBA as a bully pulpit from which to control every detail of the designs. Rather, his ambitious 
goal was to attract leading architects from all over the world, let them vie with one another in 
competitions, involve them in discussions about the fundamental problems of architecture and 
                                                
149 This whole block was actually designated as being for “women’s needs” (“frauenspezifischer Belange”) because 
Hadid and another woman, Myra Warhaftig, were chosen as architects. See Corinna Tell, “Wohnhof Block 2,” 
Forschungsinitiative IBA 87, accessed March 21, 2014, http://f-iba.de/wohnhof-block-2/. For details on the façade material, see 
Zaha Hadid, “IBA Housing,” Zaha Hadid Architects, accessed March 21, 2014, http://www.zaha-hadid.com/architecture/iba-
housing/. 
150 “Meine Entwürfe … reagieren tatsächlich auf die neue Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen unserer Zeit. Hinter den 
fliessenden und explodierenden Räumen steht die Überzeugung, dass sich unsere ganze Umwelt, auch unsere Arbeits- und 
Lebensformen, immer schneller verändern und weiter verändern werden. Alle Dinge haben eine gewisse Dynamik und wandeln 
ihre Qualität im Gebrauch … So können Architekturräume entstehen, die man nie vorher gesehen hat; in diesen neuen Räumen 
wird man sich auf eine völlig neue Art und Weise bewegen, … und die Wahrnehmung der Stadt wird eine ganz andere werden. 
Diese neu zu gewinnende Freiheit kann auch in einem grösseren Zusammenhang gesehen werden: als geistige Befreiung.” Zaha 
Hadid, “Wohnhaus - Block 2 - Stresemannstrasse/Dessauer Strasse,” in Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin 1984/87: die 
Neubaugebiete: Dokumente, Projekte, ed. Josef Paul Kleihues (Stuttgart: Gerd Hatje, 1993), 47. 
151 Critical Reconstruction itself was not the only way Kleihues saw of tackling the problem of the city. Rather, it was 
presented as one of three different possible strategies, which were to be used in tandem as deemed appropriate for each specific 
site. One alternative strategy was the idea of renewal or preservation; the other was “conscious contradiction,” where elements or 
buildings would be retained or inserted in order to create contrasts or, in Hesse’s words, “points of refraction” in the city. See 
Hesse, “Identity through Critical Reconstruction,” 43; Josef Paul Kleihues, ed., Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin 1984/87: 
die Neubaugebiete: Dokumente, Projekte (Stuttgart: G. Hatje, 1993).  
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urban development, and draw conclusions from these discussions that could be implemented as 
policy.152 Under his leadership, the IBA became a global forum for a conversation between 
architects of very different persuasions, all responding to a call for a thoughtful engagement with 
both the evolving history and the current needs of the neighborhood. And although Kleihues 
himself did not always agree with the aesthetic choices of the competition winners, he 
nevertheless allowed their designs to be built.  
In combining the threads of neo-rationalism, post-modernism, and his own brand of 
typological historicism that rested on the idea of the historical city plan as a generative form, 
Kleihues was also positioning himself, as he had done with Poetic Rationalism, as part of the 
lineage of the best German Enlightenment and Modernist architects. “What would be more 
obvious,” he wrote, “than to orient these theoretical claims on examples that stand for the better 
side of Berlin and Prussia: the time of the Enlightenment and humanism and that of the 
[nineteen-]twenties[?]”153 Between deaths of Frederick the Great (1786) and Karl Friedrich 
Schinkel (1841), Prussia and Berlin had, in Kleihues’s opinion, been blessed with a special 
quality that gave rise to intellectual and artistic innovation. Presaging Poetic Rationalism, it was 
a time when the “tendencies of rationalism were playfully relativized through the dimension of 
poetry and a metaphysically renewed ideal of nature and world.”154 In the 1920s, as well, 
Kleihues claimed that certain architects proved that strongly rationalist architecture and urban 
design did not have to be diametrically opposed to history. Hilbersheimer, Taut, Behne, and 
Scharoun (preceded by Behrens and Messel) had all created architecture that, while utilizing 
modern materials and forms, also took tradition into account. Thus, as a synthesis of these two 
                                                
152 Neumeyer, “Poetry and Reason,” 39. 
153 Kleihues, “Städtebau ist Erinnerung,” 14. 
154 Ibid. 
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moments that carried them forward into the present and future, Critical Reconstruction could 
function as a rehabilitation of the German architectural tradition that avoided directly addressing 
the problems of more recent German history, and positioned itself strategically with regards to 
the critique of CIAM. The “democratic” nature of Modernism could be retained and enriched 
through a global dialogue, and traditional forms could be carefully renewed and updated through 
the same process.  
 
Conclusion 
As both a Cold War flashpoint and a local backwater, West Berlin held a special status as 
a place of experimentation for Kleihues from the 1960s until the end of the 1980s. Because it did 
not directly represent German identity, and yet had distinct global visibility, it was the perfect 
setting in which to make the controversial move of reviving a form of traditional German 
architecture while still making use of the methods and materials of Modernism. His theories and 
his process, influenced heavily by Rossi, Adorno, and Habermas, connected directly to the 
architectural and philosophical discourse in West Germany and Western Europe at the time. 
Because they allowed for a rational approach to design problems, but used this rationality as a 
tool to incorporate those parts of life – memory and human emotion – that often elude rational 
analysis, Poetic Rationalism and Critical Reconstruction presented ways of tackling the biggest 
questions of Kleihues’s generation, without ever presenting direct, dogmatic solutions that might 
fall prey to cooption by political or economic forces. 
The ultimate problem with all this theorizing, however, was that it proved difficult to 
translate into, and to transmit through, actual built forms. Thus the results of the IBA were often 
interpreted very differently from what Kleihues intended. He was pegged as a rigid, staunch 
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traditionalist who was opposed to anything post-modern.155 And, as will be discussed in the 
following chapters, Kleihues’s openness to dialogue, diversity, and disagreement was a key 
component of Critical Reconstruction that unfortunately did not carry over into the post-1990 
era. In the hands of his successors in reunited Berlin, Critical Reconstruction, for all Kleihues’s 
careful positioning with regards to history and philosophy, was ultimately coopted as a cipher of 
both global capitalism and conservative European historicism – the very things Kleihues had 
worked so hard to avoid. 
                                                
155 Because of Kleihues’s ties to rationalism, as well as his critique of the more decorative styles of Venturi and others, 
some still attempted to paint the IBA as a war between the popular, market-friendly North American and historicist, conservative 
European factions of post-modernism. (See, for example, Josef Paul Kleihues - der Architekt und seine Stadt, dir. Ralf Lange, 
Jörg Plenio, and Meyen Wachholz, DVD (Berlin: Nicolai, 2003).) Kleihues worked hard to dispel this notion: “I have strived to 
increase the number of qualified opinions and engaged combatants. The spectrum of architects involved is one of the signs of 
this.” Kleihues, “Kritische Rekonstruktion,” 2004, 55. Elsewhere, he contends that “It’s clear that the frequently insinuated 
“architectural-political” (architekturpolitisch) onesidedness can only be called absurd. Aside from the protagonists (Abraham, 
Eisenman, Grassi, Hejduk, Rossi, Ungers) from the beginning of the IBA, among others, the names Brenner/Tonon, 
Bangert/Jansen/Schloz/Schultes, Frowein/Spangenberg, Ganz/Rolfes, Kollhoff/Ovaska stood for a new generation of architects 
who, with social as well as artistic engagement, set themselves the task of updating the Modern with individual statements.” 
Kleihues, “Städtebau ist Erinnerung,” 20. Indeed, with over 150 architects involved, he told Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, it 





International Investment and Berlin Planning in the Immediate Post-Wende Era 
 
The era immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall set the stage for the application 
of Critical Reconstruction to the reunited city. This period was characterized by rampant 
development and investment in Berlin’s city center, driven by astronomical – and, ultimately, 
erroneous – predictions of economic growth. Berlin’s designation as Germany’s new capital in 
June of 1991 fueled even more expectations for growth, putting increased pressure on city 
officials to sell off and develop historically significant sites in the city center and to seek out the 
most notable global corporate brands as buyers in order to add to the city’s prestige. Planners 
recognized that attracting such investment entailed the promotion of Berlin as having a “local” 
identity in the midst of a competitive global market, and they were thus quick to jump at 
opportunities that they felt would help reinvigorate the city’s economy while adding to its unique 
flavor. 
This situation posed two interlinking problems for Berlin’s leaders: on one hand, they 
needed to attract multinational investment to the city in order to shore up its reputation as an 
emerging “global metropolis”; on the other, in the midst of a difficult political and administrative 
sea change, they needed to guide this investment into channels that would be politically, 
aesthetically, and practically workable for the future of the city. This challenge meant that new 
developments should add to Berlin’s distinctive look and feel and embody a “local” character of 
some kind. But the complexity of Berlin’s administrative structures and the absolute chaos 
brought about by conflicting property ownership and restitution claims in the former East made it 
exceedingly difficult to make wise decisions about land sale and use (when, that is, officials 
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could even discern which administrative department should be responsible for the property in 
question). Furthermore, early property deals with powerful international firms, some made even 
before the two Germanys were officially reunited in October of 1990, quickly demonstrated just 
how much influence corporate interests could wield over city policy. One eventual answer to 
these issues was found in a rigid and reductive application of the method of Critical 
Reconstruction under Senate Construction Director Hans Stimmann, beginning in late 1991. 
This chapter unpacks the complexities of the city’s administrative situation and examines 
two key cases in Berlin’s early post-Wall development (1989-1991) that contributed to the 
perceived need for a more rigid application of Critical Reconstruction as a city planning 
philosophy after 1991. These sites in the formerly glittering commercial center of Weimar Berlin 
had, for the previous forty years, been wasting away in the no-man’s-land along the Berlin Wall, 
and they were now the most sought-after addresses for multinational companies and real estate 
investors. The first, and most prominent, of these projects was Potsdamer Platz, a massive, multi-
use site housing two corporate headquarters as well as retail, residential, and entertainment 
spaces. The debates that unfolded between 1989 and 1992 over the development of this site 
garnered international attention, not only because of the multitude of internationally-renowned 
architects who flocked to take part in the master plan competition, but because of the highly 
contentious nature of the proceedings, which generated international scandals in the architectural 
community. Observers in the media were also particularly critical of the idea that real estate 
investors, rather than planners or designers, were calling the shots. In order to keep the city from 
becoming a physical catalog of trendy, commercial starchitecture chosen solely by investors, the 
various constituents involved in Berlin planning temporarily buried many of their disagreements 
and cooperated. Whatever their other differences, they agreed on the idea that Potsdamer Platz 
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should retain something of its historical “identity,” however loosely defined, in the face of 
globally-driven development. The end results, however, were widely recognized as disappointing 
from both architectural and urban planning perspectives. The second example discussed in this 
chapter is the less conspicuous Friedrichstadt Passagen project, a set of three block-sized retail 
developments along the historically important avenue of Friedrichstrasse. While it did not attract 
the same level of attention as the Potsdamer Platz competition, it also helped shape later 
development by setting the scale – that of the entire urban block – for new projects in the city 
center. Officials were unable to adequately steer the mechanisms of planning at either Potsdamer 
Platz or the Friedrichstadt Passagen in such a way as to prevent the investors from wielding 
considerable influence over the process, and the results were, in both cases, compromises that 
were neither architecturally groundbreaking, nor recognizably “historical” in character. Rather, 
the competitions resulted in trendy, commercial designs that amounted to little more than 
ostentatious shopping malls.  
This chapter thus provides a detailed picture of the conditions affecting city planning in 
newly reunited Berlin – conditions that subsequently led Stimmann to adopt and adapt Critical 
Reconstruction as a planning model for the city’s reconstruction, as will be discussed in Chapter 
3. Unlike the hermetic world of Josef Paul Kleihues’s IBA, where just a few people planned and 
adjudicated a series of state-sponsored construction and rehabilitation projects involving the 
world’s most prominent and talented designers, the contentious, conflict-ridden, and exceedingly 
public kick-off to the rebuilding of the new Berlin was subject to what historian Janet Ward calls 
the “Stimmann Effect”: a fraught and failed attempt at fabricating a post-modern, historically-
oriented urban landscape, that ended, paradoxically, in the creation of a series of large-scale, 
consumer-oriented, and ultimately very “American” projects. In fact, however, these outcomes 
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had nothing at all to do with Stimmann. On the contrary, his late entrance onto the planning 
scene in April of 1991 allowed him a first-hand view of the outcomes of these first forays into 
Berlin’s redevelopment, but with very limited power to change them. These experiences 
convinced Stimmann that the city would have to be as strategic in its dealings with investors as it 
was about zoning, land prices, or design competitions, leading him to adopt Critical 
Reconstruction as, among other things, a means to set developers’ expectations. 
 
Knitting Berlin Back Together 
The world watched as the Berlin Wall fell on November 9th, 1989, ushering in a new era 
for Germany. Over the next year, the government of East Germany was gradually subsumed 
legally, financially, and administratively by West Germany, and the two countries officially 
united on October 3rd, 1990. This period of reunification is referred to in German as the Wende, 
or “turning point”1: a word that, as opposed to the more triumphant idea of “reunification,” 
encompasses the many problems the merge entailed – not only bureaucratic ones, but cultural 
and social ones as well. Scholars often refer to the lasting “Wall in the head” between former 
citizens of the two countries.2 In addition to the pronounced lifestyle differences between the 
Western European, American-influenced, democratic, and consumerist society of West Germany 
(the Federal Republic of Germany, or FRG), and those in impoverished, Communist East 
Germany (the German Democratic Republic, or GDR), the two societies had historicized and 
memorialized the Nazi period, World War II, and the Holocaust in very different ways. Thus the 
work of bringing the two halves of the country together took place at multiple levels. 
                                                
1 It is common usage to simply call it “the Wende” in English texts; I will follow this convention here. 
2 This phrase was coined by author Peter Schneider in his novel The Wall Jumper. See Peter Schneider, Der 
Mauerspringer: Erzählung (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1982). 
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Whereas the post-Wall years were a challenging turning point for the larger nation of 
Germany, the period between 1990 and 1992 has been dubbed Berlin’s “real estate gold rush.” 
Major companies and banks flocked to open offices there: 119 businesses with over 8,000 
employees relocated to the city in the first half of 1993, including, most prominently, Daimler 
Benz and Sony. Bolstered by the city’s bid for the 2000 Olympics, on which East and West 
Berlin began cooperation in late 1989, the message of politicians was “growth, growth, growth.”3 
Berlin was billed as the new node in the network of the Central European economy, a nexus 
between East and West, the “gateway to the East” or, as the head of the German national railway 
put it, the “turntable between East and West.”4 Exorbitant predictions circulated: Berlin was 
going to need six million square meters of new office space and would have to house up to two 
million new residents, necessitating up to 800,000 new dwellings.5 The engine for this growth 
was to be the service sector, which would, such was the hope, bloom as companies relocated to 
Berlin in order to be closer to Europe’s new geographical center. The official designation of 
Berlin as the new capital of reunited Germany in June of 1991 only added to the fervor.6 
                                                
3 Elizabeth A Strom, Building the New Berlin: The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City 
(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001), 119. Even in 1998, long after these hopes had been dashed, Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder, in his inaugural speech, expressed the hope that “Berlin,” which to him sounded “too Prussian,” would become the 
cosmopolitan “New Berlin” and take on an identity as the new center of Europe. Janet Ward, Post-Wall Berlin: Borders, Space 
and Identity (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 286; Harald Bodenschatz and Uwe 
Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in London und Berlin (Berlin: Verlagshaus Braun, 2005), 198. 
4 These characterizations had actually circulated before the Wall fell, as the climate of détente in the 1980s fueled 
increased cooperation between East and West. In the post-Wall era, Walter Momper and Tino Schwierzina were two main 
proponents of this discourse of growth. Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 198, 214; Ward, Post-Wall Berlin, 282. 
5 Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 198. See also “Grundlagen und Zielvorstellungen für die 
Entwicklung der Region Berlin, 1. Bericht – 5/90” in Siegfried Reibetanz et al., Potsdamer Platz, Leipziger Platz: 
Informationsband zur Ausschreibung des städtebaulichen Wettbewerbes (Berlin: Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und 
Umweltschutz, 1991), 130–131. 
6 The capital remained in Bonn until a controversial and narrow parliamentary vote in June of 1991 designated Berlin 
as the new seat of government, and the government did not officially make the physical move until 1999. The decision came as a 
surprise to many: historian Giles MacDonagh notes how no one in Berlin actually believed, at the time of the vote, that it would 
become the capital of united Germany. See Giles MacDonogh, Berlin (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), x–xi; see also 
Strom, Building the New Berlin, 160–163. 
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Observers predicted 100,000 additional new jobs as a result.7 Such dramatic speculative growth, 
as political scientist Elizabeth Strom notes, is relatively uncommon in Germany, and the 
situation was made infinitely more complex by the administrative and political structures of the 
two former halves of Berlin.8 
Government and Administrative Structures and Roles 
 Just as they were at the federal level, the laws and governing structures of the western 
half of the city were expanded into East Berlin upon reunification in October of 1990.9 As a city-
state, Berlin has its own Parliament (the Abgeordnetenhaus) with 149 seats, which functions 
much like the federal Parliament, with many committees and sub-groups who hash out decisions 
behind closed doors. With a few small exceptions, the parties represented in the Berlin 
Parliament tend to mirror those in the federal government: the two largest are the left-centrist 
Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, or SPD) and the right-
centrist Christian Democratic Party (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, or CDU).10 
Smaller, but still influential, parties include the Green Party,11 the post-communist Left Party 
(die Linke or die Linkspartei),12 and the classically liberal Free Democratic Party (Freie 
Demokratische Partei, or FDP).13  
                                                
7 Strom, Building the New Berlin, 122. 
8 Ibid., 119. 
9 Ibid., 23. 
10 The Bavarian CSU (Christian Social Union) party cooperates with the CDU to form one party at the national level, 
but they are not active in local Berlin politics.  
11 In Berlin the Greens are referred to as Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, in reference to the union of the Green parties from 
both East and West Berlin at the time of the Wende. The western Alternative Liste (AL) party was also part of this union for a few 
years. 
12 This party was formed in 2007 as a merger of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), successor to the East 
German Communist Party, and a left-wing breakaway from the SPD. 
13 Other smaller parties have played roles over the years as well, notably the Pirate Party, which entered parliament in 
2009. 
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The executive body of the Berlin Parliament is the Senate, whose members are voted in 
by parliament.14 With the exception of the mayor, who leads as “first among equals,” the 
members of the Senate are each responsible for overseeing a particular city administrative 
department, such as finance, employment, education, and, of course, city planning.15 This 
structure means that with each new election or change in government, the heads of these 
departments are also subject to change, creating potential inconsistencies with regards to policy. 
Further complicating Berlin’s rebuilding in the early 1990s was the fact that, at the time, two 
different Senate departments with overlapping aims and jurisdiction oversaw urban development: 
the Department of Construction and Housing and the Department of Urban Development and 
Environment.16 From 1991 to 1996, i.e. the years of the most intense urban development in 
Berlin, these two planning departments were headed by Senator Wolfgang Nagel (SPD) and 
Senator Volker Hassemer (CDU), respectively.17 Though they often cooperated, these two 
offices had the potential to put roadblocks in each other’s way if politically necessary or 
advantageous. In addition, from November 1989 until reunification, the governing body of East 
Berlin, the Magistrat, also took part in decision-making. Despite these various complexities, 
there has been considerable continuity within the Senate over the years, as is apparent from the 
following table: 
 
                                                
14 The Berlin mayor actually thus holds the title of “Lord Mayor,” or Regierende Bürgermeister. 
15 In the late 1990s the administrative departments were consolidated, reducing the number of senators from 15 to 8. 
See “Senatsgalerie: Magistrate Und Senate 1945 Bis 2013,” Berlin.de, accessed July 18, 2014, 
http://www.berlin.de/rbmskzl/regierender-buergermeister/senat/senatsgalerie/. 
16 These departments have since been consolidated into one administration, whose current name is the Department of 
City Development and Environment. 
17 At the time of the Wende, the Department of Construction and Housing, the Department of Urban Development and 
Environment, and the Department of Transportation were separate entities; in 1995 the functions of the Transportation 
department were absorbed by Construction and Housing, and in 1999 all of these were combined into a “superbureaucracy.” See 
Strom, Building the New Berlin, 101. Also note that at the time of the Wende Senator Hassemer was not in office; Michaele 
Schreyer and Norbert Meisner headed the Department of Urban Development and Environment until 1990. 
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Table 2.1: Berlin Governments and Important Senate positions, 1981-200118 
Mayor Senator for Culture Senator for Construction 
and Housing 
Senator for Urban 
Development and 
Environment 








Ulrich Rastemborski (CDU) 
until August 1983 
Klaus Franke (CDU) 
 
Volker Hassemer (CDU) 
until March 1983 
Horst Vetter (FDP) 





Klaus Franke (CDU) Horst Vetter (FDP) 





Klaus Franke (CDU) until 
April 1986 
Georg Wittwer (CDU) 
Horst Vetter (FDP) until 
April 1986 
Jürgen Starnick (no party) 
Walter Momper (SPD) 
1989-1991 
Anke Martiny (SPD) Wolfgang Nagel (SPD) Michaele Schreyer 
(Alternative Liste19/Greens) 




Wolfgang Nagel (SPD) Volker Hassemer (CDU) 
Eberhard Diepgen (CDU) 
1996-1999 
n/a (seat no longer 
existed) 
Jürgen Klemann (CDU) (as 
“Senator for Construction, 
Housing, and 
Transportation”) 
Peter Strieder (SPD) (as 




Eberhard Diepgen (CDU) 
1999-2001 
n/a (seat no longer 
existed) 
n/a (seat no longer existed) Peter Strieder (SPD) (as 
“Senator for Urban 
Development”) 
  
In addition to the Senate and Parliament, Berlin also has local districts (Bezirke), which 
are run by elected councils, but which cannot operate autonomously from the larger Berlin 
government. They rely on funds allocated by the Senate, have no revenue-generating capacities, 
and any decisions they make are subject to veto by the state.20 However, the districts do wield a 
fair amount of power over urban development, because all plans for building or renovation must 
gain their approval in order to proceed. As Strom explains, especially in the eastern districts 
where most of the immediate post-Wende development was focused, district building directors 
tended to become spokespersons for citizens’ movements and other groups who felt their views 
                                                
18 Source: “Senatsgalerie: Magistrate Und Senate 1945 Bis 2013.” 
19 The Alternative Liste was a West Berlin-based Green party that was later subsumed into Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 
20 From 1990 to 2001, there were 20 districts; they have now been consolidated into 12 districts as a cost-saving 
measure. Strom, Building the New Berlin, 21, 31.  
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on city building policy were being ignored by the state. In order to sidestep potential long-term 
conflicts with such groups, district officials were almost always included in state-sponsored 
competition juries so that the “public interest” could be said to be duly represented.21 In areas 
such as Potsdamer Platz, which were effectively uninhabited after the Wall fell, there were no 
residents to form interest groups in the first place.22  
 Another important force in Berlin politics is comprised by the various administrations 
themselves. For any given task, Strom explains, there are usually multiple agencies responsible 
at both the district and state levels: “For example, although the sale of public land is technically 
the responsibility of the Finance Department, in fact the Urban Development, Construction, and 
Commerce departments as well as each Bezirk all have sections concerned with public real 
estate.”23 In addition to decisions being spread amongst multiple agencies, the agencies 
themselves also play multiple and sometimes contradictory roles. For instance, in the immediate 
post-Wende era, the Department of Construction and Housing under Senator Wolfgang Nagel 
was responsible for, on the one hand, selling off huge chunks of land to investors (with no public 
input whatsoever), and then for heading the effort, with public input, to convince these investors 
to build appropriately.24 Adding further confusion to this already complex network of actors and 
roles was that fact that, in Strom’s words, “the rejoining of the two Berlins (as well as the two 
Germanys) resembled the takeover of a bankrupt firm more than the formation of a 
                                                
21 Ibid., 31–32. Mitte’s first building director was Dorothee Dubrau, succeeded by Karin Baumert. 
22 Strom contends that, because of the configuration of the Bezirk involvement in planning, what may look like a 
process without much participation from the general public is actually one that includes consistent mechanisms for public input. 
However, as will become clear in Chapters 4 and 5 with the examples of Alexanderplatz and the Planwerk Innenstadt, particular 
sites did give rise to citizen participation and mobilization, but because neighborhoods had few mechanisms for controlling the 
planning process, developers and city officials were able to direct planning decisions without taking these voices into account. 
23 Strom, Building the New Berlin, 26. 
24 Ibid. 
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partnership.”25 Many East German administrators were laid off or forced to retire because they 
were not able to fulfill their duties, either due to their political leanings or to a lack of the 
technical expertise needed for their new positions.26 Those who did remain had to learn a whole 
new set of rules in the midst of an intense speculation bubble. Beginning in 1989, Western 
“advisers” were placed in East Berlin administrations to help guide them toward reunification, 
and this had a palpable effect on the ways that land sales and development were handled at such 
sites as the Friedrichstadt Passagen.27 As will become clear from the discussion below, the 
design, function, and aesthetics of these buildings cannot be understood apart from the complex 
administrative and governmental apparatuses that guided their development. 
The Problem of Land Sale and Restitution in East Berlin 
 The Wende brought mass confusion to Berlin’s administration over how to manage the 
large swathes of unbuilt or uninhabited property in the former East Berlin, which lay largely in 
the central district of Mitte (fig. 1.16). According to Strom, “district planning offices were 
inundated with building applications, creating pressures that would be daunting to even the most 
experienced bureaucrat. To those in the East, who were just mastering German planning laws as 
well as the principles of the private real estate market, the workload was truly overwhelming.”28 
Just before reunification, in 1990, the government of the GDR had established an agency called 
the Treuhand (Trust Agency),29 which was responsible for holding and selling the properties in 
Berlin that had formerly belonged to East Germany, including state-run businesses and other 
government holdings. Meanwhile, the federal government claimed rights over certain areas of 
                                                
25 Ibid., 74. 
26 Ibid., 58. 
27 Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 198. 
28 Strom, Building the New Berlin, 60. 
29 Like the term “Wende,” “Treuhand” is not commonly translated in the English-language literature. Its official name 
was the Treuhandanstalt, often abbreviated as “THA.” See Ibid., 64. 
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former East Berlin, such as the “death strip” (“Todesstreife”) that surrounded the Wall, as well as 
lands that had belonged to the military.30 All of these properties, as well as East Berlin properties 
that stood under private ownership (of which there were many), were subject to West German 
restitution laws, requiring the return of property to any former owners who laid claim, going 
back as far as 1933. Multiple claims could be made on any given property, and these could also 
be bought and sold by other representatives.31 For instance, the claims of Jewish property owners 
whose lands had been seized by the Nazi regime were often represented not by individuals, but 
by an agency that used the claims money to support Holocaust survivors.32 Speculation also 
occurred, with claims being bought up privately by potential property investors. In all, about 
170,000 restitution claims for real estate were made in Berlin, and ninety percent of these were in 
Mitte.33 
 Amidst this administrative chaos, agencies did not cooperate well on setting pricing 
strategies for land sale, nor was any one agency able to clearly articulate development policies or 
set a guiding plan for the city. Observers have called this “policy schizophrenia”: different 
agencies worked at odds with one another, each trying achieve its own goals and represent its 
own particular interest groups. For instance, the Commerce Department wanted to promote 
industry, and thus looked to develop land quickly and attract investment, while the Finance 
Department wanted the maximum returns on land. One of the most prominent actors in Berlin 
planning turned out to be the Department of Transportation, since traffic and public 
                                                
30 Ibid., 103, 106. The Deutsche Bahn also had rights to any property formerly owned by the East German train 
company. 
31 Ibid., 67, 123. 
32 Strom notes that “Community activists, especially in the tenement neighborhoods of East Berlin that had been the 
center of the pre-Holocaust Jewish community, now find themselves in the awkward position of battling Jewish claimants in 
order to assert the rights of current tenants to remain in affordable apartments. Thus do the ghosts of Germany’s troubled modern 
history haunt even seemingly arcane discussions of ownership rights.” Ibid., 64–66. 
33 Only about one third were awarded. Ibid., 67. 
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transportation issues were of great interest to residents and politicians alike.34 Meanwhile, local 
officials, especially those in Mitte, were interested in small-scale growth, affordable housing, and 
the preservation of existing buildings, but were hampered by the inexperience of their 
administrators and by their limited negotiating power.35 Rather, the larger Berlin city government 
and large private investors became the main guiding forces of development. 
Two administrative-legal means helped the city government grease the wheels of 
investment. One was a federal act allowing “those willing and able to create economically 
important development projects to acquire land even if property claims are pending.”36 This 
came to be known as the “Berlin model,” where investors who could promise to build quickly 
were given preference over property claimants, who were instead compensated monetarily. 
Secondly, an institution called the “Coordinating Committee for Inner City Investment” 
(Koordinierungsausschuss für innerstädtuscher Investitionen, or KOAI) was established at the 
behest of the Senate Construction and Housing department to deal with conflicting claims, 
guarantee investors a clear title, establish which planning guidelines were applicable to the site, 
and, ultimately, choose a developer. As a relatively invisible institution (its minutes were not 
made available, there was no press coverage of meetings, and it was rarely mentioned by the 
media), the KOAI was able to skirt much of the red tape and steer, to some degree, large-scale 
development without hindrance by other agencies or by the public.37  
                                                
34 Although I do not discuss it here, traffic and transportation issues were a significant hold-up in the planning of 
Potsdamer Platz. This is well documented in Rudolf Stegers, Der Streit um den Potsdamer Platz: Eine Chronik in vier Teilen 
(Berlin: Deutsche Werkbund, 1990). 
35 Strom, Building the New Berlin, 105–106. 
36 Ibid., 65. 
37 This institution and its function as a “black box” of decision-making for land sales is discussed at length by Karin 
Lenhart. See Karin Lenhart, Berliner Metropoly: Stadtentwicklungspolitik Im Berliner Bezirk Mitte Nach Der Wende (Opladen: 
Leske + Budrich, 2001). Especially since Nagel, after leaving in office in 1996, became the director of the Fundus Real Estate 
Group, who benefitted heavily from these sales, some have accused the KOAI of corruption. His close associate Hanno Klein, the 
first head of the KOAI, who was described by one observer as “an ambitious Baron von Haussmann wannabe,” seemed to favor 
large, foreign or West German developers over local builders, claiming that local firms were simply too small to carry out high-
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 Though the decisions to sell to large-scale investors met with criticism from many fronts, 
it is important to remember that they were undertaken largely by centrist politicians who were, 
despite the predictions of growth, concerned with the financial viability of Berlin. Accustomed to 
its status as a “free-democratic bulwark” against the Communist state, with special status and 
generous subsidies from the federal government, former West Berlin now had to contend with a 
global market and, beginning in 1993, a drastically reduced federal support. Now, as Senator for 
Urban Development Volker Hassemer put it, they had to “ride the tiger”: in other words, try to 
make the best of the unruly international investors and do their best to guide the city’s rebuilding 
into channels that would be aesthetically and economically appropriate for the new German 
capital.38  
Planning and Competition Practices in Berlin 
 Land use plans in Berlin are, technically, subject to somewhat extensive review. 
However, planners and investors in the post-Wende years often relied on shortcuts in order to 
speed up the process. According to Berlin’s planning laws, a land use plan must be approved by 
the state parliament after being prepared by the Department of Urban Development and 
Environment.39 Construction plans must then be submitted for all projects, and they are subject 
to approval by both local districts and, ultimately, the Senate Department of Construction and 
Housing. At the behest of the Berlin planning departments and the KOAI, many developers 
ended up utilizing an exception to this rule: the so-called “loophole paragraphs” 
                                                                                                                                                       
profile projects. As architectural Lenhart notes, “The more spectacular the projects, the more famous the architects and more 
financially strong the investors, the more they were welcomed.” Ibid., 78. Klein was assassinated by letter bomb in 1991, and Eva 
Schweitzer points to evidence that Klein was killed by someone from the Berlin building industry who was angry that too many 
foreign companies were receiving contracts. See Eva Schweitzer, Grossbaustelle Berlin: wie die Hauptstadt verplant wird 
(Berlin: Nicolai, 1996), 63.The KOAI was not the only agency responsible for doling out contracts behind closed doors; the 
Berlin Economic Development Corporation and the Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft or BLEG were also both supposed to link 
investors with properties. See Strom, Building the New Berlin, 102, 107–109; Ward, Post-Wall Berlin, 292.  
38 Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 199. 
39 This department has since been merged with the Department of Construction and Housing. 
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(Lückenparagraphen) of the construction code (§ 34 and § 36), which state that building done for 
the purposes of infill can be subject to a much less extensive review.40 
Even utilizing these shortcuts, though, does not absolve developers of the requirement for 
state input regarding what is to be built. Berlin is famous for its culture of architectural 
competitions. All major public buildings, and many private ones, require competitions as part of 
the planning process, and the Department of Construction and Housing and Urban Planning can 
require that private investors hold competitions in exchange for being able to build on public 
land. Thus competitions are a major way in which Berlin officials have strived to steer 
development from an architectural standpoint.41 Usually overseen by the Berlin Architects’ 
Chamber (Architektenkammer), with juries chosen by the sponsoring public authority, these 
competitions are often limited to a small group of invited architects.42 Developers do not have to 
accept the winners of these competitions, but it is clear to them that things will go more smoothly 
if they do so, and this expectation has only rarely led to tensions, most notably, as will be 
discussed below, at Potsdamer Platz. Partly based on this negative experience, the Berlin 
government has since learned to pick investors who will be likely to follow their lead 
architecturally.43 Conversely, investors have recognized that it behooves them to pick architects 
that are already approved by the Senate departments, and have tended, according to Strom, to 
invite “the same local notables” to serve as jurors as the public authorities have done.44 As will 
become clear over the course of the remaining chapters, this elitism became one of the main 
                                                
40 Schweitzer, Grossbaustelle Berlin, 71; Stefanie Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild: 
Stadtentwicklungspolitik in Berlin zwischen 1991 und 1999 (Hamburg: Kovač, 2010), 242; Lenhart, Berliner Metropoly, 73–74. 
41 Investors can choose the invitees and sit on juries for these projects, but they must still consist of a majority of 
architects. See Strom, Building the New Berlin, 149. 
42 Ibid., 148. 
43 Ibid., 149. 
44 Ibid. 
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reasons that Stimmann and others came under fire for their planning decisions, and it also helps 
to explain why so many buildings in Mitte today share a similar look and feel. 
Though it may seem laborious, the competition process actually helps to speed decision-
making. Where design-by-consensus might take a very long time, competitions offer concrete 
outcomes that also shift responsibility for these choices away from single elected officials and 
onto juries (which often, it should be noted, include those same officials). But another reason, 
Strom surmises, that Berlin planning culture has come to rely so heavily on competitions has to 
do with the overall reliance on supposedly “neutral” specialists in political decision-making 
processes in Berlin and Germany generally. Strom calls this the culture of “expertocracy” 
whereby the “expert public” (Fachöffentlichkeit) (including, in the case of city planning, 
architects, planners, university professors, critics, civic group leaders, and intellectuals) is 
utilized in order to legitimize decisions and ensure support from professional organizations and 
the media. Germans tend to look on capital investment with skepticism, believing that experts 
should be the only ones entrusted with the job of deciding what should be built, an attitude that 
stems from a more general attitude, prominent in both East and West German societies, that the 
state, rather than any private entity, is the most worthy representative of public interest.45 For 
Germans, “ownership of land,” Strom says, “doesn’t imply the right to build anything you want 
on it … wealth doesn’t entitle one to leave an indelible mark on the collective built environment 
without the approval of those experts considered as guardians of the public’s space.”46 
The importance of the “expert public” means that another key group of actors in Berlin 
planning is consultants, who often work under contract with the city. Panels, advisory 
                                                
45 Ibid., 146–147. 
46 Ibid., 147. 
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commissions, and written expert opinions (Gutachten) are common.47 This arrangement can be 
politically advantageous, not only because these individuals and groups contributed much-
needed professional expertise, but also because, in this way, as Strom notes, potential critics 
become paid participants in the political process.48 The participation of experts in decision-
making processes can be seen in two opposing ways. On the one hand, one can view the experts 
as “guarantors of the public good,” doing jobs that no layperson could do, or would be interested 
in doing. On the other hand, in Strom’s words, “These processes grant the illusion of public 
participation while in fact further insulating decision making.”49 While the public is informed 
about things like architectural competitions, they have no way to participate in them directly. 
Even the two public forums sponsored by the Senate, the “City Forum” (Stadtforum, sponsored 
by the Department of Urban Development, which began in 1991 and continues to meet today) 
and the “Architecture Talks” (Architekturgespräche, 1991-2006, sponsored by Stimmann from 
within the Department of Construction and later in the Department of Urban planning), which 
supposedly functioned as spaces of debate and discussion about planning decisions, were, most 
agree, simply well-crafted, staged events featuring a handful of participants selected from 
amongst the “expert public.”50 Furthermore, such events and competitions focus public attention 
on the superficial, rather than the political or economic, aspects of planning. While newspapers 
feature arguments over design decisions, few people, even amongst city officials, actually know 
how or to whom land has been sold.51 
                                                
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 27. Strom also notes the importance of “parapublic” institutions such as the Architects’ Chamber 
(Architektenkammer), which, in addition to its traditional role as a professional organization, is responsible for setting guildelines 
and issuing approvals for competitions. “Thus,” Strom notes, “do private organizations take on public roles.” Ibid., 28–30.  
49 Strom, Building the New Berlin, 150. 
50 Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 70. 
51 Strom, Building the New Berlin, 150. 
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Together, these various relationships and roles have the effect of making Berlin planning 
policy appear inattentive to public input. The case is not quite that simple, though; rather, the 
German preference for paternalistic governance and reliance on experts constitutes a form of 
representative democracy that is somewhat removed from everyday voters, but which 
nonetheless takes their concerns into account through close cooperation with interest groups. 
However, as will become clear in the examination of Potsdamer Platz, this system, at the time of 
the Wende, was ill-equipped to deal with large multinational corporations and the quick 
development of large plots of land. 
Local Identity and Image in a Global Economy 
 On a conceptual level, much of what Berlin’s planners were grappling with at the time of 
the Wende was increased pressure to create a unique, marketable identity for Berlin in the face of 
global competition. As sociologist Saskia Sassen has argued, growing cities in the so-called 
“global age” must fulfill a paradoxical double role: on the one hand, they must be networked – 
physically and virtually – with the rest of the world, presenting themselves as totally 
interconnected “cities without walls” that will function as key nodes in the flow of global capital. 
On the other hand, no matter how interconnected they may be in terms of telecommunications, 
finance, or the shipment of goods, successful metropolises have, from a physical standpoint, 
tended to recentralize services, with finance, banking, law, and advertising firms clustered within 
easy reach of multinational headquarters. Thus, in contrast to the capitals of empires in previous 
centuries, global cities now distinguish themselves through their ability to compete on a 
worldwide level for business, “branding” themselves in unique ways in order to attract 
companies and workers.52  
                                                
52 Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991); see 
also Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Pine Forge Press, 2000). 
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Geographer David Harvey has called this situation the rise of “urban 
entrepreneurialism.”53 In an essay published right at the time of the fall of the Wall, in 1989, 
which no doubt had effects on the ways that cities such as Berlin handled city planning, Harvey 
identifies several key trends in city planning practices in the global age. His observations help to 
explain some of the decisions made by Berlin officials, which may now look to us somewhat 
naïve, hackneyed, or even corrupt. First, Harvey points out, cities are not themselves actors, but 
things arising from a “spatially grounded social process in which a wide range of different actors 
with quite different objects and agendas interact.”54 In Berlin, as explained above, a dizzying 
array of institutions, officials, interest groups, and political forces had to cooperate in order to 
further development. The centerpiece of this interaction in the global age, according to Harvey, 
is often public-private partnership, in which in “traditional local boosterism is integrated with the 
use of local governmental powers to try and attract external sources of funding, new direct 
investments, or new employment sources.”55 Always speculative in nature, this type of 
partnership tends to focus on what Harvey calls the creation of “place,”56 by which he means the 
construction of business-centered infrastructure (in the form of, for example, office parks, “civic 
centers,” or shopping malls) which has little to directly contribute to the welfare of local 
residents:  
The construction of such places may, of course, be viewed as a means to procure 
benefits for populations within a particular jurisdiction, and indeed this is a 
                                                
53 David Harvey, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late 
Capitalism,” Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography 71, no. 1 (January 1, 1989): 5.See also David Harvey, Spaces of 
Capital: Towards a Critical Geography (New York: Routledge, 2001), 346. 
54 Harvey, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism,” 6. 
55 Ibid., 7. 
56 Harvey’s definition of “place” is somewhat distinct from, though not unrelated to, the definition of “place” most 
famously put forward by Yi-Fu Tuan a decade earlier (Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977). Whereas Tuan defines a “place” as something that explicitly elicits human 
connection and attachment, Harvey seems to use the term in a more cynical way, to denote constructed landscapes that are meant 
to promote this kind of attachment, but which in actuality serve corporate interests. 
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primary claim made in the public discourse developed to support them. But for 
the most part, their form is such as to make all benefits indirect and potentially 
either wider or smaller in scope than the jurisdiction in which they lie. … City 
leaders can look upon [such] spectacular development as a "loss leader" to pull in 
other forms of development.57 
 
In other words, while the effects of building a new mall, for instance, might be to bring a few 
hundred more jobs to a neighborhood, or might benefit local businesses by attracting new 
customers, such effects are marginal, indirect, and often uncertain, as opposed to public money 
directly spent on services such as schools, hospitals, or housing. With the promise of bringing 
jobs to Berlin, as well as acting as magnets for relocation by other attendant service industries, 
Berlin’s leaders entered into exactly these kinds of public-private partnerships with large 
companies, with the aim of building precisely such “places.” 
 Harvey also notes that this type of speculative development relies on the creation of 
“urban imagery,” both in order to attract investors, and to sell such ideas to the public. The word 
“imagery” here can mean a number of image-based practices, from exhibitions and publications 
of plans, maps, and drawings, to descriptive verbal imagery, or the imagery of the constructed 
built environment itself. All of these tactics were used in Berlin’s planning. Indeed, the discourse 
on Berlin’s redevelopment is shot through with the concept of “image,” from statements by 
potential investors who desired “postcard-worthy” buildings, to the rhetoric of planners, who 
often invoked the terms “Leitbild” (“guiding image”) or “Stadtbild” (“urban image”) when 
speaking of their plans.58 The creation of numerous city-sponsored marketing firms and the 
construction of tourist attractions aimed at making a spectacle of Berlin’s reconstruction, such as 
the famous “Info-Box” at Potsdamer Platz (1995-2001), were directed, in part, towards potential 
                                                
57 Harvey, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism,” 8, 13–14. 
58 For an in-depth discussion of the term Leitbild and its use in city planning practice in Germany, see Hennecke, Die 
kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 15–54. 
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investors.59 But, Harvey points out, this kind of image-based marketing is also meant for a local 
audience: 
The production of an urban image of this sort also has internal political and social 
consequences. It helps counteract the sense of alienation and anomie that Simmel 
long ago identified as such a problematic feature of modern city life. It 
particularly does so when an urban terrain is opened for display, fashion and the 
“presentation of self” in a surrounding of spectacle and play. The orchestrated 
production of an urban image can, if successful, also help create a sense of social 
solidarity, civic pride and loyalty to place and even allow the urban image to 
provide a mental refuge in a world that capital treats as more and more place-
less.60 
 
So, although the development itself, from an economic standpoint, may only marginally benefit 
those who already live in a particular place, urban images are used to appeal to residents on a 
conceptual level, bolstering feelings of collective belonging and identity and promoting political 
support for public-private projects. This effect has the added benefit of creating the “branding” 
that the cities now need in order to attract new business. Berlin officials often relied on image-
based language that presented the new city center as the potential intersection of local and global 
life. For instance, in an editorial in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Mayor Eberhard 
Diepgen envisioned Berlin’s new city center thus: 
It is a summer’s day on the cusp of the new century, and the new square between 
the Lustgarten, the foreign ministry and the city library has the character and 
charm of a cityscape like the ones we know from old black and white 
photographs. On park benches and the chairs of a street café, casually dressed 
students from the nearby Humboldt University sit drinking espresso and leafing 
through books from the library. Well dressed visitors and officials from the 
foreign ministry stroll by; tourists from all over the world seek free tables in 
restaurants or buy international newspapers. An ideal resting place after a long 
walk down Unter den Linden, before one turns off down Berlin’s most delirious 
                                                
59 See Info-Box: Der Katalog [Ausstellung: 16. Oktober 1995 bis 31. Dezember 2000] (Berlin: Nishen, 1996). The 
place-marketing of Berlin is discussed at length in the following three works: Ward, Post-Wall Berlin; Karen E Till, The New 
Berlin: Memory, Politics, Place (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005); Claire Colomb, Staging the New Berlin: 
Place Marketing and the Politics of Urban Reinvention Post-1989 (Hoboken: Routledge, 2011). 
60 Harvey, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism,” 14. 
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stretch on Oranienburger Strasse, where hip bars, theaters, or the nexus of new 
Jewish life around the synagogue awaken their curiosity.61 
 
 As Ward points out, an irony of cities’ need to compete on a global level is that they must 
become ever-more local in their image-making, presenting themselves as unique and desirable 
places with their own special character. Especially for European cities, such localized marketing 
tactics often come to rely on historical (some would say “nostalgic”) imagery, a logical choice, 
given the various layers of centuries-long historical development in typical European urban 
landscapes.62 The emphasis on history, furthermore, is not necessarily an overtly superficial 
marketing strategy, but a key part of the larger post-modern turn towards traditional urban forms 
in architectural and urban design. By focusing on history as part of Berlin’s identity, then, 
officials were able to make the most of the intersection between local and global city dynamics 
by fostering both a sense of local distinctiveness, and becoming part of a larger global trend with 
regards to urban design and architecture that they hoped would appeal (though it did not always 
do so) to investors. 
As will become clear in the examples below, the focus on the local also made sense in 
terms of Berlin’s many actors in city development, many of whom felt threatened by the 
influence of global capital. With large, international firms calling the shots, critics and planners 
across the spectrum feared that Berlin might turn into a Disneyland of architectural experiments, 
                                                
61 “Es ist ein Sommertag an der Grenze des Jahrhunderts, der neue Platz zwischen Lustgarten, Aussenministerium und 
Stadtbibliothek hat den Charakter und Charme einer Stadtlandschaft, wie wir sie von alten Schwarzweissfotos kennen. Auf 
Parkbänken und Stühlen eines Strassencafés sitzen salopp gekleidete Studenten der nahe gelegenen Humboldt-Universität, die 
hier ihren Espresso trinken und in einem Buch aus der Bibliothek blättern. Vornehm gekleidete Besucher und Beamte des 
Auswärtigen Amtes schlendern vorbei, Besucher aus aller Welt suchen einen freien Platz im Restaurant oder kaufen 
internationale Zeitungen. Ein idealer Flucht- und Ruhepunkt nach einem langen Bummel Unter den Linden, ehe man abschwenkt 
zu Berlins irrster Meile in der Oranienburger Strasse, wo Szenekneipen, Off-Theater oder die Brennpunkte neuen jüdischen 
Lebens um die Synagoge die Neugier wecken.” Eberhard Diepgen, “Gestern Schinkel, Heute Kinkel?,” Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, April 16, 1993. Translation mine. Note that the block he describes here is the one that, at the time, was home to the 
controversial Palast der Republik (see Chapter 4). 
62 For a discussion of the idea of the “European city,” see Chapter 3, as well as Dirk Schubert, “Mythos ‘Europäische 
Stadt’: Zur Erforderlichen Kontextualisierung Eines Umstrittenen Begriffs,” Alte Stadt 28, no. 4 (2001): 270–90; Hartmut 
Häussermann and Walter Siebel, Die europäische Stadt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004). 
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which would work against the idea of a unique city identity, and would also potentially take 
away jobs from Berlin architects and contractors who hoped to profit from the influx of 
investment. Thus, Harvey’s observation that “the ideology of locality, place and community” can 
often become central to a “political rhetoric of urban governance which concentrates on the idea 
of togetherness in defense against a hostile and threatening world of international trade and 
heightened competition” rings true with regards to Berlin.63 It was just such a defensive 
mechanism that was triggered by the city’s first large-scale “place-making” project, the 
redevelopment of Potsdamer Platz.  
 
Learning from Potsdamer Platz 
Most of Berlin’s “gold rush” happened in the central district of the city, Mitte (fig. 1.16), 
which was, until 1989, situated right up against the Berlin Wall on the East Berlin side. Many of 
the projects for West Berlin’s International Building Exhibition (IBA) in the 1980s were built 
directly to the south of this area, around the famous Checkpoint Charlie, the most conspicuous 
border crossing into Mitte. Potsdamer Platz, historically a gateway leading out of Berlin towards 
the city of Potsdam, lay just a couple of blocks southwest of the checkpoint. Prior to World War 
II, this area had been a major commercial and entertainment hub, with department stores, 
theaters, clubs, cafés, and, famously, Europe’s first traffic light. Potsdamer Platz also has a 
storied architectural history: the adjoining Leipziger Platz, notable for its distinctive octagonal 
shape, had been the site of Friedrich Gilly’s famous paper monument to Frederick the Great 
(1797, fig. 2.1). In the nineteenth century, Karl Friedrich Schinkel, as well as the renowned 
landscape designer Peter Joseph Lenné, had built here, and Erich Mendelsohn’s famous 
                                                
63 Harvey, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism,” 14. 
 91 
Modernist Columbus Haus had also once stood on Potsdamer Platz (fig. 1.8).64 The site is also 
just a few blocks from Hitler’s Chancellery and the remains of his bunker. In 1989, the square 
was utterly empty, bisected by the Wall, and cleared of the rubble of World War II, the largest 
and best-known piece of “no-man’s-land” along the Berlin Wall. (figs. 2.2.-2.3).  
Potsdamer Platz had therefore become a potent cultural symbol: films such as Wim 
Wenders’s Wings of Desire poetically featured this void as a symbol of the tragedies of recent 
German history and the division of the Cold War. In the film, the character of Homer wanders 
the outskirts of Potsdamer Platz along the Western side of the Wall, searching in vain for his lost 
memories: “I cannot find Potsdamer Platz. No, I think right here … Yet it can’t be here.”65 As 
cultural historian Jonathan Bordo notes, in 1987, when the film was made, Potsdamer Platz 
constituted one of Berlin’s most charged landscapes: 
If “Platz” means place, public space, commons, even square where people gather 
… Potsdamer Platz wasn’t such a place. It wasn’t a place, at all. Potsdamer Platz 
circa 1987 was a wasteland, a ‘zone of exception’ extricated from the everyday 
circulation of life and the ‘no-man’s-land’ between East and West Berlin in the 
partition of the city by the Four Powers after World War II. Potsdamer Platz was 
no-man’s-land, to recall the space between the entrenched armies on the Western 
Front in World War I, an interdicted space devoid of human presence. … 
Wenders’s Homer searches in vain for the lost Potsdamer Platz of the era before 
the rise of National Socialism. His song is of a vanished Potsdamer Platz, 
Potsdamer Platz perdu.66 
 
To planners and investors, after November 1989, the rise of both Potsdamer Platz and Berlin as a 
kind of phoenix from the ashes – the creation of a “place” amidst what was currently a space 
connoting loss and emptiness – thus seemed not only fitting, but inevitable. Bordo’s “Potsdamer 
                                                
64 See Alan Balfour, “Octagon: The Persistence of the Ideal,” in Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary 
Landscape Architecture, ed. James Corner (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1999), 87–100. 
65 Quoted in Jonathan Bordo, “The Homer of Potsdamerplatz: Walter Benjamin in Wim Wenders’s Sky Over 
Berlin/Wings of Desire, a Critical Topography,” Images 2, no. 1 (2008): 94. The use of “place” here, though likely not overtly 
intentional, connects to Harvey’s and Tuan’s uses of the same term – a “place” is something inhabited, used, and identified with 
by people. The quote also connects to the concept of the “void,” discussed in Chapter 5, which was often used in the post-Wall 
era to describe Berlin’s physical, cultural, and social landscape. 
66 Ibid., 91–93. 
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Platz perdu” was exactly what they immediately hoped to rebuild, reviving the area as a center of 
commerce and entertainment, drawing on – some would say, exaggerating – associations with 
the glittering culture, commerce, and nightlife of Weimar Berlin.67 In the words of Daimler Benz 
head Edzard Reuter, the goal was to create an “identity-forming calling card” (identitätsstiftende 
Visitenkarte) in the form of a recognizable and easily digestible architectural image.68  
International Investors and Land Sale 
 The development of Potsdamer Platz had already started with negotiations by West 
Berlin in 1988 to reclaim a small swath of East German land known as the “Lenné-Triangle” 
along the Wall, in order to build a highway thoroughfare.69 Though they had managed to get the 
land, their plans were held up by protests from an environmental citizens’ group. In the summer 
of 1989, before anyone knew that the country and city would soon be reunited, Daimler Benz 
became interested in developing the site, and with the fall of the Wall in November of 1989, it 
quickly became a hotbed of investment, with Daimler Benz as the premier tenant. The land – 
owned mostly by the city – was quickly sold to the firm at a low price, with the added promise 
that infrastructure would be subsidized by the government.70 City officials were so keen on 
having world-class investors at the site that, as Nagel later stated, “We would have given them 
the land [for free] if they had said, ‘We will come to Berlin and open our new subsidiary, debis 
[sic], here.’”71 Nevertheless, the sale did meet with some criticism, especially from left-leaning 
parties within the Berlin parliament, who rightly feared that this move signaled a trend toward 
                                                
67 See Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 218. 
68 Ibid., 201. Reuter is the son of the famous post-war mayor of Berlin, Ernst Reuter. See Schweitzer, Grossbaustelle 
Berlin, 97. 
69 This area along the Wall had since 1981 been targeted by Senator Hassemer as an area for “inner-city” style 
redevelopment. He was not in office at the time of the Wende. See Stegers, Der Streit um den Postdamer Platz, Part 1, np. 
70 The price was 1,505 DM per square meter; the market price was estimated around 10,000 DM per square meter. 
Ibid., 4–5. 
71 debis [sic] was at the time a new arm of Daimler-Benz, established in the 1990s as a technology service firm. It was 
later sold to Deutsche Telekom.  
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investor-driven, rather than state-driven, development. Nevertheless, with the promise of 
bringing 8,000 new jobs to the area, Daimler Benz was welcomed.72 
Sony became the second large-scale investor at the site in early 1991, along with a 
handful of other companies.73 Meanwhile, parliamentary debates over how to handle traffic in 
the area, as well as a change in government, held up plans for a public architectural competition 
(Mayor Walter Momper (SPD) was succeeded by Eberhard Diepgen (CDU) in January of 1991, 
and Volker Hassemer (CDU) replaced Michaele Schreyer (Greens) as Senator for Urban 
Development and Environment).74 Finally, just three weeks after a master plan competition for 
the site was announced in the professional journal Stadtbauwelt in March of 1991, Daimler Benz, 
Sony, and the other investors, fed up with the slow pace of politics, contracted British architect 
Richard Rogers with a separate site study. This put increased pressure on the Department of 
Urban Development, under Senator Hassemer, to use the competition to come up with a design 
that would please the investors, while also staying true to the history and symbolic importance of 
the site. Hassemer also faced hefty criticism from the Architects’ Chamber, the Association of 
Architects and Engineers, and the Association of German Architects, for not allowing an open 
competition.75 
                                                
72 The sale was eventually ruled as unfair by the EU, and Daimler was legally required to pay the city of Berlin 33.8 
million DM in back sums. Daimler Benz also later edited its numbers, stating that only 3,000 jobs would come directly from 
them and the rest would be supplied by the various tenants in the development. See Stegers, Der Streit um den Postdamer Platz, 
Part 3, np. 
73 Other investors included the department store chain Hertie, Otto Beishaim/Metro AG Group, owner of a number of 
retail firms, and the investment partnership A+T, consisting of the Swiss firm Asea Brown Boveri and the German investor 
Roland Ernst. See Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 209; Malgorzata Nowobilska and Quazi Mahtab Zaman, 
Potsdamer Platz: The Reshaping of Berlin, 2014, 15, http://alltitles.ebrary.com/Doc?id=10815045; Stegers, Der Streit um den 
Postdamer Platz, Part 2, np; Schweitzer, Grossbaustelle Berlin, 95. 
74 The Department of Housing and Construction had begun the process of staging a competition for the area, but 
Hassemer put a stop to it as soon as he came into office. Stegers, Der Streit um den Postdamer Platz, Part 1, np. 
75 The Architects’ Chamber refused to grant the city competition a registration number in protest, and the Association 
of Architects and Engineers staged their own open competition simultaneously. The results, unfortunately, were met with critical 
condemnation: Gottfried Kanpp, writing in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, said that the competition unfortunately gave credence to the 
claim that there should be an “elitist” process for city planning, and Falk Jaeger, writing in the Berlin newspaper Der 
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Berlin Morgen: IBA-style Discourse, Continued 
Meanwhile, the first rumblings of the aesthetic conflicts to come were discernible in an 
architectural exhibition at the German Architectural Museum in Frankfurt in 1990-1991, 
sponsored by one of the country’s largest national newspapers, the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, titled Berlin Morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt (“Berlin Tomorrow: Ideas for 
the Heart of a Metropolis”).76 The show featured designs for the central district of Mitte by 
seventeen invited architects. As Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, then director of the German 
Architectural Museum, stated, the goal of the exhibition was to provide ideas for an overall 
guiding plan for the development of the district: 
It is true that cities, with very few exceptions, are not designed by architects, but 
build themselves: their motor is land speculation, … and there will be no lack of 
that. But to guide this dynamism onto the right tracks, and to make it useful to the 
city, a plan is needed. More specifically: an overarching idea to which the various 
projects, out of which the new city will coalesce, can be subordinated.77 
 
The list of architects was impressive, including Mario Bellini, Coop Himmelb(l)au, Norman 
Foster, Giorgio Grassi, Vittorio Gregotti, Zaha Hadid, Jacques Herzog and Pierre de Meuron, 
John Hejduk, Josef Paul Kleihues, Hans Kollhoff, Daniel Libeskind, Jean Nouvel, Manuel de 
Solà-Morales, Aldo Rossi, Oswald Mathias Ungers, Barnard Tschumi, and Robert Venturi and 
Denise Scott Brown. Although this pool was international, all of the invitees had, according to 
the organizers, palpable ties to Berlin, and represented, in Lampugnani’s view, “all of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Tagesspiegel, called it a “cabinet of horrors,” and advised that the association bury the competition as quickly and quietly as 
possible. Ibid., Part 3, np. 
76 Some of the designs were featured in the newspaper itself, demonstrating how the question of rebuilding Berlin went 
beyond professional and political circles. 
77 “Es ist wahr, daß die Städte mit ganz wenigen Ausnahmen nicht von Architekten entworfen werden, sondern sich 
selbst bauen: Ihr Motor ist die Bodenspekulation, und an der wird es …. Gewiß nicht mangeln. Doch um diese Dynamik in 
städtebaulich sinnvolle Bahnen zu lenken und der Stadt zunutze zu machen, bedarf es eines Plans.” Vittorio Magnago 
Lampugnani, Berlin morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt (Stuttgart: G. Hatje, 1991), 8. Note also that Lampugnani 
mentions Wolf Jobst Siedler, who was Kleihues’s partner in developing the IBA, as an originator of this idea. See page 6.  
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important currents” in contemporary architecture.78 Thus the exhibition could feature Daniel 
Libeskind’s radical reimagining of Unter den Linden, Berlin’s famous East-West boulevard, as 
an elevated network of negative spaces (fig. 2.4), alongside Giorgio Grassi’s much more 
conservative neo-rationalist gridded designs for Leipziger Strasse (fig. 2.5) and Hans Kollhoff’s 
vision of a downtown clustered with skyscrapers (fig. 2.6-2.7), as a means of fostering visual and 
verbal dialogue about the future of the city. 
Architectural historians Harald Bodenschatz and Uwe Altrock argue that the exhibition 
was regarded by Berlin architects and planners “as competition with the Berlin Scene – it was 
presented in the ‘wrong’ place (in Frankfurt), initiated by the ‘wrong’ institution (the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung) and supplied by the ‘wrong’ architects (especially non-Berlin architects).”79 
This is, I would argue, not at all the case, for two reasons. First, the Berlin Morgen exhibition 
had palpable connections to Kleihues’s IBA. Not only did many of the same architects 
participate, but, in much the same manner as the IBA, the exhibition brought together different 
threads of post-modernism – Deconstructivism, high-tech, and neo-rationalism – in the hopes of 
fostering a professional conversation about planning and design. Second, several of the same 
designs were directly submitted to the Potsdamer Platz master plan competition, including those 
by Kleihues and Kollhoff, and many of the same architects, such as Libeskind and Foster, were 
also invited to enter. Rather than constituting a threat from outside Berlin, then, the Berlin 
Morgen organizers represented the “old way” of doing things, imagining that competitions for 
prominent sites would go forth in much the same manner as they had during the IBA, with the 
same group of architects and jurors running the show, and with the easy cooperation of the city 
and investors. What they had not understood was how the complexities of the political and 
                                                
78 Ibid., 8–9. 
79 Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 200. 
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administrative situation in reunited Berlin, paired with the pressure from investors, could push 
development into wholly different channels and utilize forces outside their purview. 
The Master Plan Competition: “Blockrand-bouletten” versus “Hochhaus-spargel” 
 Although the term “Critical Reconstruction” was not used, some of its most basic 
principles informed the Department of Urban Development’s Potsdamer Platz competition.80 The 
competition brief called for designs that would take into account the “structures of the 
nineteenth-century city”: a geometrical street plan, closed blocks, a functional mix, and 
“appropriate heights” (though specific limits were not named).81 Part of the goal was to remedy 
the open, Modernist planning of the so-called “Kulturforum” to the south, a cluster of structures 
built in West Berlin from the 1960s-80s which included the West Berlin state library and the 
philharmonic concert hall by Hans Scharoun, as well as an art gallery by Mies van der Rohe.82 
The new Potsdamer Platz was to represent, in contrast to this open model of the Scharounian 
“Stadtlandschaft,” with monumental buildings strewn throughout a park-like landscape, the 
model of a dense, “traditional” urban landscape, full of pedestrian-friendly spaces and 
commerce. Relying on the same kind of visual rhetoric discussed above, the competition brief 
emphasized the relationship between this model of urban design and the new identity of the city: 
The urban character will be primarily formed through central plazas and street 
spaces for strolling and lingering, which will represent the city as focal points of 
metropolitan life, and with which the residents will be able to identify. The 
leisure, consumption, and entertainment-oriented society of today needs, for the 
staging of public life, spaces of the highest visual and social quality.83 
                                                
80 It should be noted that work on some IBA buildings continued through the early 1990s, so that IBA-style Critical 
Reconstruction was actually still taking place right next door to Potsdamer Platz, as well. 
81 Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umweltschutz Berlin, Potsdamer und Leipziger Platz, Internationaler 
engerer Wettbewerb: Aussschreibung (Berlin, 1991), 25. 
82 These structures were added to with the building of the Painting gallery (Gemäldegalerie) and the print collection 
archives of the Preussischer Kulutrbesitz after a design by Hilmer and Sattler (1992-98). 
83 “Der urbane Charakter wird im wesentlichen geprägt durch zentrale Plätze und Straßenräume zum Verweilen und 
Flanieren, die als Brennpunkte des großstädtischen Lebens die Stadt repräsentieren und mit denen sich der Bürger indentifizieren 
kann. Die Freizeit-, konsum- und unterhaltungsorientierte Gesellschaft heutiger Prägung braucht zur Inszenierung öffentlichen 
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Ultimately, seventeen firms were invited to take part in the competition, including Foster, 
Kleihues, Kollhoff, and Libeskind, as well as Günter Behnisch, Oswald Matthias Ungers, and 
Vittorio Gregotti.84 As the competition proceeded, the concepts of the critique of Modernist 
planning and the return to the pre-Modernist city that were implicit in the brief were the subject 
of much critical debate, crystallizing specifically around the issue of skyscrapers. Kollhoff, a 
protégé of Ungers and a close associate of Rem Koolhaas, wanted to design clusters of towers on 
each side of the center of Berlin, forming “gateways” to the East at Alexanderplatz and West at 
Potsdamer Platz (figs. 2.6-2.7). This concept reaches back to the idea of the city as “green 
archipelago” – an idea stemming from Scharoun and others, and taken up by Ungers and 
Koolhaas in the 1970s during their Summer Institutes in Berlin and at Cornell.85 From a land use 
standpoint, this idea was in direct opposition to Kleihues’s Critical Reconstruction, which 
demanded a return to the traditional street plan, block-edge development, and, to some degree, 
height limits (though Kleihues himself was also a proponent of tower blocks in particular 
contexts), and this had been a subject of debate throughout the IBA as well.86 But in the 
Potsdamer Platz competition, critics did not necessarily divide along expected lines: for instance, 
Wolf Jobst Siedler, who had co-authored The Murdered City, the famous late-1960s polemic 
supporting the idea of the traditional city, and who had been a strong force for the creation of the 
IBA as well as a close friend of Kleihues, wrote in favor of Kollhoff’s design for the Potsdamer 
Platz competition. Other architecture critics in Germany’s major publications tended to favor this 
                                                                                                                                                       
Lebens Orte von hoher visueller und sozialer Qualität.” Berlin, Potsdamer und Leipziger Platz, Internationaler engerer 
Wettbewerb: Aussschreibung, 25–26. 
84 The other firms were Alsop/Lyal/Störmer, Baumbach/Breuer, Max and Karl Dudler, Kuhler, Maler/Gumpp/Schuster, 
Ortner and Ortner, Axel Schultes, Zillich/Engel, Hilmer and Sattler, and Otto Steidle. Gunter Behnisch later dropped out of the 
competition for business reasons. Stegers, Der Streit um den Postdamer Platz, Part 2, np. 
85 For more on the archipelago, see Florian Hertweck, Der Berliner Architekturstreit: Architektur, Stadtbau, Geschichte 
und Identität in der Berliner Republik 1989-1999 (Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 2010). 
86 See Falk Jaeger, “Investorenspielwiese Berlin, Boom-City,” Architekt, no. 6 (June 1991): 317. 
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idea as well, and even Kleihues’s own design for Potsdamer Platz included two towers for 
Daimler Benz.87 On the other hand, urban critic Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm and new Senate 
Construction Director Hans Stimmann both strongly supported the idea of height limits, and 
Hoffmann-Axthelm denounced competition as whole, saying it promoted “cosmetic” planning 
without first delineating the small-scale plots and careful zoning which he considered to be at the 
basis of good city planning. As the summer of 1991 progressed, the critical discourse concerning 
the Potsdamer Platz competition coalesced around these two competing ideas for the image of 
the city: the low-rise, block-edge development of traditional nineteenth-century Berlin versus a 
green, ecological landscape strewn with high-density towers. As Michael Mönninger wrote in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “one doesn’t yet know if block-edge-meatballs 
(Blockrandbouletten) or skyscraper-asparagus (Hochhausspargel) are being grown here” – a 
cheeky play on two typical Berlin foods.88 
International Pressure and the Turn Towards Conservatism 
In late September, the jury, which included Nagel, Hassemer, architectural historian Kurt 
Forster, architect Rem Koolhaas, and Stimmann, awarded first prize to a design by the Munich 
firm of Heinz Hilmer and Christoph Sattler. The design (figs. 2.8-2.10) features rows of highly 
regular, almost cubical six-story blocks radiating out from the central node of Potsdamer Platz, 
where a cluster of diminutive towers, projecting only slightly from the low-rise blocks, frames 
the entrances to each of the avenues. The jury highlighted the design’s preservation of the 
historical street plan, its low building profiles, and block-edge development as its winning 
                                                
87 Falk Jaeger, “Keine Begeisterung in Berlin,” Deutsche Bauzeitung 125, no. 11 (November 1991): 10. Kleihues had 
been involved in several disputes throughout the city with regards to towers: his “Kant Triangle” was reduced from 60 to 35 
meters. 
88 Quoted in Stegers, Der Streit um den Postdamer Platz, Part 2, np. The comment may also refer to a saying from a 
former Senate Building Director, quoted by Hans Kollhoff a few months previously: “One can put whatever one wants into 
Berlin – a boulette will always come out.” Quoted in ibid. This issue was also a theme of discussion concerning the designs for 
Berlin Morgen. See Jaeger, “Investorenspielwiese Berlin, Boom-City,” 319. For a general discussion of the controversies over 
high-rise construction in Berlin, see Lenhart, Berliner Metropoly, 206–209. 
 99 
characteristics. “This design,” the architects stated, “is based on the compact, spatially complex 
European city rather than the American urban model of an accumulation of skyscrapers, which is 
used all over the world. Urban life should be seen in streets and squares, not hidden away inside 
huge building complexes.”89 But while the design does allow for a mixed-use, pedestrian-
oriented streetscape, it provides few “postcard-worthy” moments; rather, the height, distribution, 
and massing of the various structures seem aimed at blending seamlessly in to the existing city 
fabric of the Friedrichstadt to the north, and at drifting off without fanfare into the park-like 
landscape of the Kulturforum to the south. In terms of creating a unique, historically oriented 
architectural identity for Berlin, the design could be seen as moderately successful, but its 
unremarkable character was a clear disappointment for most critics. As John Welsh observed in 
the British architectural periodical Building Design, “The city planners have made it clear that 
the existing centers of the old West and East Berlin are sufficient. The new Potsdamer Platz is 
not intended to revive its prewar pivotal role in creating a third city center. Hilmer/Sattler’s plan 
provides this low-key response.”90 
Besides being almost universally denounced by critics as an unfortunate compromise, the 
decision also ignited a brief scandal. In a dramatic continuation of the decades-long opposition 
between the models of Critical Reconstruction and the “urban archipelago,” Rem Koolhaas, who 
was displeased with the outcome of the competition and had, according to some, stormed out of 
the proceedings early in protest, penned a letter of complaint to the Department of Urban 
Development which he then published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. His text excoriated 
Stimmann for his supposedly “tactless” participation in the selection process, and called the 
                                                
89 Quoted in Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning Potsdamer Platz, trans. 
Romana Schneider (Frankfurt am Main: DAM, 1997), 70. 
90 John Welsh, “Potsdamer ‘Farce,’” Building Design, no. 1054 (October 25, 1991): 48–48. 
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outcome a “petty bourgeois, old-fashioned, reactionary, unrealistic, banal, provincial and above 
all dilettantish image of the city.”91 As a proponent of experimental, dense urban design that 
embraced the dissolution of traditional forms, Koolhaas was especially disappointed that the 
design by Kollhoff had been rejected and that the question of skyscrapers had not been given 
adequate attention. 
 While Koolhaas clearly had a deeply personal investment in these debates, especially 
because of his ties to particular architects, the investors had money on the table, and they, too, 
rejected the outcome of the competition. In early October of 1991, Daimler Benz’s Berlin 
representative, Matthias Kleinert, in an interview with the Berlin newspaper Die Tagesspiegel, 
called the Hilmer and Sattler design “something between Berlin and Podunk.”92 Daimler Benz 
and the other investors were disappointed with the outcome of the competition, not only because 
it did not provide them with the adequate square footage to establish their respective 
headquarters, but also because it did not represent the striking image of “bustling urban life” that 
had been their explicit goal, and which had been promised in the competition brief. They threw 
their weight, instead, behind the newly finished Rogers plan (figs. 2.11-2.12), which the architect 
had personally presented to city officials in early October. Rogers’s design centered on the idea 
of Potsdamer Platz itself as what he called a “people’s place”: a pedestrian-friendly area with 
bright neon signs, beckoning users into the shopping and entertainment district along the 
radiating avenues. The building heights, contrary to Hilmer and Sattler’s design, were lower 
around Potsdamer Platz itself, and were allowed to rise gradually toward the edges of the plot, 
                                                
91 “Das Schicksal, das sich … durch die brutale Art und Weise der Auswahl ankündigt, ist ein kleinbürgerliches, 
altmodisches, reaktionäres, unrealistisches, banales, provinzielles und vor allem dilettantisches Bild der Stadt.” Koolhaas, Rem, 
“Massakrierte Ideen: Offener Brief an Die Jury Vom Potsdamer Platz,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 16, 1991. In 
reply, Thomas Sieverts, the chair of the jury, denounced Koolhaas for breaking the rule of confidentiality that was agreed upon 
for the proceedings, and claimed that the architect had actually left early simply to catch a plane. See Stegers, Der Streit um den 
Postdamer Platz, Part 3, np. 
92 Stegers, Der Streit um den Postdamer Platz, Part 3, np. 
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allowing for a ring of corporate office towers that create a striking skyline and set off the 
complex from the neighboring Kulturforum. 
 Quite suddenly, the various factions in Berlin aligned in opposition to the Rogers design, 
which they saw as a threat from the outside: as Rudolf Stegers notes, an “umbrella coalition” 
(“Maxicoalition”) including everyone from the CDU to the PDS flocked around Volker 
Hassemer.93 The Architects and Engineers Association, the Association of German Architects, 
and the Architects’ Chamber, who had previously heavily criticized the competition process, 
“now unilaterally defended its "mediocre result.”94 Although they almost universally admitted 
that the Hilmer and Sattler design was technically and aesthetically inferior to Rogers’s, German 
critics also affirmed that the city could not give in to this pressure from investors and still save 
face. In the Berliner Morgenpost, for example, the renowned architectural historian and critic 
Julius Posener wrote: “the fact that the investors allowed in their own architect against the 
official competition is a travesty, even if I like Rogers’s design better.”95 Some reacted even 
more strongly: architect Jürgen Sawade, another student of Ungers who had been on the 
competition jury, publically suggested banning Rogers from the city.96 Nagel and Stimmann, 
whose department would be taking responsibility for the site thereafter, used every chance to 
express their wholehearted support for the winning design. The main theme of conversation in 
the media and amongst officials was therefore not the question of skyscrapers, but rather on the 
pressure of private investment versus the democratic or “public” (i.e. state-driven) planning 
process.  
                                                
93 Ibid., Part 4, np. 
94 Ibid., Part 3, np. 
95 “Daß die Investoren einen eigenen Architekten gegen den offiziellen Wettbewerb antreten lassen, ist ein Unding, 
auch wenn Rogers’ Entwurf mir besser gefällt.” Quoted in ibid. Translation mine. 
96 Ibid., Part 4, np. 
 102 
In November, the city had a breakthrough: in a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee 
for City Planning and Urban Development, in which all the interested parties, including the 
investors, were present, they agreed to a compromise: they would sit down and hash out a plan 
based on the Hilmer and Sattler design that would nonetheless satisfy the needs of the investors. 
A 35 meter height limit for most of the site, with allowances for taller buildings around 
Potsdamer Platz itself and along the Landwehrkanal to the south, was agreed upon, and in 
December the Senate officially approved the plans. The “bluster over Potsdamer Platz,” Nagel 
declared, “is now over.”97  
Americanization by Mistake 
However, it was a Pyrrhic victory. Competitions were soon held for each of the four 
investors’ particular sites, and the winning designs can only be said to conform to the letter of the 
Hilmer and Sattler plan, rather than the spirit. The competition for the Daimler Benz property 
was won by Renzo Piano, including a triangular tower along Potsdamer Platz, backed by a 
lower-rise shopping mall, movie theaters, and a musical theater, with a tower for Daimler Benz’s 
new headquarters on the southernmost end (figs. 2.13-2.14). This plan, in turn, was used as an 
“optimized” master plan for the site, on which competitions for individual buildings were then 
based. Integrating the small-scale street plan of Hilmer and Sattler, the design was supposedly 
“European” in flavor and was lauded by critics, as well as by Stimmann, who was on the jury. 
However, as contracts for the designs of individual buildings on the site were awarded to various 
architects, including Kollhoff, Rogers, and Arata Isosaki, and compromises were made allowing 
for one of the streets to be covered over and turned into a shopping arcade, the complex began to 
                                                
97 Ibid., Part 3, np. 
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lose more and more of its supposedly “European” flavor.98 In Hilmer and Sattler’s original plan, 
the buildings were supposedly based on the traditional Berlin inner-courtyard or “Hof” typology 
(fig. 2.10), but the results of the ensuing competitions and adjustments to the Daimler plan 
rendered this idea ineffective. The massing of the buildings, and the way they are grouped, 
comes across as monolithic and quasi-private rather than differentiated and lively (fig. 2.15). 
With the covered, inner retail area as the main focus of the development, the outer spaces along 
the streets are seemingly relegated to “back sides” of the complex which are uninviting to 
pedestrians: here, the ground floors are, as Bodenschatz and Altrock observe, “mostly walls that 
are broken only by garage entrances or air vents.”99 This deficiency is most noticeable on the 
southern side of the development, where the much-lauded water feature – harkening back to the 
Green party’s calls for more park space at Potsdamer Platz around the time of the Wende – 
combines strangely with parking entrances, the Daimler Benz office tower, and the back side of 
Scharoun’s state library. The result is a seemingly desolate landscape that does little to remediate 
the Stadtlandschaft of the Kulturforum. 
Helmut Jahn won the competition for the Sony property, with a design regarded by critics 
as somewhat “American.” Here, a showy, circus-tent roof of steel and glass covers an inner plaza 
surrounded by retail spaces and restaurants, as well as a movie theater (figs. 2.16-2.17). 
Although it achieved the aim of preserving several fragments of historical buildings on the site, 
Mönninger called it a sell-out to “American entertainment architecture,” and Falk Jaeger, in the 
Berlin paper Der Tagesspiegel, called it a loss for Stimmann.100 Like the Daimler development, 
the Sony Center also turns its back to the street, creating an interiorized space which, though 
                                                
98 This particular section of the development, called the “Potsdamer Arkaden,” was led by the ECE Group, which has 
created over 50 similar shopping centers in Germany and Western Europe. Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 215. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Stegers, Der Streit um den Postdamer Platz, Part 4, np. 
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heavily trafficked, feels private and isolated from its context. The Sony Center has been a 
success, however, in terms of “image”: with its trio of towers and its signature roof lit by colored 
lights, it has indeed become one of the most recognizable “postcard” images of Berlin,101 and it 
is one of the most-visited areas of the city.  
Peppered with fast food restaurants and global retail chains, Potsdamer Platz as a whole 
is, in Bodenschatz and Altrock’s terms, a place where the “mass public is at home,” but where 
the international architectural community – supported by the educated middle class – missed its 
chance to build something special.102 In terms of commercial success, the investors and the 
notion of “corporate identity” (as opposed to city identity) can be said to have won out here, but 
actual profits themselves have been marginal. Daimler Benz and Sony have since sold these 
properties to other firms.103 As Stimmann observed after the first master plan competition, 
because the sales were made to investors without any stipulations as to what would be built, the 
city had to “live with” the mediocre results.104 It was this backwards approach to city-driven 
planning – trying to rein in investors, rather than assuring their cooperation from the start – that 
meant that, despite the Hilmer and Sattler plan and the city’s attachment to the idea of the 
“European city,”  “Americanization” happened anyway through a series of seemingly small 
compromises. Critic Fritz Neumeyer wrote in Der Tagesspiegel:  
Under the protectorship of the traditional European city, which was invoked in 
defense of the American city, all of a sudden American commercial architecture 
of the first water is being built: not in the form of skyscrapers, which have 
something to offer the life of the street, but in the shape of a shopping mall, which 
                                                
101 Ward points out the visual ties between Jahn’s Sony Center roof, Jean Nouvel’s glass-covered Galeries Lafayette, 
and Norman Foster’s Reichstag dome, which create a kind of high-tech triangle of landmarks in Mitte. Ward, Post-Wall Berlin, 
309. 
102 Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 219. 
103 Daimler Benz sold to Frankfurt-based SEB in 2007; Sony sold to Morgan Stanley in 2008, and it was sold to the 
South Korean firm NPS in 2010 at a loss. Ward, Post-Wall Berlin, 290. 
104 Stegers, Der Streit um den Postdamer Platz, Part 3, np. 
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turns the functions of the street inward and thus, as in an aquarium, removes city 
life into a closed-off, glass-covered space.105 
 
Ward calls this the “Stimmann Effect”:  Berlin’s planners, she contends, “let the American 
bogeyman in by mistake” through the involvement of private investors.106 As will be explored 
further in Chapter 3, Stimmann and other planners were keen to avoid what they saw as 
“American” urban forms – by which they meant the overly showy, populist commercial 
architecture of typical American structures like malls. But in fact the “Americanization” of 
Potsdamer Platz was due not simply to investor involvement, which is perhaps an inevitable and 
necessary fact of urban development under capitalism, but to the administrative confusion and 
woefully inadequate urban planning measures in place at the time. In fact, since Stimmann did 
not even take office until April of 1991, he had little effect on the sale of the land or the original 
terms – all he could do was try to exert his influence as a jury member in the competitions. As 
Strom argues, although investors were a key driver of construction in Berlin, the city’s model of 
planning is significantly more paternalistic than any American city: for Germans, ownership of 
land does not come with the rights to build whatever the owner wants.107 After the experience at 
Potsdamer Platz, Nagel, Stimmann, and others became much more careful about how they 
handled planning in tandem with corporate interests.  
 
                                                
105 “Unter dem Protektorat der traditionellen europäischen Stadt, die zur Abwehr der amerikanischen Stadt ins Feld 
geführt wurde, wird nun tatsächlich amerikanische Kommzerzarchitektur ersten Wassers gebaut werden: nicht in Gestalt des 
Hochhauses, das der Straße an Lebendigkeit durchaus etwas zu bieten hat, sondern in Gestalt der Shopping Mall, die ihre 
Funktionen von der Straße weg nach innen wendet und städtischen Leben somit wie im Aquarium in glasgedeckten, 
abschließbaren Innenräumen aufnimmt.” Quoted in ibid., Part 4, np. Translation mine. 
106 Ward, Post-Wall Berlin, 317–318. 
107 Strom, Building the New Berlin, 147. 
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Learning from the Friedrichstadt Passagen 
 Not far from Potsdamer Platz lies the North-South axis of Friedrichstrasse, which had 
been bisected by the Berlin Wall and the famous Checkpoint Charlie. The southern (i.e. West 
Berlin) section of this avenue had been rebuilt as part of the IBA, and the northern (East Berlin) 
end had also experienced considerable redevelopment during the 1980s. This famous commercial 
artery, the center of the financial and press industries of Weimar Berlin, was, like Potsdamer 
Platz, an immediate draw for investors. Officials such as Nagel and Hanno Klein (employed by 
the Department of Construction and head of the KOAI before his murder in 1991) did what they 
could to increase this interest by fostering the image of Friedrichstrasse as a future luxury quarter 
that would include high-end retail, office, and residential space. One key site along this avenue 
was a row of three large blocks on its eastern side, between Französische Strasse and 
Mohrenstrasse, which had already been partially built up by the East German government as a 
retail and entertainment center called the “Friedrichstadt Passagen” (in reference to the 
nineteenth-century retail typology of the passage) (fig. 2.18).108 As at Potsdamer Platz, a large 
international investor showed interest in one of the properties even before the two Germanys 
reunited: Galeries Lafayette, a French department store chain, was already in talks with the 
interim East Berlin government in January 1990 with the intention of gaining ownership of the 
northernmost block in the trio.109 Unlike at Potsdamer Platz, there was little debate amongst 
investors and planners as to what the guiding outlines for the development of the Friedrichstadt 
Passagen should be: historical height limits and block-edge, courtyard-centered development 
were never in question. Still, this project was yet another learning experience for Stimmann 
                                                
108 This development was to have three differentiated facades that directly referenced nineteenth-century architecture, 
fronted by a pedestrian-friendly plaza including a reproduction of the early 18th-century Villa Kamecke by Andreas Schlüter. 
Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 227–228. 
109 Ibid., 232. 
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because of its sheer size, and because of the somewhat showy nature of its architecture. Based on 
the critical failure of this project, as well as the debacle at Potsdamer Platz, he could, in 1992, 
propose stricter guidelines for rebuilding the city with the cooperation of investors. 
Land Sale and Architectural competition 
 Over one hundred investors flocked to buy the Friedrichstadt Passagen parcels from the 
Treuhand, and preliminary selections were made in October 1990, right as reunification was 
officially taking place, helped along by the fact that Klein had been appointed as the East Berlin 
representative for the property.110 Hardly a diplomat, he was quoted in the national magazine Der 
Spiegel as saying that Berlin needed a new “Gründerzeit” with “distinction and brutality,” and 
that city planning was simply “well-organized repression.”111 The magnitude of proposals 
allowed him to wrest power from the over-inundated Bezirk officials, allowing prominent 
projects to be pushed through and certain investors favored.112 Klein already had close ties to 
Galeries Lafayette, and rumors circulated that the French President François Mitterrand had even 
contacted Chancellor Kohl on behalf of the French department store chain. However, Berlin’s 
tricky property laws won out: German developer Roland Ernst was able to buy up a property 
claim to a parcel included in the block, and was ultimately awarded the sale, with Galeries 
Lafayette as a tenant rather than an owner.113  
                                                
110 Ibid., 233. 
111 The term “Gründerzeit” (“founders’ period) is commonly used to refer to the Wilhemine era (the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries). Hans Stimmann, Von der Sozialutopie zum städtischen Haus: Texte und Interviews von Hans 
Stimmann, ed. Jörn Düwel and Michael Mönninger (Berlin: DOM, 2011), 34. Schweitzer also notes the Klein had hopes for the 
Senate Construction Director position, and was upset when Stimmann was appointed in April of 1991. He immediately thereafter 
began looking for a job with a private investment company and was in negotiations with one at the time of his death in June. See 
Schweitzer, Grossbaustelle Berlin, 61. 
112 This included the removal of GDR monuments for the sake of development, something of which the Bezirk planners 
had disapproved. Strom, Building the New Berlin, 60, 102. 
113 Ibid., 204. 
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However, although Ernst was already all but guaranteed the rights to build, property sales 
and development were technically made contingent on a city-sponsored design competition 
wherein investors paired with architects to vie for each parcel. Requirements for the competition 
were set by the East Berlin Magistrat in late 1990, embodying, like the competition at Potsdamer 
Platz, many of the principles of Critical Reconstruction: mixed use, adherence to the baroque 
street plan, height limits of 22 meters with setback attic ridges of 30 meters, and respect for the 
“historical context.”114 Because they did not yet own the property, the investors could not take 
issue with the design brief, and, as opposed to those at Potsdamer Platz, they had very different 
motivations for building on this site, whose main focus was luxury retail spaces. The defining 
“postcard image” here would not be that of a flashy, new corporate identity, but of “history” as 
an element of the experience of capitalist consumption. With the help of “loophole” Paragraphs 
34 and 36 in the Berlin planning code mentioned above, the development was predicted to go 
speedily. 
By April 1991 – the same month that Stimmann came into office – the Friedrichstadt 
Passagen jury, headed by Kleihues, announced its decision: the three blocks would each be 
designed by a separate firm under a separate investor, allowing for a diversity of facades along 
the street.115 Jean Nouvel would build for Galeries Lafayette at the northern end (though, it 
should be noted, because of the earlier dealings with Klein, this was actually a “done deal” 
before the competition even took place), Pei Cobb Freed and Partners would build the middle 
                                                
114 See Hans Stimmann, “New Berlin Office and Commercial Buildings,” in Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer 
urbanen Architektur, by Annegret Burg, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 9; Bodenschatz and Altrock, 
Renaissance der Mitte, 233. 
115 The jury also included Hans Hollein, Kiessler, Marg, Sawade, Ahlrichs, Haase, Klein, and Dahlhaus. Stimmann, 
“New Berlin Office and Commercial Buildings,” 9. 21. There were 22 competition entries, including Kohn Pedderson Fox, SOM, 
and Ungers with investor Tishman Speyer; Benjamin Thompson/Shun Kanda/Hiroshi Hara, SOM/Coop Himmelb(l)au, and 
Moore Ruble Yudell/Frank Williams Associations with investor Dumas West & Co.; Pei Cobb Freed & Partners, Heinrich Baller, 
and A. Zublena with investor Bouygues/Arc Union; Krämer, Sieverts & Partners, Bankert, Jansen, Scholz & Schultes, and 
Hentrich-Petschnigg & Partners with DGI Deutsche Grundbesitz Investmentgesellschaft; and finally, Jean Nouvel with Galeries 
Lafayette. Peter Rumpf, “Die Friedrichstadtpassagen in Berlin Mitte,” Bauwelt 82, no. 18 (May 1991): 973. 
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block, funded by the French firm Bouyges Immobilier, and the American firm Tishman Speyer, 
with Ungers as architect, would be responsible for the southernmost plot. Because of existing 
landmarked structures, only Ungers’s building would be able to fill the entire block; the others 
were limited to the majority of the western sides of their respective plots. However, the very idea 
of “block-sized” development alludes to the massive size of all three complexes. 
Although in their details the three designs differ somewhat, with the high-tech 
modernism typical of Nouvel, Ungers’s trademark rationalism, and a playfully abstracted, stone-
clad take on the Berlin Mietskaserne by Pei, the three buildings are typologically similar, with 
setback attic stories, street-level retail spaces, and clearly discernable entrances. The original 
brief had called for an overground passage between the three, in the manner of the famous turn-
of-the-century pedestrian malls, but this passage was moved underground in order to preserve the 
traditional shape of the baroque street plan.116 Retail is not the only attraction: the middle block 
features a central piano bar and café, and the lower level of Galeries Lafayette houses a gourmet 
food court. In a barely-perceptible nod to history, the central, glass-covered “courtyards” of the 
buildings on their lower, interconnected floors, each take the shape of one of Berlin’s 
historically-important plazas (the square Pariser Platz, octagonal Leipziger Platz, and circular 
Belle-Alliance-Platz).  
Joined together thematically and physically by the galleries, each building in the 
Friedrichstadt Passagen nonetheless takes a unique architectural approach to historical forms. 
Ungers’s design attempts to solve the problem of its massive, block-size footprint with the 
concept of an eight-story “core building” enclosing two atriums, surrounded by six protruding 
blocks that project out of it at even intervals and create separate, recessed entrances (figs. 2.19-
                                                
116 See Stimmann, “New Berlin Office and Commercial Buildings,” 11; Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der 
Mitte. 
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2.20).117 Though its typically Ungersesque matrix of square, symmetrically-organized windows 
appears monolithic in renderings, the reflectiveness of its windows allow it to blend into the 
streetscape by mirroring the surrounding structures. As Paula Winter comments in Bauwelt 
Berlin Annual, the building “threatens to disappear as soon as one looks away,” and it is clearly 
the most conservative of the three.118  
Its neighbor, Pei Cobb Freed and Partners’ Quartier 206, creates a more striking 
impression by abstractly referencing nineteenth-century façade décor with strong horizontal 
profiling and a “prism” design on the exterior (fig. 2.21).119 Covered in light limestone with 
narrow, horizontally oriented windows, up close the façade appears both more conspicuous and 
more daring than Ungers’s. It is not until one sees the building from a distance that the complex 
façade resolves itself into a jagged decorative motif that recalls the plaster-adorned buildings of 
the previous century. The triangular tops of each prism, which from street-level appear to create 
a sharply delineated and uneven skyline, appear from a distance like dormers in a mansard roof. 
The interior also recalls the splendor of the previous century with its black-and-white checker 
motif and atrium, with a piano bar and a sweeping spiral staircase, given a starkly modern touch 
with the addition of an escalator through the center of the gallery (fig. 2.22).  
Jean Nouvel’s Galeries Lafayette building is the most explicitly modern of the 
Friedrichstadt Passagen trio, with an imposing and modern glass façade that curves around the 
northwestern corner of its block and originally allowed for ticker-tape-style digital displays, 
which have in recent years gone unused (figs. 2.23-2.24). The interior “courtyard” area 
comprises two giant, transparent glass cones, one rising up from the ground floor and one 
                                                
117 Haberlik and Zohlen, 179. 
118 Winter, quoted in Haberlik and Zohlen, 180. 
119 Burg, 103. 
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extending down from the ceiling, shedding colored rays of light into the lower café and 
gastronomy level, while providing a space for seasonal displays on the main level (figs. 2.25-
2.26).120  
Critical Reception 
The result of these designs amounts to three interconnected shopping centers with 
additional retail space facing the street – in some ways the “luxury quarter” that planners and 
investors had hoped for. But, as Bodenschatz and Altrock observe, like the developments at 
Potsdamer Platz, the Passagen are massive and somewhat inward-looking. By the time 
construction was well underway in 1993, the beginnings of the burst of the Berlin bubble were 
starting to be felt. Two of the properties had already been partially or totally resold, and there 
were well-placed fears over the profitability of all three.121 Because the amount of residential 
space built into the blocks was in actuality well under the required 20%, the area felt empty for 
several years.122 As developers pulled out, there was at first not even enough money to keep 
Nouvel’s building lit up at night, adding to the sense of vacancy along the street. 
Critics were luke-warm about the designs, originally bristling at Nouvel’s high-tech 
design, and writing off Pei’s contribution as kitschy.123 However, nothing about the specific, 
aesthetic qualities of these buildings goes against the idea of Critical Reconstruction; it is their 
size that ultimately made them negative examples. What Stimmann regretted about these projects 
was the fact that they “not only vastly exceeded the dimensions of the [individual] historical lots 
but also … the scale of the blocks of the historical Friedrichstadt district. They set the stage, and 
                                                
120 Berliners pejoratively refer to this space as the “Mülleimer” (garbage can), because of the trash that inevitably 
accumulates at the bottom of the cone.  
121 Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 234–235. 
122 Ibid., 235. 
123 Ibid. 
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unfortunately also the scale, for an entire series of project ideas from private investors for the 
area of the historical center.”124 Such massive projects went directly against Critical 
Reconstruction’s call for varied, mixed-use streetscapes, and, as will be discussed in the 
following chapter, Stimmann spent the next few years campaigning for an overall development 
plan that would not only reinstate the historical street and building codes, but would require 
small-scale investment in individual parcels. 
 
Conclusion: The Conservative Turn in Berlin Planning 
The urban planning process, Harvey contends, is often conflictual, as well as “delicate 
and difficult” – so much so that a charismatic leader with a clear vision and political skill can 
often steer this process to his or her own ends.125 Such a leader was found in Senate Construction 
Director Stimmann, who was appointed under Senator Nagel in April of 1991. Chosen, in the 
wake of Klein’s inflammatory statements about a new Gründerzeit, as a “soft” diplomat, 
Stimmann turned out to be anything but. Having learned quickly from Potsdamer Platz and the 
Friedrichstadt Passagen that investor-driven development needed to be tightly controlled from 
the outset with clear building guidelines, he began the project of not only expanding his own 
political and administrative power, but also of establishing a new version of Critical 
Reconstruction as a guiding image for the city. Stimmann’s adoption – and, perhaps more 
importantly, his adaptation – of Kleihues’s theory after 1991 cannot be understood apart from 
these early projects, or from the administrative and political structures that informed their 
development. 
                                                
124 Stimmann, “New Berlin Office and Commercial Buildings,” 11. 
125 Harvey, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism,” 7. 
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By using Critical Reconstruction as a model, Stimmann hoped to resolve many of the issues that 
had cropped up in the experiences at these two prominent sites in Mitte. First, based on 
contemporary perceptions regarding urban competition in the global age, such as those discussed 
by Harvey and Sassen, Berlin needed, in the face of rampant economic expansion, a way to 
define itself as a unique place. From a planning standpoint, this meant the need for a distinctive 
typology that would be marketable and recognizable as “Berlinisch.” Second, Stimmann needed 
to ensure that local institutions and architects who had long-term relationships with – and 
investments in – the city going back into the 1980s and earlier would feel included in the 
planning process. The threat that architects, such as Rogers, could be chosen privately at the 
whim of large investors helped these various factions band together and created the impetus for 
the formation of a cartel of architects, planners, critics, and intellectuals in Berlin that some have 
called “incestuous.”126 Finally, from a political standpoint, the city had to assert its power over 
capital, ensuring that the tradition of state-, rather than investor-, controlled planning would be 
preserved. The “Stimmann Effect,” then, actually constituted not an “Americanization” of Berlin 
through the participation of large investors, but a highly conservative and autocratic turn in the 
city’s planning culture. The details of this “effect” will be explored at length in the following 
chapter. 
                                                




Critical Reconstruction’s Transformation under Hans Stimmann 
 
This chapter looks at the changes to, and implementation of, Critical Reconstruction in 
Berlin’s central district of Mitte between 1991 and 1994. Having been closely involved in the 
debacle at Potsdamer Platz and witnessed the emerging mediocrity of the Friedrichstadt Passagen 
project, Berlin’s new Senate Construction Director Hans Stimmann, who took office in April of 
1991, decided to adopt Josef Paul Kleihues’s theory of Critical Reconstruction as the guiding 
concept for the work of his department in Mitte. Though Stimmann’s department (Berlin’s 
Department of Construction and Housing) was by no means the only planning body with 
jurisdiction over this neighborhood – Berlin’s Department of Urban Development and 
Environment and the federal government were also both in charge of large and often overlapping 
swaths of the city center – Stimmann did his best to expand both his own actual power to 
influence planning decisions, and the public perception of that power. The result was that Critical 
Reconstruction was one of the most publicly discussed facets of Berlin city planning in the 
1990s. 
Critical Reconstruction was in many ways a logical choice as a guiding strategy for 
Mitte’s redevelopment, having already gained worldwide attention in the 1980s through its 
deployment in the same neighborhood during the International Building Exhibition 
(Internationale Bauaustellung, or IBA), led by Kleihues. However, Stimmann’s adoption of 
Critical Reconstruction was also puzzling, since he had been a vocal critic of Kleihues and the 
IBA up until 1989. As a long-time, far-left member of Berlin’s Social Democratic Party (SPD), 
Stimmann wanted to curb large-scale commercial development and car-friendly traffic plans, and 
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to support the middle class by fostering small-scale property ownership. After seeing what had 
transpired at Potsdamer Platz and the Friedrichstadt Passagen, he decided that Critical 
Reconstruction was his best option for achieving these ends. However, he did not adopt 
Kleihues’s approach wholesale, nor did he enter into the types of heady theoretical 
rationalizations that characterized Kleihues’s work. Stimmann was both immanently practical 
and intensely political in his application of Critical Reconstruction. His implementation, for 
instance, of Kleihues’s plan to restore the original baroque-era street plan in Mitte was not only 
geared towards the creation of a post-modern, pedestrian-friendly landscape, but, more 
importantly, aimed to carve out new plots of land that could, Stimmann hoped, be sold off in 
small parcels, thus creating much-needed revenue for the city and allowing him control over 
what was built on these new plots. By adopting and codifying Critical Reconstruction’s pared-
down, rationalist architectural style, he also hoped to rein in multinational investors whose 
preferred designs, as had been seen clearly at Potsdamer Platz, only served to bolster corporate 
identities and threatened to turn Berlin into a landscape of overly showy façades covering 
mundane shopping malls. Thus, instead of using it as a platform for promoting carefully curated 
dialogue within the global architectural scene, as Kleihues had, Stimmann reduced Critical 
Reconstruction to a rigid set of aesthetic guidelines that real estate developers could easily 
understand. 
On the global architecture scene, the early 1990s were, in many ways, the moment when 
the ideas of post-modern architects and theorists that had been avant-garde in the 1970s and 
1980s were gaining widespread adoption. Across the United States, for instance, low-rise 
shopping centers and big-box stores began to ape some of the strategies of New Urbanism, 
refashioning themselves aesthetically to capture “local” flavor or to appear as “historic” town 
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centers, with clock towers, lush landscaping, and pedestrian walkways. However, the large-scale 
commercial application of such an approach to urbanism inevitably meant that the loss of some 
of its key theoretical facets, such as the strict regulation of traffic, the careful mix of urban and 
residential functions, and the consciously post-modern mix of traditional and experimental 
architectural styles. The same was true for Critical Reconstruction: what had been a smaller-
scale, intellectually rigorous endeavor under Kleihues necessarily lost much of this depth when it 
was applied wholesale to commercial developments across the city.  
The notion of “history,” in particular, which, as discussed in Chapter 1, Kleihues had 
made such an effort to sidestep or reframe as “memory,” became a particularly potent example of 
how Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction differed from that of his predecessor. Stimmann 
attempted to publicly legitimize his aesthetic preferences by tying Critical Reconstruction to the 
concept of the “European city” and abstract notions of “history,” discussed at length below, as 
the ideal conceptual bases for Berlin’s development. However, it is my contention that Stimmann 
actually had very little interest in a theoretical engagement with history, either in terms of an 
architecture of memory (as Kleihues or other post-modern theorists like Rossi had proposed) or 
in terms of discussions about national identity and the Historikerstreit. His brash manner and 
bold statements exemplify a kind of anti-intellectualism that saw every decision as stemming 
from a supposedly “practical” need or leading to a necessary political end. His reliance on the 
ideas of “history” and the “European city,” therefore, was a strategic move calculated to take 
advantage of the larger context of intense international focus on Berlin as a symbol of the 
reunited country’s relationship to its troubled history, as well as Berlin’s need to differentiate 
itself as having a “local” character amidst a global market. Stimmann deployed this logic in 
tandem with Critical Reconstruction’s strictures because, ultimately, he thought it would help 
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him create the socio-economic and political landscape that, since his time as a member of the 
radical 1970s SPD, he had long desired: an urban fabric that was tightly-knit, multifunctional, 
and filled with educated residents who would want to be involved in planning and advocate for 
themselves.  
Unfortunately, Stimmann’s use of Critical Reconstruction failed to help him achieve his 
various goals, and his attempt to connect it to “history” backfired in an especially unfortunate 
way. Due to investment pressures and political limitations, land in Mitte was sold off in huge, 
block-sized plots to large-scale investors, and Stimmann was criticized as a tool of capitalist 
interests. Meanwhile, his reliance on a set of rigid design standards – discussed at length below – 
that referenced “history” when convenient, but did away with the nuance and theoretical 
complexity of Kleihues’s approach, opened him up to critique by critics and architects who saw 
him as dangerously dictatorial, even fascist, in his aims to control the look of new buildings. As 
will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 4, Stimmann’s reductive deployment of Kleihues’s 
ideas dovetailed in calamitous ways with larger conversations about the conservative tendencies 
in Berlin’s new architecture. The result was that Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction came to be 
seen as conservative, backward-looking, authoritarian, and pro-big business, despite the fact that 
it was authored by a politician who had long been part of the political left and a vocal critic of 
capitalist development.  
Stimmann’s failure to successfully garner positive attention through these efforts points 
to one of the difficulties with the political dimensions of post-modernism, especially as it 
entailed historicism: it is difficult to ensure that buildings (let alone an entire urban landscape) 
will “mean” something to a public that includes constituents from outside the field of 
architecture. Even if Stimmann had succeeded in fostering the creation of a cityscape that 
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reflected the city’s history in a meaningful way, it is not clear that the users of the city would 
interpret it correctly as such. Considered alongside the complications that Stimmann faced with 
the city’s politics, economics, and institutions (discussed in Chapter 2), as well as the ways that 
contentious architectural discourse was filtered and re-interpreted through the popular media 
(discussed in Chapter 4), it is no wonder that Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction was unable to 
achieve his ambitious ends. 
 
Stimmann and the Reintroduction of Critical Reconstruction  
Stimmann’s Early Years 
Born in the northern German town of Lübeck and trained as a professional builder, 
Stimmann arrived in Berlin in 1970 to study city and regional planning at the Technical 
University, a program that focused heavily on theory and sociology rather than the raw technical 
or aesthetic aspects of planning. While there, he became deeply involved with the local SPD, 
working for SPD Building Senator Harry Ristock and publishing numerous essays on city 
planning issues. As part of a young, radical far-left movement within the SPD, Stimmann was 
especially critical of the party’s inability to successfully counteract slum clearance and freeway 
building measures – planning tactics that represented the then mainstream, post-war Modernist 
approach to city planning (discussed in Chapter 1).1 However, although he was deeply engaged 
in discussions of architecture and planning, Stimmann focused less on the technical or stylistic 
aspects of architecture and urbanism, and, influenced by his time at the Technical University, he 
preferred to look at the socio-economic issues that provided the context for that urbanism. 
During this period in his education, he had been especially drawn to Marxist, anti-capitalist 
                                                
1 Stefanie Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild: Stadtentwicklungspolitik in Berlin zwischen 1991 und 
1999 (Hamburg: Kovač, 2010), 57. 
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theories – to the point of stating, later, that he earned his diploma “without hearing one thing 
about city planning.”2 His days as a student, write Michael Mönninger and Jürgen Düwel, were 
spent in the contemplation, rather, of “abstract information about planning and politics under 
capitalism,” and “about all possible thoughts on the transformation of the system.”3 Thus 
Stimmann was not a part of the discussions about post-modernist architecture that were taking 
place simultaneously at the Technical University under Oswald Matthias Ungers and others.4 
This major rift between his training and interests and those of European post-modernist 
architects, historians, and planners who were his contemporaries became especially apparent 
during the public debates over Critical Reconstruction in the 1990s, which are discussed in detail 
in Chapter 4. 
Stimmann’s eschewal of mainstream architectural discourse continued into the following 
decade, when, in the mid-1980s, he became involved with the Internationale Bauaustellung 
(International Building Exhibition, or IBA) through its Altbau (urban renewal) projects, headed 
by the architect Hardt-Walther Hämer. As opposed to Kleihues’s Neubau (new construction) 
projects, the IBA-Altbau focused on working directly with communities, most notably in the 
West Berlin neighborhood of Kreuzberg, to improve and rehabilitate existing buildings and 
streets. During this time, Stimmann wrote several essays criticizing Critical Reconstruction as 
applied by Kleihues as head of the Neubau section of the IBA. In his essay of 1985, “Between 
                                                
2 Quoted in Hans Stimmann, Von der Sozialutopie zum städtischen Haus: Texte und Interviews von Hans Stimmann, ed. 
Jörn Düwel and Michael Mönninger (Berlin: DOM, 2011), 16. Heinrich Klotz also stated that “Mr. Stimmann, the city’s building 
director, told me quite frankly, that he never really studied architecture, that he doesn’t understand much about architecture and 
that when he got in touch with the generation of 1968 they advised him to put away the pencil. He confessed that.” Heinrich 
Klotz, Nikolaus Kuhnert, and Angelika Schnell, “For God’s Sake, Not This Kind of a Capital: Heinrich Klotz in Conversation 
with ARCH+,” trans. Tamara Domenrat, Arch +, no. 122 (June 1994): 87. 
3 Stimmann, Von der Sozialutopie ..., 16. 
4 His split with this other, totally different side of architectural theory was likely accentuated by his training as a mason. 
Instead of taking the traditional university track through his engineering and doctoral work, as figures such as Kleihues did, 
Stimmann rose up through the vocational, engineering track of university education. This background, I argue, is probably what 
gives him much of his anti-intellectual bent. See ibid., 9. 
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City Planning, Politics, and Architectural Styles: The IBA,” for instance, he delved into the long 
history of post-war Berlin planning politics to argue that the IBA-Neubau was doomed to failure. 
Created in the context of an already internally contradictory and broken political and planning 
culture, he argued, the IBA’s planners did not have the power to put through their overambitious 
plans. The disappearance of various SPD politicians from the planning leadership of the 
exhibition also meant that its progressive, socio-political goals had been lost. This issue came to 
a head with the unveiling of the famous “Kleihues Plan” (fig. 1.25, discussed Chapter 1), a map 
of Kleihues’s intended reconstruction of the city center, at the 1984 IBA exhibition titled “Idea, 
Process, Result.” Stimmann wrote, 
With this framework … Kleihues set himself over and against all previous legally 
required building plans, but also other types of planning such as district planning. 
With the creation of this plan Kleihues instead used an urban design method that, 
consciously or unconsciously, was closely related to Camillo Sitte’s 1889 artistic-
aesthetic ideas about city construction.5 
 
Stimmann is referring here to Sitte’s famous treatise, City Planning According to Artistic 
Principles. Sitte viewed late nineteenth-century city planning in his native Vienna as much too 
focused on issues of engineering, and sought to refocus planners’ attention on the aesthetic and 
stylistic aspects of city design that would create pleasant spaces for users.6 Such ideas, in 
Stimmann’s mind, emphasized the wrong facets of planning, attempting to prettify the urban 
landscape without paying attention to its social conditions. Kleihues’s designs therefore 
constituted, Stimmann wrote, 
                                                
5 “Beim Entwurf des Planes benutzte Kleihues statt dessen eine städtebauliche Entwurfsmethode, die sich, bewusst 
oder unbewusst, auf Camillo Sittes 1889 entwickelte künstlerisch-ästhetische Städtebauvorstellungen.” Hans Stimmann, 
“Zwischen Stadtplanung, Politik Und Architekturmoden. Die IBA,” in Von Der Sozialutopie Zum Städtischen Haus, by Hans 
Stimmann, ed. Jörn Düwel and Michael Mönninger (Berlin: DOM, 2011), 86–89. 
6 It should be noted that Sitte was much more focused on the psychological rather than stylistic aspects of city planning. 
His work sought to make urban spaces more comfortable, and thus he pulled together examples from many different places and 
time periods in order to achieve these ends. Stimmann is therefore quite reductive in his reading of Sitte. See George R. Collins 
and Christiane Crasemann Collins, Camillo Sitte: The Birth of Modern City Planning, Dover ed. (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2006), 
48; see also Camillo Sitte, City Planning according to Artistic Principles (New York, Random House, 1965). 
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the aesthetic – but not the social – critique of the results of the capitalist urban 
development of the late nineteenth century. … In his plans for the Southern 
Friedrichstadt, Kleihues also ignored questions of the societal requirements for 
the planned production of city construction and architecture – the land ownership 
relationships, the land prices, the financing, the legal requirements for 
participation by citizens, etc. The ambivalence and the non-binding quality of the 
plans in terms of the social results made them, conversely, into an instrument of 
completely non-artistic financial and power interests.7 
 
As a planning model, Stimmann praised the methods of Hämer’s IBA-Altbau, where “instead of 
the traditional planning methods there were one-on-one discussions, building meetings, citizens’ 
groups, seminars,” and a “working group for renewal” which included IBA representatives, 
planners, housing associations, and residents.8 To Stimmann, this was the antithesis of 
Kleihues’s “aesthetic” approach: instead of concentrating on how buildings looked, Hämer 
worked to support healthy social, economic, and political relationships between residents and the 
city government, allowing architectural reconstruction (which, in this case, was mostly 
remodeling or renovation) to arise out of these needs. Stimmann’s critiques were, in many ways, 
correct, as he would later find out: his desire to emphasize the structural relationships that would 
give rise to a healthy city fabric became a point of serious tension when he decided to adopt 
Critical Reconstruction as his own planning method. 
Stimmann as a Leading Figure in Berlin City Planning 
In 1986, Stimmann accepted the post of Construction Director in his hometown of 
Lübeck, where he spent five years before returning to Berlin.9 His appointment as Berlin Senate 
                                                
7 “… die ästhetische, nicht jedoch die soziale Kritik an den Ergebnissen des kapitalistischen Städtebaus des 
ausgehenden 19. Jahrhunderts … Ähnlich wie die [Berlin] Planer von 1910 ignoriert auch Kleihues bei seinen Plänen für die 
südliche Friedrichstadt Fragen nach den gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen für die beabsichtigte Produktion von Städtebau und 
Architektur – den Bodenbesitzverhältnissen, den Bodenpreisen, der Finanzierung, den gesetzlichen Anforderungen an 
Bürgerbeteiligung, etc. Die Gleichgültigkeit bzw. die Unverbindlichkeit der Planungen etwa gegenüber den sozialen Folgen 
macht sie anderseits zum Instrument durchaus unkünstlerischer Macht- und Geldinteressen.” Stimmann, “Zwischen 
Stadtplanung, Politik Und Architekturmoden. Die IBA,” 86–89. 
8 Ibid., 90. 
9 There, he worked to refurbish the city center, with an emphasis on traffic quieting measures. See Stimmann, Von der 
Sozialutopie ..., 29. 
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Construction Director under Senator Wolfgang Nagel in 1991 came as a surprise to many 
observers, first, because the position had been vacant for almost a decade, and second, Senator 
Nagel’s close associate Hanno Klein had expected the appointment himself.10 Nagel may have 
been nervous about Klein’s well-known tendency toward hyperbolic statements and autocratic 
dealings: as mentioned earlier, he was infamous for stating that Berlin needed a second 
Gründerzeit “with prominence and brutality.”11 Journalist and critic Rudolf Stegers has 
suggested that Nagel may have thought he was getting a softer politician in Stimmann – someone 
who could smooth things over in a way that Klein had been unable or unwilling to.12 If this is 
indeed the case, Nagel was in for a grave disappointment. Though at the time some thought 
Stimmann a laughable, provincial nobody, from the moment of his taking office, he proved 
himself to be a brash, autocratic, and controlling figure in Berlin building politics. As illustrated 
by his heated exchanges with Rem Koolhaas in the jury discussions about the Sony Center 
designs for Potsdamer Platz (discussed in Chapter 2), which gave rise to a longstanding feud 
between Koolhaas and the city of Berlin, Stimmann gave no thought to offending either his 
colleagues or others in the architectural or planning professions.  
Upon taking office in April of 1991, Stimmann’s first big move was to restructure the 
office of Senate Construction Director. Since World War II, this position had functioned chiefly 
as the “aesthetic arm” of the Construction Senator, a “city architect” who might draw up 
potential plans or make recommendations about development, but whose aims and suggestions 
were mainly aesthetic – rather than political – in nature. Stimmann attempted to gain more 
                                                
10 The position had been vacant due to political upheavals within the Berlin Senate in the early 1980s, partly over the 
future and management of the IBA, and many thought it should be done away with entirely. See Stimmann, “Zwischen 
Stadtplanung, Politik Und Architekturmoden. Die IBA,” 81–82. 
11 “Markant Und Brutal,” Der Spiegel, no. 14 (April 1, 1991): 113. 
12 This explanation seems unlikely to me, given that he was acquainted with Stimmann already and would have seen 
him in action; my suspicion is that Nagel hoped that Stimmann, with his left-leaning ideals, might be able to rein in investors in 
the right ways. 
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decision-making power than previous directors by changing his position into one of a State 
Secretary, which gave him more authority and a stronger political connection to the Senate, and 
by establishing his own department, “Section III,” with a large team of architects and 
administrators, as well as its own architecture workshop.13 Thus he became not just an 
aesthetically oriented “city architect,” but a planner in the more general sense, and one with 
much more political sway than previous directors. Though in reality his power to make decisions 
and influence planning was still somewhat limited, especially since the Construction Department 
was only one of three major planning powers with jurisdiction over the city center, the public 
persona he crafted broadcasted the opposite.14 In an oft-quoted 1991 interview in the national 
architectural journal Baumeister, Stimmann boldly asserted, “I’m a powerful man. … I can tell 
each of my employees: we’re going to do it this way – as long as my Senator doesn’t throw me 
out. Then we are simultaneously the state building commission, ministry, and president of the 
government.”15 This commanding public persona worked along with his reductive aesthetics and 
rigid planning rules to earn Stimmann a reputation as a highly conservative planner. 
 
                                                
13 See Hans Stimmann and Wolfgang Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann’: Gespräch Mit Senatsbaudirektor, 
Hans Stimmann, Berlin,” Baumeister 90, no. 7 (July 1993): 48–51. 
14 As discussed in Chapter 2, the Department of Urban Planning and the federal government both also had authority 
over overlapping swaths of Mitte. The Department of Urban Planning, in particular, was equally influential over most planning 
decisions. 
15 In the original text he relates the “powerful man” statement to the position of State Secretary: “Weil ich aber als 
Staatssekretär ein mächtiger Mann bin, kann ich alle Projekt an mich ziehen. Ich zwinge damit meine eigene Verwaltung, über 
Gestaltung nachzudenken. Die hat ja sonst keinen Gesprächspartner. Ich kann jedem meiner Mitarbeiter sagen: Jetzt wird das 
aber so gemacht – so lange mich mein Senator nich rausschmeißt. Dann sind wir gleichzeitig Landesbauamt, Ministerium und 
Regierungspräsident.”Stimmann and Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann,’” 48. In truth, he didn’t actually see himself as 




Stimmann’s Reductive Version of Critical Reconstruction 
The Concept of the European City and the Idea of the “Guiding Image” 
As noted above, Stimmann had been highly critical of Kleihues’s use of the map format 
as a publicity tool during the IBA; however, after his adoption of Critical Reconstruction in 
1991, he followed suit. Along with his many verbal and written statements, images were a key 
way in which he disseminated his message and presented arguments about what should be done 
with the city. The importance of images for Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction is underscored 
by his frequent invocation of this method as a Leitbild or “guiding image.” The Leitbild is a 
concept with a fairly long history in German planning, having come to the fore particularly in the 
1980s as a popular instrument of democratic governance.16 Formed primarily, as the term 
implies, by images (drawings, plans, and examples of existing buildings), but reinforced 
rhetorically, a Leitbild acts as a kind of “branding strategy” intended to make complex planning 
tactics easily comprehensible to the public, and to win their support.17 Comprised of his many 
statements and numerous publications that included historical photographs, plans, and maps, 
Stimmann’s Leitbild for the city center touted the vision of six-story, stone-clad, block-edge 
commercial developments topped by luxury residences and fronted by cafés and shops that 
would draw the bourgeois flâneur to stroll along its stately avenues: the very image long touted 
by continental architects and theorists as the post-modern answer to mid-century, International 
Style Modernist development. Stimmann regularly referred to this Leitbild as stemming from the 
model of the “European city.” 
                                                
16 Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 21. 
17 See ibid., 55 and; Harald Bodenschatz and Uwe Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in London und 
Berlin (Berlin: Verlagshaus Braun, 2005), 8. 
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Used widely by post-modern theorists and designers from the 1960s on, including other 
proponents of Critical Reconstruction like Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, a key figure in the 
Berlin Architecture Debates (discussed in Chapter 4), the idea of the “European city” is 
essentially a conservative one which suggests not only the need for the preservation of 
historically-important architecture, but for a certain “social” (connoting political, economic, but 
also cultural) way of life. Sociologist Walter Siebel describes the concept in terms of five 
characteristics: the city as holding the promise of political and economic emancipation in the 
form of bourgeois, democratic society; social regulation in the form of a welfare state; the city 
giving rise to special, urban ways of living (Lebensweise), formed especially by a unique kind of 
division of public and private space; the “image of the form of the European city,” inherited from 
ages past; and the tangible presence of history (architectural, political, and social) in the daily life 
of citizens.18 Siebel describes the traditional European form of the Stadtkrone, with its city hall, 
market, and church, as the “symbol for the political, economic and cultural centrality of the 
city.”19 This form is typically embodied in the Altstadt, or medieval city core.20 Drawing on the 
theories of Max Weber to argue for the socio-economic underpinning of urban forms and 
lifestyles, Siebel claims that the traditional “European city” is today being undermined by the 
shifting values of contemporary society.21 
The “European city” model can be seen as part of a larger trend towards “historical” 
forms of one kind or another in post-modern architecture and urbanism. Beginning in the 1970s, 
                                                
18 “… das überkommene Bild von der Gestalt der europäischen Stadt.” Hartmut Häussermann and Walter Siebel, Die 
europäische Stadt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), 18. 
19 “… das sinnfällige Abbild der politischen, ökonomischen und kulturellen Zentralität der Stadt.” Ibid., 16. 
20 Dirk Schubert, “Mythos ‘Europäische Stadt’: Zur Erforderlichen Kontextualisierung Eines Umstrittenen Begriffs,” 
Alte Stadt 28, no. 4 (2001): 282–283. Bodenschatz and Altrock note that this trend is also present in the United States, but is 
generally talked about as a “compact” or “liveable” city. See Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 8. 
21 Häussermann and Siebel, Die europäische Stadt, 18. 
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architects and planners all across Western Europe (and some behind the Iron Curtain, as well) 
began to focus on the notion of the historical city as a planning model. These trends were most 
notably expressed in events such as the international designation of 1975 as “European 
Monument Preservation Year,” which popularized the idea of “careful urban renewal” 
(behutsame Stadterneuerung), as well as Kleihues’s various efforts through the Dortmund 
Architecture Conferences from 1975 on (discussed in Chapter 1), and, famously, the 
architectural exhibition titled “The Presence of the Past” at the 1980 Venice Biennale, which was 
widely regarded as the entrée of historically-oriented post-modernism onto the global scene.22 
The ubiquity, by the 1990s, of the “European city” model as a way of updating 
continental urban landscapes presented a dire problem for Stimmann and other planners in 
Berlin, however. Not only had Berlin’s Altstadt already been subject to slum clearance measures 
in the late nineteenth century, but the remains of this tiny kernel had later been completely 
obliterated by World War II bombings, then divided and left empty by the city’s physical Cold 
War division. Any new Stadtkrone would have to virtually be fabricated from scratch (indeed, 
East Berlin’s planners in particular had already made attempts at this in Mitte during the 1980s 
with the creation of the Nikolaiviertel, a faux-medieval quarter centered around a reconstructed 
thirteenth-century church).23 Furthermore, Berlin has always been a fundamentally polycentric 
space, consisting of numerous incorporated towns and villages, and this quality was enhanced by 
the forty years of division by the Wall, which encouraged the East and West to create their own 
commercial centers along their respective edges of Mitte. Thus, in reunited Berlin, the recreation 
                                                
22 See Katharina Brichetti, Die Paradoxie des postmodernen Historismus: Stadtumbau und städtebauliche 
Denkmalpflege vom 19. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert am Beispiel von Berlin und Beirut (Berlin: Schiler, 2009), 142–144; and Harry 
Francis Mallgrave and David Goodman, An Introduction to Architectural Theory: 1968 to the Present (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011), 58–62. 
23 For an in-depth discussion, see Emily Pugh, “The Berlin Wall and the Urban Space and Experience of East and West 
Berlin, 1961-1989” (Ph.D. diss., CUNY Graduate Center, 2008). 
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of the “European city” type of centralized area in Mitte meant, on a practical level, simply 
refabricating much of the city center, and positing it as a Stadtkrone or Altstadt that had, in 
reality, barely, if ever, existed. 
I argue that Stimmann’s employment of the term “European city” or “historical city” in 
conjunction with the Leitbild of Critical Reconstruction was thus strategic on multiple levels. It 
allowed him not only to draw on a set of easily comprehensible visual tropes, but, in numerous 
ways, to present his plans as architectural answers to pressing issues of emergent German 
identity. First, casting Critical Reconstruction, and, by association, Berlin, as fundamentally 
“European” tacitly implied that Berlin was now fully integrated into the West: that it was 
embracing its Western rather than its Eastern connections and roots – both in terms of 
democratic governance and its cultural disposition, thus landing on the “right” side of the end of 
the Cold War. Second, the idea of the “European city” implied a significant difference from – 
even opposition to – the populist or high-tech trends in the United States.24 As Stimmann argues,  
Catchphrases such as ‘anything goes’ or, in the context of American cities, 
theories such as ‘Learning from Las Vegas,’ are not only out of place but 
destructive in a city such as Berlin which is so firmly rooted in the European 
architectural tradition, and one which has had such a decisive influence on 
modern town planning at the end of the last [i.e. nineteenth] century and 
beginning of this. … We need only to look at the catastrophic legacy of the 
destructivist theories of Futurism in European architecture and the [mid-century] 
Modernist view of the city. In a city such as Berlin, with its history of 
psychological trauma, architecture must surely revert to norms, to composition 
and – in the tradition of the one-time solid “stone city” of Berlin – to the physical, 
the material and the tectonic; only in this way can architecture fulfill its dual role 
as a factor in the urban image of the city and as a social and working 
environment.25 
 
                                                
24 See Schubert, “Mythos ‘Europäische Stadt,’” 282–283. 
25 Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin: Birkhäuser 
Verlag, 1995), 211. 
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As architectural historian Katharina Brichetti observes, the “European city” concept also 
implies the ideal of a desirable “leisure-urbanity,” a space for the urban pedestrian to enjoy street 
cafés and public plazas. It is a place where life proceeds at a slower pace, with that slowness 
acting as “a synonym for heritage, history, and continuity.”26 Stimmann was thus able to utilize 
this concept as a bulwark against the potential “mallification” of Mitte: 
In general the guiding principle of the “European city,” with its strict division 
between public streets, squares and parks on one hand and private lots on the 
other, was a central requirement. This is contradicted by the wish of many 
investors for semi-public shopping malls. The risk of this building type becoming 
the basis for new developments was especially great because the urban property, 
as the smallest operative unit of urban construction, was largely absent in the 
areas subject to re-organization.27 
 
Finally, Stimmann saw the “European city” model as a way for Berliners (and, because it 
was the capital city, presumably Germans in general) to connect with and experience their 
“history” as part of the project of finding an identity. Stimmann argued, 
In the fifties the Berliners started to search for their [architectural] identity: some 
in America, some in the Soviet Union, later wherever. In any case it was terribly 
international. That was the wrong way. Berliners need to take their own themes 
seriously again. There is not just Schinkel and Messel, but the regular Berlin 
tenement.28 
 
Stimmann’s portrayal of global Modernism as exemplifying the “wrong way” of doing things, 
and his reliance instead on an indigenous tradition based on not only on work of great German or 
Berlin architects, but the “everyday” architecture of the nineteenth century, connects directly to 
Kleihues’s project of building on the best parts of German architecture and reviving “traditional” 
Berlin typologies. But whereas Kleihues carefully sidestepped direct questions of how 
                                                
26 Brichetti, Die Paradoxie des postmodernen Historismus, 95. 
27 Hans Stimmann, “New Berlin Office and Commercial Buildings,” in Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen 
Architektur, by Annegret Burg, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 17. 
28 “In den fünfziger Jahren haben sich die Berliner aufgemacht, ihre Identität zu suchen: die einen in Amerika, die 
anderen in der Sowjetunion, später in Richtung Was-weiß-ich-wohin. Auf jeden Fall musste es furchtbar international sein. Das 
war ein falscher Weg. Die Berliner müssen ihre eigenen Themen wieder Ernst nehmen. Das sind ja nicht nur Schinkel und 
Messel, sondern das normale Berliner Wohnhaus.” Stimmann and Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann,’” 51.  
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architecture related to society, Stimmann utilized the notion of the “European city” to make more 
explicit claims about how architecture would exemplify the identity of the new city and nation, 
claiming that a “stone Berlin” was what was needed in order to restore to Berliners a sense of 
normalcy and historical continuity. The underlying assumption in this endeavor, of course, is that 
architecture itself necessarily represents the social, cultural, or national identity of those who live 
and work in it. Though Stimmann himself staunchly refused to see this rhetoric of the “European 
city” as anything other than a means of achieving particular practical, concrete planning goals, 
the Leitbild of Critical Reconstruction as a return to “European” urban forms meant, in essence, a 
turn towards the conservative position within the Historikerstreit: an invocation of German 
history as a thing to be understood, emulated, and normalized in the cityscape.29 And 
Stimmann’s reductive standards for Critical Reconstruction reinforced this problematic position 
through their reliance on neo-classical materials and styles, which had been shunned in post-war 
West Germany (and also, as discussed in Chapter 1, carefully avoided by Kleihues) because of 
their association with the Nazi regime. Now, it seemed, these forms were not only to be revived, 
but celebrated.30 
Aesthetic Categories: The Façade as Flashpoint  
Stimmann’s formulation of Critical Reconstruction changed what had been a relatively 
open and dialectical theory of urban design into a particular aesthetic recipe that was relatively 
rigid in terms of its guidelines and requirements. Stimmann stated that the “diversity” of 
                                                
29 An emphasis on “Europeanness” also tied to the contemporary formation of the EU in a post-Cold War climate, the 
creation of a shared currency, and thus to questions of Germany’s integration with the continental “West.” 
30 Though I call it “neo-classicism” throughout this and the next chapter, the style supported by the Critical 
Reconstructionists under Stimmann was more specifically a revival of a particular form of pre-war Modernism that incorporated 
neo-classical and traditional regionalist elements. It had much in common with the Scandinavian and German Modernism of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century. For the purpose of clarity, I have chosen to distinguish here between pre-war and 
mid-century Modernism and Nazi neo-classicism; in reality, these are not at all clearly differentiated – indeed, many German 
architects practiced all three at one time or another. The tangled roots of these various stylistic tendencies would be a fruitful 
subject for further research. 
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architecture supported by his department (he cites 150 architects from 11 countries as active in 
Berlin between 1994 and 1995) 
should not be confused with randomness, and experimentation should not become 
equivalent to the destruction of the urban planning structure. … New architecture 
must relate to the city, to the historical and urban planning context and to 
architectural tradition, in order to reinforce the density of the city. Architectural 
progress evolves from the continued development, and not from the complete 
renunciation, of traditions, typologies, and technologies.31  
 
In order to ensure the continuance of this “tradition,” Stimmann reduced Critical Reconstruction 
to just a few rules. First, he stated, “the historic street network and the associated historic 
frontage lines of the streets and squares should be respected or restored.”32 This rule was a direct 
adoption of Kleihues’s attempt to restore the baroque-era street plan in Mitte, in order to reduce 
auto traffic, promote pedestrian life along the street, and, in Stimmann’s case, to win back 
valuable land by reclaiming usable building space from multi-lane boulevards. Second, in terms 
of zoning, unlike the IBA, where the construction of housing had been the main goal, “under the 
changed conditions of [national] unity, the main use in the affected areas is … rather typical 
inner-city uses: office buildings, hotels, department stores, ministries, university buildings.”33 In 
terms of density and use, then, only twenty percent of the gross floor area in Stimmann’s plan 
was stipulated for housing. Single buildings were limited to a maximum size of one block, 
hosting a mix of uses. Third, on the level of individual buildings, heights were restricted to 
twenty-two meters at the eaves and thirty at the ridges, referring back to the Berlin city building 
codes of 1897 and 1929.34 This echoes, albeit in a more utilitarian manner, Kleihues’s call for a 
diverse “physiognomy” of the street and his revival of the traditional Berlin typology of the six-
                                                
31 Stimmann, “New Berlin Office and Commercial Buildings,” 19. 
32 Ibid., 13. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 15. 
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story courtyard block, though in Stimmann’s case there was much less emphasis on the courtyard 
itself. Stimmann focused instead on building heights, hoping that by limiting investors in terms 
of potential square footage, he could keep land values low enough that rents would remain 
affordable: “Here my love for the engagement with the European city happens to meet with my 
thoughts about limiting the use of land in terms of height. … The limits of height are an 
instrument of limiting speculation. There aesthetics and economics meet.”35  
Stimmann routinely claimed that his rules for Critical Reconstruction did not include 
stipulations on formal elements like façades and materials.36 Nonetheless, he often followed up 
his discussions of general city planning guidelines with statements about what kinds of 
architecture he felt were stylistically appropriate for Mitte. For instance, in a 1995 essay, 
employing the grammatical passive voice that is so common in academic German, Stimmann 
referred vaguely to a contemporary “demand” for “stone” architecture (though who was making 
this demand is unclear)  
based on the conviction that an urban atmosphere derives from the emphasized 
materiality of the city. High-tech buildings consisting solely of glass or displaying 
all their structural elements cannot allow the creation of a city in the traditional 
sense. A European city needs walls and openings that mark the transition between 
building and city.37   
 
Furthermore, “architecture as a social art,” he stated, “needs rules as the expression of society’s 
ideas of the city.”38 This objective meant a return to what he characterized as “Berlin 
architecture”:  
                                                
35 “Da trifft sich meine Liebe zum Umgang mit der europäischen Stadt zufällig mit Überlegungen, die Ausnutzung von 
Grund und Boden nach oben zu begrenzen. … Die Begrenzung der Höhe ist auch ein Instrument zur Begrenzung der 
Spekulation. Da treffen Ästhetik und Ökonomie zusammen.” Stimmann and Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann,’” 49. 
36 See, for example, P. Bornhöft and M. Mönninger, “Heimatkunde Für Neuteutonia,” Der Spiegel, October 17, 1994, 
117. 
37 Stimmann, “New Berlin Office and Commercial Buildings,” 18–19. 
38 Ibid., 17. 
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My idea is the winning back of a Berlin tradition. I am a constituent of three-
dimensional architecture, stone Berlin. … Wherever I can influence the 
architecture, I try to do so under the motto: disciplined, Prussian, conservative in 
its colors, stone, more straight than curved. That goes naturally also for the choice 
of architects: rather [Hans] Kollhoff than a big American office.39  
 
With this Stimmann not only implied a dedication to a particular style, based on forms and 
materials, but to supporting specific architects who met his aesthetic demands – all supposedly in 
service of creating an appropriate landscape for Berlin.40 Stimmann defended this position by 
claiming that the tradition of stone is intimately linked with the work of early German 
Modernists such as Peter Behrens, Alfred Messel, Hermann Muthesius, and Max Taut, and thus 
with the “historical” character of Germany and Berlin. The “architectural expression” of the 
early Modernists’ commercial buildings was, he stated, “as a rule, that of a building with a 
clearly readable entrance, with serial window formats and façade materials typical of Berlin, 
such as yellow-gray sandstone, shell limestone and limestone, as well as travertine or ceramic 
facing, or, more rarely, fired clinker brick.”41 These architects, he said, designed commercial 
architecture for a city “whose modernity they wanted to express in up-to-date architecture,” but 
they eschewed the “radical alternatives” of expressionist architects like Bruno Taut or Hans 
Scharoun.42 As a result, he admitted,  
There are architects who feel excluded. … The whole Scharoun School is 
definitely part of that. Or definitely the Deconstructivists. … They feel 
themselves terribly threatened. Before I came they had a lot more leeway. I 
believe that there are many people in the architecture scene who don’t like me 
                                                
39 “Meine Idee ist die Wiedergewinnung einer berlinischen Tradition. Ich bin ein Anhänger der körperhaften 
Architektur, des Steinernen Berlin. ... Wo immer ich Architektur beeinflussen kann, versuche ich das unter der Überschrift: 
diszipliniert, preußisch, zurückhaltend in der Farbigkeit, steinern, eher gerade als geschwungen. Das gilt natürlich auch für die 
Auswahl der Architekten: Lieber Kollhoff als ein amerikanisches Großbüro.” Stimmann and Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger 
Mann,’” 48, 51. 
40 It is also clear how easily his comments could be construed as a flimsy excuse to favor a small group of preferred 
architects with lucrative corporate contracts, one of the reasons why, as discussed further in Chapter 4, he so often came under 
fire for being part of an architectural “cartel.” 
41 Stimmann, “New Berlin Office and Commercial Buildings,” 18. 
42 Ibid., 17. 
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because of that. For the others, who favor my ideas of building continuity and my 
architectonic positions, it’s going even better than before.”43 
 
Stimmann’s clear preference for stone façades is illustrated by two controversies over 
new buildings in the city center. Planners Rainer Emenlauer and Christine von Strempel relate 
how Stimmann impertinently lambasted a design by Richard Meier for a new building along the 
main east-west boulevard of Unter den Linden: 
Wrong interpretation of the location, wrong building alignment, wrong 
distribution of the façade, too much glass, the entrance in the wrong place, etc., 
etc. Richard Meier listened to all this with perfect calm, stood up, told his 
assistant to pack up the model, and said to Hans Stimmann, “If you need an 
architect for the nineteenth century, I’m not your man.” Silence all around and 
dismay on the part of the developers. For it was clear: there could be no 
compromise, the positions were diametrically opposed.44 
 
The contract for the building was eventually given to the German rationalist Jürgen Sawade. 
Another conflict erupted over the design decision for the Academy of Arts (Akademie der 
Künste) on the southern side of Pariser Platz, perpendicular to the Brandenburg Gate. The 
Academy’s pre-war home, a baroque palace remodeled around the turn of the century by the 
early Modernist architect Ernst von Ihne, had been destroyed in the war, and only few exhibition 
rooms were still extant on the site in 1945. With the division of the country, the institution, too, 
was split into Eastern and Western components, and each half moved elsewhere in the city until 
the fall of the Wall, when it reunited and was able to reclaim its former plot on the iconic square. 
The Academy, which had full jurisdiction over the site, sponsored a competition in 1993, 
                                                
43 “Es gibt Architekten, die sich mit ihren Positionen ausgeschlossen fühlen. Die ganze Scharoun-Schule gehört 
bestimmt dazu. Oder erst recht die Dekonstruktivisten … Die fühlen sich furchtbar bedroht. Die konnten sich, bevor ich hierher 
gekommen bin, viel mehr austoben. Ich glaube daß es viele Leute in der Architektenszene gibt, die mich deshalb nicht mögen. 
Die anderen, die von der Baukonjunktur und meinen architektonischen Positionen begünstigt werden, denen geht es natürlich um 
so besser.” Stimmann and Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann,’” 51. 
44 “Falsche Interpretation des Ortes, falsche Gebäudeausrichtung, falsche Fassadengliederung, zuviel Glas, der Eingang 
an der falschen Stelle usw., usw. Richard Meier hörte sich das in aller Ruhe an, stand auf, bedeutete seinem Assistanten das 
Modell einzupacken und sagte zu Hans Stimmann: ‘If you need an architect for the 19th century, I’m not your man.’” Rainer 
Emenlauer and Christine von Strempel, “Als Richard Meier kein Architekt des 19. Jahrhunderts werden wollte,” in Kritische 
Würdigung der Kritischen Rekonstruktion: 71 Beiträge von Wegbegleitern und Widersachern des Hans Stimmann (München: 
Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2006), 33. 
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choosing a striking, glass-fronted design by the well-known West German Modernist Günter 
Behnisch (figs. 3.1-3.2).45 Behnisch’s design preserves the extant core of von Ihne’s structure, 
adding office, archival, and meeting spaces above and below. The façade is a gridded, layered 
composition of glass panels and metal filigree that echoes the asymmetrical abstraction of earlier 
Modernist designers like Gerrit Rietveld, and its transparency allows a view into the interior, 
where multiple angles and layers of original and new construction create an almost Cubist 
compositional effect. The choice of this transparent, almost Expressionist design, was an 
intentional reversal of Critical Reconstruction’s call for disciplined stucco or stone façades: as 
architectural historian Matthias Pabsch observes, the jury found it 
necessary to do justice to the function of cultural leadership that became 
incumbent upon the Academy and its members during the public discussion about 
the rebuilding of the city center. For this reason, it was important for them to find 
their own position and to represent it convincingly. For the [city’s] efforts to 
create strictures [requiring] historical reconstruction were targeted at the 
limitation of artistic freedom and thus also meant an attack on the institution 
whose duty was to defend this freedom.46 
 
The Academy, then, saw itself as a defender of artistic freedom against figures such as 
Stimmann, who wanted to strictly limit the formal language of new building façades, especially 
at historically significant sites such as Pariser Platz in Mitte. The choice of Behnisch’s design 
kicked off several years of vehement debates between various planning constituents, and the 
cornerstone for the building was not laid until the year 2000.47 Though Stimmann’s own 
                                                
45 The design was completed in collaboration with partner Manfred Sabatke and architect/historian Werner Durth. See 
Matthias Pabsch, Pariser Platz, Architektur und Technik: vom manuellen zum digitalen Zeitalter (Berlin: Reimer, 2002), 173–
179; Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 238–241.  
46 “Es galt der kulturellen Vorbildfunktion gerecht zu werden, welche der Akademie und ihren Mitgliedern in der 
öffentlichen Diskussion um die Neubebauung des Stadtzentrum zukam. Aus diesem Grund war es wichtig, eine eigene Position 
zu finden und überzeugend zu vertreten. Denn die Bestrebungen nach Regelungen für einen historisierenden Wiederaufbau 
zielten auf die Einschränkung künstlerischer Freiheit ab und bedeuteteten somit auch einen Angriff auf die Institution, deren 
Aufgabe es war, diese Freiheit zu verteidigen.” Pabsch, Pariser Platz, Architektur und Technik, 173.  
47 Ibid., 177. Architectural historian Matthias Pabsch argues that “the attempt to guarantee ‘cultural-historical 
continuity’ for city planning at this important site failed solely because the analysis was based solely on a snapshot, namely one 
of the state right before its destruction” (149). However, Pabsch’s argument that the square’s historical “contradictions” 
throughout its past means that planners should embrace the “digital” in the form of Deconstructivism is likewise a misuse of 
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department did not put up the main opposition to the glass façade (the main disagreements 
happened after Senator Nagel was replaced),48 Stimmann was an outspoken critic of Behnisch 
and of his strain of Modernism, because of their presumed relationship to expressionism: 
I am not a defender of the expressionist line from Scharoun to Behnisch and also 
not of technoid, structural construction. My architecture must fall into the 
tradition that reaches from Gilly, Schinkel, Messel, Behrens, Mies van der Rohe,  
… to Kleihues … I want to connect back to the twenties. And to the time right 
before that, that is Max Taut, Hoffmann, and Blankenstein.49 
 
The problem with Stimmann’s aesthetics, however, is that it is impossible to see how this 
preferred formal language links back simply to Weimar Modernism, and not to the restrained 
neo-classicism of the Nazi architecture that succeeded it. Though he repeatedly tried to connect 
his preferences to the tradition of 1920s commercial Modernism, his stylistic choices – due in no 
small part to the influence of the Architecture Debates, as will become clear in Chapter 4 – were 
most often interpreted by critics not as Modernist, but as “New Teutonic,” i.e. as reviving the 
conservative, neo-classical strand of Modernism that was adopted as the preferred architectural 
language of the Nazis. Here Stimmann became trapped by his own logic: if architecture’s formal 
traits were meant to represent society, then any allusion to neo-classical forms or materials (such 
as stone or axiality), which in post-war West Germany had been associated directly with the Nazi 
                                                                                                                                                       
history as a stylistic legitimation. Pabsch erroneously claims to be using the ‘actual’ history as a way to legitimate continued 
experimentation, when what the controversy was really about was the identity of Germany and its perceived relationship to its 
history. 
48 See Jürgen Tietz, “Geschichte Aus Glas - Baubeginn Am Pariser Platz,” Der Tagesspiegel, June 12, 2000, 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/kultur/geschichte-aus-glas-baubeginn-am-pariser-platz/141258.html. 
49 “ … ich bin kein Verfechter der experssionistischen Traditionslinie von Scharoun bis Behnisch und auch nicht des 
technoiden, strukturellen Bauens. Meine Architektur muß sich in die Traditionslinie von Gilly, Schinkel, Messel, Behrens, Mies 
van der Rohe, Taut bis Kleihues einordnen lassen … Ich will damit an die zwangziger Jahre anknüpfen. Und an die Zeit, die noch 
davor liegt, also Max Taut, Hoffmann und Blankenstein.” Stimmann and Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann,’” 48–49. In 
“not being a defender of the Scharoun line,” Stimmann reveals one point of extreme divergence from Kleihues’s Critical 
Reconstruction, whose aesthetics – however traditional in some respects – were also heavily influenced by Scharoun and other 
expressionists. Stimmann’s turn toward a more conservative and literal interpretation of history was mirrored in the shifts of 
architects like Kollhoff, a student of Ungers who also, as the 1990s progressed, moved further and further from the neo-rationalist 
or expressionist model of the “urban archipelago” towards a conservative and historicist position that had more in common with 
American New Urbanism and the conservative neo-historicism of Leon Krier. Kollhoff’s contributions to Critical Reconstruction 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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regime, implied a dangerous return to those politics as well. Given his lack of training in 
traditional architectural discourse, Stimmann was apparently either not couth enough or not 
interested enough to wield these historical allusions to his advantage, or to shore up his choices 
with clear examples of how they linked specifically to Weimar Modernism, and this problem 
was exacerbated by the inability of the popular media to parse the discipline-specific language of 
architectural theory and style. Instead, Stimmann relied on the power of his personality and 
position to achieve and justify his planning aims. Thus, despite Stimmann’s claims to the 
contrary, architecture critic Paul Goldberger could write in the New York Times in 1995 that he 
was deliberately ignoring the Modernist tradition: 
While Stimmann hesitates to admit it, much of Berlin was shaped by the very 
Modernist architecture that he is now trying to fight. … He is nothing if not a 
brilliant rhetorician, taunting architects with antimodernist sloganeering. And they 
have no choice but to listen. … To be an architect on Stimmann's good side is to 
get plenty of work in Berlin; otherwise, you might as well be in Helsinki.50 
 
Clearly, if the nuances of Stimmann’s position with regard to Modernism and its legacies were 
lost on Goldberger, a seasoned architectural critic, then they would also be completely lost on the 
larger public, who neither knew nor likely cared about the finer points of the Modernist 
architectural legacy. Again, as mentioned above, Stimmann’s difficulty in clearly positioning 
Critical Reconstruction in relation to Nazi aesthetics points to the larger problem of 
architecture’s ability to communicate and “mean” something to a large, diverse audience, 
especially when it connects to big ideas like “history” and “identity,” which themselves are often 
unclear.   
                                                
50 Paul Goldberger, “Reimagining Berlin,” The New York Times, February 5, 1995. 
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The Failed Goal of Small-Parcel Development  
Despite this autocratic and stylistically restrictive attitude, Stimmann managed to remain 
true, in letter, at least, to his social-democratic roots in that his stated goal was to make the inner 
city accessible to a rising middle class:  
The special problem … with the historical center of the city … is unfortunately 
that we have no more middle class. Right here in Berlin the very important Jewish 
population was, as is well known, in 1933 and in the following years, forced into 
emigration and then systematically murdered in the concentration camps. The 
typical state-centered politics of the GDR gradually forced the remaining shop 
owners, hoteliers, middle class property owners, and tradesmen to give up. So 
especially in the former East of the city a hole has been created that is going to be 
hard to fill.51 
 
But these socially progressive goals were undermined by Stimmann’s stated faith in the power of 
public-private partnerships to achieve his ends. In distinct contrast to his earlier critiques of 
capitalism, he now claimed that 
a city cannot be a city without private investment. My problem is more in 
organizing private capital so that it leaves behind a beautiful city. The private 
investors or architects as the trustees of the builders who come here with abstruse 
commercial imaginings – high-rises for the Friedrichstadt [neighborhood of 
Mitte], all kinds of malls – they ruin the foundations of the city. Most of my time 
is spent trying to convince them to utilize their long-term capital investments as a 
constitutive building block for Berlin and not for Houston, Texas. … Whoever is 
against private investment in the city, is against the city. How should these holes 
be filled? Big investment – department stores, offices – those are the places for 
new jobs. I’m for the investors. I am trying to rein them in with aesthetic 
categories.52  
                                                
51 “Das besondere Problem von Ost-Berlin mit dem historischen Zentrum der Stadt – partiell gilt das natürlich auch für 
West-Berlin – ist aber leider so, daß wir keinen Mittelstand mehr haben. Der gerade in Berlin sehr bedeutende jüdische Anteil ist 
bekanntlich 1933 und in den Folgejahren erst in die Emigration getrieben und dann systematisch in den Konzentrationslagern 
ermordet worden. Die DDR-typische Verstaatlichungspolitik hat die verbliebenen mittelständischen Hausbesitzer, 
Geschäftsleute, Hoteliers und Gewerbetreibenden nach und nach zur Aufgabe gezwungen. So ist besonders im ehemaligen Osten 
der Stadt kulturell und ökonomisch eine Brache entstanden, die nur schwer wiederzubeleben ist.” Stimmann and Bachmann, 
“‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann,’” 49–50. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Stimmann was heavily influenced in this regard by 
the urban theorist and critic Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, who was a vocal proponent of the small-scale, privately-owned parcel of 
land as the basis for democratic city governance. 
52 “[Ich bin] der festen Überzeugung, daß eine Stadt ohne privates Investment gar keine Stadt ist. Mein Problem ist 
eher, das private Kapital so zu organisieren, daß es hinterher eine schöne Stadt gibt. Die privaten Investoren oder Architekten als 
Treuhänder der Bauherren, die hier mit irgendwelchen abstrusen kommerziellen Vorstellungen ankommen – Hochhäuser für die 
Friedrichstadt, jede Menge Malls - , die ruinieren die Grundlagen der Stadt. Ich verwende die meiste Zeit darauf, mit denen zu 
diskutieren, daß sie mit der langfristigen Verwertung ihres eingesetzten Kapitals einen Baustein für Berlin schaffen und nicht für 




 This approach did, in fact, fail in the very way that he had predicted for Kleihues’s 
approach in the 1980s: he was unable to use aesthetic categories to change the economic 
foundations of real estate investment. Pressure from investors and the complexities of 
coordinating land sales between the dizzying array of agencies involved meant that Mitte ended 
up with, as Stimmann admitted, “many large, multi-lot buildings with relatively homogenous 
uses.”53 To help mitigate this situation, he focused on working with developers to try to diversify 
block-sized plots in order to artificially recreate the physical, if not the economic or social, 
conditions of small-scale property ownership. Therefore, I argue, whereas his goal was to 
achieve small-scale urban development through an awareness of “traditional” approaches to 
Berlin’s architectural forms and typologies, what Stimmann actually helped produce in central 
Berlin was simply the outward image of such development, backed by international investors. As 
Düwel and Mönninger note, “This was continually denounced as Berlin’s dilemma: the 
disciplining of building rather than planning, the confusion of city planning and architecture.”54  
Viewed in its larger context, Stimmann’s insistence that regulated stone façades 
represented the ideal form of the “historical” or “European city,” a theoretical position that he 
was unable – or unwilling – to uncouple from the heritage of Nazi neo-classicism or from the 
conservative side of the Historikerstreit, as well as his outspoken denunciation of anything that 
deviated from this strict aesthetic norm, ultimately amounted to much more than just a strategy 
for reining in developers. Whether or not Stimmann himself would openly admit it, his 
deployment of Critical Reconstruction as a Leitbild sought to have it both ways: he wanted 
                                                                                                                                                       
aufgefüllt werden? Große Investionen – Kaufhäuser, Büros – das sind die neuen Arbeitsplätze. Ich bin für die Investoren. Ich 
versuche sie zu ‘deckeln’ mit ästhetischen Kategorien.” Ibid., 49.  
53 Stimmann, “New Berlin Office and Commercial Buildings,” 11. 
54 “Das wurde immer wieder als Berlins Dilemma angeprangert: die Disziplinierung des Bauens statt des Planens, die 
Verwechslung von Städtebau und Architektur.”Stimmann, Von der Sozialutopie ..., 34.  
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Berlin’s new architecture to mean something for society, to represent Berliners and Germans, 
and to help them find a new identity in the post-Wall era by helping them recognize – or rewrite 
– their own history. At the same time, he refused to acknowledge that this history was laden with 
violence, and that a simple return to pre-World War II forms could be read as a revival of 
reactionary or fascist political tendencies. Furthermore, the reliance on the idea of the “European 
city” itself, in the context of Berlin stone architecture, signifies a problematic ethnocentrism that 
links formal architectural traits with the idea of indigenous “Germanness.” Deeply involved in 
trying to control land sales and development, however, Stimmann was uninterested in fully 
tackling such questions; his reliance on a historicist Leitbild, it seems, was for him simply a 
means to a (failed) end.  
 
Post-Wall Critical Reconstruction in Practice 
Kleihues’s Role in Post-Wall Critical Reconstruction 
 Stimmann’s reliance on Critical Reconstruction as a planning concept would appear to 
imply that Kleihues was given a central role in the re-planning of Berlin in the post-Wall era. 
Indeed, as will become clear by the number of examples discussed in this and the following 
chapter, Kleihues was involved – as either a jury member or as architect – in a staggering 
number of construction projects in Mitte in the early 1990s, thus allowing him to leave his stamp 
on almost every famous square and street.55 However, his public, discursive role in the planning 
process was minimal, and, in comparison to his prolific writing during the IBA in the 1980s, he 
published relatively few essays or other commentaries on Berlin’s new architecture. Rather, 
Kleihues chose to step back from the public eye and focus instead on shaping the new Berlin 
                                                




through his work as head of a highly successful architecture firm. This retreat from his former 
position of public visibility, in tandem with the rise of Stimmann as the new figurehead of 
Critical Reconstruction, also worked to change public perception about this method. 
 Kleihues’s statements, in the handful of interviews and articles that he did publish in the 
early 1990s, were in general not about what Berlin should look like, but about the process by 
which he thought Berlin should be planned. Berlin, he contended, direly needed both a master 
plan and a master planner to guide its development.56 He was highly critical of the tactics of 
Senator Volker Hassemer, head of the Department of Urban Development and Environment, 
whose Stadtforum meetings brought together the so-called “expert public,” as well as invested 
local constituents, to discuss and debate planning decisions. For Kleihues, this approach valued 
the “process in itself” over the result, a kind of “contemporary media-ism” (neuzeitlich 
Mediumismus) that could only lead to unfortunate compromises.57 He saw this weakness as one 
of the main reasons for the failures at Potsdamer Platz: 
I have always pleaded that at Potsdamer Platz there would be no public 
competition, but rather a [semi-private] planning process. Already in January of 
1991 I recommended to Senator Hassemer that he might bring together the 
investors on Potsdamer Platz, certain politicians, and perhaps a maximum of five 
to eight architects in seminar discussions, where they would discuss the whole 
problem – maybe two discussions a week for four to six weeks. After that the 
architects would be sent into private sessions. They would lay their designs on the 
table; then we would come either to a decision or ask them to work further. I 
believe that Potsdamer Platz deserves these types of discussions, in other words it 
deserves an elite process.58 
                                                
56 William J.V. Neill suggests that the idea of a master plan was in general feared to be fascist in itself in Germany, 
given that the last person to put through a master plan for Berlin was Hitler. William J.V. Neill, “Memory, Spatial Planning, and 
the Construction of Cultural Identity in Belfast and Berlin - an Overview,” in Urban Planning and Cultural Inclusion: Lessons 
from Belfast and Berlin, ed. William J.V. Neill and Hanns-Uve Schwedler (Houndmills [England]; New York: Palgrave, 2001), 
3–22. 
57 Josef Paul Kleihues, “Die Selbstdisziplinierung Des Städtebaus. Das Neue Berlin (VI): Plädoyer Für Einen 
‘Masterplan’ Als Künstlerisch Wegweisendes Grossstadtmodell,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 15, 1990; Josef 
Paul Kleihues, “Kritische Rekonstruktion: Auf Dem Wege Zur Metropole Berlin,” Deutsche Bauzeitung 127, no. 5 (May 1993): 
76. 
58 “Ich habe immer dafür pladiert, dass am Potsdamer Platz kein offener Wettbewerb, sondern ein Planungsverfahren 
stattfindet. Ich habe Herrn Senator Dr. Hassemer bereits im Januar 1991 empfolhen, er möchte die Investoren am Potsdamer 




As political scientist Elizabeth Strom has shown, Kleihues’s viewpoint represents an attitude, 
typical in Germany, that the “expertization” of the political process guarantees a better outcome 
than a referendum.59 In keeping with this conviction, Kleihues firmly argued for the 
professionalization of planning decisions. “In my view there is only one … method that can lead 
to success: namely, that we entrust the necessary decision-making to single, professionally 
qualified persons.”60 In this context, he gave his blessing to Stimmann, despite their differences: 
Although I, for example, do not agree with the new Senate Construction Director 
Mr. Stimmann in many areas, he has, for now, earned this leap of faith 
(Vertrauensvorschuss). Perhaps Mr. Stimmann would be well advised to revise 
his rigid eschewal of high-rises or his general call for parcel-sized construction a 
bit. But still, Mr. Stimmann is following a program. That is unfortunately very 
seldom seen.61 
 
Kleihues also stated that the changed conditions of Berlin after the Wall, as a space of rampant 
economic development, meant that Critical Reconstruction’s former “tolerance toward very 
different types of architectural directions” during the IBA years might be better left behind in 
favor of a “more precisely formulated requirements” in order to protect Berlin from too many 
competing desires. The more strict ordering that is Stimmann’s goal, Kleihues stated, was still 
                                                                                                                                                       
zusammenführen, wo das ganze Problem diskutiert werden sollte – vielleicht vier bis sechs Wochen lang zwie Gespräche 
wochtentlich. Danach würde man die Architekten in die Klausur schicken, nicht gemeinsam, sondern einzeln. Sie würden dann 
ihre Entwürfe ganz offen auf den Tisch legen; man käme dann entweder zu einer Entscheidung oder man arbeitet weiter. Ich 
glabue, der Potsdamer Platz hätte diese Art von Gesprächen, also durchaus einen elitären Prozess, verdient.” Josef Paul Kleihues 
and Werner Oechslin, “‘Der Potsdamer Platz Hätte Einen Elitären Prozess Verdient!’: Ein Interview Mit Prof. J.P. Kleihues,” 
Archithese 22, no. 2 (March 1992): 30.  
59 Elizabeth A Strom, Building the New Berlin: The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City 
(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001), 146. 
60 “Meines Erachtens kann nur eine … Methode zum Erfolg führen: nämlich, indem man einzelnen, fachlich 
qualifizierten Persönlichkeiten ein grosseres Mass an Vertrauen entgegenbringt und mit den erforderlichen 
Entscheidungskompetenzen ausstattet.” Kleihues and Oechslin, “‘Der Potsdamer Platz Hätte Einen Elitären Prozess Verdient!,’” 
26.  
61 “Obgleich ich z.B. mit dem neuen Senatsbaukirektor Berlins, Herrn Dr. Stimmann, in vielen Bereichen nicht 
übereinstimme, hat er zunächst einmal einen Vertrauensvorschuss verdient. Vielleicht wäre Herr Stimmann gut beraten, wenn er 
seine apodiktische Ablehnung von Hochhäusern oder seine generelle Forderung nach parzellengerechter Bebauung ein wenig 
relativieren würde. Immerhin verfolgt Herr Stimmann ein Programm. Das ist leider selten genug.” Ibid.  
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Critical Reconstruction, “but more restrictive and for a short time and for certain parts of the city 
more appropriate: for instance, in the Friedrichstadt [in Mitte].”62 
 On the level of what he called “urban physiognomy,” i.e. the way buildings appear from a 
stylistic point of view, Kleihues had little to say, except for a brief reference to the same ideas he 
had been propounding over the previous two decades: “Berlin is the city of the Enlightenment in 
Europe, Berlin is also the city of the Modern in Europe. We should acknowledge the stiffness 
(Sprödigkeit) and rational clarity which characterized the great building culture of Berlin’s better 
eras.”63 And elsewhere, Kleihues stated that the best Berlin architecture was always “very 
rational, very economical, very disciplined, ‘Prussian’ in a good sense.”64 As will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, these statements were construed, in tandem with Stimmann’s reductive application of 
Critical Reconstruction, as a return to a dangerously rigid type of stone-clad neoclassicism that 
some critics even suspected of fascist tendencies. However, a brief look at two of Kleihues’s 
own building projects in Mitte and greater Berlin at the time belie such a reductive reading of his 
statement; clearly “stiffness” and “rational clarity” were, for him, still to be combined with the 
playful, abstracted poetry that he espoused in his earlier writings. 
 A good example of this nuance is Kleihues’s “Triangel” building at the southern end of 
Friedrichstrasse (1994-1997) (figs. 3.3-3.4). Set along a diagonal street profile that arose from 
the removal of the baroque-era “excise wall” (a city wall created in the eighteenth century to 
support the enforcement of import-export taxes), the building features two exceedingly different 
                                                
62 “Dies ist letztlich der immanenter Anspruch auch der Kritischen Rekonstruktion, aber restriktiver und für einen 
Kurzzeitraum und in bestimmten Stadtbereichen vielleicht sogar richtiger: zum Beispiel der Friedrichstadt.” Kleihues, “Kritische 
Rekonstruktion,” 78.  
63 “Berlin ist die Stadt der Aufklärung in Europa, Berlin ist auch die Stadt der Moderne in Europa. Wir sollten uns zu 
der Sprödigkeit und rationale Klarheit bekennen, welche die grosse Baukultur der besseren Zeiten Berlins ausgezeichnet hat.” 
Kleihues and Oechslin, “‘Der Potsdamer Platz Hätte Einen Elitären Prozess Verdient!,’” 29. 
64 “… in die besten Zeiten, die Berlin erlebt hat, sehr rational, sehr ökonomsich, sehr diszipliniert, in gutem Sinne 
‘preußisch’ gedacht worden ist.” Josef Paul Kleihues and Claus Baldus, “Der historische Stadtgrundriss von Berlin ist noch 
Realität: Gespräch mit Dankwart Guratzsch,” in Josef Paul Kleihues im Gespräch (Tübingen; Berlin: Wasmuth, 1996), 101.  
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facades: one clad in tiles of unpolished granite, with strongly contoured bands of windows, and 
the other constituting a glass curtain wall articulated by bands of metallic vents. From afar, the 
stone façade strongly echoes the same commercial buildings of the 1920s (such as those by Max 
Taut) (figs. 1.9-1.10) to which Kleihues and Stimmann commonly refer as stylistic touchstones, 
but Kleihues allows this impression to dissolve as one draws nearer to the building: the square 
elements of the stone cladding are each affixed by a decorative steel rivet set directly in the 
center of the tile. This detail gives even the stone façade of the building a strikingly high-tech 
look from the perspective of a pedestrian on the sidewalk. 
 An even more stunning example of how Kleihues’s architecture refuses to confine itself 
to historicism is the much-discussed “Kant Triangle” building in the West Berlin neighborhood 
of Charlottenburg (1992-1995) (figs. 3.5-3.6). Built on a triangular plot bordered by the elevated 
tracks of the S-Bahn (inner-city rail) and Kantstrasse, the building features a cubic tower rising 
from a stone-clad, low-rise base. Partly in response to zoning decisions that limited the original 
intended height of the building, the tower is topped by a distinctive metal “coxcomb” – a 
playfully overscaled wind vane that slightly exceeds the width of the building itself. Kleihues 
describes the exterior as being divided into three “image fields”: a stone base, a metallic body, 
and the wind vane, which he also describes as a “shark fin.” Though it almost verges on the 
playful post-modernism of architects like Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown, Kleihues sees 
his design as falling directly in the Germanic, continental lineage of such designers as Schinkel 
and Loos.65 This example serves as a forceful counterpoint to critics’ later accusations (discussed 
in Chapter 4) of Kleihues as leader of an architectural cartel that espoused a rigid and possibly 
proto-fascist historicism based around the idea of the Berlin block. 
                                                
65 Josef Paul Kleihues and Claus Baldus, “Das die Alltagswelt Relativierende: Gespräch mit Claus Baldus,” in Josef 
Paul Kleihues im Gespräch (Tübingen; Berlin: Wasmuth, 1996), 123. 
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Stimmann’s Differentiated Commercial Blocks 
Kleihues was also involved in two of the three developments in Mitte that Stimmann 
considered to be the best examples of his favored method of differentiated development within a 
large block. The Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt and the Kontorhaus Mitte were both designed 
according to master plans by Kleihues, with contributions from other architects in the designs of 
individual buildings. The third example lauded by Stimmann was Aldo Rossi’s Quartier 
Schützenstrasse which featured differentiated façades stretching over – but not necessarily 
contiguous with – a handful of separate buildings, all backing onto a central courtyard space. 
Stimmann saw these three designs as representing the best that he could do with the given 
situation: economically and politically unable to sell off land in smaller pieces, he was proud of 
having worked with developers and architects to create designs that at least emulated this 
approach on the typological and aesthetic levels. 
The Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt complex (1992-1996), which occupies the block 
directly north of the Friedrichstadt Passagen, consists of both renewed historic buildings and new 
construction.66 Each building has a separate entrance and separate usage, but all open in the back 
onto a shared green courtyard space in the center of the block (fig. 3.7). All of the buildings 
conform to the typology of the mixed-use commercial and residential building that Stimmann 
argues is typical of Mitte. Four historic buildings were extant on the block: a red sandstone 
building along Französische Strasse, on the southern side of the block, was built in 1900 as a 
wine shop and delicatessen adjoining the well-known Borchardt Restaurant. Müller Riemann 
Scholz Architects renovated it into a restaurant of the same name, topped by office and 
                                                
66 Christina Haberlik and Gerwin Zohlen, Die Baumeister des neuen Berlin: Porträts, Gebäude, Konzepte (Berlin: 
Nicolai, 1997), 87. 
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residential spaces (fig. 3.8).67 The other three historic buildings are found on the western side of 
the block, along Friedrichstrasse: one near the corner of Französische Strasse, and the other two 
adjoining each other on the northern corner of Behrenstrasse. The southernmost of these 
buildings was structurally unsound and collapsed during construction of Kollhoff’s new 
buildings that were designed to flank it; its façade was reconstructed to preserve the continuity of 
the original design. 
 In addition to creating the overall design for the Hofgarten block, Kleihues designed both 
the Four Seasons Hotel on the rear side of the block facing Charlottenstrasse, and the narrow 
“atelier” building that neighbors it on the northern side of the block, along Behrenstrasse. The 
hotel, faced with light-colored Roman travertine limestone, combines the traditional, stone-clad 
Berlin block form with typical Kleihuesian abstractions such as geometrically curved window 
bays (fig. 3.9-3.10). The neighboring atelier building, by contrast, which also houses two shops 
on the ground level, allows its interiors maximum light by utilizing almost solely glass in its 
façade, accented by metallic balcony railings and window frames (fig. 3.11). Kleihues’s choice 
of material for this smaller building can also be read as a commentary on the architectural 
controversy over stone building that was taking place during its design. This conflict will be 
examined closely in Chapter 4, but it stemmed from statements by a handful of prominent 
architects and architectural historians who insisted that the most appropriate building material for 
Berlin architecture was, because of Berlin’s specific built heritage as well as the current needs of 
its population, explicitly stone. Architectural historian Gerwin Zohlen contends that Kleihues 
was annoyed with the reduction of the professional conversation to the conflict between stone 
and glass, and that “this banalization motivated him to an almost anarchistic revolt against the 
                                                
67 Burg, Berlin Mitte, 43. 
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attempt to make stone in itself into the only true way and law of architecture.”68 Thus, despite 
Kleihues’s cooperation with Stimmann, this building could be read as a small, impudent gesture 
that not only continues Kleihues’s own practice of combining the traditional Berlin building 
typologies with new building materials and rational, simplified, yet playful forms; it also signals 
that Kleihues refuses to be implicated in Stimmann’s conflicts. Unfortunately, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, such small aesthetic distinctions were totally lost in the larger 
Architecture Debates, wherein Kleihues and Stimmann were both construed as belonging to, or 
even leading, a conservative architectural cartel. 
 The other buildings in the complex are designed by three students of Ungers: the Swiss 
architect Max Dudler, and Germans Kollhoff and Jürgen Sawade. Dudler’s residential building 
echoes canonical Modernist housing designs in its organization of stacked, interlocking 
maisonettes with “functional rooms” such as baths and kitchens located in the center of the 
building, allowing the living rooms to face outward toward the street or courtyard, respectively 
(figs. 3.12-3.13). Kollhoff’s pair of matching buildings along Friedrichstrasse was originally 
designed to wrap around the existing, landmarked structure; now, due to that building’s collapse 
during construction, it actually constitutes a single building with varying façades (figs. 3.14-
3.15). The façades of Kollhoff’s two newly designed portions are almost identical, both using a 
grey-green granite in a “flat relief” design drawn from prewar Berlin architectural tradition. This 
tradition is also echoed in the three-tiered vertical differentiation of the building: the ground-
                                                
68 “Diese Banalisierung motivierte ihn zu einer fast anarchischen Revolt gegen Versuche, den Stein zum allein 
seligmachenden Atchitekturgesetz machen zu wollen.” Gerwin Zohlen, “Josef Paul Kleihues: Der Regent,” in Die Baumeister 
des neuen Berlin: Porträts, Gebäude, Konzepte, by Christina Haberlik and Gerwin Zohlen (Berlin: Nicolai, 1997), 91.  The 
conflict over stone and glass, or indeed over the use of particular building materials, reaches back into the CIAM days (echoing 
Le Corbusier’s conflict with Umbdenstock, for instance), and even to earlier debates in Berlin over the use of brick and stucco in 
the nineteenth century. Jeffry Diefendorf has written extensively on these issues as they relate to post-war rebuilding in West 
Germany, see Jeffry Diefendorf, In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II (New York: 




level and first floors constitute a “monolithic configuration” of large, tight-fitted masonry, on 
whose solid base the middle section of four floors use narrower rectangular stone elements to 
delineate the vertical matrix of windows. Finally, the upper two stories are set back and feature 
wider window openings. “The buildings,” according to Kollhoff, “aspire to be conventional, in 
the best sense of the word: along with similar constructions they set out to give form to a street, a 
city. Only when looked at more closely do they draw attention to themselves.”69 The opposite 
could be said of Sawade’s design, which is often cited as “noticeable” because of its almost 
perfectly-flat, polished grey-black granite façade containing wide window bays framed with 
narrow metal strips. A self-proclaimed “purist, rationalist, and increasingly also a minimalist,” 
Sawade designed a “logically precise construction” whose appeal lies in its technical 
perfection.70 However, especially on bright days, the building itself is actually hard to see due to 
its highly reflective surface. Rather, one sees clearly the curving glass lines of Jean Nouvel’s 
Galeries Lafayette, which stands across the street (fig. 3.16). Thus Sawade’s building achieves, 
as do the rest of the buildings in the Hofgarten complex, the paradoxical goal of being both 
daring and conventional, unique but conformist, by letting its simple form reflect the streetscape 
around it.  
Kontorhaus Mitte (1994-1997) takes a similar approach to the Hofgarten complex. 
Kleihues called the design a set of “building blocks” that found “diversity in unity” through the 
involvement of four other architects (Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, Klaus Theo Brenner, 
Marlene Dörrie, and Walther Stepp), who were each responsible for a separate structure. Rather 
than “thinking in parcels,” Kleihues stated, diversity was to be achieved through formal 
                                                
69 Hans Kollhoff, Hans Kollhoff (Berlin: Ernst, 1995), 248. 
70 Sawade, who was, along with Kleihues, one of the signatories of the “Campaign 507” manifesto, has had his own 
architectural practice in Berlin since 1970. See Haberlik and Zohlen, Die Baumeister des neuen Berlin, 169. 
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differentiation and a mix of uses within the block, culminating in a shared covered courtyard or 
“winter garden” in the center (figs. 3.17-3.20).71 Kleihues’s own comments on the work echo 
Stimmann’s realization that small-parcel development was an ultimately impractical goal in 
Mitte:  
The discussion about dividing building plots into smaller units … risks 
degenerating into a “yearning for an ideal world.” Where small plots no longer 
exist as individual property or where modern functions demand larger units, an 
artificial division into small plots cannot be adequately justified, not even with the 
argument of “obligation to history.” But the justifiable aspiration to architectural 
variety or, to be more precise, to variety in uniformity is understandable. … That 
is why we should be talking here about using a philosophy of modular building 
systems, whose functional and formal set of rules is based on the principle of 
combining a number of individual building units. … However, Friedrichstrasse 
needs to be re-established as the very lively place it always was. One factor that 
can contribute to that is the extraordinary variety of functions within this new 
kind of commercial building.72  
 
Kleihues also enthusiastically insists that the building offers Friedrichstrasse “a sense of 
joie de vivre,” a term that is, however, not at all reflected in the restrained geometries of the 
buildings by Brenner and Stepp (who designed the buildings on each corner of the block) or the 
somber sandstone façade of the Berliner Bank building by Lampugnani and Dörrie along the 
northern side of the block (figs. 3.21-3.23). Their own statements describe the structure as “solid 
and durable … unpretentious and reticent because there is nothing behind it but a perfectly 
normal office buildings and we did not want to create anything formally exceptional because that 
was not matched by the function of the building.”73 The only “joy” to be found in the Kontorhaus 
design is supplied by Kleihues’s three structures, especially the central building along 
Friedrichstrasse, whose overtly playful geometry (in the form of a series of prominent oculi at 
                                                
71 Quoted in Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 236. 
72 “Kontorhause Mitte,” Domus, no. 793 (May 1997): 15. 
73 Ibid., 16. 
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street level, as well as Kleihues’s signature lozenge shape dividing the entrance), and its light, 
warm-toned stone facing add, at the very least, some visual interest to the streetscape (fig. 3.24). 
Whereas these two blocks overseen by Kleihues blend seamlessly – one might even say 
monotonously – into the streetscape, Rossi’s colorful Quartier Schützenstrasse (1994-98) fully 
embodies a joie de vivre, offering an ebullient and striking change of pace in Mitte’s mostly gray 
and muted environment. The buildings consist of alternating vertical bays of various widths that 
refer, in the form of playful, colorful abstractions, to both traditional nineteenth-century Berlin 
architecture as well as Michelangelo’s Palazzo Farnese in Rome and previous buildings by Rossi 
himself (figs. 3.25-3.28). The design is typical of the architect in that it reflects a deeply personal 
experience of architecture, and in fact, as discussed in Chapter 1, it was largely Rossi’s own 
internationally significant book, The Architecture of the City (1966), which had originally 
inspired Kleihues to develop the theory of Critical Reconstruction. Quartier Schützenstrasse’s 
overscaled and visibly superficial façade elements, along with its bright primary colors, present a 
striking counterpoint to the Hofgarten and Kontorhaus blocks, blending more easily with the 
more daring pre-1990 IBA designs in the neighboring Southern Friedrichstadt by architects like 
Koolhaas, Eisenman, and Rossi himself.74 Still, the fact that Stimmann points to the 
Schützenstrasse development as a Critical Reconstruction success reveals some of the 
unexpected points of flexibility in his theory. Clearly a playful post-modernism was considered 
permissible and even desirable, as long as it remained true to the idea of the “European city” in 
its use of historical forms and typologies.  
 
                                                
74 Rossi passed away one day before the official opening of the building, in 1997. 
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Conclusion: Critical Reconstruction’s Conservative Turn under Stimmann 
In his critique of the reconstruction of Mitte’s famous Pariser Platz, architectural 
historian Matthias Pabsch bemoans the “simplification and standardization (Nivellierung) of 
architectural history,” blaming Critical Reconstruction, which “tolerated neither breaks nor 
contradictions.”75 Indeed, this view seemed to be the general critical and public perception of 
Stimmann’s method: it came to be regarded as a type of reactionary traditionalism, a rigid, 
historicist view that preferred harshness and discipline and was vehemently opposed to anything 
new.76 This perspective permeated the popular media, as well as professional books and journals. 
For instance, in an article titled “Local History Studies for New Teutonia,” which featured the 
transcript of a contentious conversation between Stimmann and the architectural historian and 
museum director Heinrich Klotz, the editors of the popular national new magazine Der Spiegel 
published this introductory header: 
The Architecture Debates in Berlin began when Senate Construction Director 
Hans Stimmann said, upon taking office in 1991, “We don’t need to reinvent 
Berlin” and called for the “return to the tradition of European city building.” … 
As the “aesthetic conscience” of the Construction Senator, [he] makes sure that 
the reconstruction of Berlin stays true to the historical ground plan and traditional 
stone architecture. The Berlin architect Josef Paul Kleihues is also a defender of 
these conservative construction politics. … He is accused of leading a “power 
cartel” [of architects]. The art historian Heinrich Klotz … accuses the Berliners of 
“affectations of power” (Machtallüren), limitation of building diversity and the 
return to the classicism of the Nazis. The Berlin architecture debate is becoming 
increasingly politicized and cannot be seen apart from the search for a new 
national identity for Germany.77  
                                                
75 Pabsch, Pariser Platz, Architektur und Technik, 148. 
76 See Gisa Weszkalnys, Berlin, Alexanderplatz: Transforming Place in a Unified Germany (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2010), 52; Denis Bocquet, “Hans Stimmann et L’Urbanisme Berlinois (1970-2006): Un Tournant Conservateur de La 
Reconstruction Critiqué?,” Citta E Storia V, no. 2 (2011): 467–87; Sebastian Schmaling, “Masked Nostalgia, Chic Regression: 
The ‘Critical’ Reconstruction of Berlin,” Harvard Design Magazine, no. 23 (Fall  2005/Winter 2006): 24–30. 
77 “Der Architekturstreit in Berlin begann, als der Senatsbaudirektor Hans Stimmann zu seinem Amtsantritt 1991 sagte: 
‘Wir müssen Berlin nicht neu erfinden’ und die ‘Rückbesinnung auf die europäische Städtebautradition’ forderte. Der … 
‘ästhetische Gewissen’ des Bausenators [wacht] darüber, daß sich der Neuaufbau Berlins an den historischen Stadtgrundriß und 
die traditionelle Steinarchitektur halt. Verfechter dieser konservativen Baupolitik ist auch der Berliner Architekt Josef Paul 
Kleihues, einst Leiter der Internationalen Bauaustellung in Berlin. Ihm wird vorgeworfen, ein “Machtkartell” anzuführen. Der 




In looking at what Stimmann regarded as his “successes,” as well as his statements about the 
approach of Critical Reconstruction itself, it is clear that some of this critique is warranted. 
Stimmann’s deployment of Critical Reconstruction was, indeed, a dramatic reduction of the 
experimental approach taken by Kleihues during the IBA – and, according to both him and 
Kleihues, such a reduction was necessary.  
However, although he may have lauded the Hofgarten, Kontorhaus, and Schützenstrasse 
projects as “successes,” by his own measures, Stimmann’s deployment of Critical 
Reconstruction was, for the most part, a dismal failure. He was able to emulate small-scale 
development within block-sized buildings, but this solution did nothing to satisfy the needs that 
originally founded Stimmann’s interest in this type of growth: namely, the return of a middle 
class to central Berlin, based in the economic realities of small-scale property ownership. No 
amount of physical differentiation amongst various buildings on one block could counteract the 
economic and social ramifications of their ownership by large, faceless, multinational companies 
that have little interest in creating or supporting a close-knit network of local interests. Working 
with limited political, administrative, and economic power to affect decisions about land sales or 
to create a master plan for Mitte, Stimmann saw himself forced to collaborate with large real 
estate investors to formally emulate this type of small-scale construction. In order to do so, he 
also felt compelled to constrain developers aesthetically so that the cityscape that arose out of 
this public-private partnership did not result in a collection of “fashionable experiments,” but 
took on the look of a “normal” urban landscape. Seen in the context of the Historikerstreit, this 
effort at “normalization” itself appeared dangerously conservative to many observers.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Klassizismus der Nazis vor. Der Berliner Architekturstreit wird zunehmend politisiert und ist von der Suche nach der neuen 
nationalen Identität der Deutschen nicht zu trennen.” Bornhöft and Mönninger, “Heimatkunde Für Neuteutonia,” 48.  
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 Certainly Stimmann himself was not a “fascist,” either in his politics or in his aesthetics. 
A more banal explanation for Stimmann’s preferences lies in the fact that, like Kleihues, he was 
aware that the commercialism of American or “Global” high-tech architecture did not offer 
Berlin the singular aesthetic qualities that it desperately needed in order to differentiate itself as a 
desirable location. But in trying to both attract and rein in investors on an aesthetic level, 
Stimmann proved himself supremely incapable of navigating a conversation about the 
connotations of neo-historicist styles that spanned – as will be discussed at length in the 
following chapter – public and professional media and which was rooted in the complexities of 
architectural theory and history. Stimmann’s background in Marxist theory and in the practice of 
participatory city planning during the 1970s and 1980s could not have prepared him to 
successfully rebuff accusations that his particular form of traditional Berlin architecture 
represented something that linked problematically to Nazi forms, or that sought to “normalize” 
that history in the manner of contemporary conservative politicians and thinkers like Helmut 
Kohl or Ernst Nolte. Stimmann’s choice of a highly reductive set of rules, based on just a few 
statements about zoning, density, massing, materials, and façades, reveals a supreme naïveté 
with regard to the ways in which Berlin architecture would be interpreted, especially in the 
international community, as a problematic statement about German history with ties to the 
conservative side of the Historikerstreit. The problems that this naïveté generated in tandem with 
the Architecture Debates, as well as Stimmann’s continued engagement with planning in East 
Berlin, shaped, in crucial ways, Critical Reconstruction’s fraught relationship to the discourse of 
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 Hans Stimmann’s reductive revisions to Critical Reconstruction, his crafting of a brash 
and autocratic public persona, his reliance on a problematic and undifferentiated notion of 
“history,” and his rhetorical allusions to the idea that only a preferred group of architects 
working in a particular style would be awarded contracts in Berlin’s post-Wall reconstruction did 
much to shape the general perception of his method as conservative. However, his deployment of 
Critical Reconstruction also took place within a much larger context of public debate about the 
relationships between German history, national identity, and the built environment. This chapter 
documents and analyzes the key facets of the controversy over Berlin architecture and Critical 
Reconstruction that has come to be known as the “Berlin Architecture Debates” (sometimes also 
called the “Architects’ Debates”): a series of written exchanges about architecture published in 
the popular and professional press between 1993 and 1995.1 Appearing alongside Stimmann’s 
various statements about Berlin’s historical culture of “stone architecture,” the arguments put 
forth during the Architecture Debates furthered the impression that Critical Reconstruction 
constituted a dangerously conservative architectural style. As I will show, the fact that some of 
the protagonists in these debates were also involved in prominent construction projects at the 
time, including the rehabilitation of former Nazi buildings in the city center, gives unfortunate 
credence to these critiques. Thus, instead of constituting an approach rooted deeply in the 
profession, discourse, and history of architecture, or even an attempt to reclaim a politically 
acceptable architectural heritage for Germany, Critical Reconstruction in the post-Wall era was 
                                                
1 The term “Architects’” or “Architecture Debates,” which is used frequently in the secondary literature, likely stems 
originally from a collection of primary sources from the debates edited by architecture critic Gert Kähler. See Gert Kähler, 
Einfach schwierig: eine deutsche Architekturdebatte: ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995 (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995). 
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perceived as a hypocritical ally of big business that touted a conservative set of assumptions 
about history and identity in reunified Germany. Specifically, it came across as being in line with 
Ernst Nolte’s position in the Historikerstreit in the 1980s, which encouraged the “normalization” 
of Nazi history as an error that Germans had superseded and could effectively now forget as a 
thing of the past. For many on the left, including some combatants in the Architecture Debates, 
this position was unacceptable and represented a dangerous step backward toward the very 
conditions that had given rise to fascism in the first place. 
 The Berlin Architecture Debates began in earnest in late 1993 with an essay published by 
Vittorio Magnano Lampugnani, then director of the German Architecture Museum, in the 
national magazine Der Spiegel.2 Involving a large number of architects, theorists, critics, and 
journalists, neither the disciplinary nor the temporal boundaries of the debates are clear. The 
contributions were dispersed and wide-ranging, taking place across various journals, magazines, 
and newspapers, as well as disciplinary and national boundaries, and involving a large number of 
authors.3 While the initial set of heated arguments dissipated by 1995, the same issues resurfaced 
again in the late 1990s in the debate over the rebuilding of the Prussian City Palace or “Schloss,” 
as well as in the public discussions over Stimmann’s plans for East Berlin embodied in the 
Planwerk Innenstadt, both of which will be examined in Chapter 5. The conversation reached 
back in time, as well: Lampugnani’s essay acted as a moment of crystallization for many voices 
and opinions that had already surfaced in architectural journals and the national press in 1991 
and 1992. It also resonated with a similar conflict that had taken place more than a decade 
earlier, in 1977, with the unveiling of the designs by James Stirling for the Neue Staatsgalerie in 
                                                
2 Different historians cite different dates; some date it to 1992, but with no clear origin point. Hertweck cites 
Lampugnani’s essay as the initial sally. 
3 For more lengthy discussions of the debates, see Florian Hertweck, Der Berliner Architekturstreit: Architektur, 




Stuttgart (the first post-modernist design commissioned in West Germany), which unleashed a 
storm of criticism concerning its overt classicist references, deemed by some to be too close to 
fascist forms.4 The fact that the post-Wall Architecture Debates, couched in the vocabulary and 
knowledge base of the architectural profession, garnered so much attention from the national, 
popular media, demonstrates how directly the issue of Critical Reconstruction refracted and 
related to larger questions of emergent, reunified German identity at this time. As architectural 
historian Florian Hertweck states, the Architecture Debates can thus be understood as a 
“corroboration of the societal role of architecture,” revealing its deep imbrication in social, 
political, moral, and cultural issues for the new nation.5 
The combatants in the debates fall into two main camps: those who advocated for a 
prescriptive architectural concept for Berlin, based on a historical image of the “European city” 
(represented most prominently by Lampugnani and Hans Kollhoff), and thus associated directly 
to the aesthetics of Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction; and those who, for one reason or 
another, strongly opposed Lampugnani and his colleagues (including Daniel Libeskind, Heinrich 
Klotz, and, counterintuitively, Stimmann’s main collaborator Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm). Many 
of the battle lines had already been drawn during the Potsdamer Platz competition (see Chapter 
2), where the proponents of the traditional “European city” eventually triumphed over 
representatives of the “urban archipelago” planning model. But whereas the Potsdamer Platz 
debates had centered around the issues of typology and zoning – specifically skyscrapers, 
density, and planned green space – the Architecture Debates focused much more on the 
aesthetics of the buildings themselves, especially their façades and materials, and the extent to 
                                                
4 See Gavriel D Rosenfeld, “The Architects’ Debate: Architectural Discourse and the Memory of Nazism in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 1977-1997,” History and Memory 9, no. 1/2 (1997): 189–225. 
5 Hertweck, Der Berliner Architekturstreit, 24. 
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which they referred to specific moments in German history. As the editors of Der Spiegel wrote 
in the introduction to a November 1995 article titled “New Dictates for Construction?”:  
The debate over the future of Berlin architecture has become a national trench 
war. A strange coalition of the old left and neo-modernists sees a reactionary turn 
towards Nazi architecture. The fight between modern and traditional architecture 
has developed into an urban-development Historikerstreit.6  
 
Thus, as this chapter demonstrates, Critical Reconstruction became further implicated in a host 
of negative public perceptions about how Berlin’s new architecture reflected German identity, 
from articles and editorials in the German popular press, to critical assessments by architectural 
critics and historians on both sides of the Atlantic. As architectural historian Barry Bergdoll 
observed, “anyone with the slightest knowledge of the politics and symbols in modern German 
… architectural history can scarcely be convinced that reconstruction can avoid playing a role in 
reintroducing many of the very passions meant to be calmed.”7 
 
“New Simplicity” and Critical Reconstruction: Drawing the Battle Lines 
Lampugnani’s Manifesto 
 Most observers agree that the Architecture Debates were kicked off by the publication of 
two almost identical essays by Lampugnani in late 1993. The first, titled “The New Simplicity: 
Speculations on the Architecture of the New Millennium,” was published as an accompanying 
text to a yearbook for the German Architectural Museum.8 He then submitted a slightly edited 
                                                
6 “Der Streit um die künftige Berliner Architektur wird bundesweit zum ideologischen Grabenkampf. Eine seltsame 
Koalition aus Altlinken und Neomodernen sieht eine reaktionäre Kehrtwende zur Nazi-Architektur. Der Kampf um moderne oder 
traditionelle Architektur entwickelt sich zum baupolitischen Historikerstreit.” “Neue Rechte Am Bau?,” Der Spiegel, November 
6, 1995, 244.  The article was directly followed by an interview with Hans Kollhoff titled “Stone Mitte.”  
7 Barry Bergdoll, “Reconstruction Doubts: The Ironies of Building in Schinkel’s Name,” Harvard Design Magazine, 
no. 23 (Fall 2005/Winter 2006): 32. 
8 The yearbook also included two projects by Kollhoff. See Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani and Annette Becker, eds., 
DAM Architektur Jahrbuch (München/New York, 1993). One assumes that this essay contains much of the same material as the 
talk in Magdeburg referred to by Libeskind. 
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version to the national magazine Der Spiegel, where it was published in December of 1993 under 
the title “The Challenge of the Everyday: Towards a New Building Convention.”9 Even though 
Lampugnani’s essay never directly mentions Berlin, Critical Reconstruction, Kleihues, or 
Stimmann, his suggestion that modern urban life requires an architecture of “calm solidity” was 
read by many as a direct statement about Stimmann’s plans. Hertweck even calls it a “manifesto 
for Critical Reconstruction.”10 
Born in Rome in 1951, Lampugnani studied architectural theory and practice in Rome, 
Switzerland, and Germany, holding fellowships and professorships at Harvard, Columbia, and 
the ETH Zürich. During the 1980s, he also served as editor for the Italian design magazine 
Casabella before moving to head the publication of Domus. Because of his expertise in Italian 
neo-rationalism, Kleihues called on his help for exhibitions and other projects associated with the 
IBA-Neubau (the “new construction” portion of the International Building Exhibition or IBA, 
headed by Kleihues during the 1980s), where Lampugnani was able to put his stamp on 
numerous publications and shows. In 1990, he succeeded art historian Heinrich Klotz as director 
of the national German Architectural Museum in Frankfurt. Whereas Klotz had used this 
institutional platform to champion a playful, diverse, and global post-modernism, Lampugnani 
immediately took a contrasting approach, sponsoring a series of three exhibitions that looked to 
revive an awareness of, and appreciation for, German architects and movements that had been 
considered taboo during the post-war years in West Germany. These included the neo-classical 
and regionalist strands of pre-war Modernism that were later associated with fascism. “Not since 
the war,” wrote architecture critic Falk Jäger, “has the traditional and conservative architecture” 
                                                
9 Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, “Die Provokation Des Alltäglichen,” Der Spiegel, December 30, 1993, 
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13683465.html.  
10 Hertweck, Der Berliner Architekturstreit, 89. 
 
 158 
associated with National Socialism “been presented and celebrated so impartially (some would 
say uncritically).”11 With this move, Lampugnani became widely considered as a “conservative 
architectural historian,” despite the fact that he simultaneously curated an exhibition on German 
Expressionist architecture, as well the stylistically inclusive “Berlin Tomorrow” exhibition 
(discussed in Chapter 2).12 
 Hertweck suggests that Lampugnani’s Spiegel manifesto may have been an attempt to 
respond to the controversies over Potsdamer Platz, which had already brought issues of 
architecture and city planning in Berlin forcefully into the public eye.13 This is certainly the case, 
but I argue that even more important at this time in 1993 was the master planning competition 
for Alexanderplatz, for which Lampugnani served as a juror. His manifesto is undoubtedly a 
commentary on the kind of architecture he sees as fitting for the new capital city. Its implicit 
connection to the Alexanderplatz competition is borne out by the fact that two of the other most 
involved participants in the Architecture Debates were the winner and runner-up in this 
competition, Kollhoff and Libeskind, whose designs and arguments are discussed at length 
below. 
This context for the debates is far from explicit in the writings themselves, however. 
Lampugnani’s essay remains loftily at the level of theory rather than addressing any particular 
project, competition, or site. Like Stimmann, Lampugnani links his ideas to German identity by 
relying on the vague idea of the “European city” (discussed in Chapter 3), beginning his essay 
with an attack on the two sides of post-modern architecture that he deems inappropriate for the 
contemporary continental urban landscape: American post-modernism and Deconstructivism. He 
                                                
11 “Noch nie nach den Krieg war die in Deutschland durch den Nationalsozialismus stigmatisierte traditionalistische 
und konservative Architektur so vorurteilsfrei (viele sagten: unkritisch) präsentiert und gefeiert worden.” Quoted in ibid., 68. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 23. 
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contends that playful, American post-modernism too easily becomes banal: “A joke, told barely 
a couple of times, loses its punch and becomes boring. …What should have been architecture 
parlante soon becomes blithering and fatigued by repetition.”14 Deconstructivism, on the other 
hand, dangerously reproduces the societal conditions that Lampugnani thinks users of 
architecture should be trying to escape: “Architecture means, fundamentally, the creation of 
protected space, and in order to create such spaces … walls and supports should be vertical. If 
one puts them diagonally,” he claims, then they “tend to do what they suggest: … namely fall 
down.”15 Furthermore, Deconstructivism’s “philosophical and aesthetic claim to illustrate 
destruction and fleetingness is lost in our cities,” because, he argues, these are already so full of 
this same confusion that the style’s aesthetic critique cannot even be heard over the existing 
noise. “In a world which is actually succumbing to chaos, artificial chaos is more calming than 
shocking,” he claims.16 
Having painted these two stylistic approaches as totally untenable for the future of 
European urban design, Lampugnani predictably proposes the Modernism of the Weimar era as a 
starting point for a new, more appropriate style: “A return to the Modern offers a way, at least, 
out of the unbearable alternatives between post-modernism and Deconstructivism, between 
populist wish fulfillment and arrogant ‘epatez le bourgeois,’ between the fuddy-duddy and the 
                                                
14 “Ein Wirz verliert, kaum wird er ein paarmal erzählt, die Pointe und langweilt … Was sprechende Architektur hätte 
sein sollen, wurde bald geschwätzig und in der Wiederholung enervierend.” Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, “Die Neue 
Einfachheit: Mutmassungen über die Architektur der Jahrtausendwende,” in Einfach Schwierig: Eine Deutsche 
Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 22. 
15 “Architektur bedeutet in erster Linie das Schaffen von geschützten Räumen, und um solche Räume zu konstruieren, 
empfiehlt es sich aus ganz simplen (und im übrigen unverrückbaren) statischen Gründen, Wände und Stützen sekrecht zu stellen. 
Stellt man sie schräg, neigen sie dazu, das zu tun, was si suggerieren, nämlich zusammenzustürzen.” Ibid.  
16 “Hinzu kam, daß ihr philosophischer und ästhetischer Anspruch, das Zusammenbrechen und Zerfließen zur 
Darstellung zu bringen, im Wildwuchs unserer Städte zunichte gemacht wurde. … In einer Welt, die tatsächlich im Chaos 
untergeht, wirkt artifizielles Chaos eher beruhigend als schockierend.” Ibid., 22–23.  
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cabinet of horrors. It is the way of neutrality.”17 Echoing Stimmann and Kleihues, Lampugnani 
points to pre-war Modernism as the ideal example of good design and construction: “The mass 
housing projects of the Weimar Republic tried for standardization and rationalization, but still 
put much stock in aesthetics and handicraft.”18 But there is danger in this functional Modernist 
strand of architecture as well, he thinks: the heritage of rational forms and technologically 
advanced materials of the Weimar Modernists, as expressed today, for example, in the work of 
contemporary architects like Norman Foster or Jean Nouvel (both of whom had just received 
highly prominent commissions in Berlin) are, in Lampugnani’s mind, still inadequate to address 
the needs of society. With their glass facades and high-tech detailing, they are too fleeting, too 
aesthetically ephemeral. In what almost appears as a response to the observations of such early 
theorists of modernity as Georg Simmel, who noted the barrage of images and sensations 
confronting the modern urban dweller,19 Lampugnani avers that architecture must offer a sense 
of permanence and tranquility to the viewer: 
If one can’t erase a building from the screen as soon as one gets tired of it, then a 
fresh quality must be sought which does not repeat the tired but also not the 
simply fashionable. That can only be an aesthetics of simplicity, clarity, and 
peacefulness. An aesthetic of order, into whose emptiness every individual can 
project his or her own dreams.20 
 
                                                
17 “Immerhin weist die Rückbesinnung auf die Moderne einen Weg aus der unerträglichen Alternative zwischen 
Postmoderne und Dekonstruktivismus, zwischen populistischer Bedürfniserfüllung und arrogantem ‘épatez le bourgeois,’ 
zwischen Betulichkeit und Horrorkabinett. Est ist der Weg der Neutralität.” Ibid., 23.  
18 “Die großen Massenwohnungsbauprojekte der Weimarer Republik bemühten sich um Standardisierung und 
Rationalisierung, legten aber noch großen Wert auf Ästhetik und Handwerk.” Lampugnani, “Die Provokation Des Alltäglichen,” 
143, translation mine; Karin Lenhart, Berliner Metropoly: Stadtentwicklungspolitik Im Berliner Bezirk Mitte Nach Der Wende 
(Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2001), 206–209. 
19 Georg Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” in Simmel On Culture: Selected Writings (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 1997). 
20 “Wenn man ein Gebäude nicht schnell wieder von der Bildfläche verschwinden lassen kann, sobald man es leid 
geworden ist, muß eine frische Qualität gesucht werden, die nicht ermüdet und gleichwohl nicht dem bloß Modischen huldigt. 
Das kann nur eine Ästhetik der Einfachheit, der Klarheit, der Ruhe sein. Eine Ästhetik der Ordnung, in deren Leere jeder einzelne 
seine eigenen Träume projizieren kann.” Lampugnani, “Die Provokation Des Alltäglichen,” 147.  
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In order to do this, Lampugnani suggests, architecture must provide the “masses” with 
surroundings that are “comprehensible”: architectural aesthetics grounded in “tradition,” so that 
they can be easily digested. “That which seamlessly develops out of tradition can also be 
explained by it. Everyone can ‘read’ an old building, just as everyone understands an old 
painting: in both there is a naturalized motif that the author individually varies.” He sees this 
comprehensibility as fulfilling architecture’s “public responsibility” of creating an architecture 
“appropriate” to its “uninitiated,” everyday audience.21 
Thus far, Lampugnani may be read as promoting a potentially nostalgic – or populist – 
neo-historicism: architecture, he seems to be arguing, must look back to the glory days of pre-
war Modernism, but it must also allude to the longer historical traditions of German city-
building, becoming recognizably ordinary so that it can soothe today’s harried urban dwellers. 
But then Lampugnani dares to go further than either Kleihues or Stimmann, to state outright 
what they have carefully avoided: 
The Nazi period, which, of course, in public representational buildings showed a 
preference for wooden, megalomaniacal classicism … otherwise brought forth an 
excellently solid and detailed construction. This tradition broke off abruptly in 
1945. Along with the Nazi dictatorship, the architecture that had represented it 
was rejected across the board, and unfortunately also traditional solidity.22 
 
To be clear, Lampugnani is not arguing here for a direct rehabilitation of Nazi aesthetics, but for 
a lifting of the tacit ban on the neo-classical style of stone building that began in the early 
twentieth century and eventually became one strand of the monumental classicism that the 
regime preferred. Lampugnani feels this is unfair:  
                                                
21 “Was sich bruchlos aus der Tradition entwickelt, läßt sich auch durch sie erklären. Ein altes Haus ‘liest’ jeder, wie 
auch jeder ein altes Gemälde versteht: Dort wie hier gibt es ein eingebürgertes Motiv, das der Autor individuell variiert.” Ibid.  
22 “… die Architektur in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, die zwar in den öffentlichen Repräsentationsbauten einem 
hölzernen, megalomanen Klassizismus huldigte, aber sonst ausgesprochen solide detaillierte Bauten hervorbrachte. Diese 
Tradition riß 1945 abrupt ab.” Ibid., 143.  
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The “Nazi”-verdict is still at work today. Whoever builds with older materials like 
natural stone or wood is seen as reactionary. If he builds something solid and well 
detailed out of it, he is almost totalitarian. And if the outlines are clearly 
geometric and the façade uniformly and rigidly distributed, it’s not long before he 
is denounced as a fascist. On the other hand, anyone can afford to bring together 
the most diagonal facades into which damage is pre-programmed; if it looks 
picturesque and cheerful, then it is also democratic and acceptable. Perhaps this is 
also the nemesis of German architecture: as punishment for the terror that it 
represented and beautified in the thirties and forties, it is refused the whole 
tradition.23 
 
What Lampugnani is trying to argue is that architecture itself is essentially without moral 
or ethical values, i.e. he attempts to employ the rationalist, Adornian argument for aesthetic 
autonomy (discussed in Chapter 1) in order to justify the use of the same forms as employed in 
Nazi architecture, stripping them of their negative connotations. However, he immediately 
commits a logical fallacy, for it becomes apparent that he actually believes strongly in 
architecture’s ability to signify and to influence human life on multiple levels; in fact, he sees 
architectural solutions as a necessary part of tackling society’s current ills. He thus very clearly 
does not buy his own argument that architecture is autonomous or without implicit values; on the 
contrary, contemporary architecture’s current stylistic tendencies are, in his opinion, failed 
“attempts to deal with a world that is running off its rails.” Through building a more 
homogenous architecture, Lampugnani promises “social cohesiveness.”24  “With this,” Hertweck 
rightly observes, “architecture – specifically, architectural form – is accorded not just a cultural, 
                                                
23 “Das "Nazi-Verdikt" wirkt bis heute nach. Wer im Bauen altbewährte Materialien wie Naturstein oder Holz 
verwendet, gilt als reaktionär. Wenn er daraus solide, gut detaillierte Bauten konstruiert, ist er fast schon totalitär. Und wenn die 
Grundrisse klar geometrisch angelegt und die Fassaden einheitlich und streng gegliedert sind, dauert es nicht lange, bis er als 
Faschist diffamiert wird. Demgegenüber kann es sich jeder leisten, die absurdesten Tragkonstruktionen mit den schrägsten 
Fassaden so zusammenzubringen, daß die Bauschäden programmiert sind; wenn es nur pittoresk und heiter aussieht, ist es auch 
demokratisch und akzeptabel. Vielleicht ist dies die Nemesis der deutschen Architektur: als Strafe für den Terror, den sie in den 
dreißiger und vierziger Jahren repräsentiert und beschönigt hat, wird ihr gleich die gesamte eigene Tradition verwehrt.” Ibid., 
143–144.  
24 Lampugnani, “Die Neue Einfachheit: Mutmassungen über die Architektur der Jahrtausendwende,” 21. 
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but a highly social, even ‘socio-therapeutic,’ role.”25 Therefore his proposed return to an 
architecture of solidity – even by his own measures – cannot rightfully be seen apart from its 
historical connections to fascism. In this framework, as Hertweck notes, Lampugnani’s position 
essentially constitutes the explicit architectural equivalent to the rhetoric of conservatives like 
Ernst Nolte during the Historikerstreit, who argued for the normalization of the nation and its 
violent history, claiming that Germany had done enough penance for its crimes and did not need 
to do anything further.26 Whereas Stimmann, as shown in Chapter 3, had only alluded to such a 
logic, Lampugnani put it directly into print. 
Daniel Libeskind and the Defense of Deconstructivism 
 Arguably the most vehement and internationally noted reaction to Lampugnani’s essay 
came from the Polish-American architect Daniel Libeskind. With construction already underway 
on his highly-acclaimed design for the Jewish Museum on the southeastern edge of Mitte, 
Libeskind was a formidable opponent: he represented – not only in the content of his critique, 
but in his identity as the Jewish architect of the institution that most prominently embodied the 
memory of Holocaust in Berlin at the time – the international expectation that Germany, as a 
Western, democratic nation, would continue to publicly do penance for the crimes of the Nazis.27 
In an essay titled “The Banality of Order,” which appeared in German in the architectural journal 
Arch+ in March of 1994 and was simultaneously published in English in ANY: Architecture New 
                                                
25 “Damit wird der Architektur – vielmehr: der architektonischen Form – nicht nur eine kulturelle, sondern eine in 
hohem Grade gesellschaftliche, ja ‘sozialtherapeutische’ Rolle zugesprochen.” Hertweck, Der Berliner Architekturstreit, 79. 
26 Ibid., 81. 
27 The museum design was part of the IBA and had been approved for construction before the fall of the Wall. Paul 
Jaskot has argued that the building became, in the post-Wall period, a site of discursive negotiation of neo-Nazi sentiments and 
debates over national identity in reunited Germany. See Chapter 4 of Paul B. Jaskot, The Nazi Perpetrator Postwar German Art 
and the Politics of the Right (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012). 
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York,28 Libeskind recalls a recent architecture conference in Magdeburg where Lampugnani gave 
a lecture on the future of architecture:  
His proposed set of rules called for a rigid and reactionary order that employs a 
seductive simplicity in attacking complex problems; in short, he demanded iron 
discipline during a time of transition. Lampugnani instructed the delegates on the 
various points of the new order: no new ideas were needed in architecture or 
urban planning, no dreams, no thoughts, no vision – only silence and conformity. 
As I sat there amidst the architects and planners of the former DDR, listening with 
an increasing sense of dismay, I felt a sense of outrage that what was being 
advocated was a reactionary call to order: be silent, don’t dream, relinquish 
vision, forget individual creativity, follow the rules of the game if you want to 
build.29  
 
Libeskind sees in Lampugnani not only “reactionary tendencies” that threaten Berlin’s and 
Germany’s potential to remain fertile ground for the future of architectural practice as a whole, 
but, on a more abstract level, “a dangerous and authoritarian political sensibility” in the author’s 
manifesto.30 Libeskind refuses to see design and politics as separate things, as Lampugnani 
attempts to do; instead, he is committed to the idea that architectural aesthetics are inextricable 
from the regimes they represent. 
Like Stimmann, Kleihues, and Lampugnani, Libeskind, too, tries to claim the lineage of 
Weimar Modernism for his side of the argument: 
The call for “solidity” and the praise that Lampugnani bestows on the architecture 
from the Third Reich is extremely frightening. It is impossible to separate Nazi 
ideology from that which it has produced. … German fascist ideology built 
solidity into its political policy in opposition to the openness and transparency of 
the short-lived Weimar Republic.31 
 
                                                
28 The English-language article was preceded by a translation of an exchange of letters between Libeskind and the 
editors of Der Spiegel, who turned down his submission. Daniel Libeskind, “Letter from Berlin,” ANY: Architecture New York 1, 
no. 6 (May 1994): 48–51. 
29 Ibid., 48. See also Daniel Libeskind, “Die Banalität der Ordnung,” in Einfach Schwierig: Eine Deutsche 
Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 36.  
30 Libeskind, “Letter from Berlin,” 48.  
31 Ibid., 49. Libeskind also relies on a quote from Behrens to prove one of his points. See Libeskind, “Die Banalität der 
Ordnung,” 39.  
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Then, conflating Lampugnani’s position with Berlin city planning policy under Stimmann, 
Libeskind goes on to paint Critical Reconstruction as another politically authoritarian and 
reactionary method that is, in essence, proto-fascist: 
The current criteria of the Senatsbau [sic] administration of Berlin are not just 
basic guidelines to guarantee responsible future development but are authoritarian 
and repressive edicts. … In using stone façades, gable roofs, punched-in 
windows, invariable grids, unrelenting symmetries, and closed blocks, the 
buildings and streets conform to one bureaucrat’s idea of the good. … In certain 
circles in Berlin and elsewhere there is an ugly atmosphere that resembles the 
pathology of a time in which the notion of “degenerate art” was born. It is an 
atmosphere of defamation, in which those kinds of architecture and planning that 
do not fall into a prescribed parameter are excluded from consideration by not 
being invited to compete or to build. Countless architects who refuse to toe the 
line have been blacklisted and removed from participation.32 
 
Having just lost both the Potsdamer Platz and the Alexanderplatz competitions, Libeskind surely 
counted himself as one of these “blacklisted” architects. His implication that Lampugnani’s ideas 
indicated a preference for fascist aesthetics, and that Stimmann was embodying these very 
aesthetics in his politics, was provocative and added fuel to the international suspicion that 
Lampugnani’s and Stimmann’s ideas were, at their root, on the wrong side of history.  
Defending Lampugnani: Fritz Neumeyer and the Cooption of Modernist History 
 Libeskind’s sentiments were supported by other German critics, notably Rudolf Stegers,33 
but they were also strongly rebuffed by, among others, architectural historian and critic Fritz 
Neumeyer, who had been another frequent contributor to exhibition catalogs and other 
publications on IBA-era Critical Reconstruction with Kleihues and Lampugnani. In October of 
1992 he, too, had already published a long editorial in Berlin’s daily Tagesspiegel newspaper, 
calling for a style that looked to “the conventional, the typical, the Berlinisch.” Like Stimmann, 
Neumeyer expressed concern that Berlin would become a “gigantic exhibition vitrine” for the 
                                                
32 Libeskind, “Letter from Berlin,” 48.  
33 See, for instance, Rudolf Stegers, “Aus Dem Geist von Block Und Stein,” Die Zeit, March 11, 1994. 
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“demonstration of all kinds of architectural styles.”34  Then, in a piece written for (but not 
published in) Der Spiegel in May of 1994 (it subsequently appeared in the Spanish journal A&V), 
Neumeyer neatly shores up Lampugnani’s side of the argument.35 Titled “The Architecture 
Debates in Berlin: Backslide into the Cold War,” he argues that Critical Reconstruction is just a 
“red flag for the bull of architectural criticism,” a chimera that attracts aggressive behavior but 
that obscures the real stakes of rebuilding the city.36 
Behind the attempt [by Stimmann] to head off the uncontrolled growth of the city 
and the self-staging desires of architects and investors, people detect artistic 
dictatorship and other dark intrigues. The politicization of the aesthetic and the 
aestheticization of politics have in the meantime come so far that certain 
architectural styles are alleged to have specific political positions and politics is 
alleged to be shutting out particular architectural positions.37  
 
Neumeyer thinks that these accusations are unfair and overblown, and he blames the media for 
unfairly playing the Nazi card. In fact, Neumeyer contends, if Lampugnani were not seen as a 
“foreigner” in Germany (since he is a native Italian), then Berlin’s scandal-hungry daily press 
“would have quite surely labeled him a ‘skinhead in a tie.’”38 Thus, instead of delving seriously 
into matters of architecture and city planning, the conversation about Berlin has, in Neumeyer’s 
mind, been reduced to two overly simplistic and diametrically opposed ideologies: 
                                                
34 The article was reprinted in the 1993 Centrium Jahrbuch. See Fritz Neumeyer, “Zwischen Tradition Und 
Innovation,” Centrum: Jahrbuch Architektur Und Stadt, 1993, 58. 
35 Fritz Neumeyer, “Una Controversia En Berlin: Recaída En La Guerra Fría,” A & V, no. 50 (1994): 108–13. 
36 Fritz Neumeyer, “Die Architekturkontroverse in Berlin: Rückfall in den Kalten Krieg,” in Einfach schwierig: eine 
deutsche Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 60. 
37 “Hinter dem Versuch, auf diesem Weg dem Wildwuchs der Stadt und den Selbstinszenierungsgelüsten von 
Architekten und Investoren einen Riegel vorzuschieben, wittert man inzwischen Kunstdiktatur und andere üble Machenschaften. 
Die Politisierung des Ästhetischen und die Ästhetisierung der Politik sind inzwischen soweit fortgeschritten, daß bestimmten 
Architekturen ganz bestimmte politische Haltungen unterstellt werden und der Politik die Absicht, bestimmte 
Architekturhaltungen auszusperren.” Ibid., 60–61.  
38 “Man darf nur froh sein, daß es ein ‘Ausländer,’ ein Gastarbeiter war, der für die Qualität der Tradition und die 
Tradition der Qualität das Wort erhoben hat. Ansonsten hätte Lampugnani, der gebürtige Italiener, sich von der Berliner 
Tagespresse mit ziemlicher Sicherheit den Vorwurf eines ‘Skinhead mit Krawatte’ eingehandelt.” Ibid., 63–64.  Neumeyer 
mentions that the leftist taz [sic] newspaper recently used this label against Wolf Jobst Siedler when he dared to critique a design 
for a new, mirror-shaped Holocaust memorial. 
 
 167 
Berlin is again on the front lines and has, at least in terms of the Architecture 
Debates, a new Cold War. … The culture of discussion in the field of architecture, 
and with this the architectural culture itself, falls by the wayside. If one believes 
the mean-spirited labels with which the parties oppose themselves using the so-
called “Berliner Schnauze” [Berlin’s cheeky local dialect], the “Block Wardens” 
[Blockwarte] and the “Chaotics” [Chaoten] stand on either side of this new Wall. 
The one party does not want to give up the grid of urban blocks, ground plans and 
elevations that constitute European city building, and thus they promote a 
reorientation to traditional urban conventions. The other side idealizes the 
overscaled, the fragmentary, the colorful mix of contradictory elements that 
characterizes contemporary world metropolises, and they see in this their planning 
model for the city of the future.39 
 
Instead of proposing a way of tearing down this new “Berlin Wall,” however, Neumeyer 
goes on to side with the traditionalists.40 His first argument for this viewpoint is socio-political: 
the city, after all, “needs rules, just as a society needs a constitution.”41 Secondly, echoing 
Lampugnani, he denies that particular forms must always be associated with particular histories. 
He laments that German architectural discourse and criticism is locked into an anachronistic, 
Cold War way of thinking that is committed to the “towers in the park” model as a synonym for 
democratic design, whereas “the innocent medium of stone is again made into a ‘thousand-year 
material’” that supposedly comes with “a spirit to match.”42 After all, he argues, Mussolini also 
used “transparency” – one of West Germany’s treasured symbols of democratic architecture – as 
an instrument of his own fascist politics.43 Thus no forms or materials are, in themselves, good or 
                                                
39 “Es ist also erreicht: Berlin ist wieder Frontstadt und hat, jedenfalls auf dem Schauplatz der Architekturkontroverse, 
einen neuen kalten Krieg. … Die Diskussionskultur in Sachen Architektur, und somit die architektonische Kultur selbst, bleiben 
auf die Strecke. Böswilligen Etiketten zufolge, mit denen die sprichwörtliche ‘Berliner Schnauze’ die Parteien auseinanderhält, 
stehen sich ‘Blockwarte’ und “Chaoten’ an der neuen Mauer gegenüber. Die einen wollen das Raster des städtischen Blocks, die 
Planfigure von Grundriß und Aufriß als Grundlage des europäischen Städtebaus nicht noch einmal preisgeben und fordern 
deshalb eine Reorientierung an traditionellen städtischen Konventionen. Die andere Seite idealisiert den Maßstabsbruch, das 
fragmentarische, bunte Gemisch von widersprüchlichen Elementen, das die heutigen Metropolen der Welt kennzeichnet, und 
sieht darin ihr Planungsmodell für die zukünftige Stadt.” Ibid., 63.  
40 Perhaps his implication is that New Simplicity’s critics are to be equated with East Germany and must undergo a 
similar “friendly takeover,” though one hesitates to take his metaphor too far. 
41 “Die Stadt braucht Regeln wie die Gesellschaft eine Verfassung.” Neumeyer, “Die Architekturkontroverse in Berlin: 
Rückfall in den Kalten Krieg,” 61.  




evil. As he continues with this line of reasoning, Neumeyer navigates the argument much better 
than Lampugnani does. Instead of denying architecture’s ability to carry social meaning, and 
then hypocritically reifying that very ability, Neumeyer avoids this subject altogether, and simply 
asks readers to distinguish between the rehabilitation of fascist forms and the revival of longer-
standing traditions: “in architecture a return to roots and a revival of traditions does not 
automatically mean a slipping back into conservatism. Renaissance is not reactionary.”44 Thus, 
he argues, the use of neo-classical formal language by the Nazis was one small divergence from 
a much longer and larger stream of stylistic development, into which German architects should 
now feel free to reinsert themselves.45 
At this point, like the other combatants in the debates, Neumeyer invokes specific 
examples of pre-war Modernism to prove his case, but again, in contrast to Lampugnani, he is 
able to avoid empty statements about whether or not the German Modernist masters constitute 
the architectural forefathers of one or another current architectural style. Instead, he turns to the 
popular continental leftist critique of capitalism in order to deny the suitability of 
Deconstructivist or High-Tech forms for the new Berlin: 
It is one of the ironies of architectural history that the utopian glass architecture of 
Frühlicht [Bruno Taut’s Expressionist periodical] has found its expression today 
in, of all things, the capitalist cathedrals of commerce. In the arena of the world of 
sales, what counts is stimulating diversity and that which temptingly glitters. The 
traditional city cannot keep up with the scales and sensations of the media age. 
The city thus reaches a new level, as consumer spectacle simulates the urban 
landscape, in disembodied, high-tech architectural flickerings, with glazed-over 
plazas and shopping malls whose spatial wonders are mostly only accessible 
                                                
44 Ibid., 64. 
45 As noted in a footnote in Chapter 3 (find in final draft), the pre-war Modernist, mid-century Modernist, and neo-
classical styles are not at all clearly differentiated in reality; many German architects practiced all three at one time or another. I 
have chosen not to complicate my analysis with a look at how these various schools are deeply imbricated in one another, though 
the discussion of the Reichsbank below alludes to some of this. 
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during business hours. Those who are against such modernity find themselves 
immediately denounced as conservative philistines.46 
 
Essentially, then, according to Neumeyer, the glass and steel experiments of Libeskind or 
Richard Rogers are not just unacceptable because they break with Berlin tradition; they represent 
a dangerous “selling-out” to capitalism that goes against German intellectuals’ commitment to 
art as being separate from commerce, as well as the traditional model of the “European city” as 
providing publicly accessible space amidst private development. Thus, Neumeyer implies (but, 
wisely, avoids stating explicitly), the only reasonable way forward for Berlin is a return to the 
architectural traditions of the historical city itself, regardless of whether they were subsequently 
coopted by the Nazis; as the example of Italy shows, any architecture can be turned towards 
political ends, so there is no reason to believe the fear-mongering of those who think stone is in 
essence a fascist material. 
 
Hans Kollhoff and the Case for “Urban” Stone Architecture 
If Lampugnani and Neumeyer were the most visible of the New Simplicity’s (and thus 
also Critical Reconstruction’s) theoretical supporters in the Architecture Debates, Hans Kollhoff 
is undoubtedly the most prominent architect representing this point of view. Although Josef Paul 
Kleihues was responsible for the highest number of projects underway in Berlin at the time, and 
sat on the jury for almost every important new contract, Kollhoff’s designs were in more 
conspicuous locations (Potsdamer Platz and Alexanderplatz), and his solemn, restrained aesthetic 
embodies Lampugnani’s tenets in a much more literal way than Kleihues’s continued adherence 
                                                
46 “Es gehört zu den Ironien der Architekturgeschichte, daß die utopische Glasarchitektur des ‘Frühlicht’ ausgerechnet 
in den spätkapitalistischen Kathedralen des Kommerzes ihre Fortsetzung gefunden hat. In der Arena der Warenwelt zählt 
berauschende Vielfalt und das, was verheißungsvoll glitzert. Die traditionelle Stadt kann mit den Maßstäben des Sensationellen 
im Medienzeitalter längst nicht mehr mithalten. Stadt wird folglich auf neuem Niveau, als Konsumspektakel der City simuliert: 
im körperlosen Flimmern transparenter High-Tech-Architekturen, mit glasüberdachten Plazas und Shopping Malls, deren 
Raumwunder meist nur zu Büro- und Geschäftszeiten zugänglich sind. Wer gegen solche Modernität ist, sieht sich rasch als 
konservativer Banause angeprangert.” Neumeyer, “Die Architekturkontroverse in Berlin: Rückfall in den Kalten Krieg,” 67–68.  
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to his more eclectic Poetic Rationalism. Kollhoff’s numerous written contributions to the 
Architecture Debates worked in tandem with his designs to espouse a return to what he termed 
“urban” European commercial building – which should be clad, Kollhoff argued, in the 
traditional, “solid” materials of stone or brick. Kollhoff’s position as a proponent of stone 
architecture in Berlin became one of the cornerstones of Critical Reconstruction’s conservatism. 
The restrictive aesthetics of Kollhoff’s post-Wall designs for Berlin took many critics by 
surprise. He had begun his architecture studies in 1968 at the University of Karlsruhe, spent a 
year in the atelier of Hans Hollein in Vienna, and in 1975 received a scholarship to pursue post-
graduate studies at Cornell. While there, he became a close colleague of Rem Koolhaas, studying 
and working under Oswald Matthias Ungers. Kollhoff returned to West Berlin to found his own 
architectural practice in 1978 (running it with partner Helga Timmerman since 1984),47 and the 
firm has been very successful, especially in Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. He has 
also held numerous prestigious academic positions, including one at the ETH Zürich.48 
Kollhoff’s first major project in Berlin was a group of residential buildings on Luisenplatz 
(1982-1987) in the West Berlin neighborhood of Charlottenburg.49 Designed as infill on three 
irregularly-shaped plots, the design is an overt homage to the Modernist masters: taking the form 
of two Zeilenbau blocks (one bisected by an existing building), they sport massive glass curtain 
walls that echo the gridded form of Walter Gropius’s iconic Bauhaus façade and Alvar Aalto’s 
curving block for the dorms at MIT; additionally, they are topped by sweeping, wing-shaped 
attic rooflines that visually quote Le Corbusier’s expressionist turn in his post-war work at 
                                                
47 Though Timmerman partnered with him on all of his Berlin designs, she is rarely mentioned in the literature. This 
exclusion, I argue, points to a larger problem of women’s positions in the architectural profession and discourse. 
48 See Hans Kollhoff, Hans Kollhoff: Kollhoff & Timmerman Architects (Milano: Electaarchitecture, 2004); and 
“Bürochronologie,” Kollhoff Architekten, accessed July 7, 2015, http://kollhoff.de/. 
49 “Wohnbebauung Am Luisenplatz,” Kollhoff Architekten, accessed July 7, 2015, http://kollhoff.de/. 
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Chandigarh and elsewhere (figs. 4.1-4.5). These references are subtly blended with elements of 
the typical Charlottenburg tenement in their brick cladding and semi-enclosed balconies.  
In his early work in Berlin, therefore, Kollhoff demonstrated himself to be open to both 
the material of glass and to a certain amount of formal experimentation that drew on post-war 
expressionist trends. His later design for the “Piraeus” housing complex, part of the KNSM 
Island development in Amsterdam (1989-1995), is also startlingly abstract and playful, 
comprising two large sloping, intersecting forms and using the geometry of the exterior fire 
escape and balconies as playful adornments (figs. 4.6-4.9). His first submission for the 
Potsdamer Platz master planning competition in 1991 was based in the urban archipelago model: 
a series of loosely grouped skyscrapers set in a large, open, landscape of greenery (figs. 4.10-
4.12). However, following the controversies over the site, which resulted in his colleague 
Koolhaas being effectively banned from building in Berlin, Kollhoff revised his approach to 
architecture for the new capital city: as architectural historian Andreas Ruby observes, Kollhoff 
“learned his lesson more thoroughly than any other Berlin architect,” resubmitting (after his 
initial rejection) a design for the square that conformed to the “neo-Prussian” aesthetic of what 
Lampugnani would term “New Simplicity.”50 His design for a skyscraper as part of the Daimler-
Benz development (completed 2000), despite its height, is stone-clad and starkly disciplined in 
the gridded distribution of the façade (figs. 4.13-4.15).51  
                                                
50 Andreas Ruby, “The Eternal Return of the Void: German Architecture after German Reunification,” in New German 
Architecture: A Reflexive Modernism, by Ullrich Schwarz (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002), 297. On the Potsdamer Platz 
competition entry, see Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning Potsdamer Platz, trans. 
Romana Schneider (Frankfurt am Main: DAM, 1997), 146–147. Kollhoff’s early designs for the Berlin Morgen competition can 
be found in Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, Berlin morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt (Stuttgart: G. Hatje, 1991), 130–
131. 
51 I don’t agree with Ruby entirely. Kollhoff’s Alexanderplatz proposal clearly draws on his earlier work for Berlin 
Morgen and the Potsdamer Platz competition. As discussed further below, Kollhoff’s understanding of the “urban” is a little 
different from Kleihues’s or Lampugnani’s understanding of the Berlin block, though he does introduce a much clearer “Berlin 
block” form as the basis for the skyscrapers at Alexanderplatz, and emphasizes more of the stone cladding. 
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Vying for the Future of the City: The Master Plan Competition for Alexanderplatz 
At the time of the Architecture Debates in 1993-4, Kollhoff was in the midst of several 
notable projects, including the design for Potsdamer Platz, his contribution to the Hofgarten am 
Gendarmenmarkt development planned by Kleihues, discussed in Chapter 3, and a submission to 
the planning competition for the former Reichsbank (discussed below). Most importantly, he had 
just competed directly with Libeskind in the master plan competition for Alexanderplatz. There 
is some irony in the fact that the two had already literally crossed paths at Libeskind’s Jewish 
Museum, where Kollhoff had, during the IBA, done the master planning for an adjacent park and 
residential area (Wohnpark am Berlin Museum, 1984-1986) (fig. 4.16).52 In the open green space 
behind the museum, the simple tubular form of a long, gridded steel arbor surrounded by sparse 
plantings and concrete walls blends seamlessly with the striking, fragmented Deconstructivism 
of Libeskind’s design. By the time of the Alexanderplatz competition in 1993, however, the 
gaping disparity between their two urban visions was starkly apparent. A close look at their 
designs for this area provides an illuminating subtext to the opposing positions of many of the 
Architecture Debates’ participants. 
As the easternmost square in Mitte and a major focus of East Berlin government planning 
and construction in the 1960s, Alexanderplatz was one of the first areas of the city to be slated 
for redevelopment after reunification. Located at the crossroads of several commercial 
thoroughfares that met just outside the eastern medieval city gate, it had emerged organically as a 
market square early on in Berlin's history, and by the 1920s had grown into the bustling 
commercial and transportation hub featured in Alfred Döblin’s famous novel. A 1929 plan 
                                                
52 Designed in collaboration with Arthur Ovaska, the park is part of a master plan for a series of residential buildings 
designed by various architects. See Gerwin Zohlen, “Die Gesellschaft der Häuser,” in Die Baumeister des neuen Berlin: Porträts, 
Gebäude, Konzepte, by Christina Haberlik and Gerwin Zohlen (Berlin: Nicolai, 1997), 93; “Wohnpark Am Berlin Museum, 
Block 33,” F-IBA: Forschungsinitiative IBA 87, accessed July 7, 2015, http://f-iba.de/wohnpark-am-berlin-museum-block-33/; 




intended to resolve traffic problems was never fully realized, but did result in the construction of 
two large buildings designed by Peter Behrens on the western side of the square (fig. 4.17-
4.19).53 Following the destruction wrought by World War II, which spared the Behrens buildings 
but ruined the gigantic Tietz Department Store that filled the majority of the surrounding blocks 
(figs. 4.20-4.21), the East Berlin government undertook an extensive and highly technical 
reworking of the area, creating a truly massive public space that could serve as both a recreation 
and demonstration venue. (The “emptiness” of this vast, windswept area was later the object of 
vehement critique by post-Wall planners and architects.) New construction on the square, done 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, incorporated several office towers, a high-rise hotel, 
restaurants, and the Warenhaus Centrum (Centrum Emporium), the largest department store in 
East Germany. In 1993, the Berlin Department of Urban Development and Environment 
announced a master plan competition for the entire site.54 Though this was not Stimmann’s 
department (he worked for the Department of Construction and Housing), he did serve on the 
jury.55 After short deliberations and one revisionary round, it awarded first prize to Kollhoff, 
with Libeskind as the runner-up.56 
                                                
53 Dorothea Tscheschner, “Alexanderplatz - Seine Entwicklung Nach 1945,” in Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher 
Ideenwettbewerb, ed. Kristin Feireiss (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994), 42. 
54 Many of the large buildings around Alexanderplatz had been the headquarters for GDR Kombinate and thus fell to 
the Treuhandanstalt (THA, discussed in Chapter 2) after reunification. Under pressure from investors, who were especially 
interested in the property because of its potential for high-rise development, Hassemer wrested control of the site from the city 
authorities and forced the staging of a competition. Over the intervening years, many of the plots have been sold off; the 
American Hines is now the only original company still working on developing the site. See Elizabeth A Strom, Building the New 
Berlin: The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001), 209–210. 
55 The jury also included, among others, the architects Jürgen Sawade and Albert Speer (Jr.), Hans Stimmann, Dorothee 
Dubrau (the head of urban planning for the district of Mitte) and Hassemer. See Kristin Feireiss, ed., Alexanderplatz: 
Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, trans. Michael Robinson and Hans H. Harbort (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994), 244. 




The stated aim of Kollhoff’s design was “to stop the city from drifting apart” by restoring 
the “block-like structure of the city” (figs. 4.22-4.26).57 The large open space at the heart of the 
square was to remain a pedestrian area, surrounded by cafes and restaurants that would give it a 
lively character during day and night. This open space was to be embellished by a large glazed 
circular area (replacing the extant, East German fountain) that could double as an “illuminated 
fountain with a program of waterworks” at night.58 Infill on the surrounding blocks, responding 
to Behrens’s two buildings in their height, massing, and the horizontal emphasis of their façades, 
were to provide a visual and physical base for thirteen soaring high-rises that would spring from 
the outer street-edges of the development. Some infill on the western side of the S-Bahn tracks, 
around the iconic Fernsehturm (TV tower) and extensive new construction on the large block to 
the east (between Alexanderstrasse and Mollstrasse) would restore a dense, gridded structure to 
the neighborhood. In the perspective renderings, the buildings’ facades are clearly stone, with 
filigreed detailing, taking some of their visual cues from the art deco skyscrapers of New York 
City, but also echoing the grandiose Stalinist “wedding-cake” neo-classicism of the nearby 
Stalinallee, which had been constructed along Socialist Realist lines in the 1950s.59 Kollhoff also 
added what he called a “sentimental proposal” to reconstruct the statue of the mythical female 
figure of Berolina that once stood on the square and is mentioned in Döblin’s novel: the firm’s 
                                                
57 Kollhoff Architects, “Explanatory Report 1,” in Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, ed. Kristin 
Feireiss (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994), 85. 
58 Ibid. 
59 This thoroughfare was much praised by proponents of Critical Reconstruction and the New Simplicity. Kleihues 
included a long section about it in his essay for the collection Berlin – New York that also includes an essay on art deco in New 
York City. See Josef Paul Kleihues, “From the Destruction to the Critical Reconstruction of the City: Urban Design in Berlin 
after 1945,” in Berlin/New York: Like and Unlike  : Essays on Architecture and Art from 1870 to the Present, ed. Josef Paul 
Kleihues and Christina Rathgeber (New York: Rizzoli, 1993); Rosemarie Haag Bletter, “Art Deco Skyscapers: Towers of 
Modern Babel,” in Berlin/New York: Like and Unlike  : Essays on Architecture and Art from 1870 to the Present, ed. Josef Paul 
Kleihues and Christina Rathgeber (New York: Rizzoli, 1993); see also Francesca Rogier, “The Monumentality of Rhetoric: The 
Will to Rebuild in Postwar Berlin,” in Anxious Modernisms  : Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture, by Sarah 
Williams Goldhagen and Réjean Legault (Montréal: Canadian Centre for Architecture  ; Cambridge, Mass, 2000). The association 
between Stalinallee and “good” urban design still persists in the current discourse on Berlin: Stalinallee was referenced in several 
talks at a 2013 symposium on Berlin at Yale University, which included many of the main players in the Architecture Debates. 
“Achtung Berlin” (Yale University, February 14, 2013). 
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description of the design includes a quote from the book’s main character, who is watching the 
statue being “melted down to make medals.”60 This poetic detail suggests that Kollhoff saw his 
design at least partly as a redemptive gesture that would restore Berlin to its former commercial 
glory while transcending – rather than reifying – Germany’s militaristic history.  
Clearly Kollhoff’s plan did not fully conform to the typical medium-rise “Berlin block” 
type that Kleihues and Stimmann proposed as infill for the rest of Mitte; along with Kleihues, 
Kollhoff had long been a supporter of the judicious use of high-rises in Berlin’s rebuilding, 
envisioning Potsdamer Platz and Alexanderplatz as two skyscraper-adorned gateways into the 
capital’s commercial center.61 Still, in their detailing, distribution, and massing, as well as in the 
largely orthogonal ground plan, the structures depicted in Kollhoff’s design conform to the 
stone-clad solemnity of the New Simplicity and Critical Reconstruction. Libeskind’s design, by 
contrast, could not be more opposed to these approaches in both its aesthetics and its layout. 
Loaded with a preponderance of poetic and historical references, with names like “The Book,” 
“The Window,” “The Compass,” “Dostoyevsky Passage,” “Tatlin Elevator,” and “Kafka Lane,” 
and with visual references to such icons of Constructivist experimentation as the Vesnin 
Brothers’ Pravda Building, Libeskind’s plan proposed the creation of a new and “tightly 
compressed center with its own history and identity,” which nonetheless preserved much more of 
the existing fabric of the East German square than Kollhoff’s design did (figs. 4.27-4.30).62 Like 
Kollhoff, Libeskind incorporated several high-rises, but these were to be clustered to the east 
rather than evenly encompassing the square. In the perspective views, it becomes clear that 
Libeskind envisioned a set of highly experimental forms that splinter, fragment, and contradict 
                                                
60 Kollhoff Architects, “Explanatory Report 1,” 85. 
61 Lampugnani, Berlin morgen, 130–131. 
62 Alexanderplatz Master Plan Competition Jury, “Jury’s Assessment Second Phase,” in Alexanderplatz: 
Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, ed. Kristin Feireiss (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994), 108. 
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one another. This approach sought to embody the fact that Alexanderplatz “was and still is a 
place of hit and miss, of uncertain connections, of encounters which fail to take place between 
east and west, and of other such encounters which are full of promise, a place of successes and 
failures; and who will have the last laugh may remain an open question.”63 While the jury 
appreciated his will to preserve many of the existing structures on the site, they found his 
“electrical linking of shapes” to constitute “a kind of Disneyland.” They called his reconstruction 
of the Pravda building “incomprehensible” and, foreshadowing Lampugnani’s manifesto (he 
was, in fact, on the jury), they stated that “this chaos, which simulates the chaos that is the 
distinguishing feature of the contemporary city today, is not a suitable basis for a building plan 
which was intended to place limits on the chaos.” While conceding that the plan “is a mine of 
ideas which might take shape as individual buildings,” the only redeeming quality the jury 
seemed to agree upon regarding Libeskind’s design was the fact that the Behrens buildings were 
left intact.64  
These two much-discussed master plans for the square came to be seen by many critics as 
illustrations of the opposing sides of the Architecture Debates: Gerwin Zohlen states that 
Kollhoff and Libeskind danced a “skillful pas de deux” through the debates, representing “the 
good old conflict of the old guard against the new, the avant-gardistes against the realists.”65 But 
their opposition represents much more than a simple competition between the regressive and the 
experimental: their aesthetic “Cold War” (to use Neumeyer’s term) reflects, ultimately, two 
fundamentally different visions for the future of Berlin that, in 1993, seemed like two disparate 
                                                
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 115. 
65 “Im Bellett der Formeln und Statements vollführten die beiden einen gekonnten Pas de deux .. zwischen den beiden 
war der alte, so schön alte Konflikt der Altvorderen gegen die Neuerer, der Avantgardisten gegen die Realisten aufgebrochen.” 
Zohlen, “Die Gesellschaft der Häuser,” 92–93.  
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possible paths to the reconstruction of the entire rest of the city. The critic Rudolf Stegers stated, 
in the national weekly newspaper Die Zeit, that Kollhoff’s design seemed “set on liquidation, 
simplicity, homogeneity, totality,” whereas “Libeskind looks for transformation, complexity, 
heterogeneity, plurality. … The models are easily imagined as models of a repressive society 
with Kollhoff, a liberal society with Libeskind.”66 Though Libeskind’s symbolically-
overburdened design may appear hackneyed or heavy-handed today, at the time it represented 
the expectations of the global community that Berlin would not only symbolize a futuristic, 
visionary metropolis, but that it would do so by acknowledging and working through its 
traumatic past. Kollhoff’s design, on the other hand, attempts to quietly and seamlessly insert 
Berlin into the ranks of global, capitalist metropolises by mixing high-rise commercial 
typologies with the European tradition of the medium-rise block form clad in stone – appearing 
as if, in a way, the years between 1945 and 1989 had never occurred at all.  
Kollhoff’s Argument for Urban Stone Architecture 
Kollhoff’s “about-face” in Berlin was not only aesthetic but rhetorical. Zohlen contends 
that it was not his buildings but his words that made him notorious, and that he used the platform 
of the Berlin Architecture Debates to his own advantage, turning into an effective “coup 
d’état.”67 Kollhoff’s written contributions to the debates actually began before Lampugnani’s 
opening manifesto, in an essay first published in Berlin’s newspaper Der Tagesspiegel in 
October of 1992, reprinted in the journal Centrum’s 1993 yearbook.68 (Also included in this 
                                                
66 “Kollhoff setzt auf Liquidation, Simplizität, Homogenität, Totalität; Libeskind setzt auf Transformation, 
Komplexität, Heterogenität, Pluralität. … Mühelos lassen sich die Modelle auch als Modelle einer repressiven Gesellschaft bei 
Kollhoff, einer liberalen Gesellschaft bei Libeskind vorstellen.” Stegers, “Aus Dem Geist von Block Und Stein,” np.  
67 Zohlen thinks that Stimmann actually fell into line with Kollhoff, rather than the other way around, after the 
Potsdamer Platz debates. See Zohlen, “Die Gesellschaft der Häuser,” 93.  
68 The essay first appeared in the Berlin Tagesspiegel on October 4, 1992. 
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collection were essays by Kleihues, Libeskind, and Neumeyer.69) In the essay, titled “Boredom 
and Public Opinion Making,” Kollhoff begins by lamenting the disregard shown for historical 
buildings today, arguing for the importance of craftsmanship and quality: traditions of Berlin’s 
past that, he claims, arose from care, economy, and attention to detail. These characteristics are 
especially present, he thinks, in buildings that use stone: “Stone as a building material was, in 
Berlin, something special. … Accordingly, they worked it sparingly and carefully.”70 But, he 
complains, “functional brutalism after the war left the dictum of constructive honesty … on the 
junkpile, instead choosing an ‘honest’ but cold collection of apparatuses off of which our 
emotional needs unhappily slide.”71 As in Lampugnani’s manifesto, what seems at first to simply 
be a plea for “quality” or “good craftsmanship” in architecture becomes instead an argument 
about the connections between architectural form and the state of contemporary society. And 
again like Lampugnani, Kollhoff draws on a Simmel-esque critique of the sensory excesses of 
modern urban life in order to argue that today’s architecture is too fleeting and impermanent: 
Why is it that we don’t notice these drawbacks [of lack of craftsmanship]? Do we 
go through the city with TV-vision, where the limited resolution blurs the details, 
or because we’re so hungry for the next image that we find the present 
uninteresting? Or do we already expect the devaluation of the environment that 
we produce and consume, so that we have become accustomed not to linger, 
because the next image promises hope? We have become “channel-surfers” in the 
treatment of our city. … Everything is exchangeable, everything is equally 
important, everything is just a matter of taste and one’s mood at the moment. Are 
there even still categories besides “awesome” and “awful”?72 
                                                
69 It also included an essay by Wolf Jobst Siedler. The table of contents is available online at 
http://www.zvab.com/Centrum-Jahrbuch-Architektur-Stadt-1993-Peter/231286248/buch. 
70 “Stein als Baumaterial war in Berlin etwas Besonderes. … Entsprechend sparsam und sorgfältig hat man ihn 
verarbeitet.” Hans Kollhoff, “Stumpfsinn und öffentliche Meinungsbildung,” in Einfach Schwierig: Eine Deutsche 
Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 87.  
71 “Die funktionalistische Verrohung ließ nach dem Krieg dem Diktum der konstruktiven Ehrlichkeit … zugunsten 
einer ‘ehrlichen,’ aber kalten Sammlung von Apparaten, an denen unsere emotionalen Bedürfnisse unbefriedigt abgleiten.” Ibid., 
88. 
72 “Woran liegt es, daß uns diese Derbheiten nicht mehr auffallen? Gehen wir durch die Stadt mit einem Fernsehblick, 
be idem geringe Auflösung das Detail verschluckt oder bei dem die Gier nach dem nächsten Bild das gegenwärtige uninteressant 
werden läßt? Oder ahnen wir schon die Minderwertigkeit der von uns tagtäglich produzierten und konsumierten Umwelt, so daß 




Kollhoff sees the media as complicit in this populist devaluation of architecture: “architecture 
has become commonplace. Everyone is an architect. The newspapers constantly steamroll what 
architecture is. How can you sell papers when you’re not touting the latest fad?”73 Instead of this 
parade of fashionable styles, Kollhoff avers, “We should focus on our great and, in its simplicity 
and solidity, appropriate building tradition,” in order to find “a lineage” or “tendency.”74  
This tendency, for Kollhoff, can be summarized in the term “urban”: his shorthand for the 
idea that the “European city” requires a return to a particular (i.e. “urban”) typology – that of the 
pre-war commercial block – and that, consequently, stone, in its “solidity,” is the only 
appropriate building material for this task. 
The architecture of the city is one of stone. The permanence which Aldo Rossi 
talks of does not manifest itself in glass and aluminum. If we think urban 
architecture should do more than simply please the eye but should also transcend 
its time, Gottfried Semper’s reservations about iron architecture have evidently 
not lost their relevance. It is in stone that our collective memory is concentrated.75 
  
Taken alone, this call for a return to particular typologies and materials could appear as a 
mere personal preference or a nostalgic wish to return to the forms of the nineteenth century, but 
Kollhoff chooses instead to align himself with Lampugnani in the problematic defense of Nazi 
architecture as a set of forms that can be divorced from their historical context. The 1993 
Centrum yearbook also included an interview with Kollhoff by the far-left author and architect 
                                                                                                                                                       
Umgang mit unserer Stadt (Zapping = nervöses Hin-und Herschalten der Fernsehprogramme mit Fernbedienung). Alles wird 
austauschbar, alles ist gleich wichtig, alles ist nur noch dem Geschmacksurteil und der momentanen Laune unterworden. Gibt es 
überhaupt noch Entscheidungskategorien jenseits von ‘toll’ und ‘öde’?” Ibid., 89.  
73 “Gleichzeitig ist Architektur ein Allgemeinplatz geworden. Jeder ist Architekt. Die Zeitschriften walzen 
kontinuierlich platt, was Architektur sei. Wie läßt sich das Blatt verkaufen, wenn nicht jeweils der neueste Schrei ausposaunt 
wird?” Ibid., 91.  
74 “Wir sollten uns auf unsere große und in ihre Einfachheit und Solidität durchaus zeitgemäße Bautradition besinnen 
und zu einer Linie, einer Tendenz finden …” Ibid., 92.  
75 Hans Kollhoff, “Architecture Today: Hans Kollhoff,” Domus, no. 756 (January 1994): 78. It is worth noting the 
absence of brick from these discussions; brick (“Klinker”) was considered a traditionally “native” Berlin material during the 
nineteenth century, and also figured heavily in Rossi’s work. 
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Peter Neitzke, in which Kollhoff defends Lampugnani’s exhibition featuring Nazi architects at 
the German Architecture Museum: 
Insofar as architecture is an art … I can only judge it outside of its political 
context. Your question implicates the old misunderstanding of the ideological 
worth of an artistic endeavor. … For me it is ever clearer that one must 
differentiate between the political positioning of the architects of the Third Reich, 
or the politically affirmative power of their architecture, and an intra-architectural 
engagement which was a part of architectural history before the Third Reich, 
which was repressed after the war for obvious reasons, and which is being taken 
up today in thoughtful ways.76 
 
Paving the way for Neumeyer and Lampugnani’s arguments during the Architecture Debates, 
Kollhoff equates the “towers in the park” Modernism of the post-war era with the misplaced 
desire for a “democratic” architecture that he sees devolving into to the chaotic and empty – and 
thus potentially harmful – forms of Deconstructivism.77 While Kollhoff insists that he does not 
support the revival of a Nazi architect like Paul Schmitthenner, who touted the vision of a return 
to the medieval village in service of a “Blut und Boden” ideology, he does think it is important to 
link back to German pre-World War II architectural traditions. Like every other author in the 
debates, Kollhoff then invokes the likes of Behrens, Hans Poelzig, and Alfred Messel, asserting 
that they belonged to “a tradition that was thinking about the metropolis and urban 
architecture.”78 But this supposedly innocent return to the Modernist greats is, incomprehensibly 
in Kollhoff eyes, met with suspicion by critics and the general public: 
Every approach that is conscious of tradition, which relates itself to metropolitan 
architecture, is slapped with a verdict and disqualified as potentially 
                                                
76 “Soweit aber Architektur Kunst ist, kann ich sie nur außerhalb ihres politischen Verwertungszusammenhangs 
beurteilen. Ihre Frage impliziert das alte Missverständnis der ideologischen Wertung einer künstlerischen Leistung. … Deshalb 
wird für mich immer deutlicher, daß man unterscheiden muß zwischen der politischen Standortbestimmung der Architekten des 
‘Dritten Reiches’ bzw. der politischen Affirmationskraft ihrer Architektur und einer innerarchitektonischen Auseinandersetzung, 
die Teil der deutschen Architekturgeschichte vor dem ‘Dritten Reich’ war, die nach dem Kriege aus naheliegenden Gründen 
verdrängt wurde und die es heute auf sachliche Weise aufzumehmen gilt …” “Es Geht Nicht Darum, Eine Vergangene Welt Zu 
Konservieren: Hans Kollhoff Im Gespräch Mit Peter Neitzke,” Centrum: Jahrbuch Architektur Und Stadt, 1993, 49.  




undemocratic. A solid building which arises out of the memory of an urban 
commercial typology and feels itself bound to the conventions of urban life, 
almost inevitably invites accusations of fascism. Lampugnani’s exhibition 
therefore appears necessary to me. Indeed, it should have happened earlier, for 
post-war architecture in Germany is in general a grotesque feat of repression.79  
 
Heinrich Klotz and Accusations of Fascism 
Kollhoff’s statements fed into those by Lampugnani and Neumeyer, and in July 1994, 
directly after Libeskind’s polemic appeared in Arch+, the same journal released an entire issue 
dedicated to the debates over Berlin’s reconstruction, titled “From Berlin to New Teutonia.” As 
the moniker implies, the authors included were all critics of Kollhoff, Lampugnani, and their 
fellow promoters of the New Simplicity.80 The only English text included in this volume was a 
translation of an interview with Heinrich Klotz, former director of the German Architecture 
Museum and Lampugnani’s direct predecessor, who had throughout the 1980s advocated for the 
embrace of a stylistically diverse post-modernism.  
The approach espoused by Lampugnani and exemplified clearly by Kollhoff’s designs, 
Klotz argues in the interview, constitutes “a new rigor which might even imply more echoes of 
fascist architecture than has even been the case before. For me, this is very disquieting.”81 In 
Klotz’s eyes, the formal language of New Simplicity “contains an affectation of power 
(Machtallüre) which we have not known since 1945.”82 Klotz’s argument is very similar to 
                                                
79 “Dagegen wird jeder traditionsbewusste Ansatz, der sich auf eine großstädtische Architektur bezieht, mit einem 
Verdikt belegt und als potentiell undemokratisch abqualifiziert. Ein solides Haus, das aus der Erinnerung an eine großstädtische 
Geschäftshaustypologie entsteht und sich den Konventionen städtischen Lebens verpflichtet fühlt, handelt sich geradezu 
zwangsläufig den Faschismusvorwurf ein. Lampugnanis Ausstellung erscheint mir deshalb notwendig. Ja, sie hätte sogar viel 
früher stattfinden sollen, den die Nachkriegsgeschichte der Architektur in Deutschland ist weitgehend eine groteske 
Verdrängungsleistung.” Ibid.  
80 The issue also featured an article about Behnisch’s new design for the Academy of Arts on Pariser Platz, a critique of 
the developments at Potsdamer Platz, and features on Kleihues’s Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt development as well as 
Kollhoff’s designs for Alexanderplatz.  
81 Heinrich Klotz, Nikolaus Kuhnert, and Angelika Schnell, “For God’s Sake, Not This Kind of a Capital: Heinrich 
Klotz in Conversation with ARCH+,” trans. Tamara Domenrat, Arch +, no. 122 (June 1994): 87. 
82 He and others also sometimes call this style “Prussian Classicism.” Heinrich Klotz, Nikolaus Kuhnert, and Angelika 
Schnell, “Bloß Nicht Diese Hauptstadt! Heinrich Klotz Im Gespräch Mit ARCH+,” Arch +, no. 122 (June 1994): 23. 
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Libeskind’s, but with one important difference: whereas Libeskind is suspicious of New 
Simplicity for its dictatorial politics and its limitations on style, Klotz is more concerned with the 
rehabilitation of a very particular formal language (i.e. that of “stone” architecture) that, in his 
mind, can – and, more importantly, should – never be disassociated from the Nazi regime. Just as 
Habermas and others had argued in the Historikerstreit, Klotz feels that the crimes of the Nazis 
are such that German history and identity can never be freed from that guilt; rather, Germans 
must remain continually vigilant with respect to such tendencies, and, while embracing 
innovation, diversity, and variety, must eschew any return to or revival of those things (including 
building materials and forms) that were integral to Hitler’s regime. 
Klotz states that he is opposed to any ideological or dogmatic approach to architecture: “I 
don’t like to be too hasty to read political qualities into architecture. Transparency is not always 
democracy and heavy stone is not the same as fascism.”83 Indeed, he observes, the architectural 
culture of former West Germany had its own problematic relationship to architectural form and 
political representation:  
The old Federal Republic of Germany … had an ideology of its own, an ideology 
of lightness, of transparency, of democracy, of open-mindedness. Those were all 
epithets which had been assigned to the materials and the form in order prove that 
we wanted to get rid of the representative Third-Reich type of building. … That 
was okay. [However,] it was not okay that people became dogmatic about it and 
wanted to forbid everything else. You can’t do that in the name of democracy. …  
Politics do not mean harmony and renunciation of opposition.84 
 
However, though “architecture is seldom unambiguous in its form,” i.e. Kollhoff and other 
adherents of the New Simplicity may not be explicitly fascist in their intentions, the “nearest 
relative” of a recent design by Kollhoff is, Klotz argues, Hitler’s Haus der Deutschen Kunst.85 
                                                
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 87.  
85 Ibid., 24. The design he is critiquing is Kollhoff’s idea for an entrance hall at Museum Island, never built. 
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He also expresses concern over Kollhoff’s designs currently under construction at Potsdamer 
Platz, for which he served as a jury member: “When I realized he was serious about it, the word 
‘fascistic’ came out of my mouth,” he states.86 
I was shocked. Kollhoff, an architect I like and who has, in the early years of his 
career, been responsible for many convincing buildings in the city, buildings one 
might describe as belonging to a second modernism, a person like him is now 
turning to tectonics. … In the last analysis that means that power is made visible. 
… But if the whole city looks like this, if this is the new era, I have less and less 
reason to travel to Berlin and more and more reason to say: for God’s sake, not 
this kind of a capital!87  
 
Kollhoff is not Klotz’s only target. Stimmann and Kleihues are also, according to him, 
guilty of power-mongering in the service of the New Simplicity. With this interview, Klotz adds 
to the argument, also espoused by Libeskind and shared by Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm (discussed 
below), that Berlin’s reconstruction is now subject to the rigid dictates and conservative 
aesthetics of a “cartel” of reactionary planners, theorists, and architects.  
Kollhoff published a reply to Klotz the following month in the Frankfurter Rundschau 
newspaper titled “Fiction or City: Against the Tabooization of an Urban Architecture,” arguing 
that his designs emphatically did not constitute “a rehabilitation of a conservative Modernism or 
the lifting of the taboo on Nazi architecture,” but, rather, were a return to the tradition of Weimar 
Modernism in the form of urban typologies. This kind of urbanism, argues Kollhoff, was 
wholeheartedly rejected by the Nazis, even as its surface aesthetics were appropriated by them. 
Kollhoff accuses Klotz of dismissing “urban” architecture wholesale along with Nazi forms: 
“According to Klotz’s criteria, everyone,” from Max Taut and Behrens to Mies van der Rohe and 
Poelzig, “is without exception a fascistoid architect. These architects embody nothing less than 
                                                
86 Klotz, Kuhnert, and Schnell, “For God’s Sake, Not This Kind of a Capital: Heinrich Klotz in Conversation with Arch 
+,” 87. 
87 Ibid.   
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German urban architecture! If we constrain these with a verdict, if we make taboo this great 
tradition of modern building,” then, Kollhoff thinks, we continue the destruction of the inner city 
that began with the bombs of World War II, where voids remain empty and urban life cannot 
take place.88 
Klotz made a rebuttal in the same newspaper a week later, titled “Berlin Blockade: An 
Answer to Hans Kollhoff,” arguing that, on the contrary, Kollhoff cannot claim to be an heir to 
Weimar Modernism, since he clads his buildings in stone and creates disciplined façades that, 
Klotz notes, Kleihues has described as having a “rational clarity and pure simplicity” as well as a 
“harsh [spröden] character” that is “typical for Berlin and Prussia.”89 Klotz argues that this is not 
a question of, as Kollhoff would have it, recreating an urban architectural typology, although he 
himself is a critic of the enormous size and density of the blocks being sold off and developed in 
Mitte; instead,  
What throws “Prussian harshness” [Sprödigkeit] into a very particular light is the 
language of this architecture, its details, which are described as “New Simplicity.” 
… Whoever Kollhoff’s guarantors of an early Modernism may be, from Mebes to 
Mies – it not only shows a lack of instinct to decorate the recently rediscovered 
Berlin block, blown up to the size of a metropolis, with classical details, but to do 
this with such forms that cannot absolve themselves from historical guilt and 
misuse. There is one kind of architecture which should be put aside for all time, 
just as we can no longer use certain terms like “degenerate,” “volkisch,” “Aryan,” 
etc. in a German context.90 
                                                
88 “Nach den Kriterien von Klotz wären hier, von Höger bis Ochs, Schmohl, Max Taut, Kaufmann, Behrens, Straumer, 
Hans und Oskar Gerson, Schumacher, Mendelsohn, Messel, Mebes und Emmerich, Kohtz, Hoffmann, Poelzig usw. ausnahmslos 
faschistoide Architekten versammelt. Diese Architekten verkörpern nichts weniger als die deutsche großstädtische Architektur! 
Wenn wir diese mit einem Verdikt belegen, wenn wir diese große Tradition modernen Bauens tabuisiern, dürfen wir uns über die 
katastrophale bauliche Entwicklung der Innenstädte, soweit sie im Kriege zerbombt und nicht wiederaufgebaut wurden, nicht 
beklagen.” Hans Kollhoff, “Fiktion oder Stadt: Gegen die Tabuisierung einer städtischen Architektur,” in Einfach Schwierig: 
Eine Deutsche Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 119–120.  
89Heinrich Klotz, “Berliner Blockade: Eine Antwort auf Hans Kollhoff,” in Einfach Schwierig: Eine Deutsche 
Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 124–125. Here he is 
referring to a 1992 interview with Kleihues by Werner Oechslin in the journal Archithese: Josef Paul Kleihues and Werner 
Oechslin, “‘Der Potsdamer Platz Hätte Einen Elitären Prozess Verdient!’: Ein Interview Mit Prof. J.P. Kleihues,” Archithese 22, 
no. 2 (March 1992): 25–33. 
90 “Was schließlich die neue ‘preußische Sprödigkeit’ in ein ganz besonderes Licht rückt, ist die Sprache dieser 
Architektur, sind ihre Details, die als ‘Neue Einfachheit’ bezeichnet werden. … Wer immer Herrn Kollhoffs Garanten einer 
Frühmoderne sein könnten, von Mebes bis Mies, - es ist eben nicht nur eine Instinktlosigkeit, den soeben wiederentdeckten und 




He goes on to, once again, compare Kollhoff’s architecture to the Nazis’ monumental halls; even 
if Kollhoff says he is looking back to the early Moderns, Klotz says, Nazi architects like Albert 
Speer and Paul Troost have sullied the language of even Modernist neo-classicism to the point of 
making it unusable, for this architecture cannot be freed from its “ideological baggage” and 
therefore simply become useable in an ahistorical manner.91 The German public, furthermore, is 
not too stupid to detect the conservative tendencies that underlie such designs: “Germans should 
not be assumed to be able to swallow something as if it were an innocent detail, which can never 
again be associated with innocence. Cave canem! We can tell the difference!”92 
The Rehabilitation of Nazi Architecture in Mitte 
This exchange between Kollhoff and Klotz demonstrates the easy symbolic slippage that 
can occur in architectural discourse. Certainly most of the German public was, contrary to 
Klotz’s declaration, probably not educated enough in the history of architectural styles to be able 
to differentiate between pre-war Modernist and Nazi buildings, but they were savvy enough to be 
suspicious of anything that smacked of the “wrong” kind of history. Whatever the arguments of 
Kollhoff and others in defense of a neo-classical or conservative pre-war Modernist aesthetic, the 
preservation and further utilization of such iconic Nazi buildings as the Reichsbank, for which 
Kollhoff designed the master renovation plan, demonstrate, at best, a denial of architecture’s 
many possible historical connotations, and, at worst, a problematic celebration of fascist forms. 
Post-Wall Mitte was not only slated to be Berlin’s newest commercial quarter; it was also 
to become the main location for state and national government buildings (the federal 
                                                                                                                                                       
nicht mehr von aller historischen Schuld und ihrem Mißbrauch freisprechen lassen. Es gibt eben eine Architektur; die ein für 
allemal erledigt sein sollte; so wie man auch bestimmte Begriffe wie etwa ‘entartet,’ ‘völkisch,’ ‘arisch,’ etc. nicht mehr in einem 
deutschen Kontext gebrauchen kann.” Klotz, “Berliner Blockade: Eine Antwort auf Hans Kollhoff,” 124–125.  
91 Ibid., 126.  
92 “Und den Deutschen sollte nicht zugemutet werden, etwas als unschuldig schönes Detail zu schlucken, das mit 
Unschuld nie wieder identifiziert werden kann. Cave canem! Wir können unterscheiden!” Ibid., 127.  
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government’s official move from Bonn to Berlin took place in 1999). Fortunately, there were 
ample plots of land and numerous buildings that could be repurposed for national government 
functions. But the existing structures were not treated equally: as will be discussed further in 
Chapter 5, GDR buildings were, for the most part, demolished, whereas Gründerzeit and Nazi-
era buildings were almost always reused without comment, despite their troubled history.93 One 
example of this type of reuse is the Reichsbank, a gigantic building constructed between 1933 
and 1939 along the Spree River canal, directly across from Schinkel’s Friedrichswerder Church 
and adjacent to the Prussian Schloss (figs. 4.31-4.32). It was Hitler’s first showcase project and, 
more importantly, marked the definitive end of the Bauhaus in Germany through the conspicuous 
rejection of Mies van der Rohe’s competition entry. Following the war, it functioned as the 
headquarters of the SED, East Germany’s ruling party.94 In 1994, amidst international criticism, 
the German federal government decided to readopt and refurbish the building, supposedly for 
financial reasons, and use it to house the German Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt). It held a 
master planning competition for the site, and Kollhoff’s design was chosen as the winner.95 
Architectural historian Hanno Rauterberg contends that the original Reichsbank building 
is “not a typical example of the vulgarly monotonous architecture” of the Third Reich: designed 
by Heinrich Wolff, it “exhibits elements of a conservative Modernism in such details as 
horizontally divided windows.”96 Architectural historian Hans Wilderotter agrees that the 
                                                
93 Hanno Rauterberg, “History - That Was Yesterday: The Germans are Bulding a New Normalcy: They Want to 
Preserve the Past, but Without the Memories,” in New German Architecture: A Reflexive Modernism, by Ullrich Schwarz 
(Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002), 315. 
94 Wilderotter discusses how the SED leaders were able to unproblematically appropriate the building because they felt 
themselves to be on the “good” side of history, i.e. reusing the building as their party seat meant a symbolic “triumph” over the 
Nazis. Hans Wilderotter, “Das Auswärtige Amt in Berlin,” Baumeister 96, no. 12 (December 1999): 22–31. 
95 Ibid. Göring’s former Air Ministry on the other side of Mitte was also similarly reused. The same approach was 
taken with the Aviation Ministry (designed Ernst Sagebiel, converted in the 1990s by Hentrich Petschnigg & Partner). See 
Rauterberg, “History - That Was Yesterday,” 316. 
96 Rauterberg, “History - That Was Yesterday,” 317. 
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Reichsbank is not a “typical” example of Nazi design (indeed, as Barbara Miller Lane has 
shown, there was no one, unified Nazi architectural style, though Hitler’s “Führerbauten” did 
demonstrate a particular preference for monumental stone neo-classicism97), which tended to 
towards a more populist grandeur, but that it is representative of the “conservative Modern.” 
Nevertheless, he says, the monumentality and restrained classicism of this and other conservative 
Modernist designs, including some by figures like Behrens and Poelzig, who are generally 
regarded as progressive architects, “embody a host of similarities with Nazi architecture.”98 
Indeed, it is this very aspect of the Modernists’ pre-war work – i.e. their sober, stripped-down 
references to neo-classicism – which Kollhoff, Klotz, and the other participants in the 
Architecture Debates continually invoke in order to either exonerate or condemn the German 
architecture of the 1930s.  
According to Wilderotter, many representatives of the German federal government felt 
that Nazi buildings had to be rehabilitated in order to show that the new nation was open to 
dealing with its violent history:  
Though tearing the building down would have removed the suspicion of a 
[problematic] “continuity” with the Nazi regime through new or continued use, on 
the other hand, it would have rightly garnered criticism in that it would have 
destroyed an available marker of a history which, because it belongs to the most 
pressing duties of [public] historical culture (Geschichtskultur) in Germany, must 
be kept in the public conscience (im Bewusstsein gehalten werden muss).99 
  
Kollhoff’s design addresses this perceived need for historical negotiation by emphasizing three 
“layers” of the past throughout the building. Leaving the exterior virtually untouched except for 
                                                
97 See Barbara Miller Lane, Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918-1945 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1985). 
98 Wilderotter, “Das Auswärtige Amt in Berlin.”  
99 “Zwar wäre durch einen Abriss dem Verdacht auf Kontinuitätsbildung durch Neubeziehungsweise Weiternutzung 
die Grundlage entzogen worden; andererseits jedoch hätte er zu Recht den Vorwurf auf sich gezogen, anschauliche Zeugnisse 
einer Vergangenheit zu vernichten, die, das gehört zu den vordringlichsten Aufgaben der Geschichtskultur der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, im Bewusstsein gehalten werden muss.” Ibid.  
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a new rooftop garden, Kollhoff focused on the interior, removing a significant amount of the 
GDR-era additions to reveal the original 1930s wood paneling and other detailing (fig. 4.33). 
This first historical layer is augmented by two more – arguably very subtle – ones: the 
preservation of two East German rooms, including the main meeting chambers of the SED (fig. 
4.34), and the completely new addition, in collaboration with the artist Gerhard Merz, of large, 
monochromatic surfaces on certain isolated walls and ceilings in important rooms (figs. 4.35-
4.36). The master plan also called for a large additional structure, separated from the former 
Reichsbank building by an inner courtyard, built along Französische Strasse. This new public 
front to the complex was eventually constructed according to designs by Berlin architects 
Thomas Müller and Ivan Reimann (figs. 4.37-4.38). 
Because it preserves historical details without reverting to historicism, Wilderotter sees 
the building as a successful embodiment of “the breaks and continuity of German history,” a 
“successful political self-representation” of the new nation.100 Kollhoff, however, fails to take up 
this argument in his writing about the building. Instead, echoing his statements elsewhere, he 
denies the historical connotations of the structure and suggests instead that it should be seen 
simply as “a document of style.” As Rauterberg contends, Kollhoff  
took refuge in a supposedly neutral stance, deliberately refusing to comment on 
Hitler’s decision that meant the beginning of the end for Mies and other 
Modernist architects. This odd distinction between form and content, this 
decoupling of history from its setting, amounts to an attempt to neutralize the 
architectural structure. It is transported into a sphere in which only aesthetics 
count and architects are absolved of all accountability.101  
 
Despite all these attempts by Kollhoff to both aesthetically reframe a historically-burdened space 
and to simultaneously claim that it is not burdened at all, Wilderotter contends that the 
                                                
100 Ibid. 
101 Rauterberg, “History - That Was Yesterday,” 316–317. 
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Reichsbank building is nevertheless still seen as, quite simply, “a Nazi building” by most non-
professional observers. The two-story row of columns on its monumental front and the strong 
relief of its impossibly massive sandstone façade overshadow Modernist elements such as the 
horizontal distribution of the windows.102 This impression is further heightened by the restrained 
classicism of Müller and Reimann’s new addition, which is fronted by a series of massive, four-
story granite columns (fig. 4.38). Ultimately, as Wilderotter states, “the popular impression is 
right: in the end the institution of the Reichsbank was a stronghold of the Nazi regime,” and thus 
this structure is still “cursed” building in many ways.103 Kollhoff’s claims did nothing to 
successfully counteract this impression; indeed, his careful restoration of many parts of the Nazi-
era interior only serves to shore up the idea that he and the other proponents of the New 
Simplicity and Critical Reconstruction were drawn to a dangerously revivalist version of fascist 
aesthetics rather than promoting productive architectural dialogue about Germany’s traumatic 
history.  
Contemporary projects like Norman Foster’s renovation of the Reichstag (the German 
federal parliament building, just a few blocks west of the Reichsbank) showed that such 
structures could be adapted effectively for government use while also incorporating pointed 
commentary on the layers of violent history embodied in the structure. In the case of the 
Reichstag, graffiti added by the invading Russian army in 1945 was restored and openly 
preserved in the hallways, artwork was added to contextualize the problematically ethnic 
overtones of the inscription over the entrance, and, most prominently, Foster’s transparent dome 
                                                
102 The front entrance is not open to the public and is obscured by the new addition along Französische Strasse. This 
means that the most public element of the Reichsbank building are its eastern and western elevations, which appear as both 
imposing and unwelcoming to the pedestrian (fig. 4.31). 
103 “Gleichwohl ist die populäre Wahrnehmung im Recht, schließlich war die Institution Reichsbank eine Hochburg des 
NS-Regimes.” Wilderotter, “Das Auswärtige Amt in Berlin.”  
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symbolized the democratic and open nature of reunited Germany’s government.104 Kollhoff’s 
restrained preservation of the historical layers of the Reichsbank building, with the only obvious 
addition being the abstraction of Merz’s colored walls and ceilings, hardly evokes the same 
critical engagement with the building’s troubling symbolism. 
 
Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm: The Devil’s Advocate 
The easy “Cold War” division between participants in the Architecture Debates is 
problematized by Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, who refused to join either camp. Instead, he 
represented a stance that saw city planning as a tool of politics, rather than the other way around, 
and he staunchly defended the position that architecture should only be regulated in the service 
of the creation of a middle-class, self-governing populace. These ideas were very influential on 
Stimmann, who regularly hired Hoffmann-Axthelm as a consultant on city planning measures 
beginning in 1991.  
Gruppe 9. Dezember and the Charter for the Center of Berlin 
Like Stimmann, Hoffmann-Axthelm had been heavily involved in SPD politics in Berlin 
during the 1970s, and had often critiqued Kleihues’s IBA-Neubau in his publications. A native 
West Berliner, he trained as a sociologist and theologian during the 1960s. In the seventies he 
grew increasingly interested in urban matters, becoming a regular contributor to various journals 
and newspapers, and he worked closely with Hardt-Waltherr Hämer’s community-oriented IBA-
Altbau in Kreuzberg during the 1980s.105 Immediately following the fall of the Wall, he headed 
                                                
104 For an in-depth account of the design process for the Reichstag, see Michael Z Wise, Capital Dilemma: Germany’s 
Search for a New Architecture of Democracy (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998). 
105 Hennecke offers an excellent summary of Hoffmann-Axthelm’s multiple monographs about city planning policy 
and community organization during the 1990s. See Stefanie Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild: 
Stadtentwicklungspolitik in Berlin zwischen 1991 und 1999 (Hamburg: Kovač, 2010), 71 and 99–102. 
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the Gruppe 9. Dezember (“The December 9th Group”), a ca. fifty-member association of planners 
and architects from both East and West Berlin who came together to make polemical statements 
and demands about city planning.106 In their manifesto, titled “Charter for the Center of Berlin,” 
published in Bauwelt’s quarterly volume Stadtbauwelt in March of 1991, the group specified 
twelve succinct demands for the reconstruction of Berlin that sounded much like (indeed, even 
mentioned the term) Critical Reconstruction: these included the revision of the Modernist, auto-
friendly city; the promotion of densification; the eschewal of Mitte as an “experimental field of 
utopian city building”; an attention to history; strict frontage lines and height limits; and mixed 
uses.107   
A companion essay by Hoffmann-Axthelm himself, clearly meant to provide readers with 
the “correct” reading of the group’s manifesto, stated that the Charter was a direct reaction to the 
planning failures at Potsdamer Platz, and argued for a return to the “historical” city, not 
necessarily just in the realm of aesthetics, but also in the form of grassroots governance: 
The insistence on historical structures has to do with neither historicism nor 
nostalgia. These historical structures are a model. Berlin, in spite of all the 
destruction, is a city that is already present and characterized by history. We do 
not need to invent a new city, especially not the metropolis of the third 
millennium. Moreover, these kinds of inventions are collective endeavors, they do 
not belong to the city planning office nor its associated official (or senator), but 
rather they are to be demanded from them. It is more a matter of giving back the 
historically acquired ability for commerce and regeneration to a city that has been 
violently damaged many times over.108  
                                                
106 The group formed on December 9th, 1989 to protest the demolition of a building on Leipziger Platz. Bodenschatz 
names several of the members: Wulf Eichstadt, Bruno Flierl, Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, Bernd Hunger, Nikolaus Kuhnert, 
Helmut Meier, Ulrich Reinisch, Iris Reuther, Peter Schatz, Karl Schlögel, and Bernhard Strecker. Harald Bodenschatz and Uwe 
Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in London und Berlin (Berlin: Verlagshaus Braun, 2005), 434; see also the 
footnote on Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 228. 
 
107 Gruppe 9.Dezember, “Charta Für Die Mitte von Berlin,” Bauwelt: Stadtbauwelt 82, no. 12 (March 28, 1991): 562. 
Hennecke argues that Hoffmann-Axthelm essentially used the Gruppe 9. Dezember as a “megaphone” for his own beliefs. 
Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 125. 
108 “Das Insistieren auf historischen Strukturen hat weder mit Historismus noch mit Heimweh zu tun. Die historischen 
Strukturen sind ein Modell. Berlin ist trotz aller Zerstörtheit eine vorhandene Stadt und eine historisch geprägte. Es muß keine 




In arguing for historical forms as a part of a new political planning culture, Hoffmann-Axthelm 
judiciously avoids the question of movements and styles. For Hoffmann-Axthelm, history is not 
easily reduced to single moments that can then be directly associated with (or dissociated from) 
particular architectural motifs or forms; rather, architectural movements must be seen in the 
context of the multifaceted and complex political, social, technological, and economic changes 
that accompanied and gave rise to them. (In essence, following a Marxist line of reasoning, they 
are the “superstructure” arising from the “base” of political and economic relationships, and it is 
this base that interests Hoffmann-Axthelm.) Thus there is no way, he says, to reduce the 
arguments over Berlin’s future to “Nazi” versus “democratic” aesthetics; indeed, these are the 
least of Hoffmann-Axthelm’s concerns. For him, history must be judiciously employed in the 
service of a collectively imagined future, and he is much more concerned with the mechanisms 
of this communal vision. In order to create a city in which citizens have this power, Hoffmann-
Axthelm argues, investors must be firmly hemmed in, government must become an instrument of 
the common people rather than any individual actor (or corporation), and, most importantly, the 
single, small-scale parcel of land must become the prime unit of scale for the development of the 
city. Only if land ownership is distributed in such a way can “those affected” (die Betroffene – a 
term often used in 1970s and 1980s neighborhood planning initiatives), i.e. everyday urban 
dwellers in Berlin, create a city that truly fits their needs and desires. Hoffmann-Axthelm ends 
his commentary by mentioning three other realms of concern for planners which he thinks must 
                                                                                                                                                       
kollektive Leistungen, sie stehen weder dem Stadtplanungsamt noch dem entsprechenden Stadtrat (oder Senator) zu, noch sind 
sie von ihnen zu verlangen. Es geht vielmehr darum, einer vielfach vergewaltigten Stadt ihre historisch erworbene Handlungs- 
und Regenerationsfähigkeit wiederzugeben, …” Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Hinweise Zur Entwicklung Einer Beschädigten 
Grossstadt,” Bauwelt 82, no. 12 (March 28, 1991): 565.  
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be discussed, and which are later conspicuously absent in the Architecture Debates: immigration 
and social cohesion, ecology, and transportation.109 
Stimmann’s Leftist Hand 
Hoffmann-Axthelm’s positions embodied much of what Stimmann had formerly 
advocated in his own opposition to the IBA-Neubau, and his admonition that “Berlin does not 
need to be reinvented” soon became one of Stimmann’s own catchphrases. The particular mix of 
historicism, zoning regulations, small-scale development, and grassroots planning represented in 
the “Charter for the Center of Berlin” must have appealed greatly to Stimmann; directly after his 
appointment as Senate Construction Director in April 1991, he hired Hoffmann-Axthelm as a 
consultant to contribute reports, including building recommendations, for several areas of Mitte. 
The first of these was Pariser Platz, home to the iconic Brandenburg Gate and the Academy of 
Arts (discussed in Chapter 3). This square was seen as the western gateway to the historical inner 
city of Berlin, often called the “entrée into Berlin’s living room [gute Stube].”110 As a well-
known and much-photographed point along the Berlin Wall, it was also a key symbol of the 
city’s reintegration, and the site of many public reunification celebrations (figs. 4.39-4.40). 
Though Hoffmann-Axthelm’s commissioned plan for the square, authored in late 1991 in 
cooperation with architect Bernhard Strecker, was never carried out in its original form (it was 
later modified and combined with another plan sponsored by the Department of Urban Planning 
and Environment), Stimmann’s original intention was for Pariser Platz’s reconstruction to act as 
the origin point for the application of Critical Reconstruction to the entire western portion of 
Mitte.111 
                                                
109 Ibid., 569. 
110 Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 238. 
111 Bernhard Strecker and Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Pariser Platz: Kritische Rekonstruktion Des Bereichs” 
(Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und Wohnungswesen, September 1991). Under pressure from investors, the two departments 
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As of 1991, Pariser Platz stood almost entirely empty aside from the Brandenburg Gate 
and a small handful of remaining structures left after the clearance of World War II rubble (figs. 
4.41-4.43). Hoffmann-Axthelm and Strecker recommended all new construction around the 
perimeter of the square, with a maximum building height of 10 meters on the north and south 
sides of the square and 22 meters on the eastern end, and the western side of left open on either 
side of the Brandenburg Gate (fig. 4.44). New buildings were to be of the “palazzo” type with 
punctuated facades of stucco or natural stone, supposedly linking back visually to a building by 
Schinkel that formerly stood on the southern side of the plaza.112 However, the authors stated, 
“the creation of historical replicas should be avoided. Such [literal] reconstructions of historical 
architecture lead … to such a banalization of image, that this is not commensurate with the 
desired qualities of the square.”113 Echoing the Charter, the authors argue that Critical 
Reconstruction means the creation of an urban landscape in which “historical spaces and ways of 
life [Lebensformen] (density, proximity, living in the inner city, walkability, etc.) still have a 
chance,” and which not only represent the identity of the city, but encapsulate the history of the 
dialectical process by which architecture has evolved throughout modernity.114 This means, too, 
that nothing historical is newly formulated without being useful for the future of 
the city. The recreation of historical proximity, density, and diversity is 
                                                                                                                                                       
cooperated on the new plan, but the bulk of it was based not on Stimmann, Hoffmann-Axthelm, and Strecker’s plan, but on the 
other report commissioned by the Department of Urban Planning under Senator Volker Hassemer. A highly visible and well-
funded non-profit group representing the interests of preservationists called the Gesellschaft Historisches Berlin also played a key 
role by putting public pressure on both departments to preserve the historical outlines and typologies on the square. See Matthias 
Pabsch, Pariser Platz, Architektur und Technik: vom manuellen zum digitalen Zeitalter (Berlin: Reimer, 2002), 144–147; and 
Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 239. For the full text of the approved plans, see Senatsverwaltung für 
Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt, “Pariser Platz – Textliche Festsetzungen Bebauungsplan I-200,” May 9, 1995, 
http://stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/planen/staedtebau-projekte/pariser_platz/de/b_plan/extra/text_bplan_i200.shtml. 
112 Pabsch, Pariser Platz, Architektur und Technik, 142. The computer simulation of the rebuilt square, Bodenschatz 
and Altrock argue, shows a clear relationship to the Kleihues/Grassi design from the “Berlin morgen” exhibition of 1990-1991. 
Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 238. 
113 “Die Anfertigung historischer Repliken ist auszuschließen. Jeder Nachbau historischer Architektur führt … zu einer 
solchen Banalisierung des Erscheinungsbildes, daß dies mir der angestrebten Erscheinungsqualität des Platzes nicht vereinbar 
ist.” Strecker and Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Pariser Platz: Kritische Rekonstruktion Des Bereichs,” 28–29.  
114 Ibid., 8. 
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appropriate when it is both a transportation concept and when it is not only seen 
as ecologically justifiable, but essential. Critical Reconstruction in this sense 
means recapitulating the past in order to care for the future, to use historical 
structures for the formulation of an ecological city structure.115 
 
Here, as in the Charter, Hoffmann-Axthelm clearly sees “traditional” Berlin aesthetics as 
relevant only if they are deployed in service of a plan that takes urban functions – including the 
economic function of land ownership – into account. For him, Critical Reconstruction is a means 
to achieve these sociological and political ends, because it looks back to a time (around the turn 
of the century) when ownership of plots was diversified and the city had a high population 
density. As will become clear in Chapter 5, this attitude became highly problematic when it was 
applied more generally to East Berlin through the city master plan that Hoffmann-Axthelm 
authored along with Stimmann. 
Sparring with Lampugnani in the Architecture Debates: The “End of the Discussion”  
Though he worked for Stimmann, Hoffmann-Axthelm also tended to play devil’s 
advocate to the Construction Director. He remained highly critical of the aesthetic aims of 
Critical Reconstruction, as well as Stimmann’s partnerships with private interests and particular 
architects. At the same time as he was authoring reports for the Senate Department of 
Construction and Housing, Hoffmann-Axthelm was continuing to publish various critiques of 
Berlin policy and architecture, and he made several contributions to the Architecture Debates. 
His main target was Lampugnani, whose manifesto he mercilessly excoriated in an essay bitingly 
titled “The Challenge of Yesterday” (in response to Lampugnani’s “Challenge of the Everyday”) 
published in the national weekly newspaper Die Zeit in April of 1994 and reprinted in the journal 
                                                
115 “Kritische Rekonstruktion heißt aber auch, daß nichts Historisches neuformuliert wird, ohne daß es nicht auch für 
die Stadtzukunft brauchbar ist. Die Wiederherstellung historischer Enge, Dichte und Differenziertheit stimmt dann, wenn sie 
zugleich Verkehrskonzept ist und wenn sie ökologisch nicht nur rechtfertigbar, sondern auch erforderlich ist. Kritische 
Rekonstruktion in diesem Sinne heißt, Vergangenheit aus der Sorge um die Zukunft zu rekapitulieren, historische Strukturen zu 
benutzen zur Formulierung einer ökologischen Stadtstruktur.” Ibid.  
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Werk, Bauen & Wohnen the following month.116 The main tone of the essay is that of indignant 
astonishment. According to Lampugnani, Hoffmann-Axthelm writes, 
In 1945, the “extremely high quality” (thanks to its aesthetics and craftsmanship) 
of German architecture was, with the Nazi regime, abruptly broken off, after 
which only cheap mass-productions [Massenware] were built. This is, in light of 
the very thoroughly researched building culture of the Nazi regime, such insanity 
that one really cannot imagine that he is serious. … [Then Lampugnani claims 
that] those who today build still on honest and solid stone and wood are defamed 
as fascists, while everything that is slanted and suffers from construction faults is 
seen as democratic.117 
 
These statements are such exaggerations that, Hoffmann-Axthelm suspects, Lampugnani must 
have an ulterior motive: namely, acting as the publicist for Kleihues’s conservative aesthetics, in 
the service of their own capitalist business interests. 
Kleihues’s self-styling as an architect of human proportions and Lampugnani’s 
attendant invocation of aesthetic permanence denote an apparent strategy. And 
because we find ourselves amongst architects, it is one of ensuring market 
interests. They are free to do so. But what one cannot condone is that the whole 
architectural discussion is implicated.118 
 
Hoffmann-Axthelm thus joins the ranks of those who accuse various figures in Berlin of 
belonging to a “cartel” of favored architects who are forced to adhere to a set of rigid standards: 
What differentiates Kleihues is that he understands his language of orderly, 
normal architecture to be a dictate. … If an architect wants to become something 
in the higher realms of the profession in Berlin, he must present himself 
accordingly (sich schon ein bisschen einordnen), or else he has little chance in the 
                                                
116 See Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Die Provokation Des Gestrigen,” Die Zeit, April 1, 1994; and Dieter Hoffmann-
Axthelm, “Die Provokation Des Gestrigen,” Werk, Bauen + Wohnen, no. 5 (May 1994): 45–48; also reprinted in Kähler’s 
collection: Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Die Provokation des Gestrigen,” in Einfach Schwierig: Eine Deutsche 
Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 43–50. 
117“1945 sei, mit dem Nazireich, die dank Ästhetik und Handwerk ‘extrem hohe Qualität’ der deutschen Architektur 
abrupt abgebrochen, danach sei nur noch billige Massenware gebaut worden. Das ist, angesichts der wahrlich ausreichend 
erforschten Baukultur des Nazireiches, ein so extremer Unsinn, daß man sich eigentlich nicht vorstellen kann, er meine das ernst. 
… Und siehe, im dritten Teil der Polemik erfährt man, worum es geht: Wer heute noch ehrlich und solide in Stein und Holz baue, 
werde als Faschist diffamiert, während alles, was schräg sei und unter Bauschäden litte, als demokratisch gelte.” Hoffmann-
Axthelm, “Die Provokation Des Gestrigen,” April 1, 1994, np.  
118“Kleihues’ Selbstinszenierung als ein Architekt menschlichen Maßes und Lampugnanis dazu gehörende 
Beschwörung der ästhetischen Dauer stellen offenbar eine Strategie dar. Und da wir uns unter Architekten befinden, ist es eine 
zur Sicherung von Marktanteilen. Der Versuch sei ihnen unbenommen. Was man aber nicht hinnehmen kann, ist, daß die ganze 
Architekturdiskussion davon in Mitleidenschaft gezogen wird.” Ibid.  
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competitions or direct contracts. Kleihues is the most comprehensible pole in a 
field cemented by power dynamics, which one could call the Berlin Cartel.119 
 
Hoffmann-Axthelm also accuses Lampugnani of appropriating his leftist positions on 
governance, even though Lampugnani had been diametrically opposed to them during the IBA: 
“He takes up, unbelievably, my theses … : land use, density, ecology, block, and so forth. With 
this he pats all of us who for fifteen years have occupied ourselves with Kreuzberg’s demolition, 
on the back: it was not all in vain. Only he forgets to tell us that he was also, at the time, on the 
other side.”120 In other words, he thinks that Lampugnani is hypocritically appropriating and 
deploying left-critical concepts from seventies-era planning in service of his conservative 
aesthetics. 
Typical for that which Lampugnani is doing here is the title of his essay. The 
“everyday” was once the catchword of the counterculture of the seventies. 
Amongst architects this was the attempt to situate the needs of the normal person 
against the official high gloss architecture. … [Rather], what he means [in his 
essay], when he turns this left-alternative concept to his own uses, is the 
passepartout-character of Kleihuesian architecture.121 
 
This is Lampugnani’s biggest mistake, Hoffmann-Axthelm argues. For “no one concept of 
architecture, be it that of urban chaos or Berlin block architecture, can provide the framework 
from which the material city is built.” Instead, as he has already argued in numerous essays, 
including the one that accompanied the Charter for the Center of Berlin, Hoffmann-Axthelm 
declares that “we must create the qualities we seek in the city and in architecture – such as 
                                                
119“Was Kleihues unterscheidet, ist, daß er seine Parole von der ordnenden Normalarchitektur offenbar als 
Führungsauftrag versteht. Wer in Berlin als Architekt in den oberen Etagen des Berufs etwas werden oder zu tun haben will, muß 
sich schon ein bißchen einordnen, sonst hat er bei Wettbewerben und Direktaufträgen wenig Chancen. Kleihues ist der 
greifbarste Pol in einem machtdynamisch zementierten Feld, das man das Berliner Kartell nennen kann.” Ibid.  
120“Er schließt sich, es ist nicht zu glauben, meinen Thesen aus dem grünen Suhrkamp-Bändchen an: 
Flächensparsamkeit, Verdichtung, Ökologie, Block und so weiter. Nebenbei schlägt er uns allen, die wir uns fünfzehn Jahre lang 
im Kreuzberger Abrißstaub abgemüht haben, auf die Schulter: Es sei nicht umsonst gewesen. Er vergißt nur, uns zu erwähnen, 
und auch, daß er, damals, auf der anderen Seite war.” Ibid.  
121“Typisch für das, was Lampugnani hier betreibt, ist der Titel seines Essays. „Alltäglichkeit“ war ja einmal die Parole 
der Gegenkultur in den siebziger Jahren. Unter Architekten war das der Versuch, gegen die offizielle Hochglanzarchitektur die 
Bedürfnisse der normalen Menschen zu stellen … Was er meint, wenn er den linksalternativen Begriff für seine Zwecke umdreht, 
ist der Passepartout-Charakter der Kleihuesschen Architektur.” Ibid.  
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permanence, everydayness, beauty, usability and so forth – first as societal qualities, and then set 
the architects to work.” This prioritization means, fundamentally, a return to the single parcel of 
land as the building block of the city, “on which, at one time, the builder-owner built his 
building, cheap or expensive, small or big, factory or tenement, cinema, villa, or all together. If 
one has such a structural unit, the city can hold any architecture, from the most extravagant to the 
most traditional.”122 Anyone who builds quality architecture, which for Hoffmann-Axthelm 
includes firms ranging from Coop Himmelblau and Zaha Hadid to Richard Rogers, Norman 
Foster, or Rem Koolhaas, can and should be allowed to build in Berlin, he says. And though he 
claims he is not accusing anyone of having fascist tendencies, he still links the stylistic traits of 
conservative pre-war Modernism with certain reprehensible political movements: 
The accusation [of fascism], in my mind, is a form of insanity. That stone 
architects however imitate in general the style of the period is unmistakable. One 
only has to compare the designs of the thirties with today’s – one can barely come 
nearer at the distance of two generations. It is the authoritarian architectural 
tendencies at the beginning of the thirties – the late Poelzig, the everyday 
residential building in the Nazi empire, Asplund in Sweden, the classical turn in 
the Soviet Union, Perret in France, the Milan metaphysicists around Muzio – who 
are making a comeback today, as if it were still about building a societal destiny, 
rather than to satisfy requirements for insulation.123 
 
For him, then, the erroneous and megalomaniacal qualities of both Nazi architecture and the 
“New Simplicity” have to do with the fact that their proponents believe in architecture’s ability 
to change that “societal destiny.” Hoffmann-Axthelm, on the other hand, is willing to accept any 
                                                
122“Es geht darum, daß nicht eine bestimmte Architekturauffassung, sei es die des Stadtchaos, sei es die der Berliner 
Blockarchitektur, den Rahmen abgeben kann, in dem die materielle Stadt gebaut ist. Der Rahmen muß woanders herkommen, 
und er muß so liberal beschaffen sein, daß er für jegliche Architektur Platz hat. … Wir müssen die gesellschaftlichen Qualitäten 
wie Dauer, Alltäglichkeit, Schönheit, Brauchbarkeit und so weiter, die wir von Stadt und Architektur fordern, auch als 
gesellschaftliche Qualitäten schaffen – und dann die Architekten an die Arbeit setzen.” Ibid.  
123“Den Vorwurf halte ich in der Form für Unsinn. Daß die steinernen Architekten aber generell den damaligen Zeitstil 
nachahmen, ist unverkennbar. Man muß nur Entwürfe der dreißiger Jahre mit heutigen vergleichen – näher kann man sich über 
den Abstand von zwei Generationen kaum kommen. Es sind die autoritären Architekturtendenzen Anfang der dreißiger Jahre – 
der späte Poelzig, der gewöhnliche Wohnungsbau im Nazireich, Asplund in Schweden, die klassizistische Wende in der 
Sowjetunion , Perret in Frankreich, die Mailänder Metaphysiker um Muzio –, die heute wiederkehren, als ginge es noch darum, 
Gesellschaftsschicksale zu bauen, statt der Wärmedämmungsverordnung zu genügen.” Ibid.  
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style of building that arises from the “right” structural relationships between property ownership 
and city governance. His utilization of the discourse of Critical Reconstruction is solely in 
service of achieving this end: his version of this method has little to do with materials or the 
formal qualities of façades, and is rather focused on restoring small-scale development, healthy 
density, and a mix of uses to the city center.  
The Berlin Architecture Cartel 
Though he clearly knows that Stimmann is also committed to his way of thinking, 
(indeed, it is most likely that Stimmann adopted these ideas directly from Hoffmann-Axthelm 
himself), Hoffmann-Axthelm is not above accusing him of being part of the supposed Berlin 
architecture “cartel”: 
Berlin has in the person of Senate Building Director Hans Stimmann an 
administrative commissioner for architecture who, because of his job description, 
must see his way through construction capital, politics, and architects. So he has 
entered into a coalition. Its tabernacle is Berlin stone architecture, an ideological 
construct from various sources. An architectural triumvirate, Kleihues at the front, 
Jürgen Sawade as associate, and Hans Kollhoff as junior partner, have come to 
live with Stimmann under this roof. This coalition now has a truce with the big 
investors, whose requirements would be unpleasant if dictated from above. What 
Lampugnani wrote in Der Spiegel is thus nothing less than a manifesto of this 
architectural cartel. It is not about culture and politics, but about market 
interests.124 
 
Despite his own use of Critical Reconstruction as a concept, Hoffmann-Axthelm therefore 
simultaneously represents the far-left critique of this method’s aesthetics and way of doing 
business. Under Stimmann and his “triumvirate,” he argues, Berlin has gained “an architectonic 
desire without grounding in politics,” and it is thus at risk of not only mismanaging its own 
                                                
124 “Berlin hat zudem in der Person des Senatsbaudirektors Hans Stimmann einen Verwaltungskommissar für 
Architektur, der von der Konstruktion seines Jobs her zusehen muß, wie er zwischen Baukapital, Politik und Architekten 
zurechtkommt. Er ist also ein Bündnis eingegangen. Dessen Stiftshütte ist die Berliner steinerne Architektur, ein ideologisches 
Konstrukt aus unterschiedlichen Quellen. Ein Architekten-Triumvirat, Kleihues an der Spitze, Jürgen Sawade als Associé, Hans 
Kollhoff als Juniorpartner, hat sich unter diesem Dach zu Stimmann gesellt. Über das Architekturbündnis läuft nun aber auch der 
Burgfrieden mit den großen Investoren, deren Ansprüche sonst als politischer Druck von oben unangenehm würden. Was 
Lampugnani im Spiegel geschrieben hat, ist also nichts anderes als das Manifest dieses Architekturkartells. Es geht nicht um 
Kultur und Politik, sondern um Marktanteile.” Ibid.  
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transformation, but backsliding into a planning culture that is both dangerously authoritarian – 
perhaps even fascist – and slave to corporate, capitalist interests: 
The quasi-monopoly of this architectural party will lead, if it is put through, not 
only to the accumulation of a certain kind of architecture in the north German 
metropolises, but to the creation of a culturally and politically concerning image. 
… They are nostalgics for uniformed times, and moreover they cluster around an 
excellent businessman.125 
 
 While Kleihues and Stimmann refrained from replying to Hoffmann-Axthelm’s 
statements, Lampugnani immediately published a rebuttal in Die Zeit with the optimistic 
headline “The Berlin Architects’ Debates: Classic or Modern? The Director of the German 
Architecture Museum Answers. End of the Discussion.”126 His tone is almost desperate in its 
defensiveness:  
A flat façade with many rows of identical rectangular windows is thought of as 
boring. … Can you imagine how much work that [designing such a façade] is? 
And how much creativity it demands? Much more than to artistically arrange a 
pair of pastel colored plaster half-columns or to weld two steel beams crookedly 
together.127 
 
The kind of “simplicity, convention, permanence, and appropriateness” that the New Simplicity 
espouses, Lampugnani writes, emphatically does not appeal to market interests, which prefer 
flashy, ephemeral experiments. “They are the opposite of that of which you accuse them: a 
                                                
125 “Das Quasimonopol der Architekturpartei führte, würde es weiter durchgesetzt, nicht nur zur Anhäufung einer 
bestimmten Sorte Architektur in den norddeutschen Großstädten, sondern zur Herstellung eines kulturell wie politisch gleich 
bedenklichen Bildes …Es sind Nostalgiker uniformierter Zeiten, und im übrigen scharen sie sich um einen exzellenten 
Geschäftsmann.” Ibid.  
126 Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, “Der Berliner Architektenstreit: Klassik Oder Moderne? Der Direktor Des 
Deutschen Architektur-Museums Antwortet. Ende Der Diskussion,” Die Zeit, April 15, 1994. This essay was also reprinted in the 
Summer 1994 issue of Werk, Bauen + Wohnen with the title “Discuss Rather than Discredit”: Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, 
“Diskutieren Stadt Diskreditieren,” Werk, Bauen + Wohnen, no. 7–8 (August 1994): 45–48; see also Vittorio Magnago 
Lampugnani, “Diskutieren stadt diskreditieren,” in Einfach Schwierig: Eine Deutsche Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 
1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 51–55.  
127 “Eine glatte Fassade mit vielen Reihen von gleichen rechteckigen Fenstern gilt als langweilig. Aber, lieber Dieter, 
haben Sie einmal versucht, eine solche Fassade zu entwerfen? … Können Sie sich vorstellen, wieviel Arbeit das ist? Und wieviel 
Kreativität das erfordert? Viel mehr, als ein paar pastellfarbene Halbsäulen aus Stuck malerisch zu arrangieren oder zwie 
Stahlträger schräg aneinander zu schweißen.” Lampugnani, “Diskutieren stadt diskreditieren,” 51–52.  
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utopia which goes against the Zeitgeist.”128 Lampugnani then points out (correctly) that he 
organized not only the diverse and inclusive “Berlin Tomorrow” event, to whose exhibition 
catalog Hoffmann-Axthelm himself contributed an essay, but that he also served as the editor for 
Domus, which supported many of the architects Hoffmann-Axthelm claims Lampugnani abhors. 
Lampugnani also takes issue with the idea of a cartel, arguing that he does not have anything to 
do with market interests, but simply wants to “spread his philosophy,” to “articulate his 
theoretical position” and offer it up for much-needed discussion.129 
 This response was not, as Lampugnani had hoped, the “end of the discussion”; 
Hoffmann-Axthelm published a reply in the June 1994 “From Berlin to New Teutonia” issue of 
Arch+ mentioned above, under the title, “The City Needs Rules, Architecture Needs Fantasy.”130 
Here he reiterates his position that architecture in itself does not constitute an effective aid to the 
problems of the city: “In a situation where the social instrument of the city is breaking apart, the 
solution cannot be simply about how a few architecturally irresponsible singular pieces are 
decorated, with glass or stone.” Rather, the problem lies in planning and zoning, in “stuffing the 
entire city center full of offices and push ever more urban functions out into the green space” 
surrounding the city.131 And because facades really do not matter for the city in the long run, this 
whole set of debates is, in Hoffmann-Axthelm’s eyes, a circus staged in service of “contracts, 
                                                
128 “Sie sind das Gegenteil dessen, was Sie ihnen unterstellen: eine Utopie, die es gegen den Zeitgeist, die 
ökonomischen Verhältnisse und das von Ihnen beschworene gesund Volksempinden zu vertreten gilt.” Ibid., 52.  
129 Ibid., 54. 
130 Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Die Stadt braucht Regeln, die Architektur Phantasie,” Arch+, no. 122 (June 1994): 12; 
see also Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Die Stadt braucht Regeln, die Architektur Phantasie,” in Einfach Schwierig: Eine Deutsche 
Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 56–59. 
131  “In einer Situation, wo das soziale Instrument Stadt nach allen Himmelsrichtungen auseinanderfliegt, kann es nicht 
bloß darum gehen, wie die rücksichtslosen Einzelteile architektonisch dekoriert werden, mit Glas oder Stein.” Rather, the 
problem lies in “immer mehr städtische Funktionen in Standorte draußen auf der grünen Wiese ausweichen.” Hoffmann-
Axthelm, “Die Stadt braucht Regeln, die Architektur Phantasie,” 12. 
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professorships, and being able to influence public opinion,” and with the explicit goal of limiting 
Berlin’s new architecture to a style that verges on the fascist: 
It was the exact aim of my protest to point out that the legitimization of 
conservative architecture of the twenties through the forties, including the Nazi 
period, is not a subject of academic debate, but, in a fatally instrumental way, has 
influence on the decisions that are being made in Berlin by architects, institutions, 
and investors.132  
 
 Even Lampugnani’s other main critic cannot escape rebuke: Hoffmann-Axthelm sees 
Libeskind’s argument as equally weak, since it relies on aesthetics rather than socio-political 
frameworks. “Nothing would be achieved by replacing contemporary Berlin architecture with 
another, more experimental type. The problem is not architecture, but the ability of the city to 
develop principles of ordering urban development.”133 Thus, Hoffmann-Axthelm concedes, 
Stimmann’s approach seems to be the only workable way forward, even though it serves 
corporate interests, because Stimmann at least represents a bulwark against a completely 
aesthetic view of planning: “If he weren’t there, it would in fact not make way for reasonable 
planning, but for the destruction of the city that has been so commonplace” in the past.134 
With his commitment to small-scale, community-based planning and advocacy, as well 
as a solid knowledge of architectural history and a prolific body of writing under his belt, 
Hoffmann-Axthelm contributes a truly leftist viewpoint to the Architecture Debates. Though 
employed regularly by Stimmann, he adamantly refuses public allegiance to anyone, seeming to 
consider Stimmann as the “least worst” of a group of planners and architects who are willfully 
                                                
132 “Vielmehr war es ja gerade der Kern meines Protestes, darauf hinzuweisen, daß die Legitimierung der konservativen 
Architektur der zwanziger bis vierziger Jahre einschließlich NS keine akademische Debatte ist, sondern auf eine fatal nützliche 
Weise eingeht in die Ausscheidungskämpfe, die in Berlin unter Architekten, Verwaltungen und Investoren ausgetragen werden.” 
Ibid., 12. Ibid.  
133 “Es ware nicht das geringste damit gewonnen, die augenblickliche Berliner Architektur durch eine andere, 
experimentellere zu ersetzen. Das Problem ist nicht die Architektur, sondern die Fähigkeit einer Stadt, städtebauliche 
Ordnungsvorstellungen zu entwickeln.” Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Die Stadt braucht Regeln, die Architektur Phantasie,” 12.  
134 “Gäbe es ihn nicht, würde das nämlich keineswegs den Weg für planerische Vernunft freimachen, sondern nur für 
die übliche Stadtzerstörung.” Ibid.  
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ignoring what he values most: namely land use policy and structures of governance. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, Stimmann was interested in following Hoffmann-Axthelm’s line of 
thinking, but was severely limited by pressures from both investors and the government bodies 
that oversaw land sales. Thus, he pursued Kleihues’s suggested path of creating individuated 
buildings on single blocks, funded by just a few large-scale developers, and utilized the aesthetic 
strictures of Critical Reconstruction to attempt rein in their flashy, overly-capitalist visions. As 
we shall see in Chapter 5, Stimmann’s and Hoffmann-Axthelm’s goals aligned more clearly after 
1996, when they worked together to author the Planwerk Innenstadt. 
 
Conclusion: The Architecture Debates and the Cracks in the Post-Modern Façade  
 Though it played only a side role in the debates themselves, these exchanges pushed 
Critical Reconstruction onto center stage in terms of the public’s ideas about Berlin’s rebuilding. 
This result was due in large part to the fact that, while remaining staunchly allied with the leftist, 
socio-economic interests of the type represented by Hoffmann-Axthelm and relying on 
Kleihues’s original work from the 1980s, Stimmann also freely and openly adopted the 
conservative aesthetic ideas and arguments of Lampugnani and Kollhoff. For example, 
Stimmann, collaborating with architectural historian Annegret Burg in 2006, averred: 
Office and commercial buildings must free themselves from an all too frequent 
triviality. They must be more than just a vehicle for fleeting messages and a 
surrogate reflection of consumer images; they must regain their urban dignity, 
developing into a city architecture with carefully composed spatial and tectonic 
relationships, both in terms of inner structure and, on a larger scale, as building 
volumes in the wide urban environment. Special attention must be given to the 
transition areas between inside and outside – the entrance, the foyer, the façade – 
and to those elements in a building which interact with the town – the arcade, the 
covered mall, the tower, the corner and the inner structure. If these factors are 
overlooked, then the urban image will come to be dominated by everyday, or even 
run-of-the-mill consumer architecture, driven more by a need to reflect transitory 
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visual fashions and façade treatments than a concern for a longer-lasting overall 
urban quality and architectural composition.135   
 
Stimmann’s and Critical Reconstruction’s most lasting contribution to the new Berlin, 
however, was undoubtedly the partnership with large-scale investors and developers and the 
marked preference to dole out these mammoth contracts to a small number of favored architects. 
Thus the oft-repeated accusation of the existence of a “cartel” is completely valid; indeed it was 
often corroborated by Stimmann himself, though he resented the term. Authors like Gert Kähler, 
therefore, who voice a “suspicion” that market interests were behind such decisions, are missing 
the point.136 Such critiques belie a firmly ingrained set of beliefs in the architectural community, 
reaching back to the strong influence of the continental philosophy of the 1960s, that somehow 
design in a European context should remain separate from commerce. Clearly, in a situation like 
the one in post-Wall Berlin, the continued leadership of an architectural avant-garde that 
remained separate from the “popular,” commercial world, was logistically and technically 
impossible. As Hoffmann-Axthelm rightly noted at the time, Stimmann had to make a series of 
unpleasant but necessary compromises in the service of public-private partnerships. 
Counterintuitively, however, another remnant of Modernist and mid-twentieth-century 
architectural thinking that surfaces in the Architecture Debates is the idea that the architect is not 
just a designer of buildings, but of society itself. As Lampugnani’s essay suggests, while 
remaining comfortably distanced from commercial interests, architects thought they should delve 
deeply into the everyday lives of their users in order to remedy those conditions which they see 
as plaguing society – “chaos,” “noise,” lack of attention span, and so on. The participants in the 
                                                
135 Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin; Berlin; Boston: 
Bauwelt  ; Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 209. See also Hans Stimmann, “For the city to become concrete matter,” in Neue 
Steinarchitektur in Deutschland, ed. Vincenzo Pavan (Basel: Birkhäuser-Verlag für Architektur, 2005), 94–97. 
136 See Gert Kähler, “As the Steam Began to Rise ...,” in Stadt Der Architektur, Architektur Der Stadt: Berlin 1900-
2000, ed. Thorsten Scheer, Josef Paul Kleihues, and Paul Kahlfeldt (Berlin: Nicolai, 2000), 381–87. 
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debates, and, by association, Critical Reconstruction as well, thus found themselves in the midst 
of a set of requirements for architecture that the medium and discipline were conceptually, 
aesthetically, and politically unable to fulfill. 
Turning Tides in Post-Modern Architecture 
This crisis of architectural representation was not unique to Critical Reconstruction and 
Berlin; it was, in many ways, built into the post-modern movement itself. Architects since the 
1960s had been wrestling with the question of how to take history and context into account 
without cheapening it (an aim seen clearly in Rossi’s work, for instance); others had simply 
accepted that the representative qualities of architecture made it intrinsically shallow, and sought 
answers in the self-reflexive play of signs, a position exemplified by Robert Venturi and Denise 
Scott Brown. Still others saw outright historicism as a valid way of creating “place,” as in the 
work of Léon Krier. As discussed in Chapter 1, Kleihues’s Critical Reconstruction had been an 
attempt to map a course for German architects within this range of possible responses – one that 
would allow them to access and respond to history without explicitly reproducing or referring to 
it. Stimmann’s attempt to codify Critical Reconstruction, then, can be seen as an exposure of the 
infeasibility of this project. His appropriation of Kleihues’s theory came at a time, furthermore, 
when these various strands of post-modernism were beginning to lose favor – even if the 
architects themselves were still considered prominent practitioners. By the early 1990s, a 
younger generation of architects, historians, and theorists were turning the conversation towards 
more formal and explicitly theoretical concerns. Koolhaas and OMA, Peter Eisenman, Frank 
Gehry, Hadid, and Libeskind, for instance, offered equally ambitious approaches to Rossi, 
Venturi, or Kleihues, but were less intent on providing clear answers to issues such as how one 
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should treat regional history and context. Rather than searching for a solution to the problem of 
architectural representation, they began to ask different questions.  
Some of the differences between Stimmann and Kleihues also exemplify the generational 
divisions that some scholars observe within mid-century West German society. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, Kleihues, who was born in 1933, belonged to what has been called the “skeptical 
generation,” who vividly remembered the war and were reticent to discuss it. Those who were 
about ten years younger, however – the generation to which Stimmann, born in 1941, belonged – 
resented this silence. Known in Germany as the “68ers,” this cohort came to prominence during 
the widespread student protests of the late 1960s. Their demands and viewpoints ranged widely, 
but they were generally associated with a critique of capitalist or consumer society, with the 
approach of grassroots activism, and with a cultural shift away from what were seen as 
traditional “German” values of punctuality, propriety, and order. They also had no qualms about 
openly discussing the Holocaust, and they often resented their parents’ and older siblings’ silence 
on the topic.137 By 1998, when Gerhard Schröder (SPD, born in 1944) became Chancellor, the 
‘68ers were clearly the leading generation in German society and politics, but many (very much 
including Schröder himself) had also become far more centrist. Their younger peers now saw 
them as sellouts, disconnected from the “real” problems of society, who, as German scholar Ingo 
Cornils puts it, had “imbued them [the younger generation] with a rebellious spirit whilst taking 
off to Tuscany and the fleshpots of tenured university posts.”138 
                                                
137 Ingo Cornils, “Successful Failure? The Impact of the Student Movement on the Federal Republic of Germany,” in 
Recasting German Identity: Culture, Politics, and Literature in the Berlin Republic, by Stuart Taberner and Frank Finlay 
(Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2002), 107. 
138 Ibid., 108. In 2006, as part of a study abroad program, I attended an informal talk with the editor of Berlin’s taz 
newspaper, Christian Semler, who had been a member of the radical left movement in the late 1960s. In talking about the rise of 
the 68ers, he mentioned how, while he and his colleagues had formerly set car bombs and protested capitalism as young activists, 
they now all drove Mercedes and lived in houses with lawns. 
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Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm in many ways embody this problematic: their focus, 
during the 1980s, on grassroots organization in city planning, which had led them to critique 
Kleihues’s approach as purely “aesthetic,” was quickly revised once they found themselves in 
positions of power. In order to steer a course through the shoals of institutional, political, and 
economic confusion in reunited Berlin, they found that they needed, first and foremost, to attract 
and help guide big real estate investors. As shown throughout this study, it was mainly out of 
necessity that they became closely allied with these corporate interests, but this put them in a 
difficult position politically. Paired with their inability to successfully address how their formal 
preferences related to German identity and history, this alliance with capitalist interests made 
them look not only like sellouts, but also like conservatives.139  
Berlin’s financial infrastructure began to crumble in 1993 with the collapse of one of its 
major banks.140 By 1995, real estate investment in the city had changed from a barrage to a 
trickle, and many large-scale projects, including Kollhoff’s master plan for Alexanderplatz, had 
to be shelved.141 Following the 1995 elections, when SPD Construction Senator Wolfgang Nagel 
lost his seat, Stimmann was removed from the office of Construction Director, moving to work 
under the new Senator for Urban Development, Peter Strieder (SPD). Thus, after 1995, the 
discourse surrounding Critical Reconstruction moved away from the question of façades and 
fascism, leaning more toward a negotiation of the East German city and its troubled past. This 
                                                
139 The divide between Kleihues’s and Stimmann’s versions of Critical Reconstruction may also point to the uneasy 
alliance between urban planning as it is practiced in architecture, where the focus is on urban design, and urban planning as a 
political or administrative practice, where the focus reaches far beyond the formal qualities of a city. This division parallels a 
similar split between architecture and engineering, which has its roots in the age of industrialization. The lines between these 
various professions and practices are by no means clear, and are deserving of further study in the case of Berlin specifically. 
140 See Janet Ward, Post-Wall Berlin: Borders, Space and Identity (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 292. 
141 There are still no new skyscrapers on this plaza, but a few smaller commercial buildings have sprung up over the 





shift also meant that the scope of the debate, which had heretofore mainly included architects and 
theorists from the former West Germany and the Western international community, grew to 
include critics, politicians, and historians from the former GDR. This new phase will be 




Gentrifying the GDR: Critical Reconstruction as a Colonial Move 
 
Debates over the national symbolism of Berlin’s built landscape took place on two 
different fronts after the fall of the Wall. While one side of the discussion focused on the legacy 
of the Nazi era and the potential “normalization” of that regime’s crimes, represented most 
forcefully in the Architecture Debates, another equally important strand of the conversation had 
to do with the marginalization of East German cultural identity. This process was a sensitive and 
difficult topic in the midst of what many observers argued was less a “reunification” than a 
“takeover” of the former GDR (German Democratic Republic, or East Germany) by the West.1 
Many East Berliners felt that the built history and memory of their former nation was being 
consciously and systematically erased in the capital: Western planners replaced many Eastern 
buildings in the formerly Communist districts of the city; many East Berlin streets were given 
back their pre-socialist – or even anti-socialist – names; prominent monuments (such as those 
honoring Lenin or other leading Soviet or Communist figures) were removed or “renovated” to 
downplay their prominence; and numerous GDR buildings in the city center were demolished.2 
As cultural critic Andreas Huyssen observed, East Germans tended to see this as more than just 
“tinkering with the communist city-text.” Rather, they experienced it as “a strategy of power and 
humiliation, a final burst of Cold War ideology, pursued via a politics of signs.”3 
                                                
1 Elizabeth A Strom, Building the New Berlin: The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City 
(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001), 74. 
2 Andreas Huyssen, “The Voids of Berlin,” Critical Inquiry 24, no. 1 (Autumn 1997): 61. See also Brian Ladd, “East 
Berlin Political Monuments in the Late German Democratic Republic: Finding a Place for Marx and Engels,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 37, no. 1 (2002): 91–104.  
3 Huyssen, “The Voids of Berlin,” 61. See also Andreas Ruby, “The Eternal Return of the Void: German Architecture 
after German Reunification,” in New German Architecture: A Reflexive Modernism, by Ullrich Schwarz (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje 
Cantz, 2002), 294–303; Hanno Rauterberg, “History - That Was Yesterday: The Germans are Bulding a New Normalcy: They 
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This chapter looks at the ways that Critical Reconstruction was complicit in the 
marginalization of East German history and collective memory through its destructive 
interventions in the built environment. The first half of the chapter examines how, amidst the 
ideological struggles over the cultural legacy of the East, the proposed removals or renovations 
of buildings tended to become flashpoints that could mobilize local residents and attract media 
attention for short periods of time, but, in most cases, such battles were ultimately lost to the 
more powerful interests of investment companies and developers. This phenomenon is 
exemplified by the remodeling of the prominent East German Centrum department store on 
Alexanderplatz, completed between 2004 and 2006 according to plans by Critical 
Reconstruction’s original author, Josef Paul Kleihues. A close look at this case reveals efforts on 
the part of planners, the architect, and corporate investors to reshape East Berlin as a place that 
would appeal to contemporary bourgeois consumers. Though officials made repeated efforts to 
involve the public in the planning process, their final decisions constituted a complete denial of 
the community’s calls for the building’s preservation. 
The second half of the chapter looks at the destruction of the GDR landscape through 
more general city planning measures, specifically the Planwerk Innenstadt (“Inner-City Plan”) 
proposed by Hans Stimmann and authored chiefly in collaboration with the urban critic Dieter 
Hoffmann-Axthelm. This section shows that, whereas during the 1980s, Stimmann and 
Hoffmann-Axthelm had both been vocal critics of Kleihues’s IBA model of Critical 
Reconstruction because it constituted a purely “aesthetic” mode of city planning that supposedly 
ignored the needs of everyday citizens, in the post-Wall era, their own Planwerk Innenstadt used 
Critical Reconstruction to actually legitimate a disregard for these same community interests.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Want to Preserve the Past, but Without the Memories,” in New German Architecture: A Reflexive Modernism, by Ullrich 
Schwarz (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002), 314; Strom, Building the New Berlin, 72–73. 
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In both cases, Critical Reconstruction’s sidelining and destruction of GDR architecture 
was discursively justified through the rhetoric of the “void”: the idea that East Berlin represented 
various kinds of emptiness – social, political, aesthetic, and urban – that needed to be “filled” by 
new construction and new residents. A central argument of this chapter is that this move was 
essentially colonial: this purported “lack” was used to justify the top-down dictation of large-
scale plans and dramatic changes to the landscape of the former GDR capital. In terms of 
specific buildings, GDR residents and their architecture were viewed as incapable of possessing 
a legitimate “history” that would make particular structures worthy of preservation, a logic that 
undergirded the decision to remove or renovate certain prominent buildings and urban spaces. 
However problematic or even loathed by residents, many of these structures were important 
touchstones for former East Berliners’ collective memory and history. The most problematic 
aspect of this urban erasure was that the logic used by Stimmann, Hoffmann-Axthelm, and other 
planners to justify their removal was a strange correlate of that which had been used to support 
the renovation and preservation of former Nazi buildings. In the case of Nazi architecture, 
planners argued that despite – or even because of – their association with the crimes of the 
regime, the structures were key witnesses to this part of Germany’s troubled history and thus 
needed to remain in the public consciousness. GDR buildings, on the other hand, were not 
accorded this status as witnesses to history; rather, by being portrayed as having no history at all 
– and, in conjunction, being depicted as hindrances to “good” urban development – they were 
instead allowed to disappear under new construction.  
This elision of East German history, identity, and memory in the built environment 
paralleled what was happening in the social and political spheres in reunified Germany, where 
East Germans were expected to simply suddenly conform to West German ways of life and 
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governance, and where their memories of life in the GDR were characterized by dominant 
discourse condescendingly as “nostalgic” rather than “historical.” In terms of city planning 
specifically, particularly in Hoffmann-Axthelm’s contributions to the Planwerk Innenstadt, East 
Berliners were also portrayed as lacking the requisite skills and political attitudes to adequately 
self-govern. Hoffmann-Axthelm believed that since they did not have the economic “ties to the 
land” that, according to his logic, small-scale ownership of individual parcels would produce, 
city planners and developers needed to therapeutically intervene in the cityscape in order to 
create neighborhoods that would attract middle-class, educated property owners who could 
adequately advocate for themselves. Despite the plethora of East Berlin citizens’ groups that 
formed in response to the city’s plans, the rhetoric of the Planwerk Innenstadt and its authors 
continually infantilized this population, using their supposed inabilities to justify the 
appropriation and development of properties in ways they saw fit. However, as demonstrated in 
Chapters 2 and 3, this most often meant actually cooperating with large-scale investors rather 
than restoring small-scale ownership conditions.  
This chapter thus demonstrates that, despite Stimmann’s and Hoffmann-Axthelm’s 
political affiliations with the left, by 1999, when the Planwerk Innenstadt was officially 
approved by the Berlin government, Critical Reconstruction had essentially become an elitist and 
politically conservative tool of neo-liberal, capitalist development that willingly ignored both 
important historical traces of mid-twentieth-century architecture in the former Communist 
cityscape, and citizens’ calls to preserve that architecture. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the Critical Reconstructionists’ penchant for preserving and, in many cases, lauding Nazi and 
Stalinist architecture had already pigeonholed them as supporters of conservative – even neo-
fascist – styles and planning philosophies. This conservatism was further underscored by 
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Hoffmann-Axthelm’s proposal of the theoretical relationship between “ties to the land” and 
residents’ ability to self-govern, which can also be seen as a problematic echo of the ethnocentric 
ideologies of the Nazis. Nevertheless, Stimmann, Hoffmann-Axthelm, and the other proponents 
of Critical Reconstruction appear to have remained blind to the conservative pitfalls of their 
policies and rhetoric, continuing to view themselves as social democrats who cared about the 
lives of “everyday” citizens. This blind spot, I argue, stems from the fact that their deliberate 
targeting of GDR architecture and urban planning had very little to do with an actual or direct 
negotiation of history, identity, or memory. In other words, they did not see themselves first and 
foremost as creators of national symbols via architecture. Instead, I contend, their willful 
destruction of East Berlin architecture had much more to do with two more mundane and 
profession-specific facets of post-modern architecture and planning culture: the backlash against 
the “towers in the park” model of functionalist, mid-century Modernism, and the fetishization of 
the model of the “European city” as the basis for a liberal, bourgeois society. While Stimmann, 
Hoffmann-Axthelm, Kleihues, and other planners and investors certainly failed to integrate the 
wishes and voices of the various neighborhood constituents in East Berlin into their planning 
policy, their marginalization of what might be termed these citizens’ “urban collective memory” 
was as in many ways as unwitting as it was, ultimately, politically and economically inept. 
 
The Concept of the Void as a Colonial Tool in Berlin 
Berlin as a City of Voids  
Planners’ interventions in East Berlin were supported by the widespread characterization 
(in the popular media as well as in publications and statements by planners) of central East 
Berlin as “empty” in myriad ways. Western city planners often referred to East Berlin as an 
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“ideational wasteland,” a “tabula rasa” without history.4 With its history of destruction, Berlin 
has long been characterized as containing various kinds of “voids.” In the early twentieth 
century, the philosopher Ernst Bloch noted the social void created by what he and others saw as 
the collapse of bourgeois, nineteenth-century culture after the First World War.5 This was 
followed by the creation of physical voids by Nazi demolition crews in service of Albert Speer’s 
plans for Hitler’s new capital city, and Allied bombs added to these voids soon after, as wartime 
destruction devastated much of the city center. But for the proponents of Critical Reconstruction, 
the most important and extreme source of destruction was not World War II, but post-war 
“Sanierung” measures – literally translated as “renovation,” but denoting clearance and 
rebuilding according to the mid-century Modernist principles of dispersed, auto-friendly urban 
planning and functionalist architecture – a familiar post-modern critique made by architects and 
planners around the globe at the time. In Berlin specifically, however, yet another layer of voids 
was created by the Berlin Wall, beginning with its construction in 1961 (which resulted in large 
swaths of demolition and clearance, most famously at Potsdamer Platz), and continuing with its 
removal after 1989. 
After the Wall fell, as anthropologist Gisa Weszkalnys observes, talk about what Berlin 
would become in the post-Wall era was thus very often talk about “how to fill Berlin’s 
emptiness.”6 For some authors (mainly those outside of Berlin), Berlin’s voids constituted spaces 
that were physically empty but symbolically laden, and which should ideally be preserved as a 
kind of urban memorial to the tragedies and violence of Berlin’s previous half-century. Some felt 
                                                
4  Wolfgang Kil, quoted in Gisa Weszkalnys, Berlin, Alexanderplatz: Transforming Place in a Unified Germany (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 64. 
5 Huyssen, “The Voids of Berlin,” 62. 
6 Weszkalnys, Berlin, Alexanderplatz, 61. Weszkalnys refers to Huyssen’s work here, as well as Karen E Till, The New 
Berlin: Memory, Politics, Place (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005). 
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that this approach was a particularly appealing solution for Potsdamer Platz. Huyssen famously 
suggested in his seminal 1997 essay “The Voids of Berlin” that this empty area should be 
preserved as what Berliners “affectionately” called their “‘wonderful city steppes,’ their ‘prairie 
of history.’”7 For Huyssen, this space was “a void saturated with invisible history, with 
memories of architecture both built and unbuilt. It gave rise to the desire to leave it as it was, the 
memorial as empty page right in the center of the reunified city.”8 He quoted a proposal by 
Daniel Libeskind, who originally suggested  
a wilderness, one kilometer long, within which everything can stay as it is. The 
street simply ends in the bushes. Wonderful. After all, this area is the result of 
today's divine natural law: nobody wanted it, nobody planned it, and yet it is 
firmly implanted in all our minds. And there in our minds, this image of the 
Potsdamer Platz void will remain for decades.9  
 
Huyssen feared that these “invisible” memories, which he saw as key for the understanding of 
German history as expressed in Berlin’s built landscape, would be erased if the area were 
redeveloped.10 
As should be clear from the previous chapter, however, Berlin’s leading city planners and 
the proponents of Critical Reconstruction emphatically did not see things this way. Instead, they 
viewed Berlin’s center as littered with terrible, gaping holes that desperately needed to be 
refilled. This tendency toward horror vacui was expressed in the Department of Urban 
Development and Environment’s program for “Baulückenmanagement” (the “management of 
construction gaps”) whereby every empty lot in the city center was given a “passport” 
documenting its characteristics and its projected future uses. Planners often referred to such areas 
                                                
7 Huyssen, “The Voids of Berlin,” 65. He is quoting from Francesca Rogier, “Growing Pains: From the Opening of the 
Wall to the Wrapping of the Reichstag,” Assemblage, no. 29 (April 1996): 50. 
8 Huyssen, “The Voids of Berlin,” 65–66. 
9 Quoted in ibid., 73. 
10 Huyssen’s and Libeskind’s suggestions are not necessarily less inhumane or objectifying; both assume that the space 
is socially devoid and unclaimed, and they hope to “colonize” it with their ideas of how things should be remembered. 
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in the city center as “wastelands” or “deserts,” or simply as “Leerstellen” – “empty spaces.”11 As 
urban historian Stefanie Hennecke contends, even planners’ use of the word “reconstruction” 
seemingly denotes the absence of adequate built substance.12  
This supposed lack was often also expressed as the city needing a “heart”: a “cultural and 
emotional middle point” based in a “founding place,” not only for Berliners, but for the entire 
nation as a “political point of reference.”13 This objective paired nicely with Stimmann’s and 
other Critical Reconstructionists’ commitment to the “historical,” “European city,” based on the 
model of the Altstadt or Stadtkrone as the centerpiece of the city (something that, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, Berlin had never actually possessed). The discourse of the “heart” is a direct 
expression of their belief that certain older architectural forms would have both a palliative and a 
growth-promoting effect on the formerly divided population by creating for them a sense of 
shared history on which they, presumably, could rebuild a new, unified city and nation. The 
Planwerk Innenstadt, for example, proposed that the central district of Mitte become a “core” for 
the city that would anchor all subsequent development by providing it with a “visible” 
touchstone.14 
Weszkalnys and others also argue that this rhetoric helped to construe Berlin as 
“belonging to a specific pedigree of cities thought to have evolved within Europe over 
centuries,” corresponding with the notion of the city as situated at the heart of the European 
                                                
11 Weszkalnys, Berlin, Alexanderplatz, 63; Stefanie Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild: 
Stadtentwicklungspolitik in Berlin zwischen 1991 und 1999 (Hamburg: Kovač, 2010), 138. 
12 Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 261. Kleihues talks about his choice of terms in Josef Paul 
Kleihues, “Städtebau ist Erinnerung,” in Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin 1984/87: die Neubaugebiete - Dokumente, 
Projekte, ed. Josef Paul Kleihues (Stuttgart: Gerd Hatje, 1993), 17. He argues that the term “Critical” modifies the idea of 
“reconstruction,” allowing it to mean something new, rather than a rehashing of older structures or styles. The fact that Hennecke 
can make this critique shows how far the Critical Reconstruction of Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm had drifted from 
Kleihues’s original theories. 
13 Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 198. 
14 Ibid., 194. 
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Union, and, importantly, as existing in opposition to the eastern European “other.” This 
discourse, she argues, reifies Cold War oppositions of Europe as “Western” – rational, 
democratic, politically stable and urban, and distinct from an irrational, communist, rural East. 
Using this logic, the results of socialist urban planning are easily construed as “something alien, 
imposed on the supposedly ‘organic’ structures of the European city.”15 The model of the 
continental “European city” also offered Berlin a way to market itself as a desirable location for 
companies and residents amidst an ever more competitive global economy. As noted in Chapter 
2, planners and government leaders in the late twentieth century increasingly felt pressure to 
structure their cities to emphasize supposedly unique, “local” qualities in order to attract 
investment and promote growth. Even if Berlin had never possessed a true, “historical” city core 
in the ways that other urban spaces did, it seemed that now was the perfect time to create one.16 
Much of Berlin’s GDR architecture did not fit this bill. Having been constructed in the 
1960s and 1970s, it was considered too recent to be deemed “historical,” too international and 
quotidian to be “local,” and, quite simply, too kitschy to be appealing to investors or clients. For 
the Critical Reconstructionists, especially, this style of architecture and planning constituted the 
worst kind of spatial void in Berlin: dispersed, car-friendly planning, with wide avenues, 
sweeping green spaces, and unadorned white towers of offices and apartments. “The European 
and especially the West German urban landscape,” stated Critical Reconstruction proponent 
Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, for example, “has clearly been destroyed less by the war then by 
the planners who, because of their abstract, biased, and global conception of a city which in their 
view is an addition of quantitative functions, have turned [these spaces] mostly into cheerless 
                                                
15 Weszkalnys, Berlin, Alexanderplatz, 53. 
16 These efforts are underscored by the massive amount of effort and money that the city of Berlin spent on marketing 
during the 1990s. These initiatives are examined at length in Till, The New Berlin; and Claire Colomb, Staging the New Berlin: 
Place Marketing and the Politics of Urban Reinvention Post-1989 (Hoboken: Routledge, 2011). 
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and desolate places.”17 Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm had also long been critics of this style 
of planning, calling it the “anti-city,” a “disaster” of planning that had utterly failed to deliver on 
its promises.18 And although Critical Reconstruction’s various advocates were equally critical of 
post-war Modernism in both East and West Berlin, the state’s ownership of land in the former 
East allowed them much more influence on that part of the city. As a result, mid-century 
Modernist GDR architecture became Critical Reconstruction’s main target of destruction.  
This impression was furthered by the frequent characterization of East Berlin 
architecture, especially Alexanderplatz, as a “totalitarian” space that was somehow devoid of 
symbols of democracy. Essays in the official publications concerning the 1993 planning 
competition for Alexanderplatz emphasize the “socialist” nature of the square, calling it the 
product of “a contemptible, bloodless, post-war Modernism” that resulted in “a yawning 
emptiness.” Critics likened it to the “no man’s land of Potsdamer Platz after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall,” and “the result of highly debatable totalitarian planning in the 1960s and 1970s under the 
socialist regime.”19 The historical importance of Alexanderplatz as one of the main sites of the 
resistance movement that led to the Wende was also ignored in all official rhetoric. In this way, 
as Weszkalnys notes, many spaces in East Berlin “were reconceptualized as [having] a specific 
kind of emptiness typical of the socialist system.”20 Her ethnography of the re-planning of 
                                                
17 Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani and Josef Paul Kleihues, “The Facts and the Dreams: AD Interview,” in Architecture 
in Progress: Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin 1984, ed. Frank Russell, trans. Romana Schneider (New York, N.Y.: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1983), 19.  
18 Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm and Bernhard Strecker, Städtebaulicher Strukturplan. Kritische Rekonstruktion Des 
Bereichs: Friedrichswerder, Friedrichstadt, Dorotheenstadt, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin: Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und 
Wohnungswesen, 1992); quoted in Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 138. 
19 Martin Kieren, “Which Way to Alex, Please?,” in Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, ed. Kristin 
Feireiss (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994), 26; Federico Bucci, Roberto Dulio, and Alessandro Busa, “The Rebuilding of 
Alexanderplatz,” L’Architettura., no. 597 (2005): 536.  
20 Weszkalnys, Berlin, Alexanderplatz, 65. 
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Alexanderplatz in the early 1990s reveals multiple instances of this attitude. For example, she 
recounts,  
The need for restructuring Alexanderplatz, as an East German SenStadt [Senate 
Department for Urban Development and Environment] administrator explained, 
had been an outcome of Germany’s reunification. “This oasis of socialist 
planning,” he suggested, “doesn’t match the requirements of contemporary 
society. Even though some of the existing buildings have been recently renovated, 
they are not designed for the long-term future.” In light of the various guiding 
images for Berlin – the metropolis, the global city, or the European city – 
Alexanderplatz had come to appear inadequate.21 
 
In addition to having spatial voids, East Berlin was frequently portrayed as socially 
empty. As noted above, Hoffmann-Axthelm, in particular, was convinced that because it lacked 
the conditions of small-scale land ownership, East Berlin possessed no middle class and was 
devoid of citizens who were capable of self-governance. This demeaning and paternalistic belief 
drew on general Western conceptions of East Germans as inferior. As Weszkalnys demonstrates 
in her work, even the term “Ostalgie,” a marriage of the term “East” (“Ost”) and “nostalgia” 
(“Nostalgie”), contributes to the portrayal of East Berliners as emotional and irrational: the 
emphasis on a foolish “nostalgia” for a “lost past,” rather than the sensible possession of a 
legitimate “history,” rhetorically deprives East Germans of the capability to comprehend their 
past and legitimates the more “official” understanding of history put forward by Critical 
Reconstruction’s proponents.22 Alexanderplatz in particular was often depicted as a social void 
because it harbored the “wrong” kind of people, such as immigrants, vagrants, and criminals. 
Numerous news reports throughout the 1990s represented Alexanderplatz as dangerous, further 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 75. The popular film Good Bye, Lenin! (2003), in which an East German teen tries to recreate the day-to-day 
life of the GDR in order not to traumatize his bedridden mother with the realization that the Wall has fallen, is a prime example 
of this attitude. 
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underscoring the need for its renovation and renewal as a space of capitalist leisure geared 
towards a bourgeois public who would possess the “right” kinds of values and lifestyles.23 
Voids and Colonial Discourse 
 Scholars who work in the transdisciplinary field of post-colonial studies have identified 
several tactics commonly used by colonizing societies in order to suppress and subjugate native 
colonial populations. In his seminal work Orientalism (1979), for example, literary scholar 
Edward Said argues that Western Europeans have a history of discursively constructing 
colonized cultures as backward, without history, illiterate, emotional, and even violent – in other 
words, as lacking the trappings of a supposedly “civilized” Western society – in order to 
legitimize the appropriation of their lands and labor.24 Māori scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith notes 
how “primitive” peoples are often portrayed as not being able to use their minds or intellects: 
“We could not invent things, we could not create institutions or history, we could not imagine, 
we could not produce anything of value, we did not know how to use land and other 
resources.”25 The logic of colonization depends on the idea that, since the people of a colonized 
nation are incapable of self-governance or of economic prosperity, colonizers are not only free to 
pursue the seizure and “proper” utilization of resources, but they see themselves as morally 
responsible for doing so. Having subjugated a people, colonizers, as literary scholar Henry 
Schwarz argues, then “tend to implant modern structures on their territories,” including capitalist 
                                                
23 Ibid., 72. 
24 See Edward W Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). Along with works by Frantz Fanon and Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, Said’s work is commonly regarded as one of the foundational texts in the field of post-colonial studies. 
25 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (New York: Zed Books, 
1999), 25. 
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economic practices, Western European political structures, and, importantly, the writing of 
“official” historical accounts.26 
Though East Germany was, in many ways, already “modern” when the Wall fell, and its 
residents were mainly ethnic Germans who would not normally be considered “indigenous” in 
the post-colonial sense, East Germans were made subject to many of these practices by the 
mainly West German-led reunified government after 1990. As noted above, the merging of the 
two countries was not based on mutual compromise, but on the imposition of West German 
political and economic structures on the East. Of course, given the failure of the Soviet system, 
much of this change was both practically necessary and welcomed by former East Germans, 
however difficult it made the transition. Unemployment skyrocketed in the Eastern states after 
reunification, and many areas have still not caught up economically with the former Western 
states after more than 25 years. But as many historians of Germany’s reunification have noted, 
along with this political and economic takeover came the assumption that East Germany would 
also be culturally and socially subsumed by the West. Despite their forty years of individual 
development as a nation, East Germans were regularly portrayed as being without “actual” 
history, as emotionally swayed by a “nostalgia” for the anachronistic ways of life that they had 
had during the time of division, and as being unable to self-govern because they lacked 
experience with land ownership. This attitude is neatly summed up in a quote from none other 
than Karl Marx, which serves as the epigraph to Said’s book: “They cannot represent 
themselves; they must be represented.”27 This line from one of the progenitors of socialist 
thought is, when applied to the case of reunified Berlin, both ironic and very fitting, in that the 
                                                
26 Henry Schwarz, “Mission Impossible: Introducing Postcolonial Studies in the U.S. Academy,” in A Companion to 
Postcolonial Studies, ed. Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta Ray (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 3. 
27 See the commentary on this passage in ibid., 11. 
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planners who most thoroughly perpetrated this form of colonial marginalization on the former 
Communist residents and landscape were themselves members of the radical left who held to the 
utopian belief that they were responsible for creating a new, more just and prosperous society 
that would benefit the “everyday” residents of the city.28 
The supposed “voids” in East Berlin were often rendered tangible through visuals, 
particularly maps, which appeared to plainly illustrate the “emptiness” of the city and to project 
its “completion” through infill. Such maps appeared frequently in government publications (both 
ones produced internally and ones produced for “public” consumption, such as pamphlets and 
books), on the Berlin.de website, and in city-sponsored exhibitions.29 Here it is useful to once 
again draw on the work of geographer David Harvey, who, in his 1990 book The Condition of 
Postmodernity, traces the history of map-making as a tool of political power that allows for the 
“conquest and control of space” by portraying it as something easily “malleable, and therefore 
capable of domination through human action.”30 The map view, he argues, also allows for the 
reductive “homogenization and reification of the rich diversity of spatial stories,” and the 
production of the invisibility of the map-maker, who, because his or her gaze is constructed from 
                                                
28 Schwartz takes issue with Said’s Orientalism, arguing the it “divided the world into opposing camps – the Orient vs. 
the Orientalists – that reproduced the rhetoric of the Cold War, now mirrored back onto the colonizing projects of England and 
France. … It did this in a dramatically ‘totalizing’ fashion, making the colonial relationship the most determining one in the life 
of any individual so implicated. The Orientalists, according to Said, produced the Orient as an object of study and fascination, but 
mainly one of control. This was reminiscent of the stereotypes hurled back and forth by U.S. and Soviet camps during the 
period.” Ibid. While this binary model clearly elides many of the complexities – in Germany as well as elsewhere – of colonial 
interactions, in the case of Alexanderplatz and the Planwerk Innenstadt, the Cold War opposition inherent in Said’s model is 
arguably quite fitting. 
29 One of Stimmann’s initiatives was to create a physical model of the inner city for display to the public. This model 
and several others are still on permanent display at the city’s planning offices. See Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und 
Umwelt, “Stadtmodelle,” Berlin.de, accessed February 17, 2016, http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/planen/stadtmodelle. The 
public interest in Berlin’s history and built environment is also illustrated by the blossoming of bookstores, museums, and other 
insitutions around this topic. The most conspicuous of these is Berlin Story, a bookshop devoted exclusively to Berlin history. 
The shop also sponsors a yearly “history festival,” has a museum and also oversees a restored World War II bunker. See “Wir 
Über Uns,” Berlin Story, accessed February 17, 2016, http://www.berlinstory.de/.  
30 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990), 254. Numerous other scholars have contributed work on the relationship between landscape visualization and colonial 
power, notably W.J.T. Mitchell. See W. J. T Mitchell, Landscape and Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
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the very beginning as outside the realm of vision, remains aloof and unimplicated in the scene.31 
This type of map view thus allows the planner both total control and total invisibility in the 
shaping of spaces. In doing so, as Harvey emphasizes, the map or plan necessarily cuts out 
nuances and details, rendering space legible through the erasure of its lived realities. As will be 
discussed in detail below, these characteristics pervade the visuals used by Stimmann and other 
planners to remake East Berlin, especially the aesthetically reductive map form of the Planwerk 
Innenstadt. 
Gentrification and the “Urban Frontier” 
 Another useful framework for understanding what happened in central East Berlin under 
Critical Reconstruction is provided by the concept of “gentrification.” First introduced by the 
sociologist Ruth Glass to describe the process of inner-city renewal by upper-class residents in 
London in the 1960s, it has become a common term for describing neighborhood change in terms 
of social class, typically describing the ways in which more wealthy residents or businesses 
displace working-class ones.32 Coinciding with the post-modern return to the “historical” or 
“European city” discussed in the previous chapters, gentrification grew from a relatively limited 
and sporadic phenomenon in the mid-1960s to a global phenomenon in the 1990s, supported and 
sponsored by city planning and marketing departments as well as corporate real estate interests. 
But despite its positive connotations for particular planners or constituents, the term implies not 
simply the refashioning of a given district from an architectural or urban design perspective, but 
the concomitant marginalization and, often, displacement, of working-class populations. 
Geographer Neil Smith describes it as “the class remake of the central urban landscape” that 
                                                
31 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 246, 253. 
32 See Ruth Glass, “Aspects of Change,” in The Gentrification Debates, ed. Japonica Brown-Saracino, Metropolis and 
Modern Life (New York: Routledge, 2010), 19–29. 
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represents “a struggle not just for new and old urban spaces but for the symbolic political power 
to determine the urban future.”33 
 As sociologist Sharon Zukin argues, gentrification can be seen as a form of urban 
colonialism, and as such it dovetails perfectly with the discourse of the “void,” as described 
above. Amplifying arguments also made by Smith, Zukin points to the “pioneer” mentality that 
underlies gentrification: 
Regardless of topography, building stock, and even existing populations, 
gentrification persists as a collective effort to appropriate the center for elements 
of a new urban middle class. The notion of gentrifiers as “urban pioneers” is 
properly viewed as an ideological justification of middle-class appropriation. Just 
as white settlers in the nineteenth century forced Native Americans from their 
traditional grounds, so gentrifiers, developers, and new commercial uses have 
cleared the downtown “frontier” of existing populations. This appropriation is 
coordinated, logically enough, with a local expansion of jobs and facilities in 
businesses services.34  
 
Zukin also sees gentrification as a mode of specifically privileging cultural consumers, rather 
than existing working-class or small-scale manufacturing interests. 
Gentrification joins the economic claim to space with a cultural claim that gives 
priority to the demands of historic preservationists and arts producers. In this 
view, “historic” buildings can only be appreciated to their maximum value if they 
are explained, analyzed, and understood as part of an aesthetic discourse, such as 
the history of architecture and art. Such buildings rightfully “belong” to people 
who have the resources to search for the original building plans and study their 
house in the context of the architect’s career. They belong to residents who restore 
mahogany paneling and buy copies of nineteenth-century faucets instead of those 
who prefer aluminum siding. Gentrifiers’ capital for attaching themselves to 
history gives them license to “reclaim” the downtown for their own uses. … By 
means of the building stock, they identify with an earlier group of builders rather 
than with the existing lower class population, with the “ladies’ Mile” of early-
twentieth-century department stores instead of the discount stores that have 
replaced them.35 
                                                
33 Neil Smith, “A Short History of Gentrification,” in The Gentrification Debates, ed. Japonica Brown-Saracino, 
Metropolis and Modern Life (New York: Routledge, 2010), 35–36. 
34 Sharon Zukin, “Gentrification as Market and Place,” in The Gentrification Debates, ed. Japonica Brown-Saracino, 
Metropolis and Modern Life (New York: Routledge, 2010), 37; see also Neil Smith, “Buliding the Frontier Myth,” in The 
Gentrification Debates, ed. Japonica Brown-Saracino, Metropolis and Modern Life (New York: Routledge, 2010), 113–17. 
35 Zukin, “Gentrification as Market and Place,” 41. 
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Clearly, Critical Reconstruction, seen in this context, was a strong force behind the gentrification 
of central Berlin. Relying on the idea that East Berlin, in particular, was a “frontier” devoid of 
the “proper” uses or residents, Stimmann and the other proponents of this method made a 
concerted effort to convert its landscape into a center of cultural consumption. As such, it 
constituted what I would call a “soft” or “subversive” form of colonialism that attempted to mask 
its classist and Western-centric intentions with claims about the need for economic growth and 
the supposedly objective importance of Berlin’s “historical” urban forms. 
 
Erasing the GDR’s Modernist Buildings 
The Schloss as a Structuring Element of GDR Memory Discourse 
Few observers of Berlin’s post-Wall rebuilding could miss the contentious dispute over 
the demolition of the Palast der Republik, which, alongside Libeskind’s Jewish Museum, was 
undoubtedly the most internationally-discussed facet of the city’s reconstruction. Standing at the 
eastern end of Berlin’s via triumphalis, this gigantic building inhabited the site of the former 
baroque Prussian imperial “city palace,” or “Stadtschloss” (commonly referred to simply as the 
“Schloss”). This earlier structure had sustained considerable damage during World War II, and in 
1950 its remains were dynamited by the East German regime (fig. 5.1).36 The space was paved 
and used as a parade ground until the early 1970s, when Erich Honecker’s government 
sponsored the construction of a massive building in the style of “high-gloss international 
                                                
36 This removal was done despite protests from prominent GDR architects and historians. The government cited Allied 
bombing damage, lack of funds for reconstruction, and the monarchist history of the building as reasons for its demolition. By 
demolishing the palace and turning into a parade ground, GDR officials were making a strong ideological gesture against both the 
history of Prussia and liberal-democratic capitalism. One of the palace’s portals was preserved and reused in neighboring 
Sekretariat building; it contained the balcony from which Karl Liebknecht had prematurely declared Communist victory in 1918. 
See Brian Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape (Chicago, Ill.: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998), 57–58. 
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Modernism” that was named the Palast der Republik – an allusion to the historical significance 
of the space, but also to the GDR’s opposition to the idea of monarchy and supposed status as a 
democratic “republic” (fig. 5.2).37 It was a multipurpose building, with spaces for parliamentary 
and party meetings, but it was chiefly meant as a site of entertainment and consumerism for 
GDR citizens, housing three restaurants, a post office, a bowling alley, a movie theater, a concert 
hall, and numerous shops. 
This shift in use from national parade ground to space of private consumption was an 
explicit gesture meant to suggest that the leaders of the GDR, however misguidedly or 
hypocritically, were interested in citizens’ everyday welfare and happiness.38 As with most 
realities of life in the GDR, the Palast’s users were not deluded by these propagandistic gestures; 
though the site became a tourist destination for East Germans, and its events, especially concerts, 
were heavily attended, the building quickly acquired nicknames such as “Ballast der Republik,” 
“Palazzo Prozzi” (“Chateau Show”) and “Erich’s Lamp Shop.”39 These names reveal the 
capacity that East Germans had developed for “doublethink,” i.e. separating state ideology from 
private life and fulfillment: for them, the Palast symbolized the GDR’s hypocrisy, but it also 
presented them with opportunities for personal enjoyment, which they eagerly accepted. Even 
after unification, the Palast remained an ambivalent symbol, but one, nevertheless, around which 
groups eventually rallied in order to preserve the memory of their heritage, however fraught.40 
                                                
37 Emily Pugh, “The Berlin Wall and the Urban Space and Experience of East and West Berlin, 1961-1989” (Ph.D. 
diss., CUNY Graduate Center, 2008), 173; Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape, 
59; Ladd, “East Berlin Political Monuments in the Late German Democratic Republic,” 93. 
38 Honecker promoted an interest in the historical significance of the area as connected to the nation’s German and 
Prussian roots. He was also responsible for restoring a prominent nearby statue of Frederick the Great, followed later by 
Schinkel’s Altes Museum and other important monuments.  Thus the Palast der Republik’s designers, a collective of architects 
led by Heinz Graffunder, paid particular attention to how it would integrate with the surrounding buildings, as Emily Pugh notes. 
Pugh, “The Berlin Wall and the Urban Space and Experience of East and West Berlin, 1961-1989,” 175, 285. 
39 Ibid., 184; Andreas Ulrich, Palast Der Republik: Ein Rückblick (München: Prestel, 2006), 33. 
40 Strom notes that figures such as Ernst Thälmann, subject of another popular monument that the city wanted to 
demolish, were “undoubtedly more popular now than [they ever were] in the GDR.” Strom, Building the New Berlin, 68. 
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When, in 1993, the building was declared contaminated with asbestos and the reunited federal 
government voted to tear it down for health reasons, the decision was met with heated protest by 
citizens’ groups, intellectuals, and politicians, and a decade of public debate ensued. The final 
parliamentary decision to demolish the Palast der Republik and replace it with a replica of the 
Schloss was made in 2003 in accordance with the recommendation of a “commission of 
experts.”41 The new building, now finally under construction as of 2013, will house the 
“ethnological” collection of the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation, which comprises objects 
from non-Western cultures including Africa, Latin America, East Asia, India, and Polynesia.42 
The new palace will thus complete “Museum Island,” the cluster of museums to the north of the 
Schlossplatz, one of Berlin’s biggest tourist attractions. 
Like the extant Nazi buildings in the city center, the Palast der Republik represented a 
violent and repressive regime, a fact that had never been lost on East Berliners. Yet many of 
them rallied around this formerly despised building as a reminder of that very regime and of the 
forty-year history, society, and culture that it represented. The assertions of historians like Brian 
Ladd, who characterizes the Schloss debate as being based in “competing nostalgias,” thus do 
East Berliners an injustice.43 Their bid to preserve the structure, I would argue, did not grow out 
of a simple wish to continue to live out a set of outdated and innocently ignorant mores, or to 
whitewash a troubled history with kitschy remembrances, but out of a wish to draw attention to 
the contradictions of their own history and to publicly think through and situate this history 
amidst a new socio-political moment. Perhaps because of a lack of international pressure to 
                                                
41 See Internationale Expertenkommission “Historische Mitte Berlin,” “Abschlussbericht” (Senatsverwaltung für 
Stadtentwicklung, April 2002). See also Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit, “Chronologie 
Des Bauvorhabens,” Themen: Bauen - Bundesbauten - Schloss/Humboldtforum, July 29, 2015, www.bmub.bund.de/P3310/. 
42 See “Stiftung Berliner Schloss - Humboldtforum,” July 29, 2015, www.sbs-humboldtforum.de. 
43 Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape, 59. 
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publicly contextualize or memorialize this part of Germany’s past in any meaningful way (as 
there was with regard to the Holocaust and the Nazi regime), as architectural historian Florian 
Hertweck contends, “the motives for a reconstruction of the Berlin palace façade … are above all 
based in a supposedly collective need to find cultural normality” through simply refusing to deal 
with the history of the GDR.44  
The Marginalization of Public Input at Alexanderplatz 
This problematic elision of East Germany’s built heritage in the service of a new 
“normality” took place at Alexanderplatz, as well. As discussed in Chapter 4, Alexanderplatz had 
grown up naturally as a market square on the eastern edge of Berlin’s center, and by the 1920s it 
was a major transportation and commercial hub. One of the most notable buildings on the pre-
war square was the Warenhaus Tietz, a massive department store built around the turn of the 
century by the Tietz family.45 In the typical style of the day, the store’s skylights and open 
floorplans provided a theatrical space where goods were “staged” amidst an atmosphere of 
opulence.46 The two office buildings added to the square by Peter Behrens in the late 1920s 
created a pedestrian plaza bordered on the other side by the façade of the Tietz store, creating an 
intentional spatial dialogue between the three structures (fig. 4.19). World War II bombing 
resulted in the ruination of the Tietz store and most of the surrounding area, and the subsequent 
division of the city landed Alexanderplatz in the zone of Communist East Berlin. Then, in the 
1960s, the GDR government sponsored the renovation of the space as a large public square that 
                                                
44 Florian Hertweck, Der Berliner Architekturstreit: Architektur, Stadtbau, Geschichte und Identität in der Berliner 
Republik 1989-1999 (Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 2010), 6. Emphasis mine. 
45 It was at one point the largest department store in Europe. Gerwin Zohlen, “Passages, Emporium, Department Store,” 
in Galeria Kaufhof Berlin-Alexanderplatz: Josef Paul Kleihues, by Kleihues + Kleihues (Berlin: Jovis verlag, 2007), 11. 
46 Zohlen also draws attention to the fact that this opulence was intended to offset the notion that department stores 
were only for “the milieu of ‘domestics’ who wanted to buy necessities cheaply.” Ibid. An interesting comparison today might be 
found in the subtle differences between the business approaches as those of Wal-Mart and Target stores, where the same 
emphasis on economy is pursued through very different types of branding and in-store arrangement of goods. 
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could serve as both a recreation and demonstration venue, complete with a “Fountain of 
International Friendship” and a “World Time Clock” that physically expressed the GDR’s 
embeddedness in international socialism (figs. 5.3-5.4).47 But the square’s refurbishment was 
meant to symbolize consumption and commerce, as well: the open pedestrian space was 
surrounded by a cluster of buildings that included several office towers, a high-rise hotel, 
restaurants, and, echoing the former presence of the Tietz store, the Warenhaus Centrum, the 
largest department store in East Germany (fig. 5.5). 
Barely two decades after the square’s completion under the GDR plan, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall marked the beginning of a whole new era in the square’s development. As 
Wezkalnys notes, “Alexanderplatz became an apt vehicle for talking about the demise of the 
GDR state and the future it once embodied.”48 A statement by the Department of Urban 
Development and Environment during the 1993 master plan competition (discussed in Chapter 4) 
declared that Alexanderplatz was to be reconstituted as a symbol of Berlin’s “inner 
unification.”49 This lofty goal was validated by the widespread portrayal of post-Wall 
Alexanderplatz as a spatial void: an unwelcoming wasteland that embodied the worst kind of 
socialist design that appealed only to backward East Germans who were not able to embrace the 
West. It was also seen as a social void, full of the “wrong” kinds of people – “dangerous gypsies, 
eastern European con men, violent Yugoslavian youth gangs, and illegal moneychangers.”50 
As recounted in Chapter 4, the master plan competition for the square was won by Hans 
Kollhoff, whose design featured stone-clad commercial buildings surrounded by a ring of high-
                                                
47 Wolfgang Pehnt, “German Architecture from 1945 to 1990,” in New German Architecture: A Reflexive Modernism, 
ed. Ullrich Schwarz (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002), 284. The square was also home to Hermann Henselmann’s Haus des 
Lehrers (1961-4), the first curtain walled building in the GDR. 
48 Weszkalnys, Berlin, Alexanderplatz, 72. 
49 Quoted in ibid., 73. 
50 Ibid., 72. 
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rises with detailing that echoed both American art deco and late-nineteenth century commercial 
European architecture (figs. 4.22-4.26). This decision was followed by several years of 
negotiations with private investors and the public.51 The investors funded a publicity campaign 
that included newspaper supplements, public discussions, storefront exhibitions, leaflets, and an 
“Alex-Info-Bus” where people could receive details on the plans. Residents and users of the 
square were also invited by planners to “mitgestalten” (“co-design”) and “mitbestimmen” (“have 
a say”) in the design process through questionnaires and mail-in response forms, with the 
promise that officials and developers would incorporate these suggestions. The pamphlets stated, 
“Your design suggestions and the results of the survey will be evaluated and will flower into the 
planning, for nothing ought to be built over Berliners’ heads.”52 The planning process also 
resulted in the grassroots organization of citizens’ groups such as the “Bürgervertretung 
Alexanderplatz” (“Citizens’ Representation Alexanderplatz”). This group did not oppose the idea 
of changing the square, but rather “development on a grand scale,” and they acted as a critical 
voice throughout the negotiations.53 However, the promised “flowering” of public opinion into 
actual design solutions never actually took place; instead, as Wezkalnys clearly documents, 
public comments and critiques were meticulously filed away but never used to make changes to 
the plans. Instead, officials seemed to trust themselves in their role as the “experts” that are so 
often favored in German planning culture, assuming that they simply “knew better” than the 
public did.54 Because their input was solicited and yet completely ignored, many of those 
                                                
51 The public reaction to the Kollhoff plans was resoundingly negative; Strom recounts that there were screaming 
matches between Kollhoff, Hassemer, and citizens at various public meetings. See Strom, Building the New Berlin, 212. Karin 
Lenhart offers an extremely detailed description of the various proceedings. See Karin Lenhart, Berliner Metropoly: 
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52 Weszkalnys, Berlin, Alexanderplatz, 115. 
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participating in these public discussions and surveys rightly felt themselves to be “exploited to 
legitimize the decisions of influential politicians.”55  
The planners’ choice to ignore public input was bolstered by the perceived lack of 
cultural or historical savvy amongst former East Germans. Wezkalnys reports that administrators 
frequently thought of these citizens in terms of 
the image of an activist who was East German first and citizen [of reunited 
Germany] second, who had lived in the area for years, if not decades, and who 
was now anxious not to lose his privileged living space. Sometimes, such a person 
was believed to be backward-looking socialist or an elderly member of the  
[Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, the successor to the East German 
Communist party] the socialist party, rejecting everything “Western” and wishing 
“to preserve Alexanderplatz as a GDR museum.”56 
 
Another particularly telling example of this attitude appears in a text produced by the section of 
the Department of Urban Development dedicated to evaluating citizens’ letters: 
[The letters] mirror, aside from a general rejection of radical changes, worries 
about a loss of identity. … Alexanderplatz is regarded by “East Berliners” as the 
center of East Berlin. The redesign of East Berlin’s center in the sixties and 
seventies is understood as part of both an individual and a collective history of the 
citizens of the former GDR. … [But] the rebuilding of Alexanderplatz in the 
sixties and seventies also consciously destroyed and changed numerous old 
structures. … [The proposed design] attaches itself to the layers of the older urban 
design history. … Decisions concerning how to deal with existing buildings are 
never right or wrong; rather they are oriented towards different design 
objectives.57 
 
This view was shared by the various proponents of Critical Reconstruction: that mid-century 
Modernism, especially as it was expressed in the architecture of East Germany, was both in itself 
ahistorical, and was the result of a heedless destruction of “actual” historical structures from 
earlier in the century. This double lack – a lack of historical import paired with a lack of 
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57 Quoted in ibid. 
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supposed respect for history – was used to justify the reconstruction of “layers of the older urban 
design history” through the demolition of the existing GDR buildings and the adherence to the 
styles outlined in Kollhoff’s master plan. Paired with the idea that the individuals and groups 
who opposed this development represented a social “lack” in terms of their political and cultural 
knowledge (that they were “nostalgic,” backward, or even die-hard communists, and that they 
were unable to understand what constituted a legitimate “history”), the Critical Reconstruction of 
Alexanderplatz seemed, in the planners’ eyes, to be a necessary step towards the creation of a 
cityscape that reflected reunited Germany’s (Western-centric) cohesion and prowess. 
Kleihues’s Redesign of the Centrum Department Store 
In a manner similar to the Palast der Republik, the East Berlin government’s redesign of 
Alexanderplatz during the 1960s and 1970s had been intended to reinforce the image of the state 
as a provider of material contentment to its own inhabitants, and this image was embodied 
especially well by the Centrum store, constructed between 1967 and 1970 (figs. 5.5-5.14). 
Designed by a collective of architects headed by Josef Kaiser, the Centrum was a simple box 
sheathed in a distinctive, honeycomb-patterned aluminum façade that became one of the most 
remarkable and memorable facets of Alexanderplatz. Inside the store, state-of-the-art fluorescent 
lights illuminated the four open sales floors, surrounding dual service cores housing elevators, 
escalators, and restrooms. The Centrum housed cafes and restaurants, and it created a dialogue 
with the open square through an exterior mezzanine level that provided shoppers and diners with 
views of the activities on the plaza (figs. 5.5 and 5.14). The store thus represented both 
technological advancement and aesthetic savvy in a building that also connoted a certain 
standard of living.58 Its air of leisure and consumerism was directed both inwardly, at the GDR’s 
                                                
58 Joachim Palutzki, Architektur in Der DDR (Berlin: Reimer, 2000), 254; Josef Kaiser, “Warenhaus ‘CENTRUM’ in 
Berlin,” Deutsche Architektur 10 (August 1971): 471–474. 
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citizens, and outwardly, representing the advancement of the GDR's society and government to 
international visitors and acting as a  “show window to the West.”59 As Joachim Palutzki 
remarks in his history of East German architecture, the Centrum building in particular was 
intended to furnish “proof that the international standard of consumption could also be reached 
under socialist conditions.”60 (For instance, it was, according to a former employee, the only 
place in the GDR where one could buy coveted denim jeans.)61 Fittingly, the building’s formal 
language clearly mirrors Western commercial designs from the same period (fig. 5.15).62 The 
plan also took the square’s earlier history into account, harking back to Weimar-era plans for the 
square (never completed), and Behrens’s buildings, having survived the war, also provided a 
clear physical basis for the Centrum in their height and massing (fig. 5.16). 
The Centrum chain was bought out by the large West German Kaufhof Corporation in 
1990, and the company hired Josef Paul Kleihues to redesign the Alexanderplatz store, which 
was renamed “Galeria Kaufhof.”63 The most controversial aspect of the design was the complete 
removal of the striking honeycomb façade, which, after significant construction delays, was 
removed beginning in 2004. (The Kaufhof corporation planned to complete the renovations – 
while keeping the store open – in time for Berlin’s hosting of the World Cup in 2006.64) The 
stripping of the façade elicited a “cry of outrage” from the public, but despite demonstrations, 
online petitions, and calls for preservation from members of the Berlin parliament, the head of 
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the Kaufhof corporation declared the façade “too deteriorated to be restored” (figs. 5.17-5.18).65 
The art and architecture collective atelier für alles [sic] was one of the most prominent agitators 
in favor of preserving the façade.66 They saw its destruction as part of the “rampant destruction, 
deprecation, and elimination of GDR Modernism” across the former East Germany, and noted its 
importance both for residents (for whom the façade had long been a part of daily life), and local 
institutions such as historical museums, who saw it as a key artifact to be preserved.67 Many 
observers rightly attributed the conflict over the façade to a shift in generational tastes: the 
national paper Die Welt noted that while the “parent generation” was tearing down the Centrum 
façade, younger people were creating a cult out of reusing and reconstructing East German mid-
century Modernist architecture to create things like trendy clubs – even on Alexanderplatz 
itself.68 “As it did to many other architects, [the Centrum’s] unique aesthetic really appealed to 
us,” write atelier für alles members Tilman Weitz and Olaf Gerecke. “Buildings whose 
appearance is so angular and distinctive have become quite rare. Even for one-time visitors to the 
square, the Centrum building is still today one of the main images [they remember].”69 The 
authors are clear that their appreciation for the building has nothing to do with “Ostalgie,” since 
their group comprises designers from both former East and West, and in any case they were all 
“too young to connect the GDR with the image of an enemy, political intrigues, or a lost 
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childhood.”70 In response to the atelier für alles inititative, the construction company in charge 
of removing the façade did allow about half of the remains to be auctioned, and many of the two-
meter pieces were subsequently acquired by local institutions, artists, and residents.71 The 
company’s promise to use the remaining pieces to cover the elevated walkway between the 
department store and the neighboring Park Hotel, however, was never fulfilled.72 
Kleihues’s design made absolutely no effort to preserve or even allude to any aspects of 
the GDR design. As the original author of the theory of Critical Reconstruction, Kleihues 
encouraged a return to historical forms while making use of cutting-edge materials and 
techniques. His firm stated that the design of the new Kaufhof makes reference to the “great 
department store tradition at Alexanderplatz” exemplified by the former Warenhaus Tietz, and 
simultaneously continues the “European urban planning tradition” by linking to the the idea of 
“urban architecture,” i.e. the dense urban configurations envisioned by Martin Wagner in the 
1920s (figs. 5.19-5.21).73 The design uses the structural shell of the Centrum store, but 
fundamentally reconfigures both the interior and the façade. Like the Tietz department store of 
the 1920s, Kleihues’s design comprises a clearly marked entrance and a façade punctuated by 
vertical strips of windows, and it includes shop windows along the bottom two floors that tie it 
directly to the foot traffic on the square. Kleihues’s design also looks “historical” in that it 
responds in a very literal way to Behrens’s structures, using a matching travertine for its 
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was added historical continuity in that the Kaufhof corporation was actually the “grandchild” of the Tietz family business. The 
Kaufhof firm has since gone under, and the store was acquired by the Canadian chain Hudson’s Bay. See Maris Hubschmid, 
“Kanadier Haben Im Bieterwettbewerb Die Nase Vorn,” Der Tagesspiegel, June 16, 2015. 
 236 
façade.74 The interior of the new store also recalls the historic opulence and carefully 
choreographed circulation of classic department stores through a large atrium that pierces the 
building from top to bottom, letting in natural light, and the theatrical staging of commerce 
encouraged by escalators that smoothly shuttle visitors from floor to floor, affording them a 
series of views through the space at both the products and other shoppers. Gold-colored metallic 
accents against gleaming white surfaces create a luxurious color palette, and though the aesthetic 
is pared down, emphasizing smooth surfaces and geometric forms, the design clearly echoes neo-
classical rationalism in its axiality and grandeur. Nothing could be further from the experience of 
the Centrum, with its horizontally oriented, isolated, and fluorescent-lit sales floors. 
The new design for the store foregrounds the experiential quality of shopping as 
spectacle: a spectacle that involves, at least in the minds of architects and planners, a particular 
kind of spatial encounter with history, through visual references to the past and through the 
recreation of the kind of luxurious space of the turn-of-the-century department store, which itself 
emphasized spectacle. A large atrium pierces the building from top to bottom, letting in natural 
light, a precedent set by the very first department store, Paris’s Au Bon Marché, which was 
emulated in many turn-of-the-century designs in Berlin and elsewhere. As a quintessentially 
industrial and wholly novel building type in the late nineteenth century, the department store 
presented an escape from everyday life into realms of comparative fantasy by enabling 
customers to browse through items amidst opulent surroundings. Emile Zola’s novel Au Bonheur 
des Dames (1883) famously summed up the reverence inspired by these new commercial venues 
by calling them “cathedrals of consumption.” In the case of the Kaufhof, Kleihues was 
consciously referencing this historical typology in order not only to evoke a similar aura of 
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extravagance, but, on top of that, to suggest a historical provenance for the space that lent it yet 
more import and grandeur. In removing the memorable aluminum exterior and referencing the 
early history of department store architecture on the interior of the building, Kleihues and his 
clients thus seem to have both complied with Berlin planners’ wishes to counteract “socialist” or 
Modernist planning, and made what they viewed as a necessary and commercially savvy update 
to the store’s image.  
The many threads of built history at Alexanderplatz illustrate architecture’s role as bearer 
of representational meaning or “identity,” and the role of public discourse in framing that 
identity by attaching meanings to form; however, the nature of that meaning is often slippery or 
counterintuitive. Listening to current planning rhetoric, one might conclude that the Centrum’s 
association with specifically “socialist” planning made it unappealing to its new owners; 
certainly the logic of the “socialist void” figured heavily in the publications and statements by 
city planners. However, this rhetoric was applied unevenly: there are examples of successful 
adaptive reuse of landmarked GDR buildings even on Alexanderplatz itself. For instance, the 
Haus des Lehrers (“House of the Teacher,” a name honoring a destroyed pre-war building that 
was home to the Teachers’ Guild), designed in 1962 by the well-known East German architect 
Hermann Henselmann, has been successfully converted into fashionable office and convention 
spaces (figs. 5.22-5.23).75 The “socialist” associations of such a structure does not seem to have 
hindered its transition into a useful and marketable space. Thus, despite the bandying of the term 
“totalitarian” in relationship to Alexanderplatz, its “socialist” political associations were 
ultimately probably not the prime impetus for the demolition or renovation of GDR-era 
buildings; rather, it was the Centrum’s and other buildings’ perceived lack of “historical” value 
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or, even more simply, their overt outdatedness, that precipitated their removal. Here, “history,” 
in its most simplistic form – a travertine façade – has become simply another tool of commerce. 
There was no profit to be found in preserving the Centrum as a marker of East German “history,” 
and, unlike that which was felt over the Nazi past, there was little international or national 
pressure to aggressively memorialize or “work through” the legacies of the GDR in the built 
environment. Critical Reconstruction, in this case, conveniently provided the Kaufhof 
corporation with a trendy and opulent new design that referenced the glory days of department 
stores a century ago and erased the kitschy, fluorescent-lit memories of the Centrum, shoring up 
the company’s desired image for the store as a “cathedral of consumption” rather than a 
potentially laughable relic of the recent past. After all, what could an East German building have 
to do with capitalist commerce? Just as East Berliners themselves were looked down on by 
planners as “backward” or “Ostalgic,” so too was the architecture of their capital city swept away 
as if it were a mere aberration, so that the threads of what officials considered “legitimate” 
history – i.e. structures from the time before World War II – could be picked up again, or, in this 
case, be practically re-fabricated. 
 
Remaking East Berlin via the Planwerk Innenstadt  
What Kleihues and the Kaufhof Corporation achieved on Alexanderplatz was attempted 
on a much larger and more conceptual scale in Stimmann’s planning work from 1996 to 1999. 
Having held the position of Senate Construction Director since 1991, Stimmann was forced to 
vacate the post in 1995 when his supervisor Wolfgang Nagel lost his seat in the Berlin Senate. 
Stimmann was then reinstated as State Secretary for Planning under Senator Peter Strieder 
(SPD), the newly elected Senator for Urban Development, Environmental Protection, and 
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Technology (the post formerly held by CDU politician Volker Hassemer, with whom Stimmann 
had competed and uneasily collaborated since 1991).76 Stimmann used this new position as a 
platform to draft – and ultimately pass into law – the Planwerk Innenstadt (“Inner-city Plan,” 
often referred to simply as “the Planwerk”), authored chiefly in collaboration with Hoffmann-
Axthelm (fig. 5.24).77 Its stated goal was “to create a total, identity-supporting urban planning 
concept for the inner city area” while encouraging densification “on the basis of historical 
[urban] structures, where the emphasis would be on the eastern center.”78 The plan also expanded 
the power of city officials to make decisions over land sales: as Senate Construction Director 
from 1991-1995, Stimmann’s reach had been limited to the district of Mitte, and the Planwerk 
greatly expanded his influence, which would now encompass several of Berlin’s central 
districts.79 Though this area spanned both East and West Berlin neighborhoods, the majority of 
the saleable – and thus development-ready – land lay in the East, since so much of that property 
had formerly been owned by the GDR government. 
The creation of the Planwerk did not stem from a simple desire on Stimmann’s part for 
power or influence; it was, rather, as Hennecke argues, an ambitious “socio-political project” 
grounded in the belief that a shift in land ownership policies paired with the formal approach of 
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Neumeyer and architect Manfred Ortner for the “City-West” portion of the plans, and architect Bernd Albers in collaboration 
with Hoffmann-Axthelm for the eastern portion. However, they do not figure heavily in the public discussions over the Planwerk, 
nor do the plans reflect their influence to the same degree that they do Stimmann’s and Hoffmann-Axthelm’s. See Lenhart, 
Berliner Metropoly, 105; Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 126. 
78 “Wichtigstes Ziel dabei sollte ein ganzheitliches, identitätsstiftendes städtebauliches Konzept für den 
Innenstadtbereich sein … Faktisch geht es um die Verdichtung der beiden Innenstadtbereiche auf der Grundlage historischer 
Strukturen, wobei der Schwerpunkt im östlichen Zentrum liegen soll.” Senatverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, quoted in Lenhart, 
Berliner Metropoly, 105. 
79 Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 267; Strom, Building the New Berlin, 110. 
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Critical Reconstruction would attract educated, middle-class, politically-active residents to 
central Berlin, and that these people would become an important and necessary driving force 
behind a successful reunited city and nation.80 The implication, of course, was that the area 
covered by the Planwerk – especially the eastern half of the central region of Berlin – was at 
present devoid of such residents, even though, as stated in the plans, 300,000 people already 
lived or worked there.81 In a manner very similar to what took place at Alexanderplatz and the 
Schlossplatz, the three-year process whereby the Planwerk was vetted, edited, and then 
eventually passed into law was one of supposed public involvement, but in actuality its authors 
took little of this public input into account – partly because they felt that the public lacked the 
required expertise to make good planning decisions, and partly because their private-public 
partnership development model meant that their most important constituents and discussants 
were investors, not residents.82 Thus, debates about the Planwerk in the Stadtforum (a body 
created by Senator Hassemer in the early 1990s as a way to “involve” the public in planning, but 
also critiqued by many as a group that existed simply for public show83) and on the floor of 
Berlin’s state parliament, where the plans were vehemently opposed by the PDS (the former East 
German Communist party), resulted in only a few minor changes. Specific neighborhood plans 
were somewhat reworked via a set of intensive, regional “workshops” (“Werkstatten”) before 
                                                
80 Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 127. 
81 Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, “Planwerk Innenstadt,” Amtsblatt: Amtsblatt für Berlin 49, no. 41 (August 13, 1999): 
3132. 
82 See Berlin Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt, “Archiv: Planwerk Innenstadt - Präsentationen,” 
July 29, 2015, http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/planen/planwerke/de/planwerk_innenstadt/planungsprozess/ 
praesentationen.shtml for a list of exhibitions and public presentations. 
83 Critics Werner Sewing and Rudolf Stegers were among these; see Werner Sewing, “Berlinische Architektur,” Arch 
plus, no. 122 (June 1994): 60–69; and Rudolf Stegers, Der Streit um den Potsdamer Platz: Eine Chronik in vier Teilen (Berlin: 
Deutsche Werkbund, 1990). 
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being officially approved by the Berlin Senate in 1999, but for the most part these did not 
succeed in preserving specific GDR buildings or ensembles slated for demolition or renovation.84 
However, as many observers have noted, the “official” approval of the Planwerk 
ultimately meant very little for the concrete future of the city; its power was much more political 
and rhetorical than physically effectual. Political scientist Elizabeth Strom, for instance, rightly 
observes that the Planwerk does not guarantee  
whether anyone wants to buy [the land] under those conditions, and whether once 
it is bought it will actually be developed as the planners hope. … For this to truly 
happen, Berlin’s planners will have to become very adept at managing real estate 
and its development … [and] this has not, historically, been an area in which 
Berlin’s planning officials have excelled.85 
 
Indeed, since its approval, the plan has experienced significant delays, as well as continued 
changes.86 Given that Berlin has been in the grip of a major recession for the last two decades, 
the plan has had few of the sweeping effects that Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm envisioned. 
Rather, it has functioned more distinctly as a discursive tool that, in its marginalization of East 
Berlin history, identity, and local interests in favor of a particular attachment to the aesthetics of 
the “European city” and small-scale, bourgeois land ownership, has become the ultimate 
expression of its authors’ highly conservative, capitalist, and colonialist ideals. 
The Content of the Planwerk: Visualizing Voids, Projecting Wholeness 
 Stimmann and others who had been involved in planning politics in Berlin since the 
1970s had witnessed the SPD’s planning tactics during that era, which were based in quantitative 
data analysis and top-down planning techniques, resulting in reams of text that, Stimmann and 
                                                
84 Strom, Building the New Berlin, 110; Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, “Planwerk Innenstadt,” 3134. The main changes 
to this version were substantially fewer proposed changes to traffic patterns. Ibid., 113. 
85 Ibid. 
86 See Berlin Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt, “Planwerke: Planwerk Innere Stadt,” July 29, 2015, 
http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/planen/planwerke/de/planwerk_innere_stadt/index.shtml for the current version. 
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others recognized, was as inaccessible to the public as it was ineffective for guiding policy. A 
graphic plan, Hennecke observes, “had the potential, in Stimmann’s eyes, to accomplish the 
necessary translation of general societal goals into the real space of city life.”87 Stimmann 
therefore joined the ranks of post-modern urban designers like Kleihues and many others (such 
as Aldo Rossi) who had developed a rhetoric the relied heavily on images beginning in the late 
1960s, deftly deploying plans, drawings, maps, and photographs in tandem with text in order to 
support their arguments and theories.88 Accordingly, the Planwerk is not primarily a text, but a 
series of visual documents, primarily in large-scale map form (the German word “Plan” actually 
means both “map” and “plan”).89 The main image – literally called the Leitbild, or “guiding 
image” –is a map of the city center that, in a manner very similar to Kleihues’s 1984 plan for the 
IBA (fig. 1.25, discussed in Chapter 1), shows the built substance of the city in grey, existing 
plans in orange, and proposed infill in red (fig. 5.24). The target development area, which falls 
roughly inside the former boundary of Berlin’s historical baroque Excise Wall, covers about 30 
square kilometers and includes the districts of Mitte, Friedrichshain, Kreuzberg, Tiergarten, 
Schöneberg, and Charlottenburg.90 
 With its easy color-coding and simple lines, the Planwerk, though quite large in scale, 
initially appears clear and readable. However, any attempt to use it to understand the city’s plans 
instantly mystifies the reader, in that it cannot actually function alone: unless one is a city 
                                                
87 “Ein gezeichneter Plan, … hätte genau zu der in den Augen Stimmanns notwendigen Übersetzung algemeiner 
gesellschaftspolitischer Zielvorstellungen in den realen Raum städtischen Lebens beitragen können.” Hennecke, Die kritische 
Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 63–64. 
88 Well-known examples include Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter, Collage City (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1978); 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown, Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1977); Kevin Lynch, The Image of the City (The MIT Press, 1960); and of course Aldo Rossi, The 
Architecture of the City (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982). 
89 Weszkalnys, Berlin, Alexanderplatz, 49. 
90 Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, “Planwerk Innenstadt,” 3132. Hennecke notes the similarity to the Charta für die Mitte 
Berlins, where the center is defined as being inside the former Akzisemauer. The wall is mostly non-extant today, making this a 
somewhat arbitrary means of delineation. See Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 202. 
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planner oneself, or intimately involved in the planning process, one has to rely (ironically, 
perhaps, given Stimmann’s critique of written plans) on the accompanying text or on further 
research in order to understand how the plans will affect the city. This is because the Planwerk 
includes no street names, no district borders, and does not mark inner-city train lines or other 
mass transit routes; the former path of the Berlin Wall, i.e. the division between East and West, 
is also completely invisible. An interactive version of the map on the city’s website shows the 
eight “sectors” slated for more detailed discussion in the neighborhood “workshops” highlighted 
in red, but includes no further details regarding what streets, plazas, or other identifying 
landmarks are included.91 Visually, then, the Planwerk exudes the desired “cohesion” and 
“wholeness” of Berlin in much the same way that Harvey describes in his critique of colonial 
map-making. The map’s elision of district divisions and other familiar markers, reducing the 
urban landscape to an ensemble of shapes and colors, presents the physical re-joining of the two 
halves of the city as a fait accompli. 
Because of the lack of identifying information on the Leitbild itself, we are left to rely on 
other various texts, images, and statements by planners in order to understand exactly what the 
image is attempting to communicate. Far from operating on its own, the Planwerk works 
dialectically with these other media to create an overall impression of what it will accomplish. 
The planning goals stated in the published materials include “sustainable city development 
through densification,”; “reurbanization” and the “mixing of functions” based on the Leitbild of 
the “European city”; the improvement of public transit and traffic infrastructure (especially hard 
to see on the map, since public transit is not marked); better inner-city parks and green spaces; 
“modernization and completion” of existing structures, especially through building types that are 
                                                
91 See Berlin Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt, “Archiv: Planwerk Innenstadt - Planwerkstätten,” 
July 29, 2015, http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/planen/planwerke/de/planwerk_innenstadt/planwerkstaetten/index.shtml. 
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“eigentumsfähig” (“able to be privately owned”); “a new formulation of Berlin’s city form 
through a common identity-supporting inner city and with critical respect for all historical layers 
of city development”; and the knitting together of individually planned parts of the city.92 But 
understanding the Planwerk in this way, too, is a dubious undertaking. For instance, the text 
states that areas “not characterized by an urban mix of functions and inner-city densities” exist in 
the districts of Tiergarten, Kreuzberg (both former West), Mitte, and Friedrichshain (former 
East), where “monofunctional Siedlungen” and open spaces like Alexanderplatz characterize 
large swaths of the city.93 However, if one superimposes street names and district lines onto the 
map, it immediately becomes clear that this proposed redevelopment and infill is not equally 
distributed between former East and West, nor amongst the various districts; the overwhelming 
majority of it is slated for the eastern portion of Mitte, in areas where GDR development had 
followed mid-century Modernist planning models, and where property ownership was now in the 
hands of the state. 
The Planwerk was often accompanied (for instance, on the Berlin planning department’s 
website) by a series of chronological maps called the Schwarzpläne (figure-ground plans), 
showing the unbuilt areas of the city as white voids, with built regions in black (figs. 5.25-
5.29).94 A tool used by many post-modern urban theorists (including Kleihues), these maps 
provide an easy illustration of how urban density has decreased since the 1940s, thus presenting 
historical “evidence” for the need for redevelopment. Stimmann relied on the visual rhetoric of 
the Schwarzpläne throughout his earlier tenure as Senate Construction Director (1991-1995), and 
                                                
92 Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, “Planwerk Innenstadt,” 3132. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Hennecke notes that these types of plans first appeared in the Pariser Platz and Städtebauliche Strukturplan reports 
commissioned by Stimmann in the early 1990s, captioned with phrases including the word “Störung” (“destruction”). See 
Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 151–152. 
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they continued to be used throughout the 1990s on Berlin’s city planning website, in publications 
about new construction, and they were even included as part of Germany’s installation at the 
2000 Venice Biennale.95 Stimmann’s own written statements shored up the visual rhetoric of 
voids that the Schwarzpläne clearly utilized. Invoking the city-as-text metaphor employed by 
post-structuralist thinkers like Michel de Certeau, Henri Lefebvre, Roland Barthes, and many 
others, as well as the idea of the city as a site of memory made popular by Rossi, Stimmann 
stated that these maps reveal “the memory of the city,” articulating in easy-to-read black and 
white the “letters” that “build words and sentences and tell stories.”96  
Reading the urban texture means understanding the city as text. The planner, 
Städtebauer (“city designer”) and architect, therefore, needs to continually edit his 
city, examine it for orthographic mistakes, add new chapters in some places and 
cut in others, view the text from the perspective of current societal and political 
Leitbilder (‘guiding images’) without writing it completely anew. The city builder 
is the editor of the urban texture.97 
 
As Harvey suggests, Stimmann here presents the Schwarzpläne as offering a god’s-eye-view of 
the city, over which the planner can then wield his power to “edit.” 
In addition to Schwarzpläne, photos and perspectival visualizations were also used to 
illustrate the supposed need for redevelopment at particular sites. For instance, in the report on 
the Spittelmarkt, a square in southeastern Mitte that was redeveloped by the GDR government in 
the 1960s, photos from the turn of the century were used alongside contemporary ones in order 
to, as Hennecke argues, “act as proof of the ‘inappropriateness’ of the current built substance.” 
Captions describe the crossing avenue of Leipziger Strasse as once constituting the “most elegant 
                                                
95 Ibid., 154. 
96 Hans Stimmann, “Das Gedächtnis der europäischen Stadt,” in Von der Architektur-zur Stadtdebatte: die Diskussion 
um das Planwerk Innenstadt, ed. Hans Stimmann and Eric-Jan Ouwerkerk (Berlin: Braun, 2001), 11. 
97 Quoted in Weszkalnys, Berlin, Alexanderplatz, 51.  
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street in Berlin” with “spectacular shops,” now degraded by the “absolute dominance” of 
traffic.98 As the planning materials stated, 
The Planwerk exists in the city-building tradition of the European city and relates 
itself to the historical traces of the destroyed Berlin ground plan (Stadtgrundriß), 
without obscuring the history of this destruction. The goal is not a nostalgic return 
to that which is irretrievably lost, but a dialogical and also tension-filled 
completion of the existing structures which are now assessed as inadequate (often 
results of post-war city planning measures), oriented towards contemporary needs 
for urban visiting, dwelling, and quality of life.99 
 
As Hennecke argues, the Schwarzpläne and their accompanying interpretive statements 
(including also, often, captions that describe them as depicting “destruction”) make the case that 
the city has been ruined by post-war building and planning measures: “The illustrations mislead 
(verführen) [the reader] to the knee-jerk conclusion (Kurzschluss) that every demolition was a 
destructive undertaking and only the ‘filling back up’ [of these voids] would be an appropriate 
answer.”100 The accompanying text to the Planwerk states that “demolitions should generally be 
avoided. [But] at the same time it should be ensured that the traces of the historical image of the 
city that were lost in post-war developments … should be taken up again, in consideration of 
today’s requirements (Ansprüche) for quality of life (Lebensqualität).101 To this end, the 
Planwerk supposedly “uses the method of Critical Reconstruction in order to uncover the lost 
                                                
98 Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 156. 
99 “Das Planwerk steht in der städtebaulichen Tradition der europäischen Stadt und bezieht sich auf die verschütteten 
historischen Spuren des zerstörten Berliner Stadtgrundrisses, ohne dabei die Geschichte dieser Zerstörung zu verleugnen. Ziel ist 
nicht die nostalgische Rückkehr zum unwiederbringlich Verlorenen, sondern dialogische, auch spannungsvolle Ergänzung des als 
unzulänglich bewerteten Bestandes (häufig Ergebnisse der städtebaulichen Nachkriegsmoderne), orientiert an gegenwärtigen 
Bedürfnissen nach städtischer Aufenthalts-, Wohn- und Lebensqualität.” Berlin Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und 
Umwelt, “Archiv: Planwerk Innenstadt - Anlass + Ziel,” July 29, 2015, http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/planen/planwerke 
/de/planwerk_innenstadt/anlass_ziel/index.shtml.  
100 Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 153–154. 
101 “Bei den Planungen für die Innenstadtbereiche sollen Abrisse weitgehend vermieden werden. Gleichzeitig ist 
sicherzustellen, dass die durch Nachkriegsentwicklungen verschütteten Spuren und verlorengegangenen Bauten des historischen 
Stadtbildes in Verbindung mit Neubebauungen unter Berücksichtigung heutiger Ansprüche an Lebensqualität weitgehend wieder 
aufgenommen werden.” Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, “Planwerk Innenstadt,” 3131.  
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traces of city development in the inner city.”102 But this “uncovering” ultimately does mean 
demolitions – of existing GDR architecture. Urban historian Harald Bodenschatz argues that, in 
this respect, Critical Reconstruction revealed itself as a “crusade against GDR city planning,” 
which was written off a priori as having meant “destruction” of the city structure 
(Stadtgrundriss).103 Again, as in the case of the Centrum at Alexanderplatz, mid-century GDR 
Modernism was simply written off as having no historical value. Critical Reconstruction, here, 
meant editing out as much of that Modernist legacy as possible in order to restore the “true” 
DNA of the pre-war street plan and building typologies. 
Thus, despite statements to the effect that “the superimposition of different historical 
layers … includes the history of wartime destruction and the reconstruction of the post-war 
period” and that “no historical phase should be negated,” the Planwerk slated several areas in the 
eastern portion of Mitte for complete redevelopment.104 One of these was the Fischerinsel 
neighborhood on the southern portion of what is now known as Museum Island, the site of the 
original medieval settlement in Berlin. It had been subject to slum-clearance measures in the late 
nineteenth century, and, in GDR times, had been redeveloped with several high-rise towers set 
amongst ample green space. The Planwerk proposed block-edge infill, focused along the major 
avenue of Gertraudenstrasse, and the “renewed identifiability (Kenntlichmachung) of the 
historical core” of Cölln (the name of one of Berlin’s two original medieval villages) through 
traffic-quieting measures and added architectural references to the medieval Petrikirche (Church 
                                                
102 Ibid., 3133. 
103 Quoted in Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 151. 
104 “Durch die Überlagerung mit den Stadtentwicklungsprojekten der Moderne und der Nachkriegszeit wird eine für 
Berlin signifikante Innenstadtstruktur öffentlicher Straßen und Plätze neu formuliert, die keine Phase der Berliner 
Entwicklungsgeschichte verleugnen soll.” Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, “Planwerk Innenstadt,” 3133.  
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of St. Peter) that used to stand on the site.105 One of the most contentious facets of the plan was 
the proposed removal of the “Maple-Leaf” (Ahornblatt) Restaurant, built by the GDR in the 
early 1970s and named for its distinctive star-shaped plan that culminated in a set of peaked 
rooflines (fig. 5.30). Used as a dance club after the fall of the Wall, it was eventually demolished 
and replaced by a hotel, against vehement protests by the Berlin Architects’ Chamber.106 The city 
stated that this replacement was necessary “in order to achieve a convincing formulation of the 
Cölln city core.”107  
Like the Centrum store, the Maple-Leaf Restaurant was neither universally liked nor 
appreciated by either former residents of the GDR or by contemporary critics, but it – and the 
neighborhood surrounding it –nevertheless represented an important and longstanding aspect of 
Berlin’s architectural and urban development. However, Critical Reconstruction’s basis in the 
reaction against mid-century Modernist planning meant, essentially, no chance for the 
preservation of these buildings; an attention to the supposed “layers of history” on the site meant 
an aggressively negative stance toward buildings like the Maple-Leaf, which had themselves, 
according to the proponents of Critical Reconstruction, committed the error of erasing earlier 
structures. No matter that the gigantic Reichsbank building, which lay just a block to the north, 
had also erased earlier traces of the medieval city; because of its restrained neo-classical 
Modernism and its ties to Nazi history, it was subjected to rehabilitation rather than demolition. 
                                                
105 The church had been bombed and was demolished by the GDR government in the 1960s. See Berlin 
Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt, “Archiv: Planwerk Innenstadt - Fischerinsel: Werkstatt,” July 29, 2015, 
http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/planen/planwerke/de/planwerk_innenstadt/planwerkstaetten/fischerinsel/werkstatt.shtml. 
106 There was a long debate in which many supported the idea of simply topping this building with a skyscraper (since 
the main complaint was about density), but this plan failed. See ibid.; Michael S. Falser, Zwischen Identität Und Authentizität: 
Zur Politischen Geschichte Der Denkmalpflege in Deutschland (Dresden: Thelem, 2008); and Benedikt Hotze, “‘Ahornblatt 
Muss Erhalten Werden’: Fachleute Einstimmig Gegen Abriss Eines Modernen Baudenkmals in Berlin,” BauNetz, January 22, 
2000, http://www.baunetz.de/meldungen/Meldungen_Fachleute_einstimmig_gegen_Abriss_eines_modernen_ 
Baudenkmals_in_Berlin_6431.html. 
107 Berlin Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt, “Archiv: Planwerk Innenstadt - Fischerinsel: 
Werkstatt”; Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 147. 
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Mid-century structures and ensembles that represented densities that were too low, forms that 
were too experimental, looked kitschy or outdated, or which did not sufficiently hug the edges of 
the street, were deemed blights on the cityscape. As mentioned above, such structures existed in 
both East and West Berlin, and the Planwerk looked to remedy this kind of planning on both 
sides of the former Wall. But existing private property ownership in the West made it much more 
difficult for the city to achieve these ends there, resulting in a lopsided and seemingly GDR-
focused campaign to “remedy” the results of the supposed mid-century “destruction” of the 
historical cityscape through yet more (this time purportedly salutary) demolitions of and 
incursions on the urban fabric. 
The Planwerk as a Mechanism of Social Change 
 This one-sided focus on the remains of GDR planning and construction – motivated by 
both the realities of state property ownership and an aesthetic reaction against mid-century 
planning and architecture – blended with the socio-political theories of Hoffmann-Axthelm, 
which were also adopted wholeheartedly by Stimmann, to create a discursive position for the 
Planwerk that reduced former GDR residents to, essentially, colonial subjects. Even the 
Leitbild’s accompanying text points to the reunification of not just the city structure, but its 
social fabric, targeting the proverbial “Wall in the head”: the continued cultural division between 
former East and West Germans.108 But the difference between the two populations was more 
than cultural, in the sense of different tastes, preferences, styles, or ways of interacting; it was 
also very much a set of differences based in social class. Thus along with the wish for a cohesive 
merging of two formerly separate populations, the Planwerk’s text also expresses an anxiety over 
                                                
108 Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, “Planwerk Innenstadt,” 3132. 
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the potential suburbanization of the city through the flight of wealthier, more highly-educated 
residents to larger, more luxurious housing outside the urban center: 
If we are to stop the emigration of integrative [social] layers (Schichten) out of the 
inner city, then the residential landscape must be appropriate for families, 
children, old, and young, public space must again be brought back into 
consciousness as a worthy space, possibilities for wealth accrual 
(Eigentumsbildung) must be created and requirements for mobility be satisfied.109  
 
This view jibes with more general and longstanding discussions within the architectural and 
urban planning professions over “shrinking cities” and deurbanization that was seen widely in 
North American and European cities in the 1970s and early 1980s. Post-modern architects and 
theorists such as Stimmann, Hoffmann-Axthelm, and Kleihues had been among those voices 
advocating for a restoration of and return to the mixed-use inner city as a place to live. But the 
Planwerk’s goal of attracting middle-class residents also stemmed directly from the prolific 
writings and theories of Hoffmann-Axthelm, who, since the 1980s, had been formulating his own 
idea of participatory organization based on “local processes of mediation,” i.e. door-to-door, 
intimately engaged planning. Through this method, he believed, residents themselves would 
learn to advocate for their own interests and, eventually, make it possible for the city to do away 
with top-down planning altogether.110 However, he recognized that this goal would only be 
possible if residents and owners were educated in the “right” way of advocating for themselves; 
this task necessitated that the city planner act as a “therapist-pedagog” who could teach them 
these skills. This mode of self-governance was also only possible if the “right” mix of property 
owners and residents existed in a neighborhood – if residents had what he called 
                                                
109 “Wenn der Abwanderungsprozess integrativer Schichten aus der Innenstadt gestoppt werden soll, muss sich das 
Wohnumfeld den Bedürfnissen von Familien, Kindern, Alten und Jungen anpassen, müssen die öffentlichen Räume wieder als 
wertvolle Orte ins Bewusstsein gerückt werden, die nicht verwahrlosen dürfen, müssen Möglichkeiten der Eigentumsbildung 
ausgebaut werden und die Mobilitätsbedürfnisse stadtverträglich befriedigt werden.” Ibid., 3133.  
110 Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 91. 
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“Bodenbindung,” or “attachment to land.”111 Therefore the cornerstone of Hoffmann-Axthelm’s 
theories became the idea of the individual, small-scale parcel of land, owned by a private party: 
something he related to the “historical” Berlin of the nineteenth century and earlier, before the 
advent of large-scale, state-sponsored development à la Modernism.112 The Planwerk takes up 
this goal of “initiating a new urban-civic consciousness (stadtbürgerliches Bewusstsein)” by 
encouraging – in word, at least – small-scale real-estate investment at the level of individual 
plots of land.113 
 Hoffmann-Axthelm’s theory has the goal of eventually liberating the general populace 
from government oversight, by fostering the growth of an educated, self-governing citizenry. 
However, the darker implication of this aim is the idea that the existing social and economic 
structures in the former East Berlin are so malformed that they must be cleared away – literally 
and figuratively – in order to start afresh with a new set of residents and ownership structures.114 
This reasoning paired perfectly with the aesthetic tenets of Critical Reconstruction, which looked 
to restore pre-war traffic patterns, lots, and zoning (thus enabling Hoffmann-Axthelm’s focus on 
the individual parcel), and to do away with mid-century planning and architecture, especially in 
former East Berlin. Furthermore, as Hennecke also points out, with the idea of Bodenbindung, 
Hoffmann-Axthelm’s theories demonstrate a problematic reliance on the notion of “rootedness” 
in land itself (he uses the word “Verwürzelung,” a term that has its own tainted history in 
conservative German political discourse).115 As discussed in Chapter 1, one of Kleihues’s goals 
for the creation of the theory of Critical Reconstruction was the re-establishment of a specifically 
                                                
111 Ibid., 107. 
112 Hoffmann-Axthelm misses the fact that land ownership conditions were never this ideal, neither in the nineteenth 
century nor earlier. He was as nostalgic for a fictional “lost era” as the GDR residents supposedly were. 
113 Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, “Planwerk Innenstadt,” 3131. 
114 Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 167. 
115 In the pre-war period, it was used by Nazis and others in the critique of Modernist thought. Ibid., 119. 
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German tradition of architecture. By taking up the threads of “good” architectural styles – styles 
that represented the “best moments of Germany’s history” (i.e. the era of Schinkel and Weimar 
Modernism), Kleihues thought Critical Reconstruction could help restore the nation’s prowess as 
a center of cutting-edge design. This focus on indigeneity, however, easily slides into, at best, 
cultural nationalism, and at worst, ethnocentrism.116 When paired with the idea of intervening in 
the social fabric and creating a new national identity, as in Hoffmann-Axthelm’s formulation of 
Critical Reconstruction via the Planwerk, it has the potential to look downright xenophobic: as if 
only the “right” kind of people can produce the “right” kind of society through their attachment 
to the land, using the “right” kind of architecture and planning which arises organically from 
German history and identity. Seen in the larger context of Critical Reconstruction’s reliance on 
the “European city” model, as well as its many methods of “Othering” the residents and 
architecture of the former East, Hoffmann-Axthelm’s theories reveal themselves as, if not 
intentionally, then by their myriad associations, deeply ethnocentric and troublingly colonialist 
with regard to the former GDR. 
Critical Reconstruction and the Planwerk Innenstadt as a Colonial Move 
Stimmann’s shift in roles within the Berlin planning administration in 1995 allowed him 
to implement Critical Reconstruction on a larger scale than he had as Senate Construction 
Director, where he had only wielded influence over particular parcels and sites, and in many 
cases had to compete with other planning departments for jurisdiction. As a state secretary under 
the Senator for Urban Development, he was able to address the entire inner city at once. The 
Planwerk was, at its root, a totalizing act, resting on the belief that planners (led by Stimmann 
                                                
116 Germany is still struggling very publicly with this today, as its leaders try to cope with both existing conflicts over 
their own increasingly multicultural society and the influx of refugees from southern Europe and the Middle East. See, for 
instance, “Merkel Erklärt Multikulti Für Gescheitert,” Spiegel Online, October 16, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/artikel/a-
723532.html; and “Merkel Zur Flüchtlingskrise: ‘Multikulti Bleibt Eine Lebenslüge,’” Spiegel Online, December 14, 2015, 
http://www.spiegel.de/artikel/a-1067685.html. 
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and Hoffmann-Axthelm) could – and should – intervene in the city at this macro level in order 
to, as the accompanying text stated, create an urban environment that was “appropriate” for 
certain kinds of residents, to create “possibilities for wealth accrual,” and to reunite the city not 
only physically, but socially, economically, politically, and culturally.117 The supposed 
involvement of the public in these plans – which was imperative, since Stimmann’s and 
Hoffmann-Axthelm’s logic rested on the idea that residents should govern themselves – served, 
in reality, to obscure their implicit wish for near total control over city planning decisions: their 
plans to create a self-governing urban public simultaneously denied that same public the very 
ability to self-govern. Just as it had at Alexanderplatz, public involvement in the process of the 
Planwerk’s development was essentially a way to legitimize their own plans, since they could 
listen to residents without actually changing the content of the Planwerk in any substantial 
way.118  
There was considerable critique of the Planwerk by former East German architectural 
professionals and politicians in both parliamentary discussions and in the media. Architectural 
historian Simone Hain called the “media staging” of the Planwerk “an attack on democratic 
principles and the republican constitution of society.”119 The Berlin PDS also criticized the 
Planwerk in parliamentary sessions as trying to circumvent the “democratic planning process.” 
The ironic result of this protest was that their language was, in a brazen show of hypocrisy on the 
parts of the leading centrist parties, turned around and used to direct parliamentary discussion of 
the Planwerk itself as a supposedly democratic city planning tool. As Hennecke puts it, “if the 
                                                
117 Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, “Planwerk Innenstadt,” 3132–3133. 
118 Hennecke dedicates a whole section of her book to the use of the idea of consensus in the Planwerk Innenstadt 
approval process. See Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 234–236. 
119 “Daher betrachte ich die mediale Inszenierung dieses Planwerkes als Angriff auf demokratische Prinzipien und die 
republikanische Verfassung der Gesellschaft.” Quoted in Ibid., 280.  
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allusion to a ‘democratic process’ in the PDS parliamentary motion was meant to point to an 
alternative to what they saw as the undemocratic process of the Planwerk, that very same line 
was changed, in the course of subsequent motions by the SPD and CDU fractions, into a label for 
the ‘democratic process’ of the Planwerk.”120 
The Planwerk’s disregard for dissenting voices was underpinned by Stimmann’s and 
Hoffmann-Axtelm’s view of residents of the former East as subjects needing to be educated in 
proper self-governance. As Hoffmann-Axthelm had written along with Bernhard Strecker in an 
earlier report on the city, “The main problem is the situation created by GDR planning. Here the 
emptying-out of the urban landscape and the concept of an entirely new city meant the complete 
public ownership of the reconstruction. There was, in essence, only one developer” – the state. 
This problem resulted, they argued, in a city based on abstract notions of “function” rather than 
“individual social powers,” with no “responsible parties” (Träger, also translatable as “bearers”). 
“National Socialism, the emigration and destruction of Berlin’s Jewish population, and the 
history of division with its isolation and disappropriation in East Berlin have largely destroyed 
the urban middle class (Bürgertum, also often translated as “bourgeoisie”).”121 Stimmann also 
adopted this rhetoric, declaring in a podium discussion that East Berlin’s lack of a bourgeois 
class with “elevated tastes” meant that there were no “appropriate interlocutors” with whom city 
                                                
120 “Bezieht sich der Verweis auf ein ‘demokratisches Verfahren’ im Antrag der PDS auf eine Alternative zum als 
undemokratisch angesehenen Planungsverfahren im Planwerk, so wird die gleiche Überschrift im Zuge von dazu gestellten 
Änderungsanträgen der Fraktionen der SPD und CDU zu einem Etikett für das ‘demokratische Verfahren’ des Planwerks 
umgewandelt.” Ibid., 274–275. The PDS merged with Die Linke in 2006. 
121 “Hauptproblem ist die durch die DDR-Planung geschaffene Lage. Hier entsprach der städtebaulichen Entleerung 
und dem Konzept einer neuen Stadt eine vollständige Vergesellschaftung des Wiederaufbaus. Es gab und Grunde nur noch einen 
einzigen Bauherren. Soweit wiederum Nutzungen und Menschen implantiert wurden, sind sie unter DDR-Bedingungen 
eingebracht worden, d.h. nicht als mehr oder minder selbständige soziale Mächte, sondern als mit Menschen ausgestattete 
geplante Funktionen. … Das DDR-Erbe besteht darin, daß überhaupt keine Träger da sind.” And: “Hinzu kommt, dass der 
Nationalsozialismus, die Emigration und Vernichtung des Berliner Judentums und die Geschichte der Teilung mitsamt der 
Isolierung und Enteignung in Ostberlin das städtische Bürgertum weitgehend zerstört haben.” Quoted in ibid., 168. 
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planners and developers could discuss aesthetic or other planning issues.122 East Berlin was thus 
construed as a social “void” that could only rightly be filled with the results of Critical 
Reconstruction, which would attract a bourgeois public who could then advocate for 
neighborhood interests. Essentially, this deeply colonial discourse implied that former East 
Berliners were simply interlopers in their own homes – that they did not own them, nor did they 
possess the skills to change them in the right ways; the only people who had the skills to 
“correctly” inhabit these spaces were the educated middle-class from the former West. 
 Because of the reliance on the tenets of Critical Reconstruction, the Planwerk’s filling of 
voids looked to be physical as well as social. Here, the overt visual politics of both the Leitbild 
and the Schwarzpläne served as the markers of their own success – the filling in of the literal 
“blanks” in the cityscape meant the remediation of former “mistakes” in planning. In 
Stimmann’s words, the “text” of the city needed to be rewritten.123 As Hain commented, “this 
plan is based on a concept of history which sees the post-war historical period as abnormal, 
ahistorical and ultimately destructive. It thus … ignores forty years of an urban double existence 
– which was after all of major historical and international importance.”124 The PDS called 
regularly for the protection of mid-century planning ensembles and buildings such as the Maple-
Leaf Restaurant through landmarking, but their requests were denied in favor of Critical 
Reconstruction. As Hennecke rightly observes, the developments of mid-century Modernism are 
                                                
122 Quoted in ibid., 169.  Hennecke also notes how architectural historian and critic Klaus Hartung also talked about 
central Berlin becoming a “void” of immigrants, the elderly, and the former East Germans. 
123 Weszkalnys describes the Planwerk as being the marker of its own success, since every new construction seems to 
complete the image. Weszkalnys, Berlin, Alexanderplatz, 49. 
124 Quoted in ibid., 55. 
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seen by the Critical Reconstructionists as a “mistake” which hinders “normal” and “continuity-
centered” development.125  
As discussed in Chapter 3, Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm had both been critics of 
Kleihues’s Critical Reconstruction during the 1980s, and yet, in the post-Wall era, they both 
suddenly threw their political weight entirely behind it. While it might be tempting to interpret 
Stimmann’s and Hoffmann-Axthelm’s turnabout as a purely cynical move calculated to 
manipulate the city planning apparatus and wield control over investors, it is also important to 
recall that neither of them had ever previously opposed dense, block-edge development per se. 
This was not a drastic shift in their stylistic preferences. Rather, it constituted a significant shift 
in their planning models, from one that had focused on the process of community involvement to 
one that more clearly emphasized aesthetic restrictions and top-down zoning decisions as the 
solution to Berlin’s problems. Their about-face with regard to Kleihues’s theory, I argue, was the 
result of their realization that Critical Reconstruction was exactly what they needed, from a 
practical perspective, in order to achieve their planning goals. It allowed them to create 
maximum revenue for the city by utilizing as much of the state-owned land in the former East as 
possible for development, and to guide investors toward particular typologies and densities in 
order to both limit “flashy experiments” and to attract the “right” kind of bourgeois public to live 
and work in the city center. Critical Reconstruction’s focus on moderately dense, mixed-use, 
block-edge development, as well as its loose references to “historical” (i.e. pre-war) architecture, 
was both economically viable and conveniently trendy. Within this model, mid-century 
Modernism, particularly those examples associated with the GDR, was declared unviable for 
theoretical, political, or aesthetic reasons: it not only represented a history that Stimmann and 
                                                
125 Critic Bruno Flierl argued that even the proposed infill of greens pace in between mid-century GDR buildings 
constituted a kind of destruction, since it erased the original spatial character of the ensembles. Hennecke, Die kritische 
Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 149–150. 
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others were not willing (or forced) to engage with, but, most importantly, it was a style that was, 
basically, commercially unfashionable.  
 
Conclusion: Gentrifying the GDR 
Since the early 1990s, Berlin has been in the grip of a major recession: in 2003 its long-
time mayor, Klaus Wowereit, coined the phrase “Arm aber sexy” (“poor but sexy”) to describe 
its dire financial situation, and it soon became the city’s unofficial motto. The physical outcomes 
of the Planwerk Innenstadt have therefore been less drastic than its authors first dreamed. Still, 
seen alongside individual examples like Kleihues’s Kaufhof renovation and the demolition of the 
Maple-Leaf Restaurant, as well as the rhetoric of its authors and other planners, critics, and 
politicians who support the idea of Critical Reconstruction, it is clear that the Planwerk has 
functioned as a way to marginalize the voices and “collective urban memory” of East Berliners.  
Justified as a left-leaning move toward the creation of a functional and socially cohesive 
urban society, the Planwerk and Critical Reconstruction were in actuality extremely conservative 
ideas that sought to repress anything that did not fit their image of the “historical” or “European 
city.” In essence, Critical Reconstruction became tool of the most direct kind of gentrification, a 
classist and colonial claiming of a space deemed “empty” of the “proper” kinds of residents, to 
the detriment of the existing population. Rather than engaging with the complexities of the mid-
century Modernist cityscape and the memory of the GDR, the Planwerk tried to erase and 
replace them with a new utopia based in bourgeois ideals of cultural consumption. And, though 
they formerly had been critics of Kleihues, Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm in particular 
ended up not only harking back to Kleihues’s call for a “good” German architecture, but they 
proposed this as the required basis for a new society that is properly educated and “tied to the 
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land.” Seen alongside the Architecture Debates, which helped to characterize Critical 
Reconstruction as harboring conservative or even fascist tendencies in its restrictive aesthetics, 
this all begins to look a little too close to problematic facets of German history, specifically the 
Nazi period. 
However, although it is tempting to paint Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm as “fascist” 
in their formal preferences, their discursive treatment of East Berliners, and in their desire to 
consolidate political power, such a comparison is much too reductive. These problematic facets 
of their policy are not unique to Berlin, to Germany, or to Europe, but are blind spots inherent in 
the work of planners in cities across the globe. Given their particular situation in reunited 
Germany during the 1990s, however, Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm had an added 
responsibility to discursively situate themselves not only as distinctively anti-Nazi, but as 
symbolically representative of reunited Berlin and Germany in a way that was politically viable. 
Though they certainly could have done a better job of managing this aspect of their work, it was 
also an impossibly tall order. Stimmann’s and Hoffmann-Axthelm’s struggles – and failures – to 
recreate Berlin’s urban landscape in the way they desired therefore points to the larger pitfalls of 
urban planning in the post-modern era: the impossibility of getting architecture or other city 
forms to “mean” something specific, and to achieve particular political or social ends through 
that meaning. As Rossi articulated so well decades earlier in The Architecture of the City, 
buildings and urban ensembles emphatically signify, but people become attached to them in 
different ways; they evoke different memories and have different connotations for every 
individual. Sites where these diverse significations conflict become contested ones where 
residents, officials, and members of institutions battle for the right to their own interpretations.126  
                                                
126 Two very well-known American examples of this conflict, both in Lower Manhattan, are the fight over Richard 
Serra’s Tilted Arc, and the planning process for the reconstruction of the World Trade Center after 9/11. See Harriet F. Senie, 
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The formulation of the Planwerk Innenstadt happened, for instance, alongside another decade-
long political battle in Berlin: the decision on the design for the Memorial to the Murdered Jews 
of Europe on a block-sized plot next to the Brandenburg Gate. The eventual selection of a design 
by Peter Eisenman, with the addition – opposed by the architect – of an underground 
“information center,” was a messy process involving all manner of problematic statements and 
sub-optimal compromises by government officials, the projects’ sponsors, and the contestants 
and judges in its multiple design competitions.127 Though Eisenman’s field of concrete stele has 
been generally well-received by the public and by the architectural community, it still entailed 
the drastic reduction of a complex history into a singular architectural form, and that form still 
potentially generates a whole range of “improper” readings and uses (the city has hired security 
guards to attempt to curb unwanted behavior, which frequently consists of kids playing tag or 
jumping between the rectangular slabs). Ultimately, then, while Stimmann and Hoffmann-
Axthelm can certainly be taken to task for many of the specifics of their views and operations, as 
I have done above, we must also acknowledge the enormity of the task they took on: the 
mediation of history through the semiotics of the built environment. This language of 
architectural signs proved impossible to control. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Tilted Arc Controversy Dangerous Precedent? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001); and Paul Goldberger, Up 
from Zero  : Politics, Architecture, and the Rebuilding of New York, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Random House, 2004). For a 
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127 See James Edward Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and 
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Critical Reconstruction in the Post-Modern Age 
  
This project began in 2004 when, while studying abroad in Berlin, I became interested in 
what exactly Critical Reconstruction was and how it was being used to reconstruct the city’s 
tortured landscape. But the further I delved into the literature, the more confusing it all became. 
How could Kleihues, who had designed the glass-fronted Triangel building on Friedrichstrasse, 
have authored a theory that only allowed for stone façades? And if he saw Critical 
Reconstruction as the marriage of Modernist rationalism and personal poetry, how did that 
conception relate to Stimmann’s claims about representing Berlin’s history? Why was Stimmann 
in charge of city planning, and not Kleihues? Why were only a small number of architects 
seemingly designing all the new buildings? Why did those buildings look so anonymous and, for 
lack of a better word, boring? And why was everyone debating with each other so vehemently 
over what amounted to malls and empty office space? 
As a colleague of mine observed, Critical Reconstruction is confusing because “it means 
so many different things to so many different people.” Indeed, it is baffling precisely because it 
is not simply one city planning approach, but a constantly shifting discursive formation that 
includes the many statements, debates, designs, scandals, documents, images, data, and stories 
exchanged among planners, architects, the media, and the public. As such, though it was actually 
only one of the approaches being applied in the city center (Stimmann only ever ran one of the 
city’s two planning departments, and the federal government also controlled much of the land in 
Mitte), it became the most visible way in which architectural theory and discourse, in addition to 
buildings themselves, publicly intersected with questions of memory and identity in Berlin. 
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Critical Reconstruction’s numerous problems and failures, as I have shown in the previous five 
chapters, thus point most clearly to the difficulties inherent in using architectural form to mold a 
society or to make specific statements about its identity. 
 
Post-Modernism and the Global Turn 
Berlin as a Global City  
Throughout the Cold War era, West Germany had been at pains to represent itself 
politically and culturally as integrated with the larger trans-Atlantic “West.” This goal affected 
the structure of its governing institutions, its cultural affiliations (the adoption of the 
International architectural style, for instance, as discussed in Chapter 1), and the formation of a 
self-critical historical narrative with regard to the crimes of the Nazis. More than four decades 
after the war, in the 1990s, the new, reunited Germany still struggled with these questions, but 
now it did so in very different global context. No longer a bulwark against the threat of 
Communism, Germany (and Berlin in particular) now needed to assert its prowess as both an 
independent economic power and as part of the emerging coalition of the European Union. 
International attention was focused tightly on the country’s new epicenter, the formerly divided 
capital, as representative of how Germany would operate amidst this new global order. 
However, as historian Janet Ward has so astutely observed, whereas cities may once have 
stood in for nations, globalization has also made it so that any actual given city may no longer 
hold the national significance that it once did: “Hence the reclamation of Berlin’s capital status 
and the re-branding of Berlin’s image on the urban, regional, and international levels have been 
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(at times uneasy) partners since reunification.”1 The designation of Berlin as capital, in other 
words, was not enough to make it a global metropolis or even a national or regional hub; it still 
had to compete for investment and for residents on the global market. “The process of re-
capitalizing a city for its national audience nowadays,” Ward contends, “involves at least a 
staging of the globalizing turn in order to catch up with other leading capitals and global cities.”2 
But to look “global,” as discussed in Chapter 3, cities ironically have to also find an appealing 
and unique “local” identity. Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction sought to resolve this local-
global tension in its call for the reproduction of certain formal qualities of “traditional” Berlin 
architecture married with typologies and zoning meant to attract international investors – large-
scale malls, office complexes, and small numbers of high-end apartments. Though Hoffmann-
Axthelm and even Stimmann himself gave lip service to the idea of the “small parcel,” or 
middle-class property ownership, this model proved impossible given the state of Berlin’s real 
estate market and the realities of global commerce. The goal was to put Berlin back on the map 
as the seat not only of the government, as Bonn had been, but as an economic and cultural hub, 
as it had been in the 1920s, and this ambition meant a necessary partnership with big business. 
Monumentality and the Modernist Project 
By the end of the 1980s, post-modernism in the narrow sense – formal play, pastiche, pop 
– was losing momentum, and was being surpassed by other approaches to design, especially 
Deconstructivist architecture, which received special attention in the MoMA show of the same 
name in 1988.3 Cultural critic Andreas Huyssen sees this shift as coinciding with a theoretical 
                                                
1 Janet Ward, Post-Wall Berlin: Borders, Space and Identity (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 279. 
2 Ibid., 280. 
3 Harry Francis Mallgrave and David Goodman, An Introduction to Architectural Theory: 1968 to the Present (Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 154. 
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turn from the idea of the “city as text” to the treatment of the “city as spectacle”: from a largely 
academic or intellectual conversation to one driven by raw capitalist interests and mass tourism.4 
Indeed, the 1990s saw the rise of the “starchitect” as a key way that the public understood and 
interacted with architecture as a profession, with signature buildings such as Frank Gehry’s 
Guggenheim Bilbao or, later, OMA’s Seattle Public Library drawing unprecedented media 
attention and becoming tourist attractions in their own right. Libeskind’s Jewish Museum in 
Berlin, designed in 1989, is in fact one of the first examples of such a building in the post-Cold 
War era. Such a preference for spectacularity is of course not uniquely post- (or post-post-) 
modern. The seminal post-war Modernist document “Nine Points on Monumentality,” published 
in 1943 by architectural historian Sigfried Giedion, architect José Luis Sert, and painter Fernand 
Léger, also encouraged the use of new materials, of light and color, and of the synthesis of the 
arts, to create freestanding monuments that would embody communities’ values, shared 
narratives, and aspirations. Perhaps one reason that the “starchitectural” monuments of the 1990s 
have been the subject of critique – by the Critical Reconstructionists as well as others – is that 
those shared values now seem to have to do mostly with the flows and importance of global 
capital, rather than with more traditional local or national ideals.  
As discussed throughout this dissertation, Stimmann implemented Critical 
Reconstruction explicitly to counteract the growing tendency toward spectacularity in 
commercial architecture. However, another look back at the “Nine Points” reveals close ties 
between the Critical Reconstructionist project and the concept of monumentality as formulated 
by Giedion, Sert, and Léger: 
Monuments are human landmarks which men have created as symbols for their 
                                                
4 Andreas Huyssen, “The Voids of Berlin,” Critical Inquiry 24, no. 1 (Autumn 1997): 58. 
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ideals, for their aims, and for their actions. They are intended to outlive the period 
which originated them, and constitute a heritage for future generations. … They 
have to satisfy the eternal demand of the people for translation of their collective 
force into symbols. … A new step lies ahead. Postwar changes in the whole 
economic structure of nations may bring with them the organization of 
community life in the city which has been practically neglected up to date. The 
people want the buildings that represent their social and community life to give 
more than functional fulfillment. They want their aspiration for monumentality, 
JOY, pride, and excitement to be satisfied. … [But] those who govern and 
administer the countries … are not able to recognize the creative forces of our 
period, which alone could build the monuments or public buildings that should be 
integrated into new urban centers which can form a true expression for our 
epoch.5 
 
This “true expression” of Berlin’s new identity in built form was exactly that to which Stimmann 
and others – especially architects like Kollhoff – aspired. Monumentality, then, clearly played an 
important role in Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction, but the changing role of monumentality 
itself amidst the global architectural scene – as mainly an expression of corporate, rather than 
community, interests – created a difficult point of tension for him.  
An additional theoretical aspect links Critical Reconstruction with the likes of Giedion. 
Both Stimmann’s and Kleihues’s versions of Critical Reconstruction were very “Modernist” in 
their totalizing tendencies and, in the case of Stimmann’s, in its social aims. As became clear in 
the Architecture Debates, whether or not they could prove beyond a doubt that Critical 
Reconstruction only tied back to pre-war Modernism, its authors saw themselves as seriously 
invested in the same ideals as figures like Giedion and Le Corbusier had been: top-down 
planning, an insistence on rationality, and ambitious, universalizing theories, all of which were 
intended to support the growth of an ideal society. Critical Reconstruction as a case study 
obviously points to the absurdity of such a utopian project. More importantly, though, Critical 
                                                
5 Sigfried Giedion, Fernand Léger, and José Luis Sert, “Nine Points on Monumentality,” in Architecture Culture, 1943-




Reconstruction’s status as in many ways “Modernist” reveals that at least some strands of post-
modernism were really a continuation, rather than a rejection, of Modernism itself. 
In 1979, the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard described post-modernity as a state in 
which the “metanarratives” or “grand narratives,” which had previously been used to legitimate 
things like scientific research in the service of Enlightenment progress, would be thrown into 
question, critiqued, and deconstructed.6 Certainly many facets of post-modern architectural 
theory (such as those put forward, for instance, by Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown, or by 
Peter Eisenman) took this reasoning to heart, focusing instead on formal or semiotic elements of 
architecture, on pastiche, or on the treatment of forms as a “language” to be manipulated, played 
with, or questioned. But there were still quite a few thinkers, including Kleihues, who, despite 
their acknowledgement that CIAM Modernism must be superseded, still retained an implicit 
faith in architecture as a larger societal project. Thus, the failure of Critical Reconstruction in 
Berlin allows us to see both the futile utopianism of Kleihues’s and Stimmann’s approaches and 
the ways in which post-modernism was not necessarily a reaction against Modernism so much as 
an extension of it. Indeed, even today, architecture and planning in themselves may never escape 
the Modernist conundrum: they will always strive to both serve and to represent the functions 
and users that they are built to house, and they may always fall short of this lofty goal. 
 
Critical Reconstruction as a Discourse 
Words, Images, and Buildings 
In his well-known essay “The Voids of Berlin,” Huyssen argues that in the Berlin 
Architecture Debates, the perceived “dichotomy of stone age versus cyber age is misleading: the 
                                                
6 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoffrey Bennington 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiii–xxiv. 
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fight is over image and image alone on both sides of the issue. The new nationally coded 
simplicity” – by which he means the New Simplicity or Critical Reconstruction – “is just as 
image-driven” as the spectacular “ecstasies” of architects like Libeskind.7 In other words, 
Huyssen claims, what mattered in the reconstruction of Berlin were not the actual forms of new 
buildings, but what those buildings connoted, both for other architects and for the public. For 
him, because global capital was the driving force behind these new constructions, they were 
ultimately only empty symbols of financial power and mass consumption, whether they were 
made from stone or glass. However, as discussed throughout this dissertation, Stimmann and his 
colleagues were still called upon to justify this commercial architecture with regard to reunited 
Germany’s national identity. Berlin in the 1990s, then, was a space where architecture’s ability 
to signify was being stretched to its limit. Stimmann needed the new cityscape to be at once 
“monumental” in the “Nine Points” sense, appropriate for a global city, and to signify the 
country’s own self-reflexivity about its violent and divided past. Perhaps the real problem was 
not that the built results of Critical Reconstruction were empty “images,” as Huyssen asserted, 
but that what they sought to represent was simply too complex, too nuanced, and too 
contradictory for architecture itself to embody. 
And so the planners and architects involved in Berlin’s rebuilding relied on discursive as 
well as physical constructions to “rebuild” the city. Since classical times, architects have sought 
to create, explain, or critique the built environment using the conceptual tool of language; 
indeed, amidst multiple recessions, language – in the form of theory – has become one of the 
main ways that post-modern architects have contributed to the world of design. Throughout the 
Architecture Debates, architects and critics attempted to shape Berlin’s built future, as well as the 
                                                
7 Huyssen, “The Voids of Berlin,” 68. 
 
 267 
public’s opinion about that future, using these same rhetorical tools. But as I have demonstrated, 
they were not able to do this successfully, sometimes because the arguments themselves were 
unsound, and at other times because their words begin to mean something else when read 
alongside the actual designs. Words and buildings cannot and do not always operate in the same 
manner, but they do intersect in influential and sometimes unexpected ways. Architectural forms 
can be recast by discourse and can function in the service of divergent or even diametrically 
opposed arguments. One example of this divergence, as I have shown, is the repeated 
mobilization of pre-war Modernist design to justify authors’ theoretical positions during the 
Architecture Debates.8 The various buildings I have discussed also demonstrate how architecture 
can work to contradict or undermine the words of the architects. Viewers may continue to see the 
Reichsbank, for instance, as a “Nazi” building even if Kollhoff wants them to contextualize this 
history through his redesign of the space. Another kind of contradiction appears in the many 
buildings by Kleihues himself, which continually resist the rigid strictures of Stimmann’s 
Critical Reconstruction, and which I found so confusing as I began my research. 
One could argue that this disconnect between buildings and ideas has to do with the fact 
that architecture has its own history and professional knowledge base that makes it – perhaps 
necessarily – inaccessible to the uninitiated. And if one of post-modern architecture’s stated 
goals was to communicate to that same, uninitiated, public audience, then the application of 
Critical Reconstruction in Berlin reveals the ultimate futility of this aim. For, as I have shown, 
even architecture that explicitly attempts to supply its users with a preponderance of historical 
meaning often must be “explained” using text. Perhaps the most telling example can be found, 
                                                
8 Florian Hertweck, Der Berliner Architekturstreit: Architektur, Stadtbau, Geschichte und Identität in der Berliner 
Republik 1989-1999 (Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 2010), 17. 
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ironically, in what became cast as the most explicitly non-Critical Reconstruction building9: 
Libeskind’s Jewish Museum, where large printed placards direct users as to how they should 
experience the symbolically-laden architecture. Given a situation in which all architecture is 
willingly “read” by the public, but where this activity often results in misreadings, anything that 
smacks of the “wrong” side of history in Berlin has been ultimately condemned as too 
conservative – and the subtle arguments of the architects and planners responsible are not enough 
to counteract this impression. 
German Identity in the Global Spotlight 
In terms of its economic aspirations, Berlin was no different from many other cities in the 
West where the post-modern rediscovery of historic urban centers was driving up prices and 
spurring rampant, high-end construction in formerly blighted downtowns (San Francisco and 
New York are two other prominent examples). However, planners in the United States or 
elsewhere in the EU did not have to deal with the difficult burden of correctly representing 
German history on top of the already challenging task of guiding such development. As 
discussed throughout this dissertation, ideas of German collective memory and national or 
cultural identity were points of intense discussion and debate even before the Wall fell. This was 
most clearly illustrated by the Historikerstreit in the 1980s, where conservative thinkers and 
politicians argued for the “normalization” of Nazi history – its relativization with regard to other 
crimes, such as those of Stalin, and for, if not an acquittal, then at least a release of current 
German citizens from the responsibility of dealing with the crimes of the Nazis from the 
perspective of the “perpetrators.” This wish for closure was summed up in the idea of a 
Schlussstrich: a “closing line” drawn under that chapter of German history. The fall of the Wall 
                                                
9 We must remember, though, that it was first approved as part of Kleihues’s IBA in the 1980s. 
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only served to reinvigorate these debates as the country strived to culturally and economically 
integrate an East German population that had been brought up with a very different World War II 
narrative, one that painted them as the victims of Nazi violence, rather than the criminals. Neo-
Nazism was on the rise in many former Eastern states, and the large population of Turkish 
immigrants who had moved to Germany after the war added even more complexity to 
discussions about what it meant to be “German.” And even today, more than twenty-five years 
after the Wende, issues of how to remember and talk about the Holocaust and how to integrate 
immigrants are regularly discussed and debated in the German media.10 
But what does a Schlussstrich look like in the built environment? Does it look like the 
revival and reconstruction of forms associated with the Nazis? What about those of the GDR – 
are East German buildings “totalitarian,” kitschy, or both? Even if buildings did harbor violent 
memories or messages, are people today even able to recognize those forms as such? And can 
forms themselves be held responsible for the crimes of the regimes that appropriated them? The 
answer depends on how those buildings are discursively situated and collectively remembered, 
and the destruction or preservation of particular buildings has the potential to send strong 
messages to certain groups of people. The fact that the discourse around architecture and 
urbanism is in many ways image-based, then, does not mean that buildings themselves don’t 
have real effects. Architecture, in fact, does matter profoundly. It may not be able to completely 
recreate a society or reprogram a population. But it is certainly, as Rossi argued in The 
                                                
10 In 2015, on the seventieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, for instance, the ARD network (a public 
broadcasting network similar to NPR in the U.S. or the BBC in the U.K.) published a video commentary by television journalist 
Anja Reschke on its official Facebook page. In it, she admonished people who might say things like “Auschwitz, Holocaust. I 
can’t take it anymore. It has to end sometime.” ("Auschwitz, Holocaust. Ich kann's nicht mehr hören. Es muss doch mal Schluss 
sein.") Describing her recent viewing of footage from the liberation of Auschwitz, Reschke argued, “There is no closing line in 
history!” (“Es gibt keinen Schlussstrich in der Geschichte!”) As of February 2016, the video has over six million views, 5,400 





Architecture of the City, something to which people can and do attach meaning, through which 
they form bonds, and about which they can feel a sense of community and belonging.  
Like it or not, Critical Reconstruction’s “conservative” architecture is now Berlin’s physical 
inheritance. Thus, in a similar manner to the Historikerstreit, in which the argument petered out 
but the result was a kind of de facto “normalization” of Nazi history, the debates about new 
architecture in the center of reunited Berlin never reached a formal conclusion. Their presence, 
though, has achieved a kind of “smoothing out” of that history anyway; they are now simply a 
part of Berliners’ everyday lives. Two decades after the fall of the Wall, Berlin’s new city 
planning officials are focused mainly on issues like economic inequality, jobs, and 
environmental sustainability, rather than the stylistic architectural identity of the city. But a few 
traces of the intense conflicts of the 1990s remain: in the center of Mitte, the much-debated 
reconstruction of the Stadtschloss is just now beginning to take shape. And just a little further to 
the East, along the Spree River, corporate partnerships and the role of large-scale capitalist 
development continue to be points of intense conflict and community activism. Berlin, in reality, 
will continue to, and indeed already has, “become” something different after Kleihues and 











Figure 1.2 Karl Friedrich Schinkel, Altes Museum, Berlin, 1825-1830. Source: Wikimedia 
Commons, photograph by Jean-Pierre Dalbéra, 2011. 
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Figure 1.3 Karl Friedrich Schinkel, Berlin Lustgarten and Altes Museum, perspective, 1823. 










Figure 1.5 Berlin Mietskaserne in Kreuzberg. Photograph by author, 2005. 
 
 












Figure 1.9 Max Taut, Verbandshaus des Deutschen Verkehrsbundes, Berlin, 1927-32. Source: 
Wikimedia Commons, photographed 2009. 
 
 
Figure 1.10 Max Taut and Franz Hoffmann, Warenhaus der Konsumgenossenschaft (now Max-























Figure 1.15 Rob Krier, Luxembourg Block rendering, 1978. Source: Robert L. Delevoy, ed., 
Architecture rationelle: La reconstruction de la ville européenne (Bruxelles: Archives 








Figure 1.17 Josef Paul Kleihues and Hans Moldenschart, plan for Ruhwald, 1967. Source: Josef 
Paul Kleihues: Works 1966-1980, ed. Thorsten Scheer, trans. Geoffrey Steinherz, vol. 1 
(Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2008), 8. 
 
 
Figure 1.18 Josef Paul Kleihues, Plan for Perlach area of Munich, 1969. Source: Kahlfedt, Paul, 
Lepik, Andres, and Schätzke, Andreas, eds., Josef Paul Kleihues: Stadt, Bau, Kunst (Berlin: 




Figure 1.19 Josef Paul Kleihues, Berlin Department of Sanitation, 1969. Source: Kahlfedt, Paul, 
Lepik, Andres, and Schätzke, Andreas, eds., Josef Paul Kleihues: Stadt, Bau, Kunst (Berlin: 
Nicolai, 2003), 14. 
 
 




Figure 1.21 Josef Paul Kleihues, Vinetaplatz, Berlin, 1971-77, perspective view. Source:  Josef 




Figure 1.22 Josef Paul Kleihues, Vinetaplatz, Berlin, 1971-77, plan. Source: Josef Paul Kleihues, 




Figure 1.23 Josef Paul Kleihues, Vinetaplatz, Berlin, 1971-77, exterior. Source: Kleihues.com. 
 
 




Figure 1.25 Josef Paul Kleihues, “The Kleihues Plan,” 1984, originally shown in the IBA-
sponsored exhibition Idee, Prozess, Ergebnis. Source: 750 Jahre Architektur und Städtebau in 








Figure 1.27 Aldo Rossi, Kochstrasse 1-5 (IBA Block 10), Berlin, 1981-88. Source: 




Figure 1.28 Aldo Rossi, Kochstrasse 1-5 (IBA Block 10), 1981-88, courtyard view. Source: 
Kleihues, Josef Paul, ed., Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin 1984/87, die Neubaugebiete: 
Dokumente, Projekte (Stuttgart: G. Hatje, 1993), 84. 
 
 
Figure 1.29 Rem Koolhaas and OMA, Haus am Checkpoint Charlie, 1981-89. Source: 
Wikimedia Commons, photographed 2008. 
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Figure 1.31 Zaha Hadid, IBA Block B, Stresemannstrasse, Berlin, 1987-1994. Source: Flickr, 








Figure 2.2 Potsdamer Platz during the time of the Berlin Wall. Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio 
Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt: 
DAM, 1997), 62. 
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Figure 2.3 Observation deck in West Berlin with a view of Potsdamer Platz on the other side of 
the Berlin Wall, 1977. Source: Wikipedia. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Daniel Libeskind, design for Berlin Morgen competition, 1991, model. Source: 
Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., Berlin morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt 
(Stuttgart: G.Hatje, 1991), 138. 
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Figure 2.5 Giorgio Grassi, design for Berlin Morgen competition, 1991, elevations. Source: 
Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., Berlin morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt 
(Stuttgart: G.Hatje, 1991), 106-107. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Hans Kollhoff, design for Berlin Morgen competition, 1991, perspective view. 
Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., Berlin morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt 





Figure 2.7 Hans Kollhoff, design for Berlin Morgen competition, 1991, perspective view. 
Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., Berlin morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt 
(Stuttgart: G.Hatje, 1991), 135. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Hilmer and Sattler, 1991 Potsdamer Platz competition entry, perspective view. 
Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning 




Figure 2.9 Hilmer and Sattler, 1991 Potsdamer Platz competition entry, plan. Source: 
Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning 
Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt: DAM, 1997), 71. 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Hilmer and Sattler, “Hof” typologies in 1991 Potsdamer Platz competition entry, 
plan. Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: 





Figure 2.11 Richard Rogers, 1991 Potsdamer Platz competition entry, exhibition model. Source: 
Rogers, Richard, “Potsdamer Platz,” Arch+ 109 (December 1991), 96. 
 
 
Figure 2.12 Richard Rogers, 1991 Potsdamer Platz competition entry, exhibition model. Source: 




Figure 2.13 Renzo Piano, 1992 competition entry for Daimler Benz site, plan. Source: 
Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning 
Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt: DAM, 1997), 89. 
 
 
Figure 2.14 Renzo Piano, 1992 competition entry for Daimler Benz site, exhibition model. 
Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning 




Figure 2.15 Potsdamer Platz Arkaden, aerial view. Source: Bodenschatz, Harald, and Altrock, 




Figure 2.16 Helmut Jahn, Sony Center, perspective rendering. Source: Bodenschatz, Harald, and 
Altrock, Uwe, Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in London und Berlin (Berlin: 
Verlagshaus Braun, 2005), 213. 
 
 





Figure 2.18 Günter Stahn, rendering of a design for the reconstruction of central Friedrichstrasse 
with the Friedrichstadt Passagen, 1980s, never realized (the design included the reconstruction of 
Andreas Schlüter’s Baroque-era Villa Kamecke, which earlier stood on a different site). Source: 
Harald Bodenschatz and Uwe Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in London und 




Figure 2.19 Oswald Mathias Ungers, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 205, Berlin, 1991-1996, 
elevation, section, and plan. Source: Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen 
Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 120-123. 
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Figure 2.20 Oswald Mathias Ungers, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 205, Berlin, 1991-1996, 
exterior. Photograph by author, 2006. 
 
 
Figure 2.21 Pei Cobb Freed, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 206, Berlin, 1991-1996, exterior. 




Figure 2.22 Pei Cobb Freed, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 206, Berlin, 1991-1996, interior of 
atrium (escalator is to the right, out of the frame). Photograph by author, 2006. 
 
 
Figure 2.23 Jean Nouvel, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 206, Berlin, 1991-1996, exterior with 
ticker-tape style light displays. Source: Dieter Bartetzko, “Friedrichstadtpassagen, Berlin: 1991-




Figure 2.24 Jean Nouvel, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 206, Berlin, 1991-1996, exterior. 
Photograph by author, 2006. 
 
 
Figure 2.25 Jean Nouvel, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 206, Berlin, 1991-1996, interior. 




Figure 2.26 Jean Nouvel, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 206, Berlin, 1991-1996, section and 
plan. Source: Peter Rumpf, “Die Friedrichstadtpassagen in Berlin Mitte,” Bauwelt 82, no. 18 
(May 1991): 976. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Günter Behnisch and Partners, Akademie der Künste, Berlin, designed 1993, built 





Figure 3.2 Günter Behnisch and Partners, Akademie der Künste, Berlin, designed 1993, plan and 
section. Source: Matthias Pabsch, Pariser Platz, Architektur und Technik: vom manuellen zum 





Figure 3.3 Josef Paul Kleihues, Triangel building, Berlin, 1994-97. Source: Kleihues.com. 
 
 




Figure 3.5 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kant Triangle building, 1992-95. Source: Kleihues.com. 
 
 





Figure 3.7 Josef Paul Kleihues, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt, site plan concept. Source: 
Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann 
(Berlin: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 35. 
 
 





Figure 3.9 Josef Paul Kleihues, Four Seasons Hotel, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt complex, 
1992-96, perspective rendering. Source: Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer 
urbanen Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 38. 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Josef Paul Kleihues, Four Seasons Hotel, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt complex, 




Figure 3.11 Josef Paul Kleihues, Atelier building, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt complex, 
1992-96. Photograph by author, 2006. 
 
 
Figure 3.12 Max Dudler, residential building, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt complex, 1992-
96, section. Source: Source: Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen 




Figure 3.13 Max Dudler, residential building, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt complex, 1992-
96, façade. Photograph by author, 2006. 
 
 
Figure 3.14 Hans Kollhoff, residential and office buildings, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt 
complex, 1992-96, model. Source: Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen 




Figure 3.15 Hans Kollhoff, residential and office buildings, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt 
complex, 1992-96. Photograph by author, 2006. 
 
 
Figure 3.16 Jürgen Sawade, residential and office building, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt 




Figure 3.17 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kontorhaus Mitte, 1994-97, isometric view. Source: Annegret 
Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin: 
Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 32. 
 
 
Figure 3.18 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kontorhaus Mitte, 1994-97, perspective rendering. Source: 
Martina Düttmann, “Die Neue Friedrichstrasse,” Bauwelt 84, no. 21 (May 1993): 1115.  
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Figure 3.19 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kontorhaus Mitte, 1994-97, plan. Source: Martina Düttmann, 
“Die Neue Friedrichstrasse,” Bauwelt 84, no. 21 (May 1993): 1114. 
 
 















Figure 3.23 Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani and Marlene Dörrie, Kontorhaus Mitte, residential 













Figure 3.26 Aldo Rossi, Quartier Schützenstrasse, 1994-98, elevation, sketch. Source: From the 
Ground Up, https://arc90274.wordpress.com/2013/12/26/aldo-rossi/. 
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Figure 3.28 Aldo Rossi, Quartier Schützenstrasse, 1994-98, detail of cornices. Source: 








Figure 4.2 Hans Kollhoff, residential buildings, Luisenplatz, Berlin, 1982-87, perspective 




Figure 4.3 Hans Kollhoff, residential buildings, Luisenplatz, Berlin, 1982-87, perspective 
rendering. Source: Kollhoff.de. 
 
 













Figure 4.7 Hans Kollhoff, KNSM development, 1989-1995. Source: Kollhoff.de. 
 
 










Figure 4.10 Hans Kollhoff, Potsdamer Platz master plan competition entry, 1991, plan. Source: 
Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning 




Figure 4.11 Hans Kollhoff, Potsdamer Platz master plan competition entry, 1991, model. Source: 
Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning 
Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt: DAM, 1997), 83. 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Hans Kollhoff, Potsdamer Platz master plan competition entry, 1991, overall 
perspective view with Leipziger Platz in the foreground. Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio 
Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt: 




Figure 4.13 Hans Kollhoff, Daimler Benz tower, completed 2000, site plan. Source: Kollhoff.de. 
 
 









Figure 4.16 Hans Kollhoff and Arthur Ovaska, Wohnpark am Berlin Museum, aerial view. 




Figure 4.17 Martin Wagner, traffic plan for Alexanderplatz, 1929 (never realized). Source: 




Figure 4.18 Martin Wagner and Felix Unglaube, traffic plan for Alexanderplatz, perspective 
sketch, 1929 (never realized). Source: Kleihues + Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof Berlin-




Figure 4.19 Alexanderplatz ca. 1935. Source: Kleihues + Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof Berlin-
Alexanderplatz: Josef Paul Kleihues (Berlin: Jovis, 2007), 17. 
 
 






Figure 4.21 Warenhaus Tietz, interior after 1911 renovations. Source: Peter Stürzebecher, Das 









Figure 4.23 Hans Kollhoff and Helga Timmermann, master plan for Alexanderplatz, 1994, 
perspective rendering, day. Source: Kristin Feireiss, ed., Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher 




Figure 4.24 Hans Kollhoff and Helga Timmermann, master plan for Alexanderplatz, 1994, 
perspective rendering, night. Source: Kristin Feireiss, ed., Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher 




Figure 4.25 Hans Kollhoff and Helga Timmermann, master plan for Alexanderplatz, 1994, 
showing planned green space. Source: Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de. 
 
 
Figure 4.26 Hans Kollhoff and Helga Timmermann, master plan for Alexanderplatz, 1994, use 
concept. Source: Kristin Feireiss, ed., Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, trans. 




Figure 4.27 Daniel Libeskind, Alexanderplatz master plan competition entry, 1994, plan. Source: 
Kristin Feireiss, ed., Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, trans. Michael Robinson 





Figure 4.28 Daniel Libeskind, Alexanderplatz master plan competition entry, 1994, plan for area. 
Source: Kristin Feireiss, ed., Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, trans. Michael 








Figure 4.30 Daniel Libeskind, Alexanderplatz master plan competition entry, 1994, model 
showing Pravda building replica (left, abutting Kaufhof store). Source: Kristin Feireiss, ed., 
Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, trans. Michael Robinson and Hans H. Harbort 




Figure 4.31 Heinrich Wolff, Reichsbank building, 1934-40, west elevation. Source: Wikimedia 
Commons, photographed 2009.  
 
 
Figure 4.32 Heinrich Wolff, Reichsbank building, 1934-40, original entrance (now the courtyard 




Figure 4.33 Hans Kollhoff, Foreign Ministry (former Reichsbank) renovation, 1994-99, original 
woodwork. Source: Auswaertiges-amt.de. 
 
 
Figure 4.34 Hans Kollhoff, Foreign Ministry (former Reichsbank) renovation, 1994-99, SED 





Figure 4.35 Hans Kollhoff, Foreign Ministry (former Reichsbank) renovation, 1994-99, 
monochrome wall by artist Gerhard Merz. Source: Auswaertiges-amt.de. 
 
 
Figure 4.36 Hans Kollhoff, Foreign Ministry (former Reichsbank) renovation, 1994-99, 




Figure 4.37 Thomas Müller and Ivan Reimann, Foreign Ministry (former Reichsbank) 
renovation, 1995-99, elevation renderings. Source: Auswaertiges-amt.de. 
 
 
Figure 4.38 Thomas Müller and Ivan Reimann, Foreign Ministry (former Reichsbank) 




Figure 4.39 People observing the Brandenburg Gate from the East Berlin side, 1984. Source: 




Figure 4.40 The Brandenburg Gate behind the Berlin Wall, shortly before its fall in November, 
















Figure 4.43 Pariser Platz, aerial view, 1962. Source: Bernhard Strecker and Dieter Hoffmann-
Axthelm, “Pariser Platz: Kritische Rekonstruktion Des Bereichs” (Senatsverwaltung für Bau- 
und Wohnungswesen, September 1991), 11. 
 
 
Figure 4.44 Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm and Bernhard Strecker, plan for Pariser Platz plan as part 
of their 1991 report. Source: Bernhard Strecker and Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Pariser Platz: 
Kritische Rekonstruktion Des Bereichs” (Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und Wohnungswesen, 






Figure 5.1 The Berlin Stadtschloss after World War II. Source: Bildarchiv Preussischer 
Kulturbesitz, posted on Spiegel.de. 
 
 




Figure 5.3 East Berlin government master plan for Alexanderplatz renovation, 1969. Source: 
Kleihues + Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof Berlin-Alexanderplatz: Josef Paul Kleihues (Berlin: Jovis, 
2007), 20.  
 
 





Figure 5.5 Josef Kaiser et al., Centrum department store, 1967-70. Source: Wikimedia 
Commons, courtesy German Federal Archives, photograph by Hubert Link, 1971. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, model. Source: “Warenhaus,” 




Figure 5.7 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, section. Source: “Warenhaus 
‘Centrum’ in Berlin,” Deutsche Architektur (20.8, August 1971), 468. 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, interior (photo 1971). Source: 




Figure 5.9 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, plan of one of the sales floors. 




Figure 5.10 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, interior (photo 1971). Source: 




Figure 5.11 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, interior (photo 1971). Source: 




Figure 5.12 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, interior (photo 1971). Source: 




Figure 5.13 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, interior (photo 1971). Source: 




Figure 5.14 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, exterior (photo 1971). 





Figure 5.15 West German Horten department store in Nürnberg. This store, originally part of the 
Schocken chain, was also bought by the Kaufhof corporation in the 1990s and was closed in 
2011. Source: Suedstadtherz.de. 
 
 
Figure 5.16 Alexanderplatz in 1977, aerial view showing the Centrum store (right) and the 













Figure 5.19 Josef Paul Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof renovation, 2004-6, with one of the Behrens 
buildings. Source: Kleihues + Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof Berlin-Alexanderplatz: Josef Paul 
Kleihues (Berlin: Jovis, 2007), 37. 
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Figure 5.20 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kaufhof Alexanderplatz renovation, 2004, elevation and 
section. Source: Kleihues + Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof Berlin-Alexanderplatz: Josef Paul 




Figure 5.21 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kaufhof Alexanderplatz renovation, 2004-6, interior. Source: 





Figure 5.22 Hermann Henselmann, Haus des Lehrers, 1962-64. Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
 
 




Figure 5.24 Planwerk Innenstadt: Leitbild. Source: Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de. 
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